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Semiospherical understanding: Textuality 
Peeter Tor op 
Dept. of Semiotics, University of Tartu 
Tiigi St. 78, 50410 Tartu, Estonia 
e-mail: torop@ut.ee 
Abstract. The semiospherical approach to semiotics and especially to 
semiotics of culture entails the need of juxtaposing several terminological 
fields. Among the most important, the fields of textuality, chronotopicality, 
and multimodality or multimediality should be listed. Textuality in this paper 
denotes a general principle with the help of which it is possible to observe and 
to interpret different aspects of the workings of culture. Textuality combines 
in itself text as a well-defined artefact and textualization as an abstraction 
(presentation or definition as text). In culture, we can pose in principle the 
same questions both to a concrete and to an abstract text, although an abstract 
text is only an operational means for defining, with the help of textualization, 
a certain phenomenon in the interests of a holistic and systemic analysis. The 
practice of textualization in turn helps us to understand the necessity of 
distinguishing between articulation emerging from the textual material itself 
and articulation ensuing from textuality or textualization — the former 
provides for comparability between texts made from the same material, the 
latter makes comparable all textualized phenomena irrespective of their 
material. Textuality is a possibility that culture offers to its analyser, and at the 
same time it is an ontological property of culture and an epistemological 
principle for investigating culture. 
The relevance of semiotics is increasing both in science and in culture. 
On the one hand, semiotics offers methodological support to the 
sciences the development of which has been bound up with inter­
disciplinary dialogue with other sciences and which are in need of 
methodological innovation in order to locate their shifted borders. On 
the other hand, culture and nature as the environment of human life 
have also changed, and this, in turn, requires a new understanding of 
how to comprehend and explain this changed environment or, in other 
2 
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words, how to define epistemologically the object of inquiry. Thus, 
the disciplinary structure of sciences has changed, interdisciplinary 
has given rise to new types of scientific dialogue in the form of multi-, 
cross- or transdisciplinarity, but at the same time also objects of 
sciences have changed. Especially in the humanities and in the social 
sciences, due to the (technological) development of media environ­
ment and due to the creolization and hybridisation of languages of 
culture, objects of research have changed so rapidly that semiotics has 
become both a methodological as well as an applicational resource for 
securing sustainable development of these sciences. Traditional 
science and traditional culture have arrived at a stage where frag­
mented understanding of culture, society and nature has reached a 
crisis of holism. Restoration of holistic approach presupposes that the 
methodological principles of applicational analysis of culture, of the 
sciences that investigate culture, and the principles of cultural auto-
communication and identity education are fruitfully combined into a 
unified whole. Compared to other sciences, semiotics has great advan­
tages in creating such symbiosis. 
One of the founders of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics, 
Vyatcheslav Vs. Ivanov, has concluded his study "The outlines of the 
prehistory and history of semiotics" with an epilogue where he 
emphasizes both the scientific as well as the social value of semiotics 
and defines the main task of semiotics: "The task of semiotics is to 
describe the semiosphere without which the noosphere is in­
conceivable. Semiotics has to help us in orienting in history. The joint 
effort of all those who have been active in this science or the whole 
cycle of sciences must contribute to the ultimate future establishment 
of semiotics" (Ivanov 1998: 792). 
The semiospherical approach to semiotics and especially to semio­
tics of culture entails the need of juxtaposing several terminological 
fields. Among the most important, the fields of textuality, chronotopi-
cality, and multimodality or multimediality should be listed. 
The field of textuality is related to the development of semiotics of 
culture, especially in view of the works of J. Lotman; the field of 
с h ronotopicality originated in the works of Mikhail Bakhtin. and the 
field of multimodality (multimediality) is connected at its roots with 
the works of Roman Jakobson. It is the interweaving of these three 
terminological and conceptual fields that has brought about both 
methodological and metalinguistic interference, as a result of which 
we now have to speak about creolization and hybridization of 
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metalanguage. But the same processes take place also inside these 
fields and therefore it would be expedient to investigate the three 
fields first of all individually. The present paper is devoted to the first 
one of these, the field of textuality. 
Textuality 
Textuality in this paper denotes a general principle with the help of 
which it is possible to observe and to interpret different aspects of the 
workings of culture. The concept of textuality is meant to bridge two 
poles between which the main problems of describing and explaining 
cultures are located. One pole is marked by the opposition statics -
dynamics, the other by the opposition part - whole. These two pairs of 
concepts are in fact closely related and their separation into two poles 
is necessary only for observing temporal dynamics. Through the 
concept of textuality, also the productivity of cultural-semiotic way of 
reasoning and the ability of semiotics of culture to function as a 
foundation science for other disciplines studying culture will become 
apparent. 
The concept of textuality merges several questions that are metho­
dologically relevant for all the disciplines investigating culture. First 
of all, there is the question of models that are used to describe culture. 
There does not exist a general science of culture as a separate 
discipline, and therefore a general study of culture must take into 
account the different notions that different disciplines have of this 
universal research object, and to look for correlations between diffe­
rent models of culture. 
Models of culture are methodologically designed and meta-
linguistically formulated by the disciplines that have created them, and 
therefore it is vital that a general treatment of culture identifies the 
autonomy and blending of description languages and takes into 
account the metalinguistic translation process. Besides the characte­
ristics of the description language, deriving from the specificity of a 
particular cultural model, also the existence of prestige languages in 
culture and the tendency of several research areas to translate them­
selves into the prestige language should be taken into account. There­
fore, in some cases there is no direct correspondence between the 
object described, the describing discipline and the description 
language used. This brings us to the issue of relations that a meta-
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language has with the object described and with other metalanguages 
or a prestige language. 
Between culture as a complex research object and culture as a 
functioning system, or, methodologically speaking, between des­
cription languages (metalanguages) of culture and (object language(s) 
of) the process of culture there is a linguistically heterogeneous sphere 
of culture's self-description. In the self-description of culture, meta­
and object levels are not usually easily discernible, as self-description 
is a dynamic autocommunicative process that is difficult to observe 
due to its mutability. An answer to the question of the observability of 
culture's self-description can be sought, through the concept of 
textuality, foremost from the aspect of the relations between commu­
nication and metacommunication. 
Another issue that arises in connection with a dynamic research 
object is the definition of research- or articulation units. Textuality 
combines in itself text as a well-defined artefact and textualization as 
an abstraction (presentation or definition as text). In culture, we can 
pose in principle the same questions both to a concrete and to an 
abstract text, although an abstract text is only an operational means for 
defining, with the help of textualization. a certain phenomenon in the 
interests of a holistic and systemic analysis. The practice of textua­
lization in turn helps us to understand the necessity of distinguishing 
between articulation emerging from the textual material itself and 
articulation ensuing from textuality or textualization — the former 
provides for comparability between texts made from the same mate­
rial, the latter makes comparable all textualized phenomena irrespec­
tive of their material. 
The question of textuality is also a question of understanding the 
ontology of text. Both the ontology of text and the stance toward it 
have gradually altered in relation to many changes in culture. First, 
there can be observed a decrease in logocentrism and increase in the 
role of visual and audiovisual perception, and consequently it has to 
be acknowledged that there has been a shift in the hierarchy of 
perception channels in culture. An early and intensive visual expe­
rience leaves its mark also on traditional spheres of culture and 
therefore, with each successive generation, there is reason to speak 
about changed attitudes with respect to literature, theatre, cinema or 
art, and, accordingly, also about changes in the relationships between 
those areas in culture. Secondly, processes of culture are so intensive 
and so diffuse that perceptual processes have become complementary 
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the consumption of metatexts can precede the consumption of the 
texts themselves, or, in other words, the boundary between the proper­
ties of being primary or secondary is not always visible nor important. 
Another important feature is the perception of a single event in 
communities of different types — in intertextual, interdiscursive or 
intermedial spaces. This, in turn, brings about transformation in 
whole-part relationships: the diffuse existence of a whole causes the 
autonomy of parts, and on the principle of pars pro toto, the whole 
may be represented by very different parts, while the relationship of 
parts with the whole can be implicit, discernible only to an expert. 
Hence, also the expert's mission in culture has changed, since the 
observing of a diffused whole and the uniting of diffused parts into a 
whole are becoming an important activity securing the coherence of 
culture, observing, diagnosing and making prognoses for the 
functioning of culture as a whole. The emergence of new processes in 
culture has created a double identity for texts: on the one hand, every 
text is a result of individual creation, while on the other hand, a text 
exists in culture as a diffuse mental whole and subsists in this form in 
the collective cultural memory. A mental text is an abstract whole the 
structure of which depends on the amount and types of textual 
transformations (including transformations of text's parts) in a given 
culture or, more narrowly, in a given cultural situation. Following 
from the principle of textuality, investigation of a text means juxta­
posing both individual and cultural ontologies, juxtaposing both in 
time and in space. 
Synchrony and diachrony as statics and dynamics 
Polemics with F. de Saussure has influenced the development of ideas 
of several disciplinary trends, including Russian formalism, Prague 
Linguistic Circle and Danish glossematics. F. de Saussure's Cours de 
linguistique générale contrasts synchrony and diachrony, denying at 
the same time the possibility of panchronic analysis of concrete 
linguistic facts. The reason for this lies in the divergent nature of facts 
belonging to the diachronic order and to the synchronic order. It is 
characteristic that F. de Saussure deliberately avoids the term "histo­
rical linguistics" and he prefers, when contrasting the two linguistics, 
to use the term "evolutionary linguistics" to denote the branch 
investigating the succession of linguistic states, and the term "static 
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linguistics" to denote the branch investigating the linguistic states 
themselves. In order to secure greater clarity in this contrast, F. de 
Saussure started calling anything related to statics, "synchrony , and 
anything related to evolution, "diachrony" (Saussure 1977: 114). 
One of the leading figures of Russian Formalism, in many ways 
yet undiscovered J. Tynianov, wrote in his 1924 paper "Literary fact ': 
"Literary fact is heterogeneous, and in this sense literature is an inces­
santly evolutioning order" (Tynianov 1977: 270). A few years later in 
the paper "On literary evolution" (1927) he specifies that the study of 
literary history needs to address also the living contemporary litera­
ture. As Tynianov claims, historical studies of literature were until 
then occupied either with the genesis of literary phenomena or with 
the evolution of literary order (Tynianov 1977: 271). The question of 
literary order or system is for Tynianov inseparable from the question 
of function: 
A literary system is first of all a system of the functions of the literary order 
which are in continual interrelationship with other orders. Systems change in 
their composition, but the differentiation of human activities remains. The 
evolution of literature, as of other cultural system, does not coincide either in 
tempo or in character with the systems with which it is interrelated. This is 
owing to the specificity of the material with which it is concerned. The 
evolution of the structural function occurs rapidly; the evolution of the literary 
function occurs over epochs; and the evolution of the functions of a whole 
literary system in relation to neighbouring systems occurs over centuries. 
(Tynianov 1977: 277) 
In Tynianov's system, we can observe the relatedness of literary order 
to other orders — with the order of everyday life, the order of culture, 
social order. Everyday life is correlated with literary order in its verbal 
aspect, and thus, literature has a verbal function in relation to everyday 
life. An author's attitude towards the elements of his text expresses 
structural function, and the same text as a literary work has literary 
function in its relations to the literary order. The return influence of 
literature on everyday life, again, expresses social function. The study 
of literary evolution presupposes the investigation of connections first 
of all between the closest neighbouring orders or systems, and the 
logical path leads from the structural to the literary function, from the 
literary to the verbal function. This follows from the position that 
"evolution is the change in interrelationships between the elements of 
a system — between functions and formal elements" (Tynianov 1977-
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281; see also Torop 1995-1996). Hence, evolution is understood as 
the alternation of systems (at times, alternation is slow and conti­
nuous; at times, abrupt) where formal elements do not disappear but 
gain new functions. It is necessary to understand that a system is not a 
reciprocal influence of all the elements: some elements have greater 
import (dominant) and deform others, and it is through the dominant 
that a work gains its literary importance (Tynianov 1977: 277). The 
interpretation of the structural function coincides to a large extent with 
the interpretation of the dominant, since the relations between the 
elements of a work can be described in at least two ways. Every 
element of a work can be juxtaposed with other similar elements in 
other works-systems, even in other orders — this is called "syn-
function" by Tynianov. At the same time, each element is related to 
other elements of its own system, which is called "auto-function" by 
Tynianov (1977: 272). Thus, each element has at least two functional 
parameters. 
Better known in the modern reception of Tynianov's works is the 
opposition genesis and tradition, originally presented in his earlier 
article "Tyutchev and Heine" (1922). Genesis of a literary pheno­
menon belongs to the sphere of accidental transferences from a lan­
guage into another language, from a literature into another literature, 
while tradition refers to regularities taking place within one particular 
national literature (Tynianov 1977: 29). Thus, also genesis and tradi­
tion constitute two parameters of one phenomenon, and these two 
parameters need to be juxtaposed in order to get a maximally multi-
faceted picture of reality. The distinction between genesis and tradi­
tion makes it possible, in the case of one and the same text, to speak 
about text of genesis and text of tradition. Text of genesis is an 
implicit system reflecting the subjectivity and the fortuitous nature of 
the creative process, a system that a researcher can reconstruct as 
unique. Text of tradition, on the other hand, expresses explicit be­
longing to a movement, style, grouping or genre, as well as causal or 
typological relations with predecessors or successors. A text 
exhibiting explicit characteristics of classicism or romanticism is 
certainly a text of tradition, but at the same time it does not lose its 
uniqueness, which remains present in the implicit authorial poetics 
and in which text of genesis can be discerned. Whether it is text of 
tradition, text of genesis or their symbiosis — what is searched for in a 
literary text depends on the epoch and on the reader. 
330 Peeter Torop 
The movement of Russian Formalism toward Prague Linguistic 
Circle is marked by a programmatic article "Problems of investigating 
literature and language" (1928), written jointly by J. Tynianov and R. 
Jakobson. This short research program reveals already a direct pole­
mics with F. de Saussure. The authors object to the opposition of 
synchrony and diachrony on the grounds that in reality these two 
cannot be studied in isolation: 
History of a system is in turn a system. Pure synchronism now proves to be an 
illusion: every synchronic system has its past and its future as inseparable 
structural elements of the system [...]. The opposition between synchrony and 
diachrony was an opposition between the concept of system and the concept 
of evolution; thus it loses its importance in principle as soon as we recognize 
that every system necessarily exists as an evolution, whereas, on the other 
hand, evolution is inescapably of a systemic nature. (Tynianov 1977: 282) 
Therefore, what is of foremost importance in this approach is the 
understanding that synchrony incorporates different time periods, that 
each cross-segment of synchrony may be related to most different 
epochs: 
The concept of a synchronic literary system does not coincide with the naively 
envisaged concept of a chronological epoch, since the former embraces not 
only works of art which are close to each other in time but also works which 
are drawn into the orbit of the system from foreign literatures or previous 
epochs. An indifferent cataloguing of coexisting phenomena is not sufficient: 
what is important is their hierarchical significance for the given epoch. 
(Tynianov 1977: 283) 
On the other hand, it is emphasized that the identification of immanent 
regularities of literary history should be inseparably connected with 
the identification of the ways in which literary order and other 
historical orders (systems) relate to each other. Relatedness as a 
system of systems has its own structural laws that need to be 
identified. The authors caution us against isolated study: "It would be 
methodologically fatal to consider the correlation of systems without 
taking into account the immanent laws of each system" (Tynianov 
1977: 283). In the program of J. Tynianov and R. Jakobson, it is 
possible to foresee the modern juxtaposition of text of history and text 
of culture as parameters of a single text. 
In linguistics, the same trend is continued during the 1930— 1940s 
by the Danish glossematician L. Hjelmslev. He starts out with an 
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observation that humanities have neglected their most important 
task — to establish the investigation of social phenomena as a science. 
The description of social phenomena must choose between two 
possibilities. 
The first possibility is poetic description; the second possibility lies 
in the combination of poetic and scientific treatment as two coordinate 
forms of description. The choice between the two possibilities should 
proceed from an answer to the question whether a process has an 
underlying system: 
A priori it would seem to be a generally valid thesis that for every process 
[including historical processes] there is a corresponding system, by which the 
process can be analysed and described by means of a limited number of 
premisses. It must be assumed that any process can be analysed into a limited 
number of elements recurring in various combinations. Then, on the basis of 
this analysis, it should be possible to order these elements into classes 
according to their possibilities of combination. (Hjelmslev 1963: 9) 
In L. Hjelmslev's view, it should be feasible to calculate the number 
of all possible combinations, and this would yield a much more objec­
tive description: "A history so established should rise above the level 
of mere primitive description to that of a systematic, exact, and gene­
ralizing science, in the theory of which all events (possible combina­
tions of elements) are foreseen" (Hjelmslev 1963: 9). L. Hjelmslev 
juxtaposes process as a relational (both-and function) hierarchy and 
system as a correlational (either-or function) hierarchy, associating 
these terms also with text and language, respectively. What is 
noteworthy here is not the association of this opposition with the 
treatment of paradigmatics and syntagmatics (especially in the works 
of R. Jakobson), but L. Hjelmslev's aim to create separate meta­
languages for investigating system and process. Thus, a process would 
be investigated in one metalanguage and the system underlying this 
process would be investigated in another metalanguage, although the 
two metalanguages would be correlated with each other. This is 
exactly the issue that is encountered by researchers who attempt to 
analyse, e.g., a literary work as simultaneously a historical pheno­
menon and as a contemporary with a particular epoch. In such case, 
metalinguistic bilingualism would help to avoid mixed language. To 
extend this logic further, L. Hjelmslev's innovative insight could be 
marked with the terminological pair text of system and text of process, 
where text as system and text as process would manifest only as 
3 
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special cases of this opposition. Although to a different degree, the 
dimension of history would be present in both descriptions, similarly 
to the case of J. Tynianov's concepts of genesis and tradition. 
Closer to the present time, among the manifestations of the same 
trend of thinking the New Historicist approach should be mentioned 
first, in whose vocabulary "historical context" has been substituted 
with "cultural system" and where relations between text and culture 
are seen as inherently intertextual. with intertextuality taking place 
between two types of text, text of literature and text of culture (see 
White 1989: 294). Any literary event is therefore a diachronic text of 
the autonomous history of literature and a synchronic text of the 
cultural system (White 1989: 301). 
An example of the further development of the same line of 
thinking is provided by A. Assmann's concept of cultural text. As a 
subsystem of culture, literature itself is also a cultural text; however, 
one and the same text has different properties as a literary text and as a 
cultural text. From the aspect of the relationship of identity, a literary 
text is a means of individual communication, while for a cultural text, 
a reader is foremost a representative of a group or a community. From 
the viewpoint of reception, between a receiver and a literary text there 
is an aesthetic distance, while in the case of a cultural text, there is an 
insistence on truth. From the aspect of innovation and canonicity. 
literary text strives toward innovation, while cultural text is associated 
with canonization. From the aspect of resistance to time, the 
background system for literary text is formed of history, of different 
readings done by different generations, while for cultural text, the 
background system is average tradition (Assmann 1995). Of course, 
the relations of cultural text and literary text are more complicated 
than that. Texts with prestige such as the Classics or the Bible 
function above all as cultural texts. On the other hand, cultural text 
can bring about the emergence of literary text, as can be witnessed in 
the case of salon literature or album verse. 
The study of a text in culture is inseparable from the search for 
parameters in order to characterize the different functions of the text. 
Every text has its own history and at the same time it exists in general 
history; every text is contemporary and historical at the same time. 
Every text is a framed whole and as such, unchangeable. At the same 
time, each text is a part of culture (of cultural situation and of cultural 
history) and as such, ambiguous, multifunctional and changing, text of 
culture and text of literature (or text of any other form of art) can be 
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different forms of existence of the same text, they can be contained in 
each other as a part is contained in a whole, they can be autonomous 
wholes, temporal or atemporal, concrete or abstract, static or dynamic; 
however, with all these oppositions the boundary between the two 
sides will remain vague and ambivalent. Pure diachrony and synchro­
ny or pure statics and dynamics are but idealized concepts. Therefore, 
in this context it would often be more accurate to speak not about 
texts, but about textuality, about complicated relations in time and 
space for the description of which it is convenient to use the 
operational term "text". Becoming a text and being as text have to do 
in the analysis of cultural phenomena both with ontology and 
epistemology and help to understand culture as a hierarchy of (textual) 
identities. 
Textuality, metatextuality, and intertextuality 
In parallel and in relation to the linguistically oriented developments 
there emerged similar issues also in the anthropological disciplines. At 
the end of the 1950s, C. Lévi-Strauss wrote in his book Structural 
Anthropology (1958) about the necessity to describe rules of marriage 
and kinship systems as a kind of language, serving as a means of 
communication between individuals and groups of individuals. In the 
year 1973 C. Geertz voices his objection to isolated descriptions that 
stem from ethnographic fieldwork. His book The Interpretation of 
Cultures provides an example of textualization of description of 
culture. Here, interpretative anthropology forms a parallel to semiotics 
of culture. C. Geertz's concept of thick description refers to the ability 
of a researcher to explicate or reconstruct the whole on the basis of 
very heterogeneous, commingled or ambivalent data. In such 
approach, a foreign culture becomes an acted document that can be 
interpreted in communication. This document is comparable to a 
foreign and incoherent manuscript where graphic signs are replaced by 
examples of behaviour (Geertz 1993: 10). Such text of behaviour is 
one example of how a complex research object can be textualized. 
Textuality as a methodological principle has a significant role also 
in the development of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics. One of 
the most renowned members of the school, A. Pyatigorski, has post 
factum observed that this tradition started out with an undelimited 
research object. While in the first works at the beginning of the 1960s 
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the object of semiotics was "anything", then after the publication of J. 
Lotman's first semiotic book Lectures on Structural Poetics (1964) 
the object became specified as literature. 
In Lotman's "Lectures", a huge role was played by the introduction of the 
term "text" as a fundamental concept of semiotics and at the same time, as a 
neutral concept with respect to its object, literature. It was precisely the 
concept of "text" which made it possible for Juri Mikhailovich to pass from 
literature over to culture as a universal object of semiotics. (Pyatigorskij 1996: 
54-55) 
"Theses on the Semiotic Study of Cultures" (1973), the programmatic 
work of the Tartu-Moscow School, defines semiotics of culture as a 
science investigating the functional correlation of different sign 
systems, which proceeds from the position that "none of the sign 
systems possesses a mechanism which would enable it to function 
culturally in isolation" (Theses 1998: 33). Text has been defined in 
"Theses" as a bridging link between a general semiotic and a concrete 
empirical investigation: 
The text has integral meaning and integral function (if we distinguish between 
the position of the investigator of culture and the position of its carrier, then 
from the point of view of the former the text appears as the carrier of integral 
function, while from the position of the latter it is the carrier of integral 
meaning). In this sense it may be regarded as the primary element (basic unit) 
of culture. The relationship of the text with the whole of culture and with its 
system of codes is shown by the fact that on different levels the same message 
may appear as a text, pari of a text, or an entire set of texts. (Theses 1998: 38) 
In the tradition of the Tartu-Moscow School, the concept of text is, 
above all. dynamic: text can be an integral sign or a sequence of signs; 
it can be a part or a whole. On the other hand, a text can be a linguisti­
cally concrete text of language or a culturally concrete text of culture: 
In defining culture as a certain secondary language, we introduce the concept 
of a "culture text", a text in this secondary language. So long as some natural 
language is a part of the language of culture, there arises the question of the 
relationship between the text in the natural language and the verbal text of 
culture. (Theses 1998: 43) 
As three subtypes of this relationship there are mentioned cases where 
(1) a text in a natural language is not a text of a given culture (e a 
oral texts in a writing-oriented culture); (2) a text in a secondary 
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language, i.e. a text of culture is at the same time also a text of 
language, i.e. a text in a natural language (e.g., a poem that is 
expressed simultaneously in a secondary, poetic language and in a 
primary language, for instance, in the poet's mother tongue); (3) a 
verbal text of culture is not a text in a natural language (e.g., a Latin 
prayer for Slavs). 
From the modern perspective, "Theses on the Semiotic Study of 
Cultures" written in 1973 touched upon an important aspect — 
virtuality: "The place of the text in the textual space is defined as the 
sum total of potential texts" (Theses 1998: 45). Where J. Derrida 
would call this sum total "discourse", J. Lotman has used the term 
"homeostasis". In his book Universe of the Mind (1990), expanding 
upon the ideas of F. de Saussure, he has claimed that "synchrony is 
homeostatic while diachrony is made up of a series of external and 
accidental infringements of it, in reacting against which synchrony re­
establishes its integrity" (Lotman 1990: 6). 
On the background of cultural homeostasis, the advance toward 
semiosphere appears as natural. Let us recall once again the already-
quoted thought of V. Ivanov: "The task of semiotics is to describe the 
semiosphere without which the noosphere is inconceivable" (Ivanov 
1998: 792). As noosphere is the future living environment of the 
humankind, created in mutual agreement and on rational principles, it 
follows from this definition that semiotics must assist mankind in 
understanding both history and future. Hence, in addition to the 
relationship with the present, semiosphere has also its dimensions of 
history and future. What is more important, however, is that semio­
sphere establishes the dynamics between the part and the whole: 
Since all the levels of the semiosphere — ranging from a human individual or 
an individual text to global semiotic unities — are all like semiospheres 
inserted into each other, then each and one of them is both a participant in the 
dialogue (a part of the semiosphere) as well as the space of the dialogue (an 
entire semiosphere). (Lotman 1999: 33) 
This whole-part relationship is joined, in turn, by the dynamics 
between the subjective and the objective: "The structural parallelism 
between semiotic characteristics of a text and of a personality enables 
us to define any text on any level as a semiotic personality, and to 
regard any personality on any sociocultural level as a text" (Lotman 
1999: 66). 
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The semiospherical perspective in the analysis of culture implies 
the establishment of textuality as an operational principle in which 
texts in the ordinary sense and phenomena described as texts in the 
interests of better comprehension exist together on equal terms. The 
question of their differentiation and comparability is a question of 
delimitation — in other words, a question of the boundaries of 
textuality. From the aspect of scientific accuracy, the only requirement 
that will stand is the traditional demand of cultural semiotics — that 
the position of the observer or the analyser must remain visible. This 
provides for the necessary degree of precision in the case where the 
units of analysis cannot be formalized and are not unequivocally clear-
cut. Textualization should not be regarded as arbitrary delimitation but 
as identification of different levels in the holistic dimension in culture. 
The universality of and necessity for this method stems from the need 
to preserve the interrelations between different parts of a whole and 
the need to see that the whole itself exists also both as a part and as a 
division into parts. Each particular act of communication can be 
analysed as such, but it can also always be shown that the relations 
between a prototext and its metatext are not exhausted with the 
creation of the typology of metatexts. Usually, the prototext itself is 
also in some respect already a metatext — it is difficult to envision the 
existence of pure original texts in culture. 
Textuality of culture is accompanied by the possibility to conduct 
analysis on many levels. A text can be investigated as autonomous and 
focused at by exploring its inner workings. At the same time, it can be 
investigated as participating in metacommunication and here, now 
regarded as a prototext. the text is seen as accompanied by a number 
of metatexts of different kinds (see also Torop 1999: 27^41). The bulk 
of textual transformations ranging from translations to annotations 
can, on the one hand, be described from the aspect of relations 
between the prototext and the metatext. but on the other hand each 
metatext belongs to its own discourse and can be analysed as a part of 
this. By investigating metatexts as a textual whole it is possible to 
analyse the ways in which a particular prototext exists in culture. This 
kind of investigation makes it also possible to reconstruct a missing 
prototext. History of theatre provides a good example of the need for 
metatexts in order to describe a missing prototext. It is possible to 
reconstruct old untaped theatre performances, but also hypothetical 
primal forms of different types of fairy tales (as invariants of the later 
variants) etc. In addition, the investigation of the relations between a 
Semiospherical understanding: Textuality 337 
prototext and metatexts makes it possible to talk about the capacity of 
a particular text to communicate with culture, with its audience, about 
the possible world of the ways the text can be interpreted and under­
stood. 
Related to this, but functioning in a completely different manner, is 
another unity — the intertextual association of texts, where each 
particular text gains its meaning through relations with other texts, 
that is, as a part of a whole. Such association can also be interdiscur-
sive or intermedial. Unlike metatextuality, intertextual association is 
more difficult to delimit and its holistic dimension many not be as 
concrete. 
Both the metatextual and the intertextual associations are subtypes 
of textuality and indicate that science needs to find possibilities first to 
define and then to give as multifaceted explanation as possible of the 
functioning of a complex cultural mechanism. A science investigating 
culture must constantly recreate its research object, must define and 
re-define its borders since in culture as a living organism there 
constantly emerge new relations and new systems. Culture changes, 
culture's textuality is constant. Textuality is a possibility that culture 
offers to its analyser, and at the same time it is an ontological property 
of culture and an epistemological principle for investigating culture. 
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Семиосферическое понимание: текстуальность 
Семиосферический подход к семиотике (культуры) приводит к не­
обходимости сопоставления нескольких терминологических полей. 
В число самых важных входят поля текстуальности, хроното-
пичности и мультимодальности или -медийности. Поле текстуаль­
ности связано с развитием семиотики культуры исходя прежде всего 
из работ Ю. Лотмана. поле хронотопичности восходит к работам М. 
Бахтина 
и у истоков мультимодальности или -медийности лежат 
труды Р Якобсона. Именно в результате переплетения этих трёх 
терминологических и концептуальных полей можно говорить как о 
методологической, так и о метаязыковой интерференции, резуль­
татом которой является креолизация и гибридизация метаязыка. Но 
те же процессы происходят внутри указанных полей и поэтому 
целесообразно рассмотреть эти поля отдельно. Данная статья 
посвяшена первому из них. полю текстуальности. 
Текстуальность обозначает в данной статье некоторый общий 
принцип при помощи которого можно наблюдать и осмыслять раз­
ные аспекты действия культуры. Понятие текстуальности призвано 
соединять два полюса, между которыми располагаются основные 
проблемы описания и толкования культур. Один полюс обозначается 
бинарностью статика-динамика, второй бинарностью часть-целое. 
В текстуальности объединяются текст как обрамлённый артефакт 
и тексту ал изация как абстракция (изображение или обрамление 
текстом). В культуре могут быть конкретному и абстрактном) текс­
там заданы те же вопросы, хотя абстрактный текст является лишь 
операциональным приёмом текстуализации явлений в целях систе­
много и целостного анализа. Практика текстуализации способствует 
пониманию 
необходимости различения членения на основе мате­
риала текста и членения на основе текстуальности (текстуализа-
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ции)— первое обеспечивает сравнимость текстов, созданных из 
одного материала, второе обеспечивает сравнимость всех те кету а-
лизированных явлений вне зависимости от их материала. 
Текстуальность — это возможность, предлагаемая аналитику 
культурой, будучи одновременно онтологическим признаком куль­
туры и эпистемологическим принципом её исследования. 
Semiosfääriline mõistmine: tekstuaalsus 
Semiootika ja eriti kultuurisemiootika semiosfääriline käsitlemine toob 
kaasa mitme terminivälja kõrvutamise vajaduse. Olulisemate seas tuleks 
nimetada tekstuaalsuse, kronotoobilisuse ja multimodaalsuse ehk multi-
meedialisuse välja. Tekstuaalne väli on seotud kultuurisemiootika aren­
guga eriti Juri Lotmani töid silmas pidades, kronoioobiline väli on saanud 
alguse Mihhail Bahtini töödest ja multimodaalsuse (multimeedialisuse) 
lätete juures on Roman Jakobsoni uurimused. Just nende kolme termino­
loogilise ja kontseptuaalse välja põimumisel on tekkinud nii metodo­
loogiline kui metakeeleline interferents, mille tulemusena me oleme 
sunnitud rääkima metakeele kreoliseerumisest ja hübridiseerumisest. Kuid 
samad protsessid toimuvad ka nende väljade sees ja seetõttu on ots­
tarbekas ka neid välju kõigepealt eraldi vaadelda. Käesolev artikkel on 
pühendatud neist esimesele, tekstuaalsuse väljale. 
Tekstuaalsus tähistab käesolevas artiklis üldisemat printsiipi, mille 
abil on võimalik jälgida ja mõtestada kultuuri toimimise erinevaid 
aspekte. Tekstuaalsuse mõiste on mõeldud ühendama kaht poolust, mille 
vahel kultuuride kirjeldamise ja seletamise põhiprobleemid paiknevad. 
Üht poolust tähistab binaarsus staatika - dünaamika, teist poolust 
binaarsus osa - tervik. 
Tekstuaalsus ühendab endas teksti kui kindlapiirilise artefakti ja 
tekstualiseerimise kui abstraktsiooni (tekstina kujutamise või piiritle­
mise). Kultuuris võime konkreetsele tekstile ja abstraktsele tekstile esi­
tada põhimõtteliselt samu küsimusi, kuigi abstraktne tekst on vaid operat-
sionaalne võte piiritleda tekstualiseerimise abil mõnd nähtust holistliku ja 
süsteemse analüüsi huvides. Tekstualiseerimise praktika omakorda aitab 
mõista vajadust eristada tekstimaterjalist tulenevat liigendust ja tekstuaal-
susest või tekstualiseerimisest tulenevat liigendust — esimene tagab 
võrreldavuse samast materjalist loodud tekstide vahel, teine teeb võrrel­
davaks kõik tekstualiseeritud nähtused nende materjalist sõltumata. 
Tekstuaalsus on võimalus, mida kultuur analüütikule pakub, olles 
samaaegselt kultuuri ontoloogiline tunnus ja kultuuri uurimise episte-
moloogiline printsiip. 
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Abstract. This paper presents the notion that verbal discourse is structured, in 
form and contents, by metaphorical reasoning. It discusses the concept of 
"metaphorical network" as a framework for relating the parts of a speech act 
to each other, since such an act seems to cohere into a meaningful text on the 
basis of "domains" that deliver common concepts. The basic finding of 
several research projects on this concept suggest that source domains allow 
speakers to derive sense from a verbal interaction because they interconnect 
the topic of discussion to culturally-meaningful images and ideas. This 
suggests, in turn, that language is intertwined with nonverbal systems of 
meaning, reflecting them in the contents of verbal messages. Overall, the 
concept of metaphorical networks implies that human cognition is highly 
associative in structure. 
Introduction 
Verbal communication unfolds so automatically that we hardly ever 
take notice of the complex conceptual system that makes it possible 
for us to engage in it so effortlessly. In the late 1940s, the relation 
between that system and the grammatical system that allows us to 
transmit information "linearly" in actual speech situations came to 
constitute a central preoccupation of language and communication 
scientists. It was the American engineer Claude Shannon (1948) who 
argued in that era that information of any kind could be described in 
terms of binary choices between equally probable alternatives. From 
Shannon's work — and that of mathematician Norbert Wiener (1949), 
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who pioneered the field of cybernetics and the development of com­
puter science — there emerged a. widespread notion in the language 
and communication sciences in the 1950s, which is still prevalent 
today, that verbal communication was subject to the same rule-
governed stochastic processes that characterize mechanical and animal 
signaling systems. By the 1960s, this led to the development of 
theories of language, which continue, to this day, to portray language 
as a grammatical "object" based on universal stochastic principles. 
But by the 1980s, and certainly by the 1990s, it became obvious that 
such an approach to language hardly told the whole story of how 
grammar delivers concepts in even the most simple speech acts (Em-
meche 2000; Kull 2000; Brier 2000). Isolated from speech, gram­
matical systems can indeed be described in mathematical terms, as 
these theories have aptly shown. But this tells us nothing about the 
ways in which the architecture of grammar delivers the complex 
meanings of sentences. Despite substantial and noteworthy research 
on the nature of grammatical rules and syntactic systems since the 
publication of Noam Chomsky's Syntactic Structures in 1957, current 
grammatical theories and models seem incapable of adequately 
explaining the conceptual richness of even the simplest of sentences. 
This is, no doubt, the reason why Chomsky continues to separate 
grammatical phenomena from meaning considerations (Chomsky 
2000). 
Starting in the 1970s, there emerged several interesting attempts to 
make grammatical theories more sensitive to the conceptual 
complexity inherent in speech acts (e.g.. Hymes 1971; Halliday 1975; 
1985). This led to much significant work in the 1980s and 1990s 
examining the relation between conceptual and grammatical structure 
from a non-stochastic viewpoint (e.g., Fauconnier 1985; 1997; Lan­
gacker 1987; 1990; Croft 1991 ; Ru wet 1991; Deane 1992; Taylor 
1995; Fauconnier, Sweetser 1996; Nuyts, Pederson 1997; Allwood, 
Gärdenfors 1998; Dirven, Verspoor 1998). The proposal put forward 
here is in line with such research. Indeed, my objective is to suggest 
that the categories making up sentence structure in discourse 
situations are, in effect, "reflexes" of largely unconscious "conceptual 
networks", whose various "circuits" are converted into specific types 
of words and phrases in the delivery of speech. The point of departure 
for such research can be traced to 1977, when Pollio, Barlow Fine 
and Pollio published their extensive investigation of common 
discourse texts, finding them to be structured primarily by metapho-
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rical concepts. They discovered that speakers of English, for instance, 
uttered on average 3,000 novel metaphors and 7,000 idioms per week. 
Their pivotal study was followed by Lakoff and Johnson's momentous 
1980 study, Metaphors We Live By, which has since provided a 
powerful framework for relating the meaning of specific grammatical 
devices to particular conceptual structures (see, for instance, Kövecses 
1986; 1988; 1990; Lakoff 1987; Johnson 1987; Sweetser 1990; 
Indurkhya 1992; Danesi 1993; Gibbs 1994; Goatley 1997; Lakoff, 
Johnson 1999). To put it in strictly semiotic terms, this line of inquiry 
has finally started to show how signifieds, the units of meaning and 
reference, can be linked etiologically to their signifiers, the physical 
forms that deliver these units. 
Although semioticians have, by and large, been openly critical of 
the Chomskyan view of language (Sebeok, Danesi 2000), they have 
not normally become involved in research designed to provide a 
viable alternative based on the relation between signifieds and 
signifiers in language structure. The purpose of the present paper is to 
offer such an alternative, derived primarily from experimental and 
pedagogical work with second language learners — individuals who, 
more than anyone else, are faced with the complex task of learning 
how the signifiers of the new language overlap with native language 
signifieds and how they deliver conceptually new and/or subtly 
different signifieds (Danesi 2000). The claim to be made here is that 
verbal discourse involves a "reflexive loop" between the grammatical 
and the conceptual domains. 
Semiotic network theory 
Called langue by Saussure (1916) and linguistic competence by 
Chomsky (1957), knowledge of language as a rule-governed system 
has been traditionally assumed to be independent of how it is applied 
to real-life communicative situations, which Saussure called parole. In 
the early 1970s, the linguist Dell Hymes (1972) challenged this view, 
proposing that knowledge of language structure was interconnected 
with knowledge of how to use it appropriately in specific social 
settings. He called this type of knowledge communicative competence. 
In actual fact, the study of communicative competence was implicit in 
the work of various structuralist linguists and communication theorists 
before Hymes (e.g., Firth 1957; Jakobson 1960; Austin 1962; Dance 
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1967; Searle 1969; Andersch et al. 1969; Barnlund 1970). It has 
become a major focus for both sociolinguistics and communication 
theory ever since (e.g., Myers, Myers 1985; Cherwitz, Hikins 1986; 
Tannen 1989; Fairclough 1995; van Dijk 1997). At the core of this 
approach to discourse is the idea of transaction — the view that verbal 
structures in discourse are "negotiated" between the interlocutors and 
that acts of negotiation influence cumulatively the actual grammar and 
vocabulary of a language. Such research has shown rather con­
vincingly that communication variables are primary factors in modi­
fying grammar and vocabulary, thus largely rebutting the view that 
grammatical systems are based on "universal properties" and thus are 
impervious to the influence of communication. As Colin Cherry aptly 
put it in his monumental study of communication, the use of language 
among humans "is essentially a social affair" (Cherry 1957: 9). But. 
with few exceptions (e.g.. Kress 1985; Ellis. McClintock 1990; Garza-
Cuaron 1991; Cobley 1996; Agha 1997; Kramsch 1998), lacking from 
communicative competence theory is the fundamental semiotic view 
of language as a representational device interconnected with the other 
(nonverbal) representational systems of a culture (Verschueren 1995; 
Yabuuchi 1996; Edwards 1997; Danesi. Perron 1999; Jaworski, 
Coupland 2000). This view emphasizes that language is not an 
autonomous code, separate from the other codes humans employ to 
represent and communicate information, ideas, emotions, etc. The 
central notion of what I have elsewhere called semiotic network theory 
(Danesi 2000) is that there exist three main types of conceptual 
networks that link language with nonverbal codes — denotative. 
connotative, and metaphorical. These are reflected in the forms that 
specific signifiers in each of the codes of a culture assume. In short, 
the same signifieds surface in the form of different verbal and 
nonverbal signifiers because these are interconnected to each other by 
the same complex cognitive circuitry that characterizes the conceptual 
network systems present in a culture. 
Network theory has been developed primarily from several 
research projects carried out at both the University of Toronto and the 
University of Lugano during the academic years 1997-1998. Over 500 
students were instructed to draw up network analyses of over 200 
common concepts, ranging from colors to emotions in English and 
Italian. Their analyses were then matched against the conceptual 
structures inherent in common written texts, such as newspaper and 
magazine articles published in Toronto and Lugano. The findings 
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suggest rather strongly that verbal communication is shaped by a 
complex web of denotative, connotative, and metaphorical circuits 
that are concealed in every word, phrase, and sentence (Danesi 2000). 
In Saussurean semiotics, the term concept designates the conven­
tional meaning we get from a sign (Saussure 1916). As it turns out, 
however, it is not a straightforward matter to explicate what a concept 
is by using other words to do so. Consider, for example, what happens 
when we look up the definition of a word such as cat in a dictionary. 
Typically, the latter defines a cat as "a carnivorous mammal (Felis 
eatus) domesticated since early times as a catcher of rats and mice and 
as a pet and existing in several distinctive breeds and varieties". The 
problem with this definition is that it uses mammal to define cat. What 
is a mammall The dictionary defines mammal as "any of various 
warm-blooded vertebrate animals of the class Mammalia". What is an 
animal? The dictionary goes on to define an animal as "a living 
organism other than a plant or a bacterium". What is an organism? An 
organism, the dictionary stipulates, is "an individual animal or plant 
having diverse organs and parts that function together as a whole to 
maintain life and its activities". But, then, what is life? Life, it 
specifies, is "the property that distinguishes living organisms". At that 
point it is apparent that the dictionary has gone into a conceptual 
loop — it has employed an already-used concept, organism, to define 
life. 
Looping is caused by the fact that dictionaries employ words, 
which of course encode other concepts, to define an entry. As it turns 
out. the dictionary approach just described is the only possible one — 
for the reason that all human systems of knowledge have a looping 
associative structure, including mathematics, as the brilliant mathe­
matician Kurt Gödel demonstrated in 1931. This suggests that the 
meaning of something can only be inferred by relating it to the 
meaning of something else to which it is, or can be, associated. There 
simply is no such thing as an "absolute concept." So, the meaning of 
cat is something that can only be extrapolated from the circuitry of 
conceptual associations that it evokes. This circuitry can be called a 
network. In addition to the concepts of mammal, animal, organism, 
and life, used by the dictionary, one can add others such as whiskers 
and tail to the circuitry of the cat network. In sum, the meaning of a 
concept such as cat crystallizes from an intricate interplay of related 
conceptual associations that it evokes. 
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There are several things about networks and network theory that 
must be made clear from the very outset. First, the term theory is not 
used in its strictly scientific sense, but rather in its original 
etymological sense of "a view. Network theory is not a theory of 
concepts" in the psychological sense. It simply provides a descriptive 
apparatus for literally showing what dictionary makers have known 
for centuries — namely that the meaning of something is impossible 
to pin down without reference to other meanings. The position of 
nodes (concepts), the configuration of circuits (the associations among 
concepts), and the "distances" between nodes and circuits in a network 
reflect no necessary pattern or intrinsic structure. There is no limit 
(maximum or minimum) to the number and types of nodes and 
circuits that can be used to characterize a concept. It depends on a host 
of factors, not the least of which is the knowledge of the network-
maker. In the network for cat, secondary circuits generated by 
mammal, for example, could be extended to contain carnivorous, 
rodent-eater, etc.; the life node could be extended to generate a 
secondary circuit of its own containing nodes such as animate, breath, 
existence, etc. in no particular order; other nodes such as feline, 
carnivorous, Siamese, tabby, etc. could be inserted to give a more 
detailed "picture" of the conceptual structure of cat, and so on. 
Finally, network design will vary according to case and necessity. The 
network described above would put cat at its focal point because that 
is the concept under consideration by the dictionary. However, if 
animal were to be needed as the focal concept, then cat would be 
represented differently as a nonfocal node connected to it in a circuit 
that would also include dog and horse, among other associated nodes. 
In effect, there is no way to predict the configuration of a network in 
adv ance. It all depends on the analyst, on the purpose of the analysis, 
on the type of concept, and on other such factors that are variable 
and/or unpredictable. 
The primary node concepts — mammal, animal, life, and orga­
nism — are superordinate ones; cat is a basic concept; and whiskers 
and tail are subordinate concepts. In prototype theory (e.g., Rosch 
1973), superordinate concepts are those that have a highly general 
referential function. Basic concepts have a typological function. They 
allow for reference to types of things. Finally, subordinate concepts 
have a detailing function. Although it is beyond the purpose of the 
present discussion, it would be interesting to investigate the relation of 
nodes and circuits (primary, secondary, etc.) to these functions and 
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determine if a pattern emerges. That is something that will have to be 
left for future work on semiotic network analysis. Clearly, the 
configuration of a network will vary according to the function of its 
focal node — i.e. a network that has a superordinate focal node (e.g., 
mammal) will display a different pattern of circuitry than will one that 
has a basic concept at its focal center. 
Types of networks 
Denotative, connotative, and metaphorical concepts are not to be con­
sidered separate phenomena, but rather, interconnected to each other 
through various kinds of circuitry and network linkages. Denotation is 
the initial meaning captured by a concept. The denotative meaning of 
the word blue in English, for instance, encodes the image of a hue on 
the color spectrum with a wavelength of approximately 450 to 490 
nanometers. The specific image that comes to mind will be different 
from individual to individual. But all images will fall within the above 
wavelength, if one is a native speaker of English. The denotative 
concept of "blueness" is forged cognitively from the experience of 
observing the hues found in natural phenomena such as the sky and 
the sea, by observing other hues in things, and so on. 
The denotative network for this focal node will thus contain 
circuits made up of nonfocal nodes such as color, shade, hue, 
gradation, sky, and sea, among others. Since blue is a type of color, it 
is really part of a conceptual, or network, domain that has color as its 
focal point. However, in specific network analyses, it is not necessary 
to show the relevant network domain — in which blue would, in 
effect, be configured as a primary node connected to color. A network 
domain can be defined as the associative configuration generated by 
superordinate categories — color, animals, etc. Within such domains, 
basic and subordinate concepts can be subdivided, for the purpose of a 
specific analysis, into smaller networks of their own. That applies to 
the network designed for blue as a type of color interconnected to 
yellow, green, etc. within the same circuit. 
Denotative networks allow speakers of a language to talk and think 
about concrete things in specific ways. But such networks are rather 
limited when it comes to serving the need of describing abstractions, 
emotions, morals, etc. For this reason they are extended considerably 
5 
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through further associative thinking. Consider the use ot cat and blue 
in sentences such as the following ones. 
(1) He's a real cool cat. 
(2) Today I've got the blues. 
(3) She let the cat out of the bag. 
(4) That hit me right out of the blue. 
These encode connotative and metaphorical meanings, which are 
"added" or "extended" meanings of the two concepts. The use of cat 
in (1) to mean "attractive," "engaging," etc. comes out of the network 
domain associated with jazz music', and the use of blues in (2) to mean 
"sad," "gloomy," etc. comes out of the network domain associated 
with blues music. In effect, these have been linked to the original 
networks of cat and blue through the channel of specific cultural 
traditions. They are nodes that interconnect cat and blue to the 
network domains of jazz and blues music. 
The meaning of "something secret" associated with cat in example 
(3) above and the meaning of "unexpectedness" associated with blue 
in (4) have resulted from linking cat with the secrecy network domain 
and blue with the sky domain. Sentence (3) is, in effect, a specific 
instantiation of the conceptual metaphor [animals reflect human life 
and activities], which underlies common expressions such as: 
(5) It's a dog's life. 
(6) Your life is a cat's cradle. 
(7) I heard it from the horse's mouth. 
Sentence (4) is an instantiation of the conceptual metaphor [Nature is 
a portent of destiny] — which literary critics classify as a stylistic 
technique under the rubric of pathetic fallacy. This concept underlies 
such common expressions as: 
(8) I heard it from an angry wind. 
(9) Cruel clouds are gathering over your life. 
The networks that are generated by metaphorical signifieds extend the 
meanings of signs within networks considerably. Comprehensive 
network analyses of cat and blue would have to show how all 
meanings — denotative, connotative, metaphorical — are inter­
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connected to each other through complex circuitry. It is the ability to 
navigate through the overarching circuitry of such networks, choosing 
appropriate denotative, connotative, or metaphorical nodes according 
to communicative need, and integrating them cohesively into appro­
priate individually-fashioned circuitry to match the need, that consti­
tutes what may be called conceptual competence in a language, as 
opposed to abstract linguistic competence. 
The connotative extensional process is, needless to say, highly 
associative. But it is not one based on association-by-sense, as it is in 
the formation of denotative concepts. Rather, it is based on 
association-by-inference. To grasp what this means, consider the word 
tail, which the dictionary defines as "the flexible appendage found at 
the rear end of an animal's body". This is the denotative meaning of 
tail in utterances such as the following: 
(10) My cat's tail is over one foot long. 
(11) Are there any species of dogs without tai I si 
(12) That horse's tail is rather short, isn't it? 
In a denotative network tail, as a focal node, would be connected to a 
circuit that contains appendage and rear-end nodes. These provide 
basic information about what a tail is — an extremity — and where it 
is found on an animal — on its rear end. Now. these nodes are what 
guide the extension of tail to encompass meanings such as following: 
(13) The tail of that shirt is not bleached. 
(14) Do you want heads or tails for this coin toss? 
(15) The tail section of that airplane is making a funny noise. 
Such extensions are hardly random or disconnected to the original 
circuit. Shirts, coins, and airplanes are conceptualized in English-
speaking cultures as having appendages and rear ends. In network 
terms, a shirt, a coin, and an airplane are concepts that belong to 
separate networks of their own. However, through associative infe­
rence these are interlinked to the tail network. The process of network 
linking can be called grafting. Grafting is the process that underlies 
connotation and metaphorization. 
As another practical example, consider the following metaphorical 
statement: "The professor is a snake." Clearly, it is not the denotative 
meaning of the vehicle, snake, that is transferred to the topic, 
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professor, but rather its connotative meanings, namely the culture-
specific characteristics perceived in snakes — "slyness," "danger, 
"slippenness, ' etc. It is this circuit ot connotations linked to snake that 
are grafted onto the professor circuit. The grafting of the connotative 
nodes associated with the source network domain circuit (snake) onto 
the focal target domain node (professor) is what creates the meaning 
(or ground) of the metaphor. The concept of grafting suggests that this 
statement is hardly an isolated example of metaphorical fancy; rather, 
it implies that it is one of an infinitude of similar expressions that 
cluster around the idea that [human personality] is understandable in 
terms of [animal features]: 
(16) John is a pig. 
(17) That woman is a tiger. 
(18) My friend is a gorilla. 
(19) She roars when she gets angry. 
Each is a specific instantiation of that very idea — namely [human 
personality is understandable in terms of animal features], or simply 
[people are animals]. This is dubbed a conceptual metaphor by Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980) and, more recently, a metaform by Sebeok and 
Danesi (2000). Note again that the grafting of meanings in the 
metaphorization process is not based on linking denotative circuits, 
but connotative ones. Thus, it is not the reptilian physical qualities of 
snakes, or the feline qualities of tigers, that are grafted onto [people], 
but rather the kinds of behavioral characteristics that snakes and tigers 
are thought to have in human terms. This is what creates the 
meaningful circuitry in metaphorization. It is not a simple transferal 
process, but one based on association-by-inference, as it has been 
called above. Using electric current as an analogy, it can be said that 
such circuits run on "alternating conceptual current," so to speak. 
Given the controversy surrounding the term association in psycho­
logy and linguistics, it is necessary to clarify, albeit briefly, what is 
meant by it in the framework of network theory. In psychology, 
associationism is the theory that the mind comes to know concepts by 
combining simple, irreducible elements through mental connection. 
As is well known, interest in associationism was kindled in antiquity 
by Aristotle, who recognized four strategies by which associations are 
forged: through similarity (e.g. an orange and a lemon), through 
difference (e.g. hot and cold), through contiguity in time (e.g. sunrise 
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and a rooster's crow), and through contiguity in space (e.g. a cup and 
saucer). British empiricist philosophers John Locke and David Hume 
saw sensory perception as the underlying factor in such processes. In 
the nineteenth century, the Aristotelian view was examined 
empirically, leading eventually to the foundation of an associationist 
school of psychology, guided by the principles enunciated by James 
Mill in his Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind (1829). In 
addition to Aristotle's original four strategies, that school found that 
such factors as intensity, inseparability, and repetition added to the 
strength of an association: e.g. arms are associated with bodies 
because they are inseparable from them; rainbows are associated with 
rain because of repeated observations of the two as co-occurring 
phenomena; etc. 
The one who developed associationism experimentally was Ed­
ward Thorndike, who extended the work initiated by the Russian 
psychologist Ivan Pavlov in 1904. Pavlov provided an empirical basis 
for investigating how associations through repetition are made. When 
he presented a meat stimulus to a hungry dog, for instance, the animal 
would salivate spontaneously, as expected. This was termed the dog's 
"unconditioned response." After Pavlov rang a bell while presenting 
the meat stimulus a number of times, he found that the dog would 
eventually salivate only to the ringing bell, without the meat stimulus. 
Clearly, Pavlov suggested, the ringing by itself, which would not have 
triggered the salivation initially, had brought about a "conditioned 
response" in the dog. By association the dog had learned something 
new. Every major behavioral psychologist has utilized the Pavlovian 
notion of associationism in one way or other. Although behaviorists 
believe all thought processes can be accounted for through as­
sociations of stimuli and responses, other psychologists strongly reject 
such an approach as inadequate to explain creative thought and verbal 
behavior. 
The meaning of association as used in the network theory frame­
work is not the Pavlovian one. In line with twentieth century Gestalt 
psychology, it is used to stress that abstract concepts beget their 
meanings only in relation to other concepts. Gestalt psychologists 
believed that pattern, or form, was the most important part of 
experience. The whole pattern in a conceptual network, for instance, 
gives meaning to each individual element (node, circuit, etc.) within it. 
In other words, the whole is more important than the sum of its parts. 
As discussed above, network patterns can be forged by sense, i.e. by 
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observing physical features of referents, or by inference, i.e. by 
applying the sense associations to referents that are perceived as 
possessing the same features. 
Reflexivization 
Associative conceptual structure is converted into linear surface gram­
matical structure through a process that can be called reflexivization. 
Consider, for example, an underlying circuit containing snake as a 
metaphorical concept that is to be used in a specific speech act. In the 
surface language that is chosen to deliver it. it can show up as a verb 
(20), if it is the snake's movements that are grafted onto the target, or 
as an adjective (21), if it is a serpentine quality that is grafted 
conceptually onto the target: 
(20) The professor snaked his way around the issue. 
(21 ) The professor has a snaky way of doing things. 
The difference between the two surface forms — snaked and snaky — 
can be traced to underlying circuits that extend the snake concept in 
specific ways. The reflexivization of (20) shows that the grafted 
concept included a movement node. In (22) the relevant circuit grafted 
onto the target concept included, instead, a quality node. 
The notion of reflexivization is not a theory of grammar. It is a 
heuristic technique for showing how words, phrases, and sentences 
appear to reflect conceptual structure, i.e. to encode it in specific 
ways. Needless to say, surface linear structure reflects not only 
concepts, but is also sensitive to communicative functions, situational 
variables, stylistic needs, etc. There are an infinitude of ways in which 
the reflexivization of concepts can unfold. The choices made by the 
speaker, the context of the speech act, the grammatical and lexical 
knowledge of the speaker, etc. are the factors that constrain surface 
structure outcomes. It is not the purpose of reflexivization analysis to 
consider these factors. The main objective of such analysis is showing 
how grammar, vocabulary, and concepts are interconnected in a 
systemic way. 
Differences in surface linear structure are typically due to under­
lying conceptual dichotomies. In Italian, for instance, the difference 
between the denotative and connotative meaning of an adjectival 
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concept is sometimes reflected in the surface by a difference in 
position with respect to the noun. Thus, in (22) and (23), the different 
surface position of the adjective is a reflex of the different networks to 
which the meanings belong: 
(22) Lui è un uomopovero ("He's an indigent man"). 
(23) Lui è un povero uomo ("He's a forlorn man"). 
In (22) it is the denotative meaning of povero that is reflected in the 
surface by a post-positioning of the adjective with respect to the noun 
(the normal position for qualitative adjectives). In (23) the connotative 
meaning of povero is indicated by means of its pre-positioning, 
alerting the interlocutor in an anticipatory fashion as to the type of 
concept that is intended. 
As another example of how conceptual dichotomies are refle-
xivized, consider the use of the English prepositions since and for in 
sentences such as the following: 
(24) I have been living here since 1980. 
(25) I have known Lucy since November. 
(26) I have not been able to sleep since Monday. 
(27) I have been living here for twenty years. 
(28) I have known Lucy for nine months. 
(29) I have not been able to sleep for seven days. 
An analysis of the complements that follow since or for reveals that 
those that follow the former are [points in time], i.e. they are 
complements that reflect a conception of time as a [point] on a 
[timeline] which shows specific years, months, etc.: 1980, November, 
Monday, etc. Complements that follow for, on the other hand, reflect a 
conception of time as a [quantity]: twenty years, nine months, seven 
days, etc. These two network domains — [time is a point] and [time is 
a quantity] — have an underlying metaphorical circuitry structure, 
reflecting our propensity to imagine an abstract notion such as "time" 
in terms of something concrete. These can now be seen to have a 
specific effect at the level of syntax by motivating a grammatical 
dichotomy — complements introduced by since are reflexes of the 
conceptual domain [time is a point]; those introduced by for are 
reflexes of the conceptual domain [time is a quantity]. This is, in fact, 
the kind of rule of grammar that reveals how concepts are encoded 
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linearly it relates, in effect, how two specific domains of 
conceptualization have worked their way into the grammar. In a word, 
this rule stipulates how a grammatical dichotomy reflects a conceptual 
dichotomy. 
Take, as one final example, the selection of certain verbs in 
particular types of sentences in Italian. The verb fare "to make" is 
used to convey a weather situation — fa caldo (literally) "it makes 
hot," fa freddo (literally) "it makes cold." The physical states of 
[hotness] and [coldness] are conveyed instead by the verb essere "to 
be" when referring to objects — è caldo "it is hot," è freddo "it is 
cold"— and by avere "to have" when referring to people — ha caldo 
"he/she is hot," ha freddo "he/she is cold." The use of one verb or the 
other—fare, essere, or avere — is motivated by an underlying 
metaphorical conceptualization of bodies and the environment as 
[containers]. So, the [containment context] in which the quality of 
[hotness] or [coldness] is located determines the verbal category to be 
employed. If it is in the environment, it is "made" by Nature (fa 
caldo/freddo)\ if it is in a human being, then the body "has" it (ha 
caldo/freddoy, and if it is in an object, then the object "is" its container 
(è caldo/freddo). 
To summarize, it is obvious that conceptual domains leave their 
reflexes in the grammars of specific languages. Knowledge of such 
differentiated reflexive properties is what guides conceptually-appro-
priate communication among interlocutors. Grammar in this frame­
work is definable, therefore, as a system that reflexivizes conceptual 
circuitry in specific ways. 
It must be emphasized again that the notion of reflexivization is 
not a theory of grammar. It is proposed simply to show that in the 
same way that a painting is much more than an assemblage of lines, 
shapes, colors, and melodies a combination of notes and harmonies, so 
too a sentence in language is much more than an assemblage of words 
and phrases built from some abstract rule system in the brain. We use 
the surface grammatical and lexical codes at our disposal to model the 
world of concepts in ways that parallel how musicians use melodic 
elements and painters visual ones to model it. 
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Discourse 
Network analyses of conversations show, above all else, that discourse 
is structured largely by connotative inter-network linkages. A truly 
interesting feature of discourse that this type analysis also reveals can 
be called connotative chaining. This occurs when a specific connota­
tive node generates derivative associations in the immediate span of 
the discourse. To put it figuratively, it tends to "infect" the whole 
conversation. For instance, once a word such as drop is used connota-
tively by a speaker in a certain situation, then it may spawn a chain of 
associated concepts such as pick up, let go, etc. Here is an example of 
a conversation excerpt that I recorded at the University of Toronto, 
during which a speaker (a university student) used the word drop as 
just described: "Yeah, I dropped that course yesterday... No, I won't 
pick it up next year... The main reason for letting it go was the prof. 
He was awful... Believe me, I haven't lost anything..." 
In this sample of discourse, the connotative meaning of drop 
initiated a circuit on its own that included pick up, let go, and lose in 
close proximity to each other. In effect, the image of "falling" is 
distributed in the circuit, surfacing in various lexical forms. The nodes 
are linked again through a process of association-by-inference — 
picking up something means that it was dropped; losing something 
elicits the image of dropping it; and, of course, letting something go 
will cause it to drop. The construction of the circuit is a subjective act, 
based on grafting nodes from network domains. This is what makes 
discourse unpredictable in actual form, but understandable, and even 
predictable, conceptually. 
Once connotative circuits have been introduced into discourse they 
tend to guide the flow of conversation through chaining. In the above 
circuit, for instance, the pick up node led a little later in the con­
versation to the use of take, which, in turn, generated its own circuitry 
with two nodes — carry and heavy: "I really can't take any more 
subjects... I'm already carrying the maximum... I've got quite a 
heavy load..." 
There are various kinds of connotative chains that characterize 
discourse flow. Some of these contain nodes based on narrative tradi­
tions; these are concepts referring to themes, plot-lines, characters, 
and settings that surface in narratives. Calling someone a Casanova or 
a Don Juan, rather than lady-killer, evokes an array of socially-
significant connotations that these characters embody. Referring to a 
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place as Eden or Hell elicits connotations that have a basis in mythic 
and religious narrative. The circuits that have been grafted from these 
stories also surface constantly in common discourse events. Climato-
logists, for example, refer to the warming of the ocean surface off the 
western coast of South America that occurs every 4 to 12 years when 
upwelling of cold, nutrient-rich water does not occur as a person, El 
Nino, "the little one" in Spanish. This mythic personification of a 
climatological condition makes it much more understandable in 
human terms. Although people do not think of El Nino as a mythic 
figure, they nonetheless find it convenient to blame "him" for certain 
weather repercussions as if it were one. This is how original myths 
worked cognitively — the difference being that the personified 
conditions of the past were actually believed to be real gods or 
mythical beings. The discourse that surrounds El Nino is virtually 
always interpretable in mythic terms. For instance, I recorded a 
weather commentary on American television recently that contained a 
circuit generated by mythic personification: "This year El Nino is 
having a great time of it. He has wreaked havoc upon anyone or 
anything in his path. He has come down very strenuously upon us." 
In effect, connotative and metaphorical circuitry in discourse is 
densely distributed through networks present in the entire system of 
culture. Take, as an example, the up-down metaphorical concept that 
entails the connotative feature [verticality]. In verbal discourse this 
feature is a node that is reflexivized commonly in expressions such as 
the following: 
(30) I'm feeling up. 
(31 ) They're feeling down 
(32) I'm working my way up the ladder of success 
(33) His enthusiasm has gone down considerably. 
This same concept manifests itself in the religious domain, where 
goodness, spirituality, and heaven are portrayed as up, and evil, 
damnation, and hell as down in sermons, theological narratives, 
religious visual representations, the design of churches, etc. In public 
building design, too, it can be discerned in the fact that the taller office 
buildings in a modern city are the ones that indicate which institutions 
(and individuals) hold social and economic power. In musical 
composition, higher tones are typically employed to convey a 
sensation of happiness, lower ones of sadness. During speech, the 
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raising of the hand designates notions of amelioration, betterment, 
growth, etc., whereas the lowering of the hand designates the opposite 
notions. In bodily representation and perception, this concept shows 
up in the common viewpoint that taller is more attractive/shorter is 
less attractive. In mathematical and scientific representational prac­
tices its reflexivization can be seen, for instance, in the ways in which 
graphs are designed — lines that are oriented in an upward direction 
indicate a growth or an increase of some kind, while those that are 
slanted in a downward direction indicate a decline or decrease. 
The foregoing analysis of interconnected networks is intended to 
show how highly complementary abstractions are to each other and 
how they are utilized to generate representational practices and 
systems. The [people are animals] network discussed above is the 
source of such symbolic activities as the use of animals in totemic 
codes, in heraldic traditions, in the creation of fictional characters for 
use in story-telling to children (Bugs Bunny, Foghorn Leghorn, Daffy 
Duck, etc.), in the naming of sports teams (Chicago Bears, St. Louis 
Cardinals, Miami Dolphins, etc.), and in the creation of surnames, to 
mention but a few. 
This type of analysis also explains why discourse texts produced 
by computers and foreign-language learners alike (at the beginning of 
their study of a new language) will manifest a high degree of accuracy 
in sentence-formation, but they will invariably lack the conceptual 
appropriateness that characterizes the corresponding discourse texts of 
native speakers. To put it another way, students and machines "speak" 
artificially with the formal grammatical structures of the language as 
they have been taught them or programmed to do respectively, but 
they are unable to "think" in terms of the conceptual system that 
underlies the structures: i.e. students typically make-up target 
language sentences as artificial "carriers" of their own native language 
concepts through the rules they have been taught; computers generate 
them in response to the rules programmed into them. When these 
coincide with the ways in which concepts are relayed by native 
speakers naturally, then the student and machine texts coincide 
serendipitously with culturally-appropriate discourse texts; when they 
do not, they manifest an asymmetry between sentence form and 
conceptual content. 
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Concluding remarks 
The notions of semiotic networks and of reflexivization raise some 
specific questions for future research. The guiding question is: What 
are the verbal cues that reveal conceptual domains? In this paper, for 
instance, the structures since and for were related to the conceptual 
domain as reflexes of differentiated metaphorical networks: [time is a 
point] and [time is a quantity]. The work on cognitive grammar by 
Langacker (1987; 1990), as mentioned, is leading the way in showing 
us how analyses of this type might be envisioned. Another question is 
to determine to what extent and in what ways conceptual networks 
relate to, or are embedded in, world knowledge. Is world knowledge 
built up from such circuitry? And if so, how is this incorporable into 
an extensive analysis of language? Some possibilities have been 
explored in the past (e.g., Pike 1967), and I believe that this kind of 
exploration is the wave of the future in semiotics, linguistics, and 
communication science. As Levin (1988: 10) has aptly remarked, 
however, one must proceed cautiously in this area of inquiry, simply 
because the many modes of knowing defy the possibility of en­
visioning a single theory — e.g., innate knowledge, personal know­
ledge. tacit knowledge, spiritual knowledge, declarative and pro­
cedural knowledge, knowing that and knowing how, certitude (as well 
as certainty), and so on. The more appropriate goal for linguistics and 
semiotics should be. therefore, to determine to what extent and in 
what specific ways language reflects knowledge structures. 
The bulk of the work on grammatical systems in linguistics and 
verbal communication generally has traditionally excluded the relation 
between concepts and grammatical categories. The present study has 
aimed to show, however, that sentence form is shaped by conceptual 
factors much more than traditional grammatical analysis would allow. 
The effect of conceptual structure on categorization in grammar has 
been taken up somewhat in the linguistic literature, but it has never 
really penetrated the mindset of language scientists until recently. The 
philosopher Herder, for instance, saw an intimate connection between 
language and what he called "ethnic character." Subsequently. 
Wilhelm von Humboldt gave Herder's hypothesis a more testable 
formulation when he portrayed the structure of a particular language 
as interdependent with the thought and behavior of the people using it 
for communication. Needless to say, von Humboldt's perspective 
went contrary to the views of the Port-Royale grammarians who saw 
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language as the product of the universal logical laws of the human 
mind. It was shortly after von Humboldt's alluring pronouncements 
that the study of "language and mind" was given its first scientific 
research impetus. In the twentieth century, work on language and 
thought was pursued by both those espousing a Humboldtian per­
spective — Sapir (1921), Whorf (1956), and others — and those 
advocating a universalist Port Royale perspective — especially 
Chomsky. As mentioned, the goal of Humboldtians, such as Sapir and 
Whorf, has never been truly envisioned by mainstream linguistics 
until very recently. The North American version of linguistic science 
took its characteristic shape and methodological orientation from 
Leonard Bloomfield's 1933 textbook entitled simply Language. In the 
same way that Euclid's Elements bestowed systematicity and unity 
upon the study and practice of geometry in antiquity through its 
coherent synthesis of geometrical concepts and techniques, so too did 
Language provide the fledgling science of linguistics in the 1930s 
with an organized repertory of notions and procedures for carrying out 
detailed investigations and analytical characterizations of specific 
languages. This is the main reason why, in my view, Bloomfield's 
Language, and not the work bearing the same title and published more 
than a decade earlier by Edward Sapir (1921), came to be accepted by 
the majority of linguists as the point of reference for conducting 
empirical research and for developing models of language design. 
While Bloomfield's work constituted the first true "textbook" in 
the history of linguistic science, Sapir's book was the first real attempt 
to provide a framework for studying the relation of language to 
cognition and culture. And whereas for most of the twentieth century 
linguists diligently pursued the investigation of language systems per 
se, along the lines laid down first by Bloomfield and later by 
Chomsky, they have recently started to move more and more toward 
the adoption of Sapir's original paradigm. 
The question that Sapir sought to answer throughout his life is 
probably as old as civilization itself: How is thought related to 
language? He was intrigued, in other words, by the possibility that 
human ideas, concepts, feelings and characteristic social behaviors 
might be mirrored by the verbal categories that specific cultures 
employ to codify them. Sapir suspected that the most direct route to 
the mind was through language. Due to his tragically early death, 
Sapir was never able to design and carry out a research program aimed 
at examining his idea rigorously and systematically. As is well known, 
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it fell on the shoulders of Sapir s brilliant student Benjamin Lee 
Whorf (1956) to elaborate substantively upon his mentor's views and 
to give them a more empirically-testable articulation. Whorf posited, 
in essence, that the categories of one's particular language are much 
more than simple mediators of thought. He saw them as being the 
"shapers" of the very thought patterns they embody: "The world is 
presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be 
organized by our minds — and this means largely by the linguistic 
systems in our minds" (Whorf 1956: 153). But Whorf s experimental 
program for studying the language-thought nexus could not have been 
devised without his teacher's profound insights. Sapir saw language as 
being much more than a communication system. He considered it to 
be a kind of cognitive filter through which humans come to perceive 
and understand the world around them. 
Semiotic network theory is an attempt to make good on Sapir's 
agenda for linguistic science. It is just one way that can be envisaged 
for relating formally how thought and language are interdependent. 
Grammatical properties cannot be studied in isolation. To rewrite 
natural grammars with reflexive rules would imply research on the 
domains of meaning that are implicit in sentences first and. then, to 
connect the grammatical categories to these in direct ways. Some of 
the ways have been discussed tentatively in this paper. There is no 
doubt that future work in semiotics and linguistics will show how to 
encompass all the traditional morphological and syntactic categories 
within a semiotic framework of meaning. Within this framework, 
everything form verb tenses to adverb usage will be linked to the 
interconnected experiences of the world that are manifested in the use 
of a language b\ native speakers in cultural contexts. This was the 
research challenge put forward by Sapir; and the time has come to 
take up his challenge seriously. 
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Метафорическая «сеть» и вербальная коммуникация: 
семиотическая перспектива человеческого дискурса 
В статье утверждается, что языковой дискурс структурирован (на 
уровне формы и содержания) на метафорической основе. Понятие 
"метафорическая сеть" используется в качестве соотносительной 
рамки разных частей речевого акта, так как речевые акты 
соединяются в осмысленный текст на основе "общностей", которые 
передают общие понятия. Разные исследования, занимающиеся этим 
концептом, выявляют факт, что именно эти общности в качестве 
источников позволяют говорящему в ходе вербальной интеракции 
вывести значение, соединяя дискутируемую тему культурно значи­
мыми образами и идеями. Из этого, в свою очередь, следует, что 
7 
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язык тесно переплетается с невербальными системами значения, от­
ражая их в содержании языковых сообщений. Таким образом, поня­
тие метафорическая сеть приводит нас к мысли, что структура 
человеческой когнитивной деятельности во многом ассоциативна. 
Metafoorilised "võrgustikud" ja verbaalne kommunikatsioon: 
inimdiskursuse semiootiline perspektiiv 
Artiklis väidetakse, et keeleline diskursus on struktureeritud (nii vormi 
kui sisu tasandil) metafoorilisel põhimõttel. Mõistet "metafooriline võr­
gustik" käsitletakse kui kõneakti osade suhestumisraamistikku, kuivõrd 
kõneaktid ühenduvad tähenduslikuks tekstiks "valdkondade" alusel, mis 
edastavad ühiseid mõisteid. Erinevad seda kontsepti käsitlevad uurimused 
toovad esile, et just allikvaldkonnad võimaldavad rääkijail tuletada 
tähendus verbaalses interaktsioonis, ühendades käsitletava teema kultuu­
riliselt tähenduslike kujundite ja ideedega. Sellest omakorda järeldub, et 
keel on tihedalt läbi põimunud mitteverbaalsete tähendussüsteemidega, 
peegeldades neid keeleliste teadete sisus. Seega, metafooriliste võrgustike 
mõistest tuleneb, et inimtunnetus on suurel määral assotsiatiivse struk­
tuuriga. 
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Функция характеризации 
в настоящем времени 
M. Паладян 
Dept. of Germanic and Romance languages, 
State University of Yerevan, Armenia 1  
Abstract. Michel Paladian. Function of characterization in present tense. 
This article is devoted to a field in cognitive and semantic analysis where 
stylistics and grammar meet: it concerns the function of characterisation in the 
Present tense. In general, linguistic works, which are devoted to the Present 
tense, take into account only the time and the aspect. However, from a point 
of cognitive view, the values of the Present are not limited to the Verb; they 
also relate to the values of the Adjective. We must thus take into consideration 
not only the Time conceptualisation (time features), but also the Space 
conceptualisation (space features). We know, since Davidson, how the event, 
which the Verb represents, can be broken up into phases; it is to the one of 
these phases that the function of actualisation is attached. Actualisation is 
parallel to the function of characterisation specific to the Adjective. As such 
this phase seizes, retains and assimilates entities and processes of the world in 
their instantaneous appearance. This cognitive operation can also be analyzed 
on another level: on the level of visual work. 
Мозг человека— чувствительнейший детектор времени. Глаголь­
ные времена в связи с этим можно считать следующими друг за 
другом пространственными закреплениями. произведенными 
мышлением. Время и пространство образуют некий континуум, 
выступая вместе на разных участках зарегестрированного собы­
тия в разных пропорциях. Этот процесс проходит сначала в 
настоящем времени, которое служит моделью систематизации 
пространственно-временных отношений. Настоящее есть первич­
1  Michel Paladian passed away in February 2, 2004, in Paris. He was born in 
6.7.1943 in Lyon (France). 
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ная система, концептуальная схема (conceptual frame), пункт 
встречи говорящего со временем. Оно проявляется в сознании, 
как компактная реальность, однако, под этим впечатлением 
целостности скрывается вся инфраструктура глагольной системы. 
Переходя в пространство, время одновременно принимает на 
себя и три этапа его концептуализации: виртуальность, характе-
ризация, детерминация. 
В этой статье мы сжато рассмотрим механизмы характериза-
ции через настоящее и выявляем его стилистические возможнос­
ти в литературе и живописи. 
1. О структуре настоящего времени 
Если говорить конкретно, настоящее время кодирует лишь один 
временной охват (w2): указанные временные референции (I, II) и 
референция момента речи {поле Я) совпадают. Границы процесса 
(событие в целом — W1) остаются вне поля наблюдения. Го­
ворящее лицо держит в памяти открывающую границу процесса, 
а закрывающая — ожидается. Таким 
образом, настоящее время 
содержит в своей структуре частицу опускающегося объективно­
го времени — Т (см. об этом Паладян 2001), то есть реализо­
ванное локализованное время (прошедшее) и частицу поднимаю­
щегося субъективного еще нереализованного времени (будущее) 
(Рис. 1 ). 
W1 
w 2 
А2 
субъективное вр емя 
будущее 
пр ошедшее 
• будущее прошедшее , 
Я 
Рис. 1. Формирование настоящего. T — объективное время; W1 — 
большое окно; w2 — маленькое окно; X— настоящее 1; Y — на­
стоящее 2; А1-А2 —границы процесса; I—II — временные референ­
ции. 
Функция характеризации в настоящем времени 367 
Я не может утвердиться по отношению к уходящему объектив­
ному времени. В связи с тем, что объективное время постоянно 
обновляется, Я также вынуждено обновлять свое настоящее, 
создавая относительное (субъективное) время; иначе говоря, 
сколько моментов речи, столько и Настоящих. Границы процесса 
(событие в целом — W1) остаются вне поля наблюдения. Рас­
смотрим теперь Настоящее, так сказать, изнутри. 
Настоящее представляет собой сложный механизм. Процесс 
есть совокупность движений, микропроцессов, как говорит Д. 
Давидсон (Davidson 1967). Когда Я, как говорящее лицо, нахо­
дится в зафиксированной точке, его настоящее региструет час­
тицу процесса в дилатации. Оно унифицирует микромоменты. 
Настоящее время совмещает два микромомента: процесс (process) 
и состояние (state). 
Не все глаголы, однако, регистририруют настоящее время 
одинаково. Это зависит от того, к какому типу относится гла­
гол — телическому, или ателическому. Каждый телический про­
цесс состоит из серии превращений, которые идут от инпута к 
аутпуту (например: Съесть яблоко). 
Инпут —> превращение 1 + превращение 2 + превращение п —> Аутпут 
Настоящее время в телических процессах фиксирует проме­
жуточные превращения и держит их в напряжении; процесс 
подвержен дилатации. Время захвачено в пространстве. Подоб­
ной напряженности нет в ателических процессах (например. 
спать), в которых отсутствуют превращения: инпут и аутпут 
одинаковы. Если ателические процессы можно разделить на 
отдельные части и потом их вновь собрать (Swart 1997), то с 
телическими это невозможно. Вот почему лексическое значение 
ателических глаголов содержит больше пространственности 
(- динамика), чем у телических (+ динамика). 
В обоих случаях, ясно одно: вход времени в пространство 
приближает глагол к прилагательному и через него к существи­
тельному. Благодаря этому становится возможным уловить вре­
менную динамику и описать ее. Я имею ввиду описание времен­
ной динамики, а не связь Глагола с Существительным на лекси-
косемантическом уровне, которая уже изучена. Ж. Муанье (1980) 
писал: 
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Каждая глагольная форма содержит в себе номинальное начало. Глагол 
бежать во всех своих формах предполагает бегущего человека: либо 
виртуально, либо актуализировано. (Moignet 1980: 56.) 
2. Актуализация и характеризация 
Настоящее время актуализирует процесс и фиксирует его в 
пространстве: Я + Здесь + Сейчас. В качестве чисто временной 
предикации оно приносит новую информацию (new) о теме (gi­
ven). Если тема основывается на чем-то нам известном, то преди­
кат, как новый информационный элемент, описывает ее про­
странственные превращения. Актуализированная часть настоя­
щего (state), будучи зафиксированным состоянием, наполовину 
уже подвержена транскатегоризации. Вот почему можно сказать, 
что на нее распространяется проблематика таких категорий, как 
существительное и прилагательное. Я читаю предполагает Я 
читающий; а читающий уже частично входит в зону прилага­
тельного и существительного (Рис. 2). 
Я читаю 
Я прочитал 
Я читаю 
>s 
ДО 
после 
во время 
до + по еле 
Рис. 2. Актуализация — характеризация. 
Таким образом, благодаря своим привилегированным отноше­
ниям с прилагательным (партиципы), глагол получает функцию, 
которая свойственна в основном существительным и прилага­
тельным. Это явление наиболее очевидно в германских языках, а 
также в армянском. В английском, например, употребляется на­
стоящий партицип с [ing], который, как известно, часто перехо­
дит в категорию существительного (standing, parking). А армян­
ский язык употребляет неопределенный 
партицип в предложном 
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падеже с [um] + вспомогательный глагол в настоящем времени с 
[ет\, [es], [е] / [enk], [ek], [еп]. Эти партиципы объявляют начало 
окончательной локализации (и параллельно квантификации), 
осуществляемой далее через дополнение или обстоятельство. 
Разница между определительной функцией глагола и той же 
функцией прилагательного состоит в том, что глагол через диа-
тезис связан со всеми аргументами; в то время, как прилагатель­
ное связано 
лишь с одним. В предложении Я люблю эту книгу 
характеризующая черта глагола касается Я прямо, и книги 
косвенно. 
Отметим однако, что степень характеризации глагола варьи­
руется в зависимости от его типа — телического или атели-
ческого. Второй тип содержит большую степень характеризации, 
нежели первый. Предложение Самвел пьет вино почти не харак­
теризует Агенса (accomplissement), в то время, как Самвел пьет, 
(activité) можно уже понять как: Самвел— пьяница. 
Время, обычно, вносит перспективу в пространство, деля его 
на участки. Перспектива дает возможность сравнивать интервалы 
телических глаголов и тем характеризовать актанты в разных 
состояниях и в полной конфигурации. 
Процесс характеризации можно описать как улавливание 
характеризующих черт Существительного, благодаря которому 
происходит концептуальный переход, например, от livre в un livre. 
Характеризация и актуализация (глагол — см. Рис. 2) — парал­
лельные семантико-грамматические процессы. Подобный про­
межуток улавливания черт существует и между виртуальным (0 
степень лица; 0 степень времени; 0 степень модальности, выра­
женные инфинитивом) и актуализированным глаголами. С семан­
тикой глагола происходит то же, что и с семантикой существи­
тельного. Я читающий со своей семантикой, близкой к прила­
гательному, маркирует промежуточное пространство между вир­
туальным (type) и детерминированным (token). Здесь, как и у 
Существительного, есть три этапа актуализации: первый — еще 
виртуальный этап; второй — характеризация, третий — детерми­
нация. Впрочем, второй этап Существительного (характеризация) 
можно считать своего рода когнитивной предикацией. Именно 
здесь прилагательное встречается, с одной стороны, с существи­
тельным, а с другой — с глаголом. Об этом свидетельствует пере­
ходность прилагательного, например: жаждущий чего-то; 
чувствительный к чему-то и т. п. Первое прилагательное содер­
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жит в своем семантизме агентивность, которая свойственна гла­
голам волеизъявления. А второе построено как глагол движения. 
3. Стилистический анализ: Бодлер, Гармония вечера 
В стихотворении Гармония вечера (Harmonie du soir) Шарль Бод­
лер (Baudelaire 1991) прибегает к настоящему времени и по­
вторяет его с целью охарактеризавать убегающее время. Прото-
роли (система аргументов) функционируют как локусы этой хара-
теризации. Поэт стремится тематизироватъ движение, не анну­
лируя его. Стихотворение начинается с катафатической попыт­
ки локализации времени: локуторное пространство получает свои 
ориентиры в Я + Здесь + Сейчас. Эта попытка осуществляется 
посредством повелительного Настоящего — Презентатива voici 
(вот). Напомним, что наречие voici происходит от vois ci! (смотри 
на это). Бодлер описывает не пришедший, а приходящий вечер. 
Цель поэта задержать возникающие ощущения при первом же их 
появлении. Эти нюансы, к сожалению, не учитывают русские 
переводы . Так. например, А. Владимиров переводит voici venir — 
Уж вечер", а М. Касаткин вместо настоящих (партиципа и 
времени) vibrant и s'évapore использует прошедшее совершенное 
"возжег"' (Baudelaire 1991 : Бодлер 1970; 1998). 
Voici venir les temps où vibrant sur sa tige 
Chaque fleur s'évapore ainsi qu'un encensoir ; 
Les sons et les parfums tournent dans l'air du soir; 
Valse mélancolique et langoureux vertige! 
Chaque fleur s'évapore ainsi qu'un encensoir: 
Le violon frémit comme un cœur qu'on afflige: 
Valse mélancolique et langoureux vertige! 
Le ciel est triste et beau comme un grand reposoir. 
Le violon frémit comme un cœur qu'on afflige; 
Un cœur tendre, qui hait le néant vaste et noir. 
Le ciel est triste et beau comme un grand reposoir 
Le soleil s'est noyé dans son sang qui se fige. 
Un cœur tendre, qui hait le néant vaste et noir, 
Du passé lumineux recueille tout vestige, 
Le soleil s'est noyé dans son sang qui se fige ... 
Ton souvenir en moi luit comme un ostensoir! 
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Вот час, когда в полях, струя благоуханья, 
Кадильницы цветов возжег незримый клир; 
За звуком 
аромат уносится в эфир 
Печально-плавный вальс, истомное порханье! 
Кадильницы цветов возжег незримый клир; 
Трепещет скрипки вздох, как сердце в миг 
страданья; Печально-плавный вальс, 
истомное порханье! 
Прекрасен, как алтарь, закатных туч порфир; 
Трепещет скрипки вздох, как сердце в миг 
страданья; 
Ужасна сердцу смерть — пустынный черный 
мир 
Прекрасен, как алтарь, закатных туч порфир;. 
Диск солнца потонул за обагренной гранью... 
Ужасна сердцу смерть — пустынный черный 
мир! 
Минувшее зажгло свои воспоминанья! 
Диск солнца потонул за обагренной гранью... 
Ты в памяти моей блистаешь, как потир! 
(перевод М. Касаткина) 
Уж вечер . Все цветущие растения , 
Как дым кадил, роняут аромат; 
За звуком звук по воздуху летят; 
Печальный вальс и томное круженье! 
Как дым кадил, роняут аромат; 
И стонет скрипка, как душа в мученье; 
Печальный вальс и томное круженье! 
И небеса, как алтари, горят. 
И стонет скрипка, как душа в мученье. 
Испившая сует смертельный яд; 
И небеса, как алтари, горят 
Светило дня 
зардело на мгновенье. 
Земных сует испив смертельный яд, 
Минувшего душа сбирает звенья 
Светило дня зардело на мгновенье. 
И, как потир, мечты о ней блестят ... 
(перевод А. Владимирова) 
Бодлер связывает презентатив voici с глаголом движения venir + 
подлежащее, представляющее собой нематериальную вещь 
(temps) во множественном числе; персонификация времени вхо­
дит в программу локализации убегающего времени в настоящем 
моменте. Лексически глагол venir подразумевает исходное 
состояние, но он описывает аутпут — кульминацию процесса (в 
растяжении). Глагол venir не спряжен и употребляется в качестве 
пантонима. Этот термин, который внес в употребление Ф. Хамон 
(Hamon 1983), подразумевает слово, открывающее и резюми­
рующее текст. Например, писатель сначала употребляет панто-
ним "дом" и уже после этого приводит всю парадигму этого 
понятия, как то: двери, окна, стены, крыша и т.д. Далее текст 
может вновь вернутся к пантониму "дом" для того, чтобы пере­
дать парадигму цельно в одном слове, то есть, резюмировать, что 
все описанное и есть дом. У Бодлера после пантонима "voici 
venir" идет целая серия настоящих, которые составляют пара­
дигму "venir". Эти Настоящие (сюда входят как телические, так 
и ателические глаголы) призваны выделить открывающую гра­
ницу процесса (телические глаголы) и одновременно его статич­
ность (ателические глаголы) как можно четче в попытке 
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растяжения временной динамики. Парадокс заключается именно 
в этом; он феноменологического порядка. Задержание ощущения 
предполагает дать ему сначала развиться, переселить в про­
странство, не впустив, тем самым, ничего нового; дать возникаю­
щему событию лишь обозначится.Семантические протороли, как 
индексы без конечной конфигурации, находятся почти на уровне 
стимулуса. Иначе говоря, поэт оперирует глаголом так, словно он 
существительное. Впрочем, Бодлер чаще отдает предпочтение 
процессу в виде резюме (summary scanning как сказал бы Ланга-
кер — Langacker 1987: 144): Печально-плавный вальс, истомное 
порханье! 
Любое высказывание возможно и самобытно только тогда, 
когда оно обладает пространственной определенностью, иначе 
говоря тогда, когда оно выводится из неопределенности. В тот 
момент, когда Бодлер начинает свое описание, частица вре­
мени — хронотезиса (О (<совершенное время по Гийому) уже 
реализована. Поэтому поэту необходимо задержать ее как можно 
ближе к хронотезису ос (несовершенное время по Гийому). 
Вещи сосуществуют в пространстве в связи с тем. что они представлены 
одному и тому же воспринимающему субъекту и охвачены единой 
временной волной. Однако, единство и особенность каждой волны 
возможны только благодаря ее спрессованности с предшествующей и 
последующей, а также благодаря тому, что та же пульсация, которая 
продвигает волну, задерживает предшествующую и пробует задержать 
последующую. (Merleau-Ponty 1945: 318) 
Как мы уже отмечали, говорящее лицо не желает разрывать 
момент речи от события. 
Un cœur tendre, qui hait le néant vaste et noir, 
Du passé lumineux recueille tout vestige... 
Нежное сердце, ненавидящее обширное и черное небытие, 
Собирает все обломки сияющего прошлого... 
Вот почему можно провести параллель между становлением 
фонетического знака и настоящим. Если фонетический знак 
считать местом, вернее, дорогой (о концепте дорога см. Jacken­
doff 1983; 1993), на которой встречаются концепт и мир, то 
настоящее можно считать той дорогой (path), где встречаются 
объективное и субъективное время — момент деиксиса и 
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аподеиксиса. Именно здесь должны встречаться собирательная 
энергия субъекта и собирательный телос процесса. 
Для маркировки этой программы Бодлер использует форму 
пантума (которую не использует Владимиров — Бодлер 1998). 
Эта малайзийская форма воспринимается поэтом как прими-
тивний язык, имеющий онтологическую связь с деиксисом. Она 
обеспечивает иллюзию задержанного, или растянутого мгнове­
ния. Каждое настоящее повторяется как эхо: 
s'évapore —> s'évapore/ frémit —> frémit /fige —> fige 
Программа задержания открыто дается в последнем стихе: 
Ton souvenir en moi luit comme un ostensoir! 
(Память о тебе светится во мне как потир) 
Но, согласно переводу М. Касаткина (Бодлер 1970): 
Ты в памяти моей блистаешь как потир! 
Как видим, устранение метонимии (ton souvenir) в русском пере­
воде (у Касаткина) снимает программу задержания. А устране­
ние притяжательного прилагательного и деиксиса (Топ) у Влади­
мирова 
превращает актуализованное Настоящее в Обобщающее 
Настоящее. 
Программа задержания завершается единственным в тексте 
прошедшим совершенным s'est noyé, которое служит закрываю­
щей границей задержания (последняя картина: смерть солнца). 
4. Настоящее и визуальный знак 
Техника дилатации, которая пытается воспроизвести мгновен­
ное ощущение, иногда встречается и в живописи, к ней, в част­
ности, прибегает импрессионизм. 
Если до импрессионизма художники (Ян Вермер например: 
см. илл.2), передавали после персонажа (хронотезис to / - дина­
мика), то импрессионистов (Ренуар) стало интересовать до или 
полупосле персонажа (хронотезис а / + динамика). Можно 
сказать, что импрессионисты создают в живописи нечто, подоб­
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ное перформативному настоящему, — свет y них сам себя 
представляет, мы наблюдаем его результат и процесс одновре­
менно. В этом смысле можно оспорить известное представление 
о 
натуралистической основе импрессионизма, как внутренне про­
тиворечивое, поскольку импрессионистический метод по своей 
сути аналитичен: импрессионист дсконструирует пространство, 
реформирует его с целью ввести время-, он производит время 
посредством пространства. 
Дрожание контуров в картинах импрессионистов (мы при­
водим в качестве примера произведение О. Ренуара, Рис. 3) 
призвано закрепить черты стимулуса (черты настоящего в его 
процессуальном напряжении). Свет, слегка перемещенный, или 
растворенный, приобретает емкость и, как эксцесс, предвосхи­
щается в своем движении. Превращение света в пространство 
выявляет его секрет — тот миг, когда он достигает объект, ка­
сается его (не вселяясь, ибо время, как таковое, существует 
только будучи нереализованным) и взрывается. Техника дрожа­
ния вносит временную динамику в статичный ("прошлое вещи") 
по своей природе живописный образ. 
Рис. 3. Ренуар и Вермер. 
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Однако, чаще искушение передать прошчое света бывает сильнее: 
изображение пространства привлекательнее тем, что оно спо­
собно передавать смысл. Художник-классицист лишает свет 
динамики с целью зафиксировать настоящее, он передает вечное 
через пространство. Каждая картина является по сути оста­
новкой во времени (приостановка динамики). Вот почему для 
современного зрителя классическое искусство воспринимается 
как статичное ("музейное"). Парадоксально, что мы всегда склон­
ны жаловаться на быстротечность времени (она приближает нас к 
смерти), тогда как именно поток времени есть гарант жизни. 
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Karakterisatsiooni funktsioon olevikus 
Artiklis vaadeldakse kognitiivset valdkonda, kus kohtuvad stilistika ja 
grammatika: selleks on karakterisatsiooni funktsioon olevikus. Tavaliselt 
arvestatakse oleviku puhul vaid aega ja aspekti. Kuid kognitiivsest vaate­
punktist on olevik seotud mitte ainult tegusõna, vaid ka omadussõnaga; 
seda iseloomustab mitte ainult aeg, vaid ka ruumilisus (space features). 
Just seetõttu võib sel juhul öelda, et tegusõna stilistika kohtub omadus­
sõna stilistikaga. Tuuakse välja olevikus kasutatavate karakterisatsiooni-
mehhanismide stilistilised võimalused nii kirjanduse kui maalikunsti 
näitel. 
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Abstract. Are pictures signs? That pictures are signs is evident in the case of 
pictures that "represent", but is not "representation" a synonym of "sign", and 
if so, can non-representational paintings be considered signs? Some semioti-
cians have declared that such pictures cannot be signs because they have no 
referent, and in phenomenology the opinion prevails that they are not signs 
because they are phenomena sui generis. The present approach follows 
C. S. Peirce's semiotics: representational and non-representational pictures 
and even mental pictures are signs. How and why pictures without a referent 
can nevertheless be defined as signs is examined on the basis of examples of 
monochrome paintings and historical maps that show non-existing or 
imaginary territories. The focus of attention is on their semiotic object and, in 
the case of non-representational paintings, on their interpretation as genuine 
icons, not in the sense of signs that represent most accurately, but in the sense 
of signs that represent nothing but themselves, i.e., self-referential signs. 
Premises 
To discuss the semiotic foundations of the study of pictures pre­
supposes that pictures are signs. After all, semiotics is the study of 
signs, and if the study of signs can contribute anything fundamental to 
the study of pictures, the premise must be valid that pictures are signs. 
The validity of this premise has been doubted.1 Pictures are not 
always signs, and even when they are, their sign function is often 
1 Especially by Wiesing (1998; 2001) and Böhme (1999). Böhme (1999: 10) 
finds it necessary to "overcome the hypertrophy of semiotics" by means of a 
phenomenology of the picture which would assign an only marginal role to the 
semiotic approach in the study of pictures. His anti-semiotic line of argument 
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secondary, has been the argument of a recent theory of the picture 
founded in phenomenology." which goes on to claim that it has 
become more than evident that pictures can no longer be considered as 
signs since paintings have become non-representational. Abstract 
pictures do not represent anything, but rather 'show' or 'exhibit' only 
themselves (Böhme 1999: 28). 
In contrast to such arguments, I would like to develop the thesis 
that all pictures, including the abstract ones, are signs. My aim is to 
show that the arguments against a general semiotics of pictures suffer 
from the lack of an adequate model of the sign and have been 
developed without due consideration of the results and tendencies of 
current research in the semiotics of pictures," ignoring research in the 
semiotics of painting, which has not been restricted to the study of 
signs and meanings in representational paintings, but has done much 
research in non-representational painting. 
Exemplary studies in this context are the semiotic analyses of 
pictures which the Group ц has published in their Treatise of the 
visual sign (Edeline et al. 1992) or the semiotic studies in painting by 
the Greimas School, for which Thürlemann's (1990) book on a 
painting by Paul Klee can serve as an example, but we cannot go into 
further details since the following discussion will be based on a 
different semiotic theory, i.e., Charles Sanders Peirce's general theory 
of the sign. 
The crisis of representation as a crisis of the sign? 
The view that pictures are no longer signs is closely related to the 
debate of those who have deplored the "crisis of representation".4 
Evidence of this crisis has been seen in modern art, which confronts 
cumulates with these words: "The theory of the picture has to do away with 
semiotics in order to become itself'. See also footnote 10. 
2 Based on phenomenological assumptions, Wiesing (2001: 193) argues that 
there are only two semiotic ways of using pictures: pictures as signs of objects and 
pictures as signs of perspectives of seeing, including pictorial styles. Typical 
examples of types of picture that are not signs, according to Wiesing, are the 
classical collage and even the digital image (see footnote 5). 
3 For a survery of the state of the art, see Nöth (2000) and Santaella, Nöth 
(1998). 
4 Cf. Nöth (2003a). 
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us with pictures that seem to have lost their referents. A preliminary 
climax of this development has been discerned in the digital world of 
virtual reality, and theoreticians of the picture have not failed to 
declare that digital images are the prototypes of pictures which 
represent nothing and can hence not be signs." 
However, if representing something without a visible referent in a 
"real" world is a symptom of a crisis of representation, this crisis is 
certainly as old as the world of pictures in general. Indeed, pictures 
that represent something invisible in "real" space and time are as old 
as the history of pictures. If it is true that Leonardo's painting of Mona 
Lisa does actually not represent any historical person of Leonardo's 
time, 6  this only means that Mona Lisa is no faithful depiction like a 
photograph may be. However, it cannot be concluded that a painting 
that does not depict a "real" object is no sign. The assumption that 
only those pictures are signs which depict, like a photograph, an 
object or a living being suffers from the reductionistic view that every 
sign must have a material object as its referent. 7  Consider the logical 
consequence of such a theory for the semiotics of language. 8  Words 
could only count as language signs, if they depict objects such as 
"apple", "house", or "fish". Words such as "love", "unicorn", or 
"good" that depict no "real" objects could not count as language signs 
since they depict no real objects. 9  It is not plausible why the picture of 
a unicorn should be no sign, while the word that represents what the 
picture shows is a sign. 
Wiesing (2001: 197), e.g., argues: "The picture of a chessboard on a computer 
monitor is not a sign of an absent chessboard, but the presence of an imaginary 
chessboard." Furthermore: "The computer picture does not refer, but it creates an 
artificial presence by making the visibility of the picture its purpose." 
л  Böhme (1999: 46) gives this example to support his thesis that pictures 
without a "referent" are not signs and to surprise his readers with his insight that 
Leonardo da Vinci's painting is hence no sign. 
According to Boehm (1994: 327), the mistake of reducing pictures to 
depictions ("Abbilder") has been characteristic of the "conventional" approach to 
pictures in general: "The conventional concept of picture [...] is based on the idea 
of depiction. It is the idea that pictures mirror a presupposed reality (in whatever 
stylistic distortion). What we know and what we are acquainted with meets us 
once more under exonerating visual circumstances. At any rate, the nature of 
depiction consists in a doubling." 
h See more in detail Nöth (2002b). 
9 Böhme (1999: 46) ignores this parallel when he argues that words are signs in 
general, whereas pictures, in contrast to words are not signs but evince a "parti­
cular mode of being". 
9 
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It is true that the sign model reduced to the dyad of "sign and 
object" with which some uninformed theoreticians of the picture 
operate still today10 — can be found early in the history of semiotics. 
Nomen significat rem, "the word signifies the thing" was a definition 
to be found with Roman grammarians, and until Albert the Great, we 
find the view that the scholastic definition of the sign, aliquid stat pro 
aliquo 'something stands for something [else]' was interpreted as a 
relationship between a sign and an object. However, as early as in the 
writings of the scholastic semiotician William of Ockham the sign no 
longer stands for a "thing". There, the new and more modern defi­
nition states that the sign "evokes something in a cognition": Signum 
est ille, quod aliquid facit in cognitionem venire (Nöth 2000: 137). 
Both views of the sign, the one that focuses on the referential 
aspect of the sign referring to an object and the one that focuses on the 
mental aspect the sign evoking a cognition have later in the history of 
semiotics become integrated in models of the sign that distinguish 
three components of the sign, the sign itself or sign vehicle, the object 
Such as Böhme (1999: 27, 43), who, in continuation of the caricature of the 
alleged hypertrophy of semiotics quoted in footnote 1, goes on to distort the 
semiotic approach to pictures as follows: "The simplest reply to the question 
concerning the essence of the picture is: a picture is a sign. However, what is more 
trivial than the statement that a picture depicts something that is not the object, but 
refers to it. A picture makes something present that is not there itself. It refers to 
something else and has its essence in such reference." After his discussion of 
Leonardo's Mona Lisa as an example of a picture without a referent and hence of 
a picture that is not a sign (see footnote 6), the author comes to the following 
conclusion clearly based on a sign model reduced to the sign-referent dyad 
(Böhme 1999: 45): "What is then a picture'1 The fact that a picture can be a 
picture without having a referent obliges us to assume a being of pictures that is 
independent of the being of the things." 
Whereas Boehm restricts his critique of the interpretation of pictures as 
depictions to those who have an inadequate concept of picture, Wiesing extends 
this critique to a critique of the concept ot sign in general. However, his own view 
of the sign as a depiction of an object is clearly inadequate and it is inappropriate 
to substantiate his thesis that pictures are not signs. Wiesing (1998: 98) argues: 
"From a phenomenological point ot view one can say: pictures are the things 
whose visibility becomes autonomous. Pictures show something which they are 
not themselves — in contrast to an imitation which imitates and also wants to be 
that which it imitates. However, something on which you can see something other 
than what is present is not necessarily a sign of this other thing." — Even from an 
everyday understanding of the German word Zeichen ('sign') used in this line of 
argument, it is hard to see why something that shows (German: zeigt) something 
which it is not itself should not be a sign (Zeichen). 
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of reference relating the sign to the world of things, and the meaning 
which relates the sign to the mental or cognitive world of ideas. 
According to this triadic model, a picture, for example a photo of 
Sir Winston Churchill, is a sign vehicle, its object of reference is the 
politician who died on January 24, 1965 in London, and its meaning is 
the sum total of our cultural and historical knowledge about the life of 
this politician. 
Although the model of the semiotic triangle had advantages in 
relation to previous dyadic models, it suffered from a number of 
weaknesses. For example, the triangle was often not really taken for a 
genuinely triadic model of the sign. Instead, the reduction of the triad 
to two dyads used to be taken for possible or even necessary. For 
example, the picture of an apple or a fish, according to this view, are 
signs with both an object of reference and a cultural meaning. A 
picture of a unicorn, by contrast, is a sign with a meaning, but without 
a referent, while proper names are signs with a referent, but without a 
meaning. 
Such reductions of the semiotic triad to two independent dyads are 
not possible in the framework of Peirce's semiotics, as will be seen 
below. Every sign, and hence every picture, both has meaning and 
refers to an object. However, this theory of the genuinely triadic 
nature of the sign does not mean that the object of a unicorn, 
according to Peirce, is a really existent being with some similarity to 
the picture that depicts it. Rather, the object of the picture of the 
unicorn and the object of the sign in general is defined in a way that 
differs greatly from the realist tradition, which claims that only things 
can be objects. 
Pictures as signs 
In order to define pictures as genuinely triadic signs according to 
Peirce and thus to come closer to a solution of the nature of their 
objects, a short account of Peirce's sign model is necessary. One of 
the many definitions of the sign which Peirce gives is: 
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for 
something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates 
in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed 
sign. That sign which it creates I call the interprétant of the first sign. The 
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sien stands for something, its object. It stands tor that object, not in all 
respects, but in reference to a sort of idea. (Peirce, CP 2.228) 
In our context, the sign, that which "stands to somebody for some­
thing in some respect", is the picture. To be a sign, it is not necessary 
that the picture be on paper or canvas. A sign, according to Peirce, can 
also be a mere thought, an idea. Hence, a mental image can also be a 
sign. What is important is that the sign as a picture on paper or as a 
mental image be "a first", something that comes first to a mind that 
then relates it to an object as its "second" and an interprétant as its 
"third". 
The object for which the picture stands "not in all respects" can be 
a concrete object, such as an apple or a fish. However, it can also be a 
mere idea or something purely imaginary to which the sign refers, 
since the object, according to Peirce, is not necessarily some "real" 
object. Peirce says nothing about the 'reality' of this object at all and 
describes it as something "perceptible, or only imaginable or even 
unimaginable in one sense" (CP 2.230). He even goes so far as to 
speculate that "perhaps the Object is altogether fictive" (CP 8.314). 
Hence, not only really existent, but also merely imaginary beings, 
such as unicorns, can be objects of the sign. 
The interprétant of a pictorial sign are the ideas, thoughts, 
conclusions, impressions or actions the picture evokes. It is important 
to point out that the distinction between the object and the interprétant 
is not the distinction between a material and a mental correlate of a 
sign. All three correlates of the pictorial sign can be of a mental kind 
and thus a mental image, as we have seen. The difference between a 
mental picture that is a sign, one that is an object and one that is the 
interprétant of a sign has to do with the temporal sequence of these 
three mental images in the sign process. When the mental image is the 
object of a sign, it precedes the sign as something that evokes it. When 
it is an interprétant, the mental image is the effect that the sign has 
created in a mind. When it is a sign, it is a mental image which comes 
to a mind in a sequence of thoughts in which it refers back to other 
ideas and leads to a new interprétant. While the pictorial object relates 
to a past, which precedes and causes it, and the sign itself refers to the 
present, in which it is perceived, its interprétant unfolds in the future, 
in which it creates its semiotic effects. 
Both existent things and non-existent, merely fictional or imagi­
nary ideas can thus be the objects of a picture. The object of a picture 
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is not necessarily something existing in space and time, it can be 
anything that has determined the sign to represent what it does, a 
legend, a vision, another picture, or some real experience, whether the 
painter was aware of these determinants or not. 
In order to investigate all pictures as signs according to these 
premises, two kinds of pictures will be examined in the following that 
have often been given as examples of pictures without referential 
objects, namely imaginary pictures of things that do not exist and 
pictures that seem to represent nothing at all. 
Imaginary pictures and their objects 
My example of pictures that represent nothing in our visual universe is 
from historical cartography." Medieval and early modern maps 
abound with representations of imaginary territories which were 
mapped without empirical evidence because of false, erroneous, 
legendary, or mythical reports. 
A striking example is the representation of non-existent islands, 
such as the islands St. Brendan and Brazil, which were traditionally 
shown west of Ireland. Reports about the existence of these islands 
come from Early Celtic legends. Waldseemüller's map of the British 
Isles of 1522 shows one of these two imaginary islands (Moreland, 
Bannister 1983: 53-54). 
Another kind of cartographic representation of nonexistent terri­
tories are "unknown" or "not yet known" territories. For example, 
Ortelius's world map of 1587 shows a northern continent designated 
as terra incognita and represents a huge southern continent as a "not 
yet known" continent (Moreland, Bannister 1983: Plate 2). 
Notice that from the point of view of logic, such cartographic-
representations constitute a semiotic paradox, for, if the territory is 
unknown, how can it be mapped at all? On the other hand, terra 
incognita can also refer to an existent country about which knowledge 
is only insufficiently available, and Ortelius's representation of the 
huge southern continent called Terra Australis seems indeed to be a 
representation of the continent today better known under the name 
Antarctica. However, Ortelius's affirmation that this continent is not 
11 Cf. more in detail Nöth (2004). 
384 Winfried Nöth 
yet known must be taken literally. In his time, there was no empirical 
evidence whatsoever of the existence of the Antarctic continent, which 
was only discovered in 1820. The early cartographers' conviction of 
the existence of this continent was founded in mere geographical 
speculations published by Pomponius of Mela in the first century AD 
(Moreland, Bannister 1983: 58). 
Nobody can deny that maps which represent accurately existent 
territories are complex signs. However, the idea that maps of non­
existent, imaginary, or merely speculative territories are signs must 
seem unacceptable to those who maintain that imaginary pictures are 
no signs. Nevertheless, in contrast to the naive realist view of the 
referent of a picture, the object of the sign, according to Peirce. does 
not exclude imaginary or even false territories. Imaginary territories of 
maps have their object both in the world of geographical facts and in 
human minds. 
The object is rooted in the empirical world insofar as every 
imagination is somehow also influenced by experience. For example, 
the shape of the imaginary island Brazil on Waldseemüller's map is 
not only rooted in imagination, but also in the cartographers' know­
ledge of what "real" islands look like and how it is mapped. In this 
sense, even a map of a non-existent territory is affected by geo­
graphical facts, which constitute part of their object. After all. these 
territories are at least geographically possible, as the example of Terra 
Australis on Ortelius's map shows, which was imaginary in 1587, but 
became real in 1820. Notice that the geographer's negation of the 
knowledge of a territory, which is expressed by the adjective 
incognita, presupposes at least the possibility that this place exists. In 
this way. the world of geographical facts is also influential in the 
drawing of a map of an unknown territory, but at this point the 
empirical object merges with the mental object of the imaginary map. 
The mental aspect of the object of an imaginary map consists in the 
cultural, mythical, or legendary knowledge which preceded and thus 
caused the drawing of this map. In the case of our imaginary island 
Brazil, this aspect of the object of the cartographic sign has changed 
and even disappeared with time since the cultural knowledge that 
motivated the earlier early cartographers is no longer valid today. 
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Non-representational pictures and their objects 
Let us now consider non-representational pictures as signs and 
investigate in how far they can be said to stand for an object. The 
answer is complex, and only a rough outline can be given here. 1 2  It 
has to do with Peirce's theory of the genuine icon and the category of 
firstness. 
A genuine icon is not a sign characterized by similarity to its object 
but by its undistinguishability from it. (Similarity between sign and 
object is the characteristic of what Peirce defines as a hypoicon.) The 
genuinely iconic sign constitutes a kind of degree zero of semioticity 
since it is reduced to the category of firstness, "the mode of being of 
that which is such as it is, positively and without reference to anything 
else" (CP 8.328). Such an icon is a sign merely by virtue of qualities 
of its own, and since it is not yet distinguished from its object, it does 
not refer to or "stand for" it at all (CP 2.92, 2.276). Peirce says that 
the genuine icon "does not draw any distinction between itself and its 
object" since it is a sign by virtue of its own particular qualities (CP 
5.74, 4.447). He calls such an icon, which is a sign merely of its own 
qualities, a rhematic qualisign. As a sign undistinguishable from its 
object in this way it is a self-referential sign. 
Genuine icons are not a class of objects, they are phenomena that 
create a particular way of seeing without relating the object of 
attention to something else. Peirce describes how in the contemplation 
of a representational painting the picture may lose its referential nature 
and become transformed from a sign with reference to a genuine icon 
without: 
Icons are so completely substituted for their objects as hardly to be 
distinguished from them. [...] So in contemplating a painting, there is a 
moment when we lose the consciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction 
of the real and the copy disappears, and it is for the moment a pure dream — 
not any particular existence, and yet not general. (Peirce, CP 3.362) 
Once a picture is thus contemplated in total disregard of its referent, it 
is no longer a hypoicon, but a genuine or pure icon. The process 
comes close to what the tradition of aesthetics has defined as the 
autonomous or self-referential function of art. The painting that loses 
12 For more details see Nöth, Santaella (2000), Santaella (2001: 206-226), and 
Nöth (2002a; 2003b). 
386 Winfried Nöth 
its power to refer to anything but to itself opens the eyes of the 
beholder for the seeing of colours and forms as such, and in fact, 
elsewhere, Peirce identifies pure icons with pure forms, when he states 
that "Icons can represent nothing but Forms and Feelings" and that 
"no pure Icons represent anything but Forms; no pure forms are 
represented by anything but icons" (CP 4.531). 
The shift from a hypoiconic seeing of pictures to seeing pictures as 
pure icons is evidently what has happened in the historical revolution 
of modern art, where abstract and otherwise non-representational 
pictures have become liberated from the bonds of their referential 
objects to function as autonomous compositions of colour and form in 
which the difference between sign and object has been obliterated and 
meanings have become mere possibilities. 
Prototypes of pictures that have become iconic qualisigns are 
monochrome paintings and minimal art. These are probably the works 
of art which have negated most radically the referential object of the 
pictonal sign. Any reference to the world of material things, living 
beings, and symbols is programmatically eliminated. The pictures are 
reduced to pure forms and colours that refer to nothing but to them­
selves. 
A monochrome picture, such as the yellow composition by the 
minimalist John McCracken of 1967 (Fig. 1) either "means" nothing 
or it has an unlimited referential potential, since it may be taken to 
refer to all yellow and rectangular things in the world. Since such a 
picture is referentially both empty and completely open, it is best to 
abandon the illusion of reference and to focus on its pure form, and in 
fact, this is what the minimalists propose. 
Besides monochrome paintings, a very different kind of picture 
belongs to the iconic qualisigns, pictures that evince complete chaos 
without any recognizable principle of composition. Such pictures with 
lines, forms, and colours never seen before are free from any stylistic 
principle of visual coding and exhibit nothing but their own qualities. 
What such pictures have in common with monochrome pictures is that 
nothing is similar to them, and precisely because of this, they can be 
similar to everything. 
Once more the question arises whether and how such pictures can 
be signs or whether it is a semiotic contradiction to consider pictures 
without referents in the traditional sense as signs.'1 In the framework 
13 See also Edeline et al. (1992: 114). 
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of Peirce's semiotics, such a contradiction does not arise, since it takes 
into account the possibility of self-reference in signs. 1 4  As we have 
seen, a sign can be its own object (CP 2.274). According to these pre­
mises, non-representational paintings are self-referential signs whose 
objects is in their own structure, colours, light reflections, and 
shadings, which constitute a system of chromatic and formal 
references existing between the pictorial elements only. 
Figure 1. John McCracken (1967), There's no reason not to. (The colour 
of the panel is yellow.) 
14 Cf. Schönrich (1990: ИЗ). 
lu 
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However, поп-représentât ion al pictures are not only signs insofar as 
they are self-referential. There are other respects in which they are 
signs. First of all, they are signs insofar as they belong to the genre of 
painting. In this respect, they want to convey, so to speak, the 
message: "I am a work of art (and not some other rectangular surface 
that happens to be yellow)." Furthermore, such paintings inevitably 
refer to previous and current styles or trends of art, even if they are 
opposed to all of them. Finally, if nothing seems to be meaningful, at 
least the title of an abstract picture certainly conveys meaning to the 
painting. 
John McCracken's monochrome work in yellow, for example, has 
the title There's No Reason Not To. The declaration of this title is 
open to many interpretations, since the verb of the predicate is 
omitted. Nevertheless, the negation expressed by no reason suggests a 
distancing from previous compositional principles in the minimalist 
tradition. Unlike other works in this tradition, as for example Bamett 
Newman's Eve (in red) of 1950, McCracken's yellow composition is 
not a canvas, but a hybrid of panel painting and sculpture. Instead of 
hanging on the wall, it leans against it as if to visualize and to 
supplement the incomplete title and to convey the full message: 
"There is no reason not to lean against, instead of hanging on the 
wair. This conceptual and visual reference to the codes of traditional 
canvas painting, to which it is in opposition, indicates the object of 
McCracken's hybrid sculpture, the knowledge of previous paintings 
that we need to have in order to understand the present work of art. 
Peirce's category of the iconic sign, of which we have so far 
applied the subcategory of the iconic qualisign, comprises two further 
variants of the iconic sign which are relevant to the semiotic study of 
non-representational art, the iconic sinsign and the iconic legisign. 
While an iconic sinsign is predominantly a singular and unique sign, 
the iconic legisign is determined by a law or, as we would say today, 
by a code. 
Both categories of iconicity are characteristic of two further trends 
in non-representational art.15 The prototype of pictures which are 
predominantly iconic sinsigns is probably Action painting. Jackson 
Pollock's Action paintings evince singularity and individuality insofar 
15 Insofar as it is an original and refers to its painter as an individual, every 
single painting, whether representational or non-representational, evinces singula­
rity. Insofar, every original painting is a sinsign. 
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as they show indexical traces of the painter's presence in the picture. 
His expressive pictorial gestures visualize the movements of his hand, 
his paint brush, and they show the traces of his paint pots in the 
process of painting. 
The traces of singularity of a work of art are not only restricted to 
the expressive gestures of the painter's hand, but they can also consist 
in an invisible demonstrative gesture of choice and presentation. Such 
gestures characterize the singularity of the objet trouvé of the Dada 
artists. Marcel Duchamp's Fountain is an example. It is an object 
selected from an everyday context and placed into the radically new 
context of an art gallery. There it loses its reference to its ordinary use 
value and becomes a self-referential genuinely iconic sign instead. It is 
self-referential insofar as it denies its reference to its original use 
value. After all, to understand it in terms of its use value would mean 
to misunderstand its aesthetic value. The dramatic gesture of Marcel 
Duchamp's choice at a particular moment in the history of art, which 
was the main cause of its aesthetic value, makes it predominantly16 an 
iconic sinsign, which lets the beholder feel the artist' presence without 
whose signature the found object would be mere rubbish. 
The third class of iconic signs of relevance to the analysis of non-
representational pictures is the iconic legisign. Instead of its mere 
quality or striking singularity, this category of sign is characterized by 
a law that determines its composition. In painting, such laws can be 
symmetry, balance, polarity, tension, contrast, opposition, invariance, 
geometrical form, or chromatic complementarity. Prototypically, such 
laws are apparent in the compositional principles of Constructivism 
and Suprematism — for example, in the paintings of Mondrian. 
The structure of Piet Mondrian's paintings, for example, his 
Composition in Red, Black, Blue, Yellow and Gray ( 1920), obey the 
geometrical laws of the construction of rectangular forms, being 
radically reduced to coloured squares and rectangles divided by black 
lines. A square forms the visual centre around which the rectangles are 
l f i  There are many other semiotic aspects of this complex works of art. Today, 
that the scandal which Duchamp's work once caused has become a mere historical 
reminiscence, this work of art has also acquired the status of a legisign, the class 
of signs associated with habit and convention, insofar as it belongs to the canon of 
the classics of art history. Furthermore, since the original is lost and only 
reconstructions of the original can be seen today, these reconstructions can no 
longer be called sinsigns, since they lack singularity and are mere replicas of the 
original sinsign. 
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displayed in quasi-symmetrical arrangements, and the colours are 
chosen to create a harmonious balance without being in perfect 
symmetry. Forms and colours are not determined by their mere quality 
or the artist's spontaneous intuition, but by a chromatic and 
geometrical morphology and syntax, whose validity is not only 
restricted to this particular picture. The picture is a sign related by 
visual laws to the colours and forms which constitute their object. 
Conclusion 
Let us summarize. Pictures are signs, but to study them from a 
semiotic perspective requires an adequate sign model. Our discussion 
was based on Peirce's semiotics, and the focus was on imaginary 
maps and non-representational pictures, whose sign nature has been 
questioned. We have shown that the concepts of genuine iconicity and 
self-reference are necessary and useful tools in the study of non-
representational pictures. The subdivision of genuine pictorial icons 
into qualisigns, sinsigns, and legisigns, which focuses on the nature of 
the pictorial sign as such, made it possible to distinguish three major 
trends in non-representational painting. 
The third semiotic dimension of pictorial analysis, the study of the 
pictorial interprétants, had to remain largely excluded from this paper, 
not only because of lack of time, but also because there can be little 
doubt about the fact that pictures exert aesthetic, emotional, and 
rational effects on their beholders, whose result is, last, but not least, 
the interpretative discourse to which this paper has tried to be a 
modest contribution. 
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Семиотические основания к изучению изооражении 
Является ли картина знаком? Если картина "репрезентирует" нечто, 
очевидно, можно говорить, что картина есть знак. Но если "репре­
зентация" есть синоним "знака", то можно ли счтитать значащей 
абстрактную живопись? Некоторые семиотики полагают, что такая 
живопись не может считаться знаковой, поскольку она не имеет 
референта. Эта точка зрения преобладает в феноменологии: такие 
изображения не есть знаки, это самостоятельные феномены. В своем 
подходе я следую семиотике Ч. С. Пирса: и фигуративные, и не­
фигуративные произведения, и даже ментальные картины суть 
знаки. Как и почему произведения с отсутствующим референтом 
могут быть определены в качестве знаков, прослеживается на мате­
риале монохромной живописи и исторических географических карт, 
представляющих несуществующие или воображаемые территории. 
Основное внимание уделяется выявлению семиотического объекта. 
Не-фигуративное изображение интерпретируется как аутентичный 
икон, не в том смысле, что оно представляет объект наиболее точно, 
но в том, что оно является знаком саморепрезентации, то есть авто­
референтным знаком. 
Kujutiste uurimise semiootilised alused 
Kas pilt on märk? Kui pilt "representeerib" midagi, siis võib ilmselt 
öelda, et pilt on märk. Kuid kui "representatsioon" on "märgi" sünonüüm, 
kas siis võib tähenduslikuks lugeda ka abstraktset maalikunsti? Mõnede 
semiootikute arvates ei saa sellist maalikunsti lugeda märgiliseks, kuna ta 
ei oma referenti. Taoline seisukoht on valitsev fenomenoloogias: sellised 
kujutised ei ole märgid, vaid iseseisvad fenomenid. Käesolevas käsitluses 
järgin ma C. S. Peirce'i semiootikat, kelle järgi nii figuratiivsed kui 
mittefiguratiivsed teosed ja isegi mentaalsed pildid on oma olemuselt 
märgid. Kuidas ja miks puuduva referendiga pildid võivad olla määrat­
letud märkidena, vaadeldakse monokroomse maalikunsti ja niisuguste 
ajalooliste geograafiliste kaartide baasil, millel kujutatakse olematuid või 
imaginaarseid territooriume. Põhitähelepanu pööratakse semiootilise ob­
jekti eristamisele. Mittefiguratiivset kujutist interpreteeritakse kui 
autentset/olemuslikku ikooni, ning mitte selles mõttes, et ta kujutab ob­
jekti kõige täpsemalt, vaid selles, et ta on eneserepresentatsiooni märgiks, 
so autoreferentseks märgiks. 
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Abstract. Maria Goltsman. On some graphic regularities of perception in 
painting and dance: Mnemonic form of dance. The present article handles 
some problems of the mechanisms of visual perception in painting and classical 
ballet. It proceeds from the assumption that the interaction between those arts is 
based on the similarity of their formal languages. The main attention focuses on 
the questions of how and why does the classical ballet use the code of painting? 
The interaction between pictorial art and ballet occurs through the theatre, which 
is considered to be a picture coming alive in European tradition. This principle 
is taken here as a main method of analysis of ballet art and it is used in two 
ways. The first handles a problem of composition of a ballet as a theatrical 
performance. The second analyses the movement itself — the language of the 
choreography as such. The last part of the article contains the answer to the 
question — why does the ballet need such aspects of pictorial code as frontal 
composition of a picture coming alive, memory photo, multiplication of the 
similar images and repeating movements. Dance is dynamic, picture is stable. 
To represent a movement, the painting uses the rhythm and visual repeating of 
lines and contours. It helps to construct an illusion of motion and brings the 
temporal aspect into a static piece of art. Whereas different stops, poses and 
fixations in ballet help it to visualize the movement, to capture the space. This is 
one of the ways for ballet to leave its trace in space as much as in the memory of 
the spectators, to become fixed in space, to prevent the dispersion of dance in 
the thin air and to surmount in such a way the ephemera characteristic of it. 
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1. Язык живописи и язык балета — общее и различное 
В культурном сознании живопись и танец
1  
традиционно связаны, 
что проявляется как в изображении танца на плоскости, так и в 
живописном оформлении танцевальных представлений. Но поми­
мо этих общеизвестных моментов, существует и более глубокий 
уровень взаимных влияний живописи и танца — уровень общих 
возможностей языков этих двух видов искусств, когда можно 
говорить о взаимном переводе в семиотическом смысле. На этом 
уровне можно выявить принципы языка танца в живописных 
текстах, где он отсутствует сюжетно, а также читать спектакль по 
законам живописной композиции, даже если он поставлен на 
голой сцене без ухищрений декораторов и костюмеров. Свое­
образное "сотрудничество" этих двух видов искусства базируется 
на некоторой общности их художественных кодов, анализу 
которой и будет посвящена настоящая статья. Основной задачей 
мы видим выявление функций применения живописного языка в 
языке классического балета. 
Танец и живопись в своем историческом развитии постоянно 
соприкасаются и формально влияют друг на друга. Изначально, 
уже по самой своей природе, изображение и танец предполагают 
визуальное 
восприятие — и картину, и балетный спектакль 
смотрят. Это два пространственно-временных вида искусства, 
моделирующих свою художественную реальность при помощи 
изобразительных средств. Как живописью, так и балетом исполь­
зуются цветовые пятна и линии, пластика человеческого тела, 
мимика, жесты, костюмы, декорации, прически, грим, освещение 
и расположение тел в пространстве — композиция. 
Взгляд на балет через призму визуального образа проходит 
яркой нитью сквозь всю историю классического танца. В XV-
XVI веках, когда танец только начинал теоретизироваться и скла­
дываться в академическую науку с особым, присущим ей хорео­
графическим метаязыком, правилами и классификацией движе­
ний, стали появляться первые учебники и трактаты, фиксиро­
вавшие нормы профессионального танца. Законы танца записы­
вались, но так как одними словами доступно описать движение 
очень сложно, то наиболее адекватным пояснением к учебнику 
1  
Здесь и далее речь идет о европейских традициях этих двух видов 
искусства. 
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являлись иллюстрации, изображавшие позы и движения. Из 
трактатов XV века примером может служить книга Гульельмо 
Эбрео "Трактат об искусстве танца" 1463г., из трактатов XVI 
века— "Танцовщик" Фабрицио Карозо 1581г. (Рис. 1), "Оркесо-
графия" Туано Арбо 1589г. Примером иллюстрированного учеб­
ника танца первой трети XX века может служить самый главный 
труд в теории классического танца — хрестоматия А. Я. Вага­
новой "Основы классического танца" 1934г., выдержавшая 4 
издания, переведенная на многие языки и до сих пор считаю­
щаяся основой методики преподавания балета (Рис. 2). Изучение 
исторического танца непременно включает в себя знакомство с 
образами живописи и скульптуры различных эпох. На это обра­
щает внимание основоположник методики преподавания 
историко-бытового танца Н. П. Ивановский (1948: 15-17) в пре­
дисловии к своей монографии о бальном танце XVI-XIX вв. 
Рис. 1. В трактате Ф. Карозо перед началом словесного описания 
каждого танца предлагается гравюра, изображающая начальное по­
ложение танцовщиков относительно друг друга (Caroso 1581: 54). 
11 
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Рис. 2. Пример оформления учебника классического танца — стра­
нички с рисунками, фотографией и поясняющим текстом из Основ 
классического танца А. Я. Вагановой (1934: 48-49). 
По определению живопись и балет — немые виды искусства, в 
них не присутствует звучащее слово. Ю. Слонимский в 60-х го­
дах XX века определил балет как систему образов, воплощенных 
"бессловесными" средствами танца и пантомимы. (Слонимский 
1965: 7) Соответственно, и живописи, и балету приходится ре­
шать определенную редукционную задачу по передаче той 
информации, которая традиционно выразима только вербальным 
языком, в виде образов. И то, и другое искусство апеллируют 
именно к иконическому, образному смыслоразличению. Балет и 
живопись являются пространственными моделями культуры: 
в отличие от других основных форм семиотического моделирования, они 
строятся не на словесно-дискретной, а на иконически-континуальной 
основе. Фундамент их составляют зрительно представимые, иконические 
тексты, вербализация же имеет вторичный характер. Такой образ вселен­
ной легче протанцевать, чем рассказать, нарисовать, слепить или по­
строить, чем логически эксплицировать. (Лотман 2000: 334) 
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Конечно, в силу того, что человеческая культура изначально 
строится на слове, вербальный элемент так или иначе все-таки 
присутствует как в живописи, так и в балете — он, согласно Ю. 
М. Лотману, появляется при первых же попытках самоописания 
этих структур (Лотман 2000: 334). Так, например, вербальны, 
названия работ и имена авторов, также каждое изображенное на 
полотне или на сцене событие может быть словесно интерпре­
тировано, либо является интерпретацией уже существующего 
текста (произведение литературы; факт, описанный в истори­
ческих хрониках и т. д.). Не исключено и введение слова как 
такового в картину или балетный спектакль. В живописи при­
мером может служить широко распространенная в эпоху Ренес­
санса иконографическая традиция "Благовещения", где художни­
ки изображают фразы, которыми обмениваются Архангел 
Гавриил и Дева Мария.
2  
В балете же слово присутствовало в 
эпоху формирования его как самостоятельного вида искусства. 
Во второй половине XVI - первой половине XVII веков балет 
был неотделим от поэтического слова и представлял собой пьесы 
с пением и диалогом, где танец не всегда имел преобладающее 
значение. Но главным выразительным средством как живописи, 
так и балета в его классической форме остается все-таки не слово, 
а образ. 
Между живописью и балетом существует и важное отличие. 
Танец — это прежде всего динамика. Основа танца состоит в 
метаморфозах, постоянном перетекании, изменении и игре форм. 
В отличие от танца, изобразительное искусство не способно 
передавать физических перемещений и движений в пространстве, 
на живописном полотне могут присутствовать только неподвиж­
ные образы, которые закреплены на поверхности и по сути своей 
неизменны, то есть не могут производить реальные физические 
движения. Тем не менее, изобразительные искусства обладают 
свойством создавать иллюзию движения и даже иллюзию танца. 
Для передачи динамики на плоскости применяется, например, 
композиционный прием ритмического повтора линий и контуров, 
которые способны создавать зрительный эффект движения. Если 
См., например, композиции "Благовещения" Симоне Мартини (1333г., 
Флоренция, Галерея Уффици), Яна Ван Эйка (1432г., Гентский алтарь, 
Гентский собор Св.Бавона), Фра Беато Анджелико (ок. 1434г., Кортона, Му-
зео Диочезано) и др. Подробнее о таком способе изображения "Благовеще­
ния" см., например, Майкапар (1998: 39-40). 
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живопись двухмерна, статична и закрепляет на плоскости недви­
жимые образы, то балет — искусство трехмерное, динамичное, 
изменчивое и крайне эфемерное. В живописи преобладает про­
странство, в балете — время. Поэтому, применение в живописи 
таких приемов, как ритмика линий, а также пластика тел, мимика 
лиц, привносит сюда временной аспект, и повышает динамику. 
Тогда как контрастные динамике действия общие статичные 
композиции и фиксированные отдельные позы в балете упо­
добляют его живописи и помогают ему закрепиться в про­
странстве. 
2. Театр как объединяющее звено 
Объединяющим звеном между живописью и балетом является 
театр. Сценический танец — это часть театрального представле­
ния, 
а театр в том виде, который он получил в Европе — это в 
некотором роде (согласно распространенной метафоре) ожившая 
картина, имеющая даже реальную раму — так называемое 
"зеркало сцены" — проем в архитектурном портале, отделяющем 
театральную сцену от зрительного зала. Интерес к эффекту ожи­
вающей 
и вновь замирающей картины стоял у истоков зарож­
дения классического балета и не угасал в течение всей истории 
этого вида искусства. Балет как система классического танца 
начал зарождаться во Флоренции эпохи кватроченто, но 
подготовлялся он издавна внутри различных зрелищ, как светских, так и 
церковных. Процесс уходил вглубь столетий, и начало его лишь условно 
может быть отнесено к XIV веку, откуда уже отчетливо прослеживается 
постепенное становление балета, кристаллизация которого завершилась 
к концу XVI века. 4  
Считается, что классический танец зарождался в городских и 
придворных театрализованных празднествах, во время которых, 
уже начиная с XIII века, одним из распространенных способов 
построения представления был упомянутый выше принцип 
?  
Очень подробно функциональную параллель картина-театр рассмат­
ривает Ю. М. Лотман в своей статье о восприятии театральной сцены через 
живописный код в культуре начала XIX века (Лотман 1998: 636-645). 
4  
Подробнее см. Красовская (1979: 25-28). 
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оживающей и вновь застывающей в начальной позе "живой 
картины". Так, например, при праздновании дня Св. Иоанна, 
покровителя Флоренции, по городу проходили пышные процес­
сии, во время которых из групп людей создавались фигуры — 
артистически составленные композиции на основе известных 
библейских сюжетов. Эти композиции размещались на колесни­
цах, проезжавших по улицам на главную площадь, и по прибытии 
статичные картины оживали и развертывались в действенную 
игровую сценку: сюжет излагала пантомима под пение 
(Красовская 1979: 17). В Италии XV-начала XVI веков танец 
присутствовал как в уличных праздниках, так и в дворцовых 
пиршествах, в организацию и оформление которых вовлекались 
такие художники, как Леонардо да Винчи, Андреа Мантенья, 
Сандро Боттичелли, Рафаэль. Они участвовали как в создании 
декора — живописного фона для праздников, написанного темпе­
рой на холстах, расставленных вдоль пути следования власти­
тельных особ во время их торжественных выездов и в покоях 
герцогских дворцов, так и непосредственно в режиссуре и внеш­
нем оформлении (костюмы, декорации, сценические эффекты) 
живых картин. В результате такого тесного взаимодействия, по 
словам М. Соколова, в этот период получила распространение 
картинизация театра, тогда как в живописи происходил обрат­
ный процесс — театрализации и режиссуры (Соколов 1999: 319). 
Здесь можно заметить интересный парадокс: художники создают 
работы, отражающие окружающую их действительность, (как 
известно, эпоха Ренессанса провозгласила принцип искусства как 
зеркала природы), тогда как сама эта действительность протекает 
на фоне театральных декораций, созданных этими же художни­
ками. В результате, имеет место двойная кодировка — художник 
воспроизводит языком живописи действительность, построенную 
по законам театра. 
В конце XVI века в Европе появились традиционные для 
сегодняшнего зрителя публичные театральные здания, предназна­
ченные для просмотра представления на специально устроенной 
т.н. сцене-"коробке" — замкнутой с трех сторон площадке. 
Пространство такой сцены сделало балет искусством чисто фрон­
тальным, чем еще больше сблизило его с живописью. Из расчета 
на взгляд с одной стороны, вся композиция балетного спектакля 
выстраивается по направлению к рампе. Это и делается главным 
отличием сценического танца от бального. На балах посетители 
400 Maria Goltsman 
являлись одновременно и зрителями и танцовщиками. Танцую­
щие могли быть окружены зрителями со всех сторон и находи­
лись они в том же самом пространстве, что и зрители — на полу 
бальной 
или пиршественной залы. Появление традиционной в 
сегодняшнем понимании театральной сцены внесло четкое про­
странственное разграничение зрителя и актера (в данном 
случае— танцовщика). Театральное представление стало про­
исходить в отграниченном пространстве, устроенном из расчета 
на взгляд со стороны — как картина, отделенная от реальности 
рамой упомянутого выше зеркала сцены и заключенная в 
горизонт живописно оформленных кулис и задника. 
Далее, по ходу истории балетного театра, эффект ожившей 
живописи можно обнаружить как в общих композициях спектак­
лей, 
так и в лексических элементах самого хореографического 
языка. В первом случае мы имеем дело с целым историческим 
рядом конкретных примеров непосредственного уподобления 
балетного спектакля живописной композиции. Картина здесь 
используется в качестве статического инварианта к динамической 
развертке движений в танце. Второй случай более сложен, он 
требует пристального внимания к самому языку балетного ис­
кусства. Здесь следует обратить внимание на специфику балет­
ного движения — это пример того, что, при помощи доступных 
ему хореографических средств, танец способен рисовать в про­
странстве и создавать своего рода живую живопись. 
3. Балетный спектакль как оживающая картина 
Этот подход пропагандировал в своих рассуждениях балетмейс­
тер и теоретик танца XVIII века Ж. Ж. Новерр. В своих "Письмах 
о танце" он пишет о том, что балет представляет собой картину 
или, вернее, последовательный ряд оживших картин, связанных в 
одно целое определенным действием и непрерывно сменяющих 
одна другую (Новерр 1965: 50, 79). Эти идеи оказали большое 
влияние на последующую историю балетного театра. Параллель 
картина-балет прошла сквозь всю историю вплоть до XX века. 
Примерами начала XX века могут служить живые картины, сочи­
ненные М. Петипа в 1903 году для благотворительного спектакля 
в пользу Отдела защиты детей от жестокого обращения ("Пир у 
Нерона", "Уголок заброшенного парка" и "Фрина"). Также важно 
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отметить знаменитый балет М. Петипа "Спящая красавица" 
(1890г.), зрелищную суть которого, по словам В. Гаевского, 
составляет картинность: "медленное передвижение из пролога в 
первый акт, затем во второй, затем панорама и, наконец, при­
бытие в третий акт напоминает движение по залам музея. И это 
особый музей — музей парадных портретов" (Гаевский 2000: 13). 
А в центре сюжетной композиции "Спящей красавицы" лежит 
все тот же популярный мотив оживления застывшей картины — 
королевство, погруженное злой феей Карабосс в летаргический 
сон, оживает спустя сто лет. Хорошим наглядным примером к 
первому случаю служит также балет-пантомима М. Фокина 
"Павильон Армиды" (1907г.), описание которого сохранилось в 
"Воспоминаниях" балетмейстера: 
Балет начинался с грандиозной группы. Чаровница Армида сидела в 
своем саду, окруженная пышной свитой и массой рабов. Всю группу я 
прикрыл тюлями, стараясь создать иллюзию гобелена, в котором при 
отдельных ярких синих и малиновых пятнах все же доминируют обычно 
мутные серовато-желтые тона. Затем я 
увеличивал свет за тюлями. Они 
делались невидимыми и раздвигались. Краски оживали. Оживали и 
персонажи, "вытканные" на гобелене. Разворачивались группы, танцы. 
(Фокин 1962: 180) 
В целом, можно отметить, что прием ожившей и вновь зами­
рающей картины применяется чаще всего в качестве эффектных 
начал, кульминаций и концовок частей балета. Он плотно вошел 
в его композицию и даже получил неформальный термин для 
своего обозначения — "фотография на память". Исполнители 
замирают в определенной позе, заданной балетмейстером и 
остаются неподвижными какое-то время. Если имеет место конец 
спектакля или одного из актов, то танцовщики держат позу до тех 
пор, пока не закроется занавес или не погаснет свет. Все позы и 
расположение танцовщиков на сцене четко определены балет­
мейстером из расчета на взгляд из зрительного зала — компо­
зиция фронтальна и разворачивается по направлению к зрителю. 
Этот прием дает балету дополнительный способ маркирования 
начала и конца, выступая в качестве временной рамы, делающей 
законченными следующие друг за другом во времени части 
спектакля. 
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4. Изобразительность хореографии 
Изобразительность присутствует в самой хореографии, в дви­
жениях и позах. Это одна из основных особенностей класси­
ческого танца, которая требует от танцовщиков умения чисто 
выполнять заданные балетмейстером движения, фиксировать в 
танце четкие позы и владеть всей лексикой строгого балетного 
языка. Танец — это постоянное движение. В танце, по точной 
метафоре Ф. Г аре и а Лорки, происходит борьба тела с незримым 
туманом, в котором оно тонет и поэтому должно мгновенно и 
непрерывно высвечивать свои контуры (Гарсиа Лорка 1971: 82). 
Это означает, что динамика в танце тесно взаимодействует со 
статикой. Классический танец строится по принципу разложения 
быстрого движения на фазы. Танцу необходимы мгновенные 
остановки, промежуточные фиксации и четко сделанные дви­
жения для того, чтобы он "смотрелся", чтобы он смог изобразить. 
Танец живет только в движении, а стоит ему остановиться, 
замереть на месте, окончательно застыть в какой-нибудь позе, и 
он сразу же начинает напоминать живопись. Он, как живопись, 
начинает не совершать, но изображать движение. Можно ска­
зать, что танец есть динамический переход от одного изобра­
жения движения к другому. 
Движение в танце — это не просто перемещение в про­
странстве, но значимое передвижение, оно — носитель инфор­
мации. Каждый шаг здесь должен быть семантически оправдан. 
Уже в эпоху кватроченто сценический танец основывался на 
демонстрации движения как такового и в этом сближался с живо­
писью и графикой. Он строился на принципах фиксации стати­
ческих положений, был малоподвижен и состоял главным обра­
зом из смены изящных поз, поклонов, реверансов. Как и живо­
пись, сценический танец стремился не просто произвести движе­
ние, 
но изобразить его. Изображение движения подразумевает 
искусственность, неестественность — так, как ходят на сцене, не 
ходят в жизни и т.д. Эта неестественность послужила для 
отстранения факта движения самого по себе от факта изобра­
жения движения. Профессиональный танец стал рисовать движе­
ниями. М. Соколов считает, что в культуре Возрождения рисун­
ку, основой которого является линия, как живому прочерку 
воображения, отводилось суверенное место, и, вместе с ним, 
самому принципу неоконченности, частным случаем которого 
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рисунок и можно считать. Понятие disegno использовалось во 
всех сферах деятельности — от эстетики до политики и несло в 
себе функцию вырисовывания, обнажения краешка идеи, как бы 
выглядывающей из материи (Соколов 1999: 59-61). 
С течением времени, в результате своего исторического разви­
тия балет стал представлять собой строго урегулированное дви­
жение, в котором четко разработана система позиций ног, рук, 
корпуса, головы, совместно с ограниченным числом групп дви­
жений. Эта система обусловливает единое для всех танцовщиков 
правильное исполнение каждого движения (РБЭ 1997: 537-539). 
Даже самое простое движение — спокойный шаг, например, в 
балете совершается по правилам. И чем выше сложность движе­
ния, чем оно быстрее и стремительнее, тем больше правил дейст­
вует при его исполнении. Теоретик и историк классического 
танца первой половины XX века J1. Д. Блок писала о том, что те 
движения, которые присущи танцевальным проявлениям чело­
века. входят в систему классического танца не в их эмпирически 
данной форме, но в абстрагированном до формулы виде. Как 
пример, она приводит прыжок, который в отличие от беспорядоч­
ного прыгания в танцах первобытных народов, в балете схемати­
зируется, исчерпываются все его возможности, и каждый из его 
видов разрабатывается до геометрически отчетливой схемы. При 
исполнении движения 
в балете, его форма зависит от того, как 
линии тела соотносятся друг с другом в момент совершения дви­
жения — положения головы, рук, спины, ног дают так назы­
ваемую линию танца (Блок 1987: 25-26). Линия танца очерчивает 
своими контурами балетное движение, она создает графический 
рисунок танца. Это означает, что танцовщику необходимо уметь 
ощущать свое тело в пространстве, он должен суметь проде­
монстрировать то или иное движение, поймать и воплотить в 
своей пластике линию и фактуру той или иной позы так, чтобы 
она успела зафиксироваться в пространстве. Чем чище и графич-
нее может это сделать танцовщик, тем выше его мастерство. 
Отсюда закономерность сравнения Ж. Ж. Новерра, согласно 
которому балетмейстер — это тот же художник, только он рисует 
не кистью, а телами танцовщиков: "Сцена, если можно так 
выразиться, — это холст, на котором запечатлевает свои мысли 
балетмейстер" (Новерр 1965: 50). 
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5. Балетный спектакль как событие 
Искусство балета, насчитывающее несколько веков истории, не 
говоря уже о танце вообще (народный, религиозный, бытовой и 
т.д.), имеет только единичные примеры надолго сохранившихся, 
да и то с большими изменениями, произведений. 5  И если в XXI 
веке можно пойти в музей и увидеть там произведения искусства, 
созданные даже задолго до нашей эры, то в репертуаре современ­
ного балетного театра трудно найти (если допустить, что это во­
обще возможно), постановку XV или XVI веков, да еще и иден­
тичную старинному оригиналу. Забытые и ушедшие из репер­
туара балетные спектакли восстанавливать необычайно сложно. 
Одной из причин краткой жизни балетных представлений 
является отсутствие универсальной системы их фиксации. Для 
того, чтобы сохранить свои произведения, многие балетмейстеры 
более поздних эпох (А. Сен-Леон, В. И. Степанов, М. Петипа, 
М. Фокин и др.) стремились изобрести системы записи движений. 
Но, во-первых, к моменту создания этой системы прошло уже 
почти пять веков развития балетного искусства, а, во-вторых, эта 
система настолько индивидуальна у разных балетмейстеров, что 
расшифровать ее зачастую под силу только самому тому, кто ее 
создал.
6  
В XX веке появились средства видеозаписи, что во многом 
изменило и улучшило ситуацию. Многие балетмейстеры активно 
используют средства кино- и видеотехники, создают видео-копии 
своих постановок, вводят видеоряд и видеоинсталляции в балет­
ные и танцевальные спектакли. Можно говорить и о том, что воз­
ник новый жанр искусства — фильм-балет. Но то, что в течение 
предыдущих исторических эпох (с сер. XV в. и до начала XX в.) не 
закрепилось в традиции классического танца, навсегда исчезло из 
балетного театра. И, кроме того, разумеется, фильм-балет не иден­
тичен спектаклю по целому ряду параметров. 
Каждое балетное представление существует как событие, оно 
происходит для зрителей только здесь и сейчас, то есть обладает 
единством 
места и времени воспроизведения. Оно не зак­
репляется в пространстве, и при повторе не совпадает само с 
собой. В статичном искусстве живописи следы, оставленные 
кистью художника, сохраняются неизменными на годы, в балете 
5  
Подробнее, например, в Слонимский (1968: 119-127). 
6  
Подробнее о несовершенстве системы записи танца см. Лопухов 1972. 
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образы рождаются и умирают по ходу действия. За счет дина­
мичного характера балет дает возможность показать больше 
живописных образов, но все они растворяются по окончании 
представления. Тем не менее, балет не был бы искусством, если 
бы вовсе не оставался в памяти. "Средний" зритель не может 
удержать весь спектакль в памяти целиком, но, безусловно, запо­
минаются какие-то отрывки, моменты, позы, движения. Кажется, 
что то, насколько полно зафиксируется в памяти балет, зависит 
именно от законов, общих для визуального восприятия живописи 
и балета. Итак, каковы формальные средства и инструменты 
фиксации танца в памяти? 
6. Мнемонические приемы балета 
Набор этих мнемонических приемов свидетельствует об архаич­
ности исходной мнемонической задачи танца. Только, если реконст­
рукции архаического ритуального танца скорее говорят о том, что 
при помощи ритмических движений закрепляется в культурной 
памяти сообщества некое правило, закон, регулирующий его бытие 
в мире, то в случае с классическим балетом эта мнемоническая 
функция направлена в первую очередь на сам танец. 
6.1. Визуальные повторы 
В первую очередь здесь следует указать на постоянное повторе­
ние пространственных элементов на разных уровнях, в том числе 
и на визуальном. Так, например, весь репетиционный процесс, 
как правило, строится на регулярном повторении заданного 
хореографом лексического материала. Реальная жизнь спектакля 
длится до тех пор, пока он держится в репертуаре и, как уже было 
сказано выше, восстановить забытый спектакль в оригинальном 
виде очень сложно. Для того, чтобы связать между собой следую­
щие друг за другом во времени части, в балете (как, впрочем, и в 
танце вообще) в качестве композиционного приема широко 
используется повтор движений, компенсирующий однонаправ­
ленность исполнения (Арнхейм 1994: 85). Здесь балет в первую 
очередь следует за музыкой, с которой он тесно связан и которая 
во многом влияет на характер сцен и отдельных движений. Как 
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правило, классическая танцевальная музыка характеризуется чет­
ким ритмом и определенным темпом, в основе ее лежат ритми­
ческие фигуры, которые могут повторяться в неизмененном или 
варьированном виде. По такому же принципу иногда строятся и 
танцевальные композиции, когда одинаковая или похожая комби­
нация движений повторяется в ходе представления. 
Существует еще один широко распространенный в балете 
прием, построенный на принципе повтора и имеющий сильное 
влияние на восприятие. Речь идет о повторении визуальных обра­
зов — когда на сцене присутствует масса одинаково выглядящих 
исполнителей — кордебалет. Наиболее известными из корде­
балетных сцен являются именно те, что строятся на принципе 
множественного ритмического повторения одной и той же 
фигуры в пространстве — танцы Вилис в "Жизели" (1841 г.), акт 
Теней из "Баядерки" (1877 г.), лебединые сцены из "Лебединого 
озера" (1877 г. — Москва. 1895 г. — Санкт-Петербург). Так, 
например, в балете "Лебединое озеро" в танцах лебедей второго 
акта задействовано 33 танцовщицы — кордебалет, корифейки и 
солистка — которые по внешнему облику не отличаются друг от 
друга (Рис. 3). Их единообразие достигнуто путем подобия 
костюмов, причесок, грима, а также за счет хореографии. 
Танцовщицы кордебалета располагаются в определенном, очень 
четком рисунке, на одинаковом расстоянии друг от друга и 
синхронно исполняют поставленные движения. Этим задается 
четкий визуальный ритм композиции танцевальной сцены. Кори­
феек и солистку отличает от кордебалета только расположение на 
сцене и повышенная сложность хореографии, корифейки на­
ходятся ближе к зрителю, солистка же, как правило, на самом 
первом плане и в центре. Но общий стиль, ритм, характер дви­
жений солистки совпадает с кордебалетом и корифейками, и за 
этот счет создается впечатление, что образ главной героини как 
бы отражается одновременно во множестве зеркал. Общеизвест­
ное культурное свойство зеркала удерживать душу и жизненную 
силу отражающихся 
в нем людей, когда отражение и отражаемое 
имеют между собой магическую связь (Бидерманн 1996: 95), 
нашло применение в балете, где кордебалет, как правило, вы-
В данном случае речь идет о версии К. Сергеева (1990 г., Мариинский 
театр), которая опирается на оригинальную хореографию М. Петипа и 
JI. Иванова. 
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ступает выразителем душевного состояния главного действую­
щего лица — группа лебедей как зеркало души Одетты. За счет 
множественного повтора, мультиплицированности визуального 
образа в пространстве, происходит многократное усиление 
эмоционального состояния, оказывающее мощное воздействие на 
зрителя. Этот же прием мультиплицированности главного персо­
нажа присутствует в знаменитом акте теней в "Баядерке" (Рис. 3), 
когда на сцену одна за другой выходят 32 одинаково выглядящих 
и совершающих одно и то же движение танцовщиц. Здесь, по 
словам В. Гаевского, происходит 
постепенное и сверхчеловечески мерное нарастание количественных 
впечатлений — сам выход "теней", наводняющий арабесками пустую 
сцену. Затем нарастание напряжения в долгих [...] паузах-позах, вы­
держиваемых тридцатью двумя танцовщицами в унисон, и деликатное, 
без судорог и суеты, снятие этого напряжения последовательными 
эволюциями четырех рядов кордебалета. А в целом — медленное и 
неотвратимое, как судьба, но математически точно измеренное нараста­
ние темы: от шага на плие до бега из глубины к авансцене. [...] сцена 
"теней" — сон Солора [богатый кшатрия, возлюбленный Никии — 
М. К.], которого преследует, множась, словно в невидимых зеркалах, 
видение смерти Никии-баядерки. (Гаевский 2000: 80) 
Рис. 3. Акт Теней из постановки балета "Баядерка" 1970-х годов. 
Воспроизведено в: Гаевский 2000: ил л. 41^4. 
408 Maria Goltsman 
6.2. Фиксация фаз движения 
Другим важнейшим мнемоническим приемом в балете следует 
считать фиксацию фаз движения, о чем уже упоминалось выше. 
Сформировавшаяся упорядоченная система классического балета 
говорит на своем конкретном языке. Каждое движение в функцио­
нальности своего эталонного воспроизведения здесь идентично 
слову естественного языка. И как неясен слушателю смысл слов 
того, кто говорит нечетко, размазано, без выражения и интонации, 
так и образ танцующего, выполняющего заданные па неумело, 
неуверенно, не доводя их до конца и не разделяя их четкими 
переходами, не замечается зрителем и не остается в его памяти. 
Следует отметить, что танцовщик должен уметь вырисовывать идею 
через танец. Любое движение в балете раскладывается на фазы — 
дискретные единицы, составляющие общий континуум балетного 
спектакля. И здесь его можно сравнить с более поздним явлением 
культуры — кинематографом: "воспроизводя зримый и подвижный 
образ жизни, кинематограф расчленяет его на отрезки" (Лотман 
1998: 307). Иллюзия движения персонажа в кино создается за счет 
проекции на экран покадровых изображений последовательных фаз 
его 
движения. Кино дает возможность проследить развитие дви­
жения в каждый отдельно взятый момент времени. Балет изображал 
движение, производя его на сцене по такому же принципу еще 
задолго до появления кино. Он еще не мог быть зафиксирован на 
видеопленке, но стремился фиксировать себя в пространстве. И этим 
методом расчленения движения балет как бы предугадал рождение 
кино. А появление кино в свою очередь повлияло на перео­
смысление балетом своих принципов так же, как и многими други­
ми видами искусства. 
Конец XIX начало XX веков — время становления кино­
искусства. Начало XX века — зарождение авангардистских тече­
ний, одной из характерных черт которых является размывание 
границ между видами и жанрами, тесное взаимодействие и 
взаимопроникновение различных видов искусств. Анализируя 
основные принципы авангарда, Я. Мукаржовский отмечает, что 
"искусства развивались не параллельно друг другу, а перекре­
щивались. взаимопроникали, в определенные моменты просто 
подменяли друг друга" (Мукаржовский 1994: 573-574). В связи с 
темой изображения последовательных стадий движения, особое 
внимание хотелось бы обратить на основные принципы футурис­
Об графических закономерностях восприятия живописи и балета 409 
тического искусства (зародилось в 1909г. в Италии), где нераз­
рывно слились движение, кино и изображение. Опыты футуризма 
тесно связаны с попытками изображения движения. Известно, 
что вдохновленные первыми шагами кинематографа, футуристы 
пытались передать в своих работах одновременность различных 
моментов движения, а также искажение формы объектов, вызван­
ное самим процессом движения. В результате, зрителю предла­
гаются визуальные образы, содержащие множество линий, изо­
бражающих части тела на различных стадиях движения.
8  
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передачи динамики, футуристы прорисовывают те следы, кото­
рые оставляет тело в процессе движения. Динамика оказывается 
наглядно составленной из отдельных статичных состояний. 
Таким образом, опыты кино и изобразительного искусства начала 
XX века — это ни что иное, как результат их тесного взаимо­
действия, проявившегося и в балете. 
Примером этому может служить одноактный балет "После­
полуденный отдых фавна" В. Нижинского (1912г.), где балет­
мейстером применены одновременно приемы живописи, скуль­
птуры и киноискусства по изображению движения. Начало бале­
та оформлено как огромная картина (за счет декораций и костю­
мов JI. Бакста), на которой в глубине уже присутствует фавн, но 
он настолько сливается со всем ярким и буйным ландшафтом 
декораций, что становится заметным только тогда, когда он начи­
нает двигаться. Затем появляются нимфы, хореографический 
рисунок которых копирует движения античных барельефов, из­
ображающих взявшихся за руки танцовщиц. Стилистика всей 
пластики Фавна — смена неподвижных поз, фиксирующих фазы 
движения. Каждое движение и каждый жест фиксируются 
танцовщиком, при помощи пауз акцентируя внимание на пре­
рывности, искусственности движения. Таким образом, если в 
живописи прием разложения движения на фазы применялся фу­
туристами с целью повышения динамики образа, то в балете — 
наоборот, для фиксации движения в пространстве. 
Свойственное балету стремление овладеть пространством 
путем оставления следов движения прочитывается и в специфике 
одного из видов балетного костюма. Речь идет о женской тю-
М. Дюшан "Обнаженная, спускающаяся с лестницы"  1 и  2, 1911-
1912гг., Дж. Балла "Динамика собаки на поводке" 1912г. (Рис. 5), Дж. Севери-
ни "Голубая танцовщица" 1912г., К. Kappa "Красный всадник" 1913г. и мн.др. 
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нике — платье с длинной пышной многослойной юбкой из 
легкого тонкого материала, применяемое чаще всего в романти­
ческих балетах. Длинные тюники помогают балету создать 
эффект движения, разложенного на фазы — их складки образуют 
линии, расходящиеся к краю юбки как лучи и вторящие линиям 
ног (Рис. 4). В момент совершения какого-либо движения, тю­
ника взлетает выше, чем идет нога, и после завершения движения 
опускается позже. В результате, она оказывается следом только 
что совершенного движения, она прорисовывает в пространстве 
фазы движения ног за счет складок, образуемых юбкой. При 
высоком прыжке, тюника повторяет не только линии ног, но и 
линии рук. Она создает тот же эффект, что и многорукие и 
многоногие фигуры на картинах футуристов. Она показывает, 
прорисовывает, фиксирует фазы движения. Повторяя траекторию 
ноги с небольшим опозданием, тюника оставляет в пространстве 
видимый след только что совершенного движения. 
Рис. 4. Пример женского балетного костюма романтической 
эпохи — тюника. На фото — солисты из балета "Шопениана" 
М. Фокина. Фотография любезно предоставлена театром 
и
Ване-
муйне", Тарту, Эстония (фотограф Р. Урбель). 
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6.3. Универсальные графические схемы 
Третьим условием долгой жизни балета в культуре можно счи­
тать введение в текстуру спектакля таких художественных эле­
ментов, которые играют роль ярких визуальных акцентов и 
воздействуют на зрительское восприятие по принципу мнемо­
нических фигур. И здесь балет обращается к живописи: в по­
строении динамического события используются законы, дейст­
вующие в искусстве статичном, относительно неизменном, закре­
пленном на холсте. Это, в первую очередь, применение таких 
композиционных приемов, в основе которых лежат двухмерные 
(линия, круг, квадрат, овал, крест, треугольник) и трехмерные 
(конус, пирамида) геометрические фигуры. Эти геометрические 
фигуры являются основой так называемого рисунка танца — 
того рисунка, который получается, если проследить все те линии, 
по которым идет передвижение танцовщиков на полу и в воздухе, 
то есть, в горизонтальном и в вертикальном направлениях. В 
связи с тематикой статьи, важно отметить, что эти геометри­
ческие фигуры появляются и исчезают по ходу действия пред­
ставления в силу динамического характера этого вида искусства. 
Рис. 5. Балла Дж. Динамика собаки на поводке. 1912г. Художествен­
ная галерея Олбрайт-Нокса, Буффало. Фото любезно предоставлено 
официальным интернет-сайтом Albright-Knox Art Gallery. 
13 
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Можно выделить два основных варианта геометрического 
моделирования в балете: в индивидуальном танце и в массовых 
сценах. В первом случае имеется в виду то, что в каждом дви­
жении, в каждой классической позе присутствует четкая геомет­
рия. При исполнении балетных па, все тело танцовщика обрисо­
вывает в пространстве круги, полукружия, квадраты, кресты и 
треугольники. Но особенно широко различные геометрические 
фигуры применяются в построении массовых сцен и танцах 
кордебалета. Так, например, балетный кордебалет представляет 
собой, как уже упоминалось выше, строго урегулированную 
массу одинаковых танцовщиков и танцовщиц, передвигающихся 
по сцене четкими линиями, рядами, колоннами, танцующих в 
кругу, квадрате, прямоугольнике, по овалу, крестом, звездой и 
составляющие трехмерные группы, в основе которых — пира­
мида или конус (Рис. 6). 
Рис. 6. Пример построения композиции кордебалетной сцены на 
основе прямоугольника. "Лебединое озеро" Красноярского Госу­
дарственного Театра Оперы и Балета. Фотография любезно 
предоставлена официальным интернет-сайтом Красноярского 
Государственного Театра Оперы и Балета: 
http://www.opera.kiasnoyarsk.ru/swanlake.php3 
Об графических закономерностях восприятия живописи и балета 413 
Как известно, геометрические фигуры лежат в основе самых 
распространенных символов культуры и являются графическими 
образами, выражающими архетипические понятия коллективного 
бессознательного: "Константы вращения земли (движение солнца 
по небосклону), движения небесных светил, временных природ­
ных циклов оказывают непосредственное влияние на то, как 
человек моделирует мир в своем сознании" (Лотман 2000: 257). 9  
Каждую из групп танца, построенную на основе одной из таких 
универсальных графических форм, можно определить как свое­
образный прижизненный памятник — пространственную отмет­
ку, призванную запомнить то, что еще происходит, но скоро 
должно исчезнуть. В культурной традиции памятник "всегда 
является фиксированным, то есть мнемоническим, каналом 
соотнесения единичного, случайного события с универсальным 
(божественным, космическим, природным, историческим) миро­
порядком" (Григорьева 2000: 70). При помощи приема соеди­
нения уникального события с некоей универсальной схемой, 
балет получает возможность выйти за отведенные ему временные 
границы, то, что происходит здесь и сейчас — явление времен­
ное, приобретает черты явления универсального и закрепляется в 
памяти зрителя неким мнемоническим блоком, своеобразным 
монументом, созданным средствами балета. Круг, треугольник, 
крест, пирамида, конус, входящие в состав того или иного жи­
вого памятника, являются фигурами, репрезентирующими 
абстрактное понятие времени (это выражается в самой форме 
часов — соединенные вершинами пирамиды песочных часов или 
круглый циферблат со стрелками). Применение этих элементов 
дает балетному искусству возможность овеществить время в 
пространстве, создать его пространственный знак. Путем сочета­
ния законов статичного искусства живописи с динамичной 
изобразительностью, балету удается на какой-то момент побе­
дить время и подчинить его своим целям. Балет как бы сам стано­
вится видимым временем. 
Помимо того, что в культуре время репрезентируется в гео­
метрических фигурах, основополагающим свойством архетипи-
ческого понятия времени является взаимообратимость его дроб­
ности и непрерывности. Время в метафорике культурного созна-
' Подробнее о значении квадрата, круга и креста в культуре см., например 
МНМ (1997). 
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ния складывается из неисчислимых одинаковых мельчайших 
частиц — песчинок, минут, капель и т.д. Эти маленькие частицы 
представляют собой течение времени, выраженное через про­
странство (Григорьева 2000: 97). В балете в качестве таких 
частиц выступают именно танцовщики кордебалета — они рабо­
тают 
как хорошо налаженный часовой механизм, симметрично 
располагаясь на сцене и синхронно совершая одинаковые дви­
жения. Как правило, главной качественной характеристикой 
хорошего кордебалета является умение выполнять движение по 
принципу "все как один". По ходу действия, танцовщики корде­
балета то собираются в группы, создавая живые монументы, то 
рассыпаются по сцене. 
Например, в случае, когда танец кордебалета строится по 
кругу, он репрезентирует поступательное движение времени 
внутри цикла — танцовщики как минуты или секунды проходят 
по окружности, перемещаясь в четком ритме. Известно, что сакра­
лизация жизненного пути, замыкающегося в круг и смыкающего 
рождение и смерть, является одной из важнейших составляющих 
мифологического сознания: 
В народной культуре (обрядности, верованиях, фольклоре) модель чело­
веческой жизни накладывается на материю природы всего окружающего 
мира, сакрализуя и годовой круг времени (мифология календаря), и 
вегетативный цикл ("жития" культурных растений), и производственную 
деятельность человека (ткачество, гончарство и т.п.), преобразующую 
природу в культуру. (Толстые 1992: 130) 
Круг, как наиболее удобная форма массового танца, был известен 
еще традиционному человеческому обществу, а с развитием 
абстрактного мышления, он стал наделяться астральными сим­
волическими значениями. Танец, исполняемый в кругу, считался 
оберегом 
от злых сил, гарантировал благополучный исход охоты, 
в земледельческих обрядовых танцах символизировал плодо­
родие. в кругу совершались обряды исцеления и бракосочетания. 
(Еремина 1998: 21-22) Магическая функция кругового танца 
перешла и в классический балет. Один из примеров — сцена из 
второго акта "Жизели", где вилисы преследуют Иллариона, лес­
ничего, 
заколдовывают его, заставляя танцевать с ними, окру­
жают, замыкая его в свой хоровод, и кружатся вокруг него, 
взявшись за руки. Лесничий изнемогает от непрерывного танца, 
теряет способность сопротивляться, и вилисы убивают его. 
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На примере одного из самых популярных концертных номе­
ров классического балета — хореографической миниатюры М. 
Фокина "Умирающий лебедь" на музыку К. Сен-Санса (1907 г.), 
можно рассмотреть, каким образом в балете отразилась мифоло­
гическая функция креста. Общая схема движений балерины в 
"Умирающем лебеде" строится на лейтмотиве мелкого перебора 
ног (па сюиви) на пуантах и распростертых в стороны рук. ими­
тирующих движения крыльев. Общий образ балерины (см., на­
пример, фотографию первой исполнительницы этого номера 
Анны Павловой — Рис. 7) может быть схематично соотнесен с 
крестом. Вертикальная линия образуется соединенными ногами, 
корпусом, шеей и головой, тогда как распростертые в стороны 
руки и пачка создают две параллельные горизонтали, пересе­
кающие эту вертикаль. Крест в основе хореографического образа 
лебедя относит первую очередь к телу летящей птицы с раскры-
u  10 ,Л  
тыми крыльями и вытянутой шеей. Крест — это мощный 
мифологический знак, главная идея которого состоит в разгра­
ничении внутреннего и внешнего пространства и подчеркивании 
идеи центра и основных направлений, ведущих от центра 
(изнутри вовне). При этом, основная мифологема, связанная с 
крестом, подчеркивает двоякую ориентированность идеи креста: 
человек (или божество), висящий на кресте и раскинувший руки по 
сторонам креста [иногда эта схема дублируется птицей с распростер­
тыми крыльями (ср., с одной стороны, соответствующий образ мирового 
древа, а с другой — голубя, в которого воплотился дух святой в 
христианской символике)], умирает, чтобы через крестные мучения и 
крестную смерть возродиться к новой (вечной) жизни. [...] Человек 
мифопоэтического сознания стоит перед крестом как перед пере­
крестком, развилкой пути, где налево — смерть, направо — жизнь, но он 
не знает, где право, где лево в той метрике мифологического про­
странства, которая задается образом креста. (МНМ II, 1997: 12-13) 
Крест, перекресток, как выбор между жизнью и смертью при­
сутствует и в мифологеме умирающего лебедя как существа, на­
ходящегося в момент исполнения номера между двумя мира­
ми — миром живых и миром мертвых. 
Примечательно, что созвездие Лебедя представляет собой фигуру в виде 
креста из ярких звезд в северном Млечном Пути. 
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Рис. 7. Анна Павлова в хореографической миниатюре М. Фокина 
"Умирающий лебедь" (Фокин 1962: 389). 
Кульминацией же многих балетных представлений ("Лебединое 
озеро". "Дон Кихот", "Корсар", "Легенда о любви") является 
исполнение прима-балериной тридцати двух фуэте в центре 
сцены. Согласно энциклопедическому описанию, это движение 
исполняется следующим образом: "во время поворота рабо­
тающая нога, замахиваясь за икру опорной, сгибается в колене, ее 
носок сзади переводится вперед, затем нога резко выпрямляется в 
сторону" (РБЭ 1997: 549), руки при этом разводятся в стороны и 
вновь собираются при каждом новом вращении." Это виртуозное 
вращение на пальцах на одном месте стало уже самым узна­
ваемым в широкой публике знаком балета как такового. По всей 
видимости, успех этого приема заключается, в переводе мифоло­
гической метафоры в регулярно работающий механизм, по тому 
же принципу, как это происходит в механических часах, которые 
разительно воспроизводит фуэте. В этом движении, как и в 
традиционных часах, оказываются соединенными крест и круг — 
руки и ноги танцовщицы как стрелки бегут по циферблату 
описываемого при вращении круга. Круг при этом подчерки­
вается костюмом танцовщицы — классической балетной пачкой. 
1 1  
Виртуальную реконструкцию этого движения см. 
http:// www.troyettes.com/ DanceInfo.html. 
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Комбинация круга и креста означает собой, согласно Т. 
Бургкхарту, начало, конец и вечный центр (Бургкхарт 1999: 54-
56). Тридцать два фуэте оказываются воронкой времени в балет­
ном 
спектакле. Вращающийся в быстром темпе в центре сцены 
крест, превращается в круг и концентрирует все внимание 
зрителей на себе за счет многократного повторения движения, 
визуализирующего время. 
Ритмическое повторение одного и того же движения в бы­
стром темпе — это трюк, но этот трюк имеет сильное эмоцио­
нальное воздействие на подсознание зрителя. Здесь имеет место 
тот же эффект, что и в случае с выходом теней в "Баядерке". 
Только если в первом случае одно и то же движение исполняется 
тридцатью двумя танцовщицами, то здесь одной танцовщице 
исполняется одно и то же движение тридцать два раза. И в пер­
вом, и во втором случае имеет место нанизывание одинаковых 
движений с целью усиления воздействия. Происходит внедрение 
самодовлеющего механического ритма в визуальную ткань балет­
ного представления, который, персонифицируясь в определенном 
образе (или образах), воспринимается как автономно-активный 
элемент или механизм, "заведенный" некоей запредельной силой. 
Сила влияния такого приема велика. При этом он способен 
воздействовать на два разных уровня человеческого восприятия. 
В случае, когда одно и то же движение выполняется кордебале­
том, воздействие происходит на уровне коллективного сознания 
аудитории. В случае же с сольным танцем происходит частное, 
тонкое, индивидуальное воздействие на каждого отдельного зри­
теля. Кордебалетные танцы, таким образом, выступают как объе­
диняющая структура, а сольные — воздействуют на личностном 
уровне восприятия каждого отдельно взятого зрителя. 
В заключение следует сказать, что балету необходимы прие­
мы, заимствованные из живописи для того, чтобы закрепиться в 
пространстве и преодолеть присущую ему эфемерность. Балет 
использует визуальные повторы, фиксации фаз движения, 
абстрактно-геометрические формулы и схемы в своем урегули­
рованном движении в качестве мнемонических фигур. Упо­
добляясь живописи и графике, он стремится сохранить память о 
совершенном движении. В живописи — визуальный образ — это 
след оставленный рукой, двигавшейся в процессе создания изо­
бражения. Живопись — это застывшее движение. В балете следы 
от движения не могут быть закреплены надолго, но, тем не 
418 Maria Goltsman 
менее, он стремится сохранить память о каждом совершенном 
шаге, станцованном номере, сыгранном акте и целом спектакле 
как визуальном событии. При помощи тех изобразительных 
приемов, которые выделены в данной статье как общие для 
визуального восприятия живописи и балета, классический танец 
преодолевает законы времени, овладевает пространством и 
фиксируется в культурной памяти. 
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Maalikunsti ja balleti visuaalse tajumise 
üldistest graafilistest seaduspärasustest: 
tantsu mnemooniline vorm 
Artiklis käsitletakse maalikunsti ja klassikalise balleti visuaalse tajumise 
mõningaid aspekte. Teema tuleneb sellest, et nende kahe kunsti põimu­
mine toimub formaalse keele tasandil. Vaadeldakse klassikalise balleti ja 
maalikunsti koodide sarnasust, pöörates tähelepanu kõigepealt sellele, 
kuidas ja millise eesmärgiga klassikaline ballett kasutab maalikunsti 
koodi. Balletti ja maalikunsti ühendab teater, mis on Euroopa traditsioonis 
kujunenud nagu elav pilt (või elav maal). Näidatakse, kuidas nn. elava 
maali printsiipi kasutatakse balletikunstis erinevatel tasanditel — nii 
etenduse kompositsioonis, kui ka koreograafia keeles. Kui maalikunstis 
on kujundid staatilised ja fikseeritud, siis ballett on efemeerne, ta eksis­
teerib ruumis ainult kindlas ajaraamis ja kaob siis, kui etendus lõppeb. 
Artikli viimane osa on pühendatud küsimusele: miks balletikunst vajab 
selliseid visuaalseid võtteid nagu pidev kordamine erinevatel tasanditel, 
liikumise faaside fikseerimine ja mnemooniliste figuuride kasutamine. 
Kui tants on kõigepealt dünaamika, pidev liikumine ja muutumine, siis 
maalikunst on staatiline, muutumatu, tasapinnal kinnitatud kujund. Tant­
sus domineerib aeg, maalikunstis aga ruum. Ballett kasutab maalikunsti 
printsiipe selleks, et kinnistuda ruumis ja ületada oma efemeersust ehk 
temporaalsust. Ballett kasutab oma kõrgelt struktureeritud keeles ka 
abstraktseid-geomeetrilisi vorme, et jäädvustuda vaataja ning kultuuri 
mälus. 
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Abstract. The metaphor of parasites or parasitism has dominated literary 
critical discourse since the 1970s, prominent examples being Michel Serres in 
France and J. Hiilis Miller in America. In their writings the relationship 
between text and paratext, literature and criticism, is often likened to that 
between host and parasite, and can be therefore deconstructed. Their writings, 
along with those by Derrida, Barthes, and Thom, seem to be suggesting the 
possibility of a semiotics of parasitism. Unfortunately, none of these writers 
has drawn enough on the biological foundation of parasitism. Curiously, even 
in biology, parasitism is already a metaphor through which the signified of an 
ecological phenomenon involving two organisms is expressed by the signifier 
of "[eating] food at another's [side] table". This paper will make some 
preliminary remarks on semiotics of parasitism, based on the notions of 
Umwelt (Jakob von UexkUll) and structural coupling (Maturana and Varela). 
It will look into the phenomenon of co-evolutionary process in community 
ecology. With reference to empirical history, the project will briefly survey 
the literary and medical praxis of the 17th century England where large 
number of creative writings referred to the phenomenon of parasitism, which 
was deeply embedded in religious practice (e.g., the Eucharist) and political 
life (e.g., the courtier ecology in monarchy) of the times. Finally, it will touch 
upon the possible 'parasitic' relationship between language and biology. 
1. Parasite: The word and the matter 
Despite its Greek etymology of карал- cnzoç, meaning "beside + 
grain [food]" or by extension "one who eats at the table of another", 
the word parasite appears rather late in the European languages. It 
first appeared in the 16th century, traceable to Rabelais [1535] in 
French, and was recorded a few times in Shakespeare's plays. In his 
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Timon of Athens [1607] Shakespeare has the hero inveigh his 'Mouth-
Friends' as 'most [...] detested Parasites". 
Live loathed and long. 
Most smiling, smooth, detested parasites, 
Courteous destroyers, affable wolves, meek bears, 
You fools of fortune, trencher-friends, time's flies, 
Cap and knee slaves, vapours, and minute-jacks! 
Of man and beast the infinite malady 
Crust you quite o'er! 
(Shakespeare, Timon of Athens [1607] III, vi, 53-59) 
The same year 1607 saw Ben Jonson's explicit reference to a character 
as parasite. In his Volpone the hero addresses his servant: "Hold thee, 
Mosca, / Take of my hand; thou strik'st on truth, in all: / And they are 
enuious, terme thee Parasite" (I, i, 1-3), thus suggesting the current 
folk wisdom that the fly was a parasite. The popular use of the word 
was not, however, enough to give rise to the scientific knowledge 
devoted to the study of these strange creatures. Notwithstanding the 
invention of the microscope in the 17th century, the discipline of 
parasitology appeared much later, dating probably in the mid 19th 
century with the pioneering work of the Belgian biolgist Pierre-Joseph 
van Beneden (1809-1894), who unraveled the life history of tape­
worms and other groups. 
2. From worm to flea: 
Parasites in 17th-century texts 
However, the belated register of the word parasite in French and 
English and the medical science dealing with it by no means suggests 
that the biological concept and its various implications had to wait 
until the linguistic coinage and medical institutionalization. A much 
older word, probably of Scandinavian origin, and extremely popular in 
Renaissance texts is worm. It is a favourite word of Shakespeare's 
although it is used in several senses, some of which not necessarily 
related to parasitism. Where shall we start except to pay homage to 
our host? So we start with Hamlet, the Prince of Denmark. Having just 
slain Polonius, by accident per chance. Hamlet is confronted with his 
uncle Claudius. 
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CLAUDIUS Now, Hamlet, where's Polonius? 
HAMLET At supper. 
CLAUDIUS At supper! where? 
HAMLET Not where he eats, but where he is eaten: a certain 
convocation of politic worms are e'en at him. Your 
worm is your only emperor for diet: we fat all 
creatures else to fat us, and we fat ourselves for 
maggots: your fat king and your lean beggar is but 
variable service, two dishes, but to one table: 
that's the end. 
CLAUDIUS Alas, alas! 
HAMLET A man may fish with the worm that hath eat of a 
king, and eat of the fish that hath fed ofthat worm. 
CLAUDIUS What dost you mean by this? 
HAMLET Nothing but to show you how a king may go a 
progress through the guts of a beggar. 
(Shakespeare, Hamlet [1603] IV. iii, 24—30; my emphasis) 
This is not the occasion to interpret once more the well-known pas­
sage. What interests me is the life cycle and food chain which Hamlet 
evokes. The cycle involves three groups, (1) human (e.g., beggar and 
king), (2) fish, (3) worm, all of which enter into a predator versus prey 
chain relationship. Now this only parallels the life cycle of a parasite 
because of the ambiguity of the word "worm" in Shakespeare. Among 
other things, the word had the following senses in Shakespeare's time: 
(1) the earthworm or Lumbricus terrestris, (2) the maggot, and (3) the 
parasite, and the first two were often confused, hence the popular 
notion that earthworms feed on corpses, which incidentally is true. 
If the worm is the earthworm, then there is implicit parasitism 
involving the host of Lumbricus terrestris and the yet unidentified 
parasite of Metastrongylus elongatus, which serves in turn as the 
intermediate host of pig flu virus strain that was to claim twenty 
million lives in the early 20th century. An immediate parallel is the 
recent outbreak of the epidemic SARS in East Asia caused by a new 
form of Coronavirus. Thus the life cycle described by Hamlet can be 
expanded to include microscopic and ultramicroscopic bacteria and 
viruses not foreseeable to the prince despite his poetic vision. To 
account more adequately for this expanded life cycle, the melancholy 
Danish crown prince would have had to seek inspiration from the as 
yet non-existent parasitology, bacteriology (1880s), and virology 
(1930s), all of which deal respectively with the phenomenon of 
organismic associations. Needless to say, even this expanded version 
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cannot hope to exhaust everything because of the imprecise nomencla­
ture of fish and worm, and the possibility that many taxa of worms 
and fish are involved, granted there are more than 1,800 species of 
terrestrial worms known to us. and thousands of microorganisms they 
live on. However, lest we be carried away, let us pause here and go 
back to the strange worm, which was unfortunately confused with the 
maggot. 
We are aware the ill-defined worm, when mistaken for the maggot, 
is in fact the larva of Diptera. such as the true fly. About half the fly 
species have larvae known as maggots. Most of them feed on 
decaying organic matter, including the dead bodies of kings and 
beggars, but again there are wide differences in the food preferences 
of different flies. Eight "waves" of maggots have been distinguished; 
each wave attacks dead animals in a strict sequence as decay pro­
gresses from the newly dead corpse through rigor and putrefaction to 
mummification. What do maggots suggest then? Why, they suggest 
the life cycle of Diptera, in particular. Cyclorrhapha, which breed in 
dead animals, so as to complicate the process outlined by Hamlet. 
We are yet to meet with parasites textualised. As I said in the 
beginning, the Renaissance texts are not short of them, especially 
given its monarch-dependent courtier culture. Even a definition from a 
parasitology textbook would introduce the parasite as a "person who 
received free meals from a rich patron, in return for amusing, impu­
dent. and flattering conversation; in other words, a sycophant" 
(Brooks. McLennan. 1993: 2). The best example of this kind of mu­
tualism is perhaps Ben Jonson's Mosca. meaning fly, in his Volpone. 
But to the extent that a parasite feeds on and eventually kills his host, 
one thinks of Bosola in John Webster's Duchess of Malfi {performed. 
1613, published 1623) who gives a vivid ecological picture of 
parasitism. 
BOSOLA: He and his brother are like plum trees, that grow crooked 
over standing pools, they are rich, and o'erladen with fruit, but none 
but crows, pies, and caterpillars feed on them. Could I be one of their 
flatt'ring panders, I would hang on their ears like a horse-leech, till I were 
full, and then drop off. 
(Webster, Duchess of Malfi [1623] I. i, 38) 
This text gives a better picture of the interaction between living 
systems on the one hand, and that between living systems and their 
environments on the other. The living systems include (1) plum trees, 
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(2) crows, magpies, and caterpillars, (3) horse-leech, (4) human 
"flatt'ring panders" (i.e., servants to the Duke); and the environments 
that provide location for the construction of their Umwelten are (1) 
standing pools, (2) fruit, (3) [horse] ears, (4) Dukedom (or the Duke 
on whom his panders live on). The main function of the environments, 
as Jakob von UexkUll would say, is providing food-circle. It is 
interesting to note living systems and environments are reciprocal in 3 
and 4, i.e., the environments are living systems in themselves. Much 
as the horse-leech lives on [the blood from] horse ears, sycophants 
live on [the provisions from] the Duke. That is where parasitism 
occurs both in nature and in culture. The only reservation one may 
have is a relatively minor one: i.e., whether the horse-leech (Haemopis 
sanguisuga of phylum Annelida) is a parasite, a blood predator, or 
even just a predator of smaller invertebrate animals, though the play­
wright obviously takes it to be, or mistakes it for, a parasite.1 
Such courtier-parasites abound in Shakespeare and other Eliza­
bethan and Jacobean writers. Even in Hamlet we have a host of them: 
Polonius, Osiric, Rosencranz and Gildenstern. From Jacobean theat-
rum parasitum, we move to poetry. None other is better known than 
John Donne's (1572-1631) "The Flea," published posthumously in 
1633. 
1 According to one interpretation (uk.rec.gardening web-ring), none of the three 
kinds of leech found in the U. K. today is harmful to humans. Webster's know­
ledge of horse-leech may have been mediated by the Biblical allusion in Proverbs, 
which is an isolated instance. But obviously the phrase horse-leech had a referent 
in Webster's times, and therefore had a historical basis; otherwise, the translator 
would not have rendered 'alukah into horse-leech. The leech referred to in the 
Book of Proverbs 30: 15, 'alukah may not have been found in England, but its 
behaviour must have caught Wester's attention. Or more likely, there was a 
species of leech in Jacobean England, with which the Biblical worm was 
identified. The following description from Easton's Bible dictionary is helpful to 
our understanding of the passage: "There are various species in the marshes and 
pools of Palestine. That here referred to, the Hoemopis, is remarkable for the 
coarseness of its bite, and is therefore not used for medical purposes. They are 
spoken of in the East with feelings of aversion and horror, because of their 
propensity to fasten on the tongue and nostrils of horses when they come to drink 
out of the pools. The medicinal leech (Hirudo medicinalis), besides other species 
of leeches, is common in the waters of Syria." We are not sure if parasitic leeches 
were existent in Webster's England, but the medicinal leech had been widely used 
since the 17th century. The book I consulted in the Museum of Natural History in 
London is Johnson (1816). 
426 Han-liang Chang 
MARK but this flea, and mark in this, 
How little that which thou deniest me is; 
It suck'd me first, and now sucks thee, 
Arid in this flea our two bloods mingled be. 
Thou know'st that this cannot be said 
A sin, nor shame, nor loss of maidenhead : 
Yet this enjoys before it woo, 
And pamper'd swells with one blood made of two; 
And this, alas! is more than we would do. 
О stay, three lives in one flea spare, 
Where we almost, yea, more than married are. 
This flea is you and /, and this 
Our marriage bed, and marriage temple is. 
Though parents grudge, and you, we're met, 
And cloister'd in these living walls of jet. 
Though use make you apt to kill me, 
Let not to that self-murder added be, 
And sacrilege, three sins in killing three. 
Cruel and sudden, hast thou since 
Purpled thy nail in blood of innocence? 
Wherein could this flea guilty be, 
Except in that drop which it suck'd from thee? 
Yet thou triumph'st, and say'st that thou 
Find'st not thyself nor me the weaker now. 
Tis true; then learn how false fears be; 
Just so much honour, when thou yield'st to me, 
Will waste, as this flea's death took life from thee. 
(John Donne, "The Flea" [1633]; my emphasis) 
The poet describes the relationship between flea and human, in this 
case, the first-person addresser and the second-person addressee as 
lovers: "It suck'd me first, and now sucks thee, / And in this flea our 
two bloods mingled be". The result of the flea bite is "pamper'd 
swells with one blood made of two". Despite its accuracy in obser­
vation, this kind of poetic extravagance may sound strange to an ear 
unused to lyricism, but it would have made sense to a modern day 
parasitologist. 
First of all. he may have questioned the systematic issue of the flea 
as a real ectoparasite or a blood predator. Then he would be attracted 
to the interaction between parasite and host, e.g., how the one feeds on 
the other, using the other to construct its Umwelt primarily as food 
rather than as habitat, how as a result, the host becomes "weaker", as 
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described later in line 24. This would lead him to account for the 
biochemical metabolism of the two parties involved. Finally, we know 
that the flea preys on more than one host, indeed jumps from one 
species to another, say, from cats to humans, 2  and that the flea may 
enter into competition with other parasitic phyla, orders, and species. 
Such facts would shift the biologist's or, more precisely, epidemio­
logist's, attention from individual organism to species and to popu­
lation, in both parasite and host, thus pointing to the socio-medical 
context of parasitism (in relation to such human diseases as plague 
and typhus) in the 17th-century England.' Further inquiries would 
return us to the same issue of life cycle and development of the flea, 
from egg to larva, from larva to pupa, and from pupa to adult, the 
latter finally finding a host in Donne's speaker and then in his lover, 
and, not purely out of coincidence, reaching maturity together with the 
human sexual consummation to which the poet devoutly aspires (lines 
27-29). 
What do the texts of Hamlet and "The Flea" reveal? A matter-of-
fact position may observe that neither Shakespeare nor Donne was 
2 Again, this is paralleled by the life-cycle of the SARS Coronavirus. On Satur­
day, 24th May, 2003, the Associated Press released a news in London: "Re­
searchers from the University of Hong Kong examined 25 animals belonging to 
eight species in a live animal market in southern China that supplies restaurants in 
Guangdong province, where the SARS outbreak is believed to have started. Six of 
the animals tested were masked palm civets, which look like long-nosed cats but 
are related to the mongoose. All the civets, which came from several different 
owners and appeared healthy, tested positive for a SARS-like virus, said Dr. Klaus 
Stohr, WHO's chief SARS virologist. One raccoon dog — a member of the dog 
family native to eastern Asia — was tested and found to have the virus in its 
feces." 
Another recent finding is the virus strains that cause AIDS. The AP reported 
on 14th June 2003: "After analyzing the DNA make-up of the simian immuno­
deficiency virus (SIV) in African monkeys they fa group of scientists in America 
and France] found the red-capped mangabeys and spot-nosed guenons carried the 
strains"; and then "the virus was passed onto chimpanzees when they ate infected 
monkey meat," and finally passed on to humans probably before 1930s. 
I have consulted the following information in the Museum of London: Regu­
lations on Public Health (1623), Book of Regulations (1588), Mortality Broad­
sheet (London: John Winder, 1604?). The last one has this record: "Nov. 1602 -
Nov. 1603. The plague struck severely in 1603, nearly 37,000 deaths were 
attributed to it that year, out of 42,700 deaths recorded." The record clearly 
suggests that the sick world of Denmark in Shakespeare's Hamlet has an 
immediate topic reference. 
15 
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aware of the compound microscopes constructed by the Dutch 
sometime between 1590 and 1608, not to mention the more refined 
form developed by Robert Hooke (1635-1703) in England long after 
the poets' death. 4  A traditional but now naïve view would insist on the 
distinction between literary discourse and biological discourse, a 
distinction that endows the poet with a license to let fly of his 
imagination. From this fictitious distinction one may develop accor­
dingly a literary semiotics and a biological semiotics, as if the latter 
could be immuned from the contamination of language. This, of 
course, is to miss the encroachment of rhetoric on biology and the fact 
that even parasitology as a positive science is encoded in language in 
the first place. See, for instance, the trendy title of a 1993 book on 
parasitism: Parascript: Parasites and the Language of Evolution, 
where the authors call attention to the many "myths, metaphors, and 
misconceptions" (Brooks, McLennan 1993: ix) about parasites and 
their evolution, but believe, as did their predecessor Harold W. 
Manter, that the parasites themselves are capable of forming a 
meaningful language called parascript [57c.] that tells of their lives 
(Brooks, McLennan 1993: 21). 
3. The parasite metaphor in 20th-century critical discourse 
The now banal-sounding witticism in "parascript" takes us to mid 
20th-century writings. The word is etymologically dubious, but would 
not make a strange bedfellow with "paracriticism", coined by the 
American literary critic Ihab Hassan (1975), "paratext" proposed by 
the French narratologist Gérard Genette (1997), and other similar 
paradox-ladden wordplays that have inflicted literary criticism over 
the past half-century. As early as 1955, J. L. Austin, founder of 
speech-act philosophy, already described some extreme cases of 
performative use of language, such as on the stage (e.g.. Hamlet) or in 
a poem (e.g., "The Flea"), as "parasitic upon its [language's] normal 
use" (Austin 1975: 22). And it was Jacques Derrida who, in his persis­
tent critique on the presence and transparency of speech communi­
4 Two microscopes 1 saw in the Museum of Science in London were developed 
by Anthony van Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723), [Museum of Science London, 
Inventory No. A500644. Leeuwenhoek Microscope. Dutch, c. 1673] and Johan 
van Musschenbroek (1660-1707) [Musschenbroek Microscope, Dutch, 1686. 
Museum of Science London, Inventory No.Al 37247]. 
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cation, launches a deconstruction (i.e., reversal and displacement) of 
the host/parasite relationship in language use, including speech and 
writing (1977 [Fr. 1971]). 
We note Derrida's use of parasitism, like Austin before him, is a 
metaphor borrowed from biology, but neither of them questioned the 
force and limit of the metaphor. More often than not, once when the 
critic has received the message or the tenor, s/he tends to ignore the 
vehicle in which the tenor is carried. Derrida's comment on Austin has 
actually levelled a metacommentary on second-order observation: 
What kind of metaphorical structure is retained in the expression of 
parasitism when it is used not as a metaphor, but as a constative 
statement, as Austin would say, about "real" parasites and their hosts? 
Needless to say. we cannot pause and feel gratified with the simplistic 
assumption that the phonetic signifier of /pger 3sa I-t Iz( 3)m/, pointing 
to the semantic signified of [parasitism], amounts to the vehicle/tenor 
relationship of metaphor. By so doing, either we get into a circular 
argument or we end up in semiosic regressus ad infinitum. Having 
said this, it is interesting to rethink the semantic felicity of the coinage 
parascript where the parasitologist finds shelter in another metaphor 
borrowed from language, i.e.. from grammatology, to encode para­
sitism. The brainstorms to be raised by the encounter of advocates of 
parasitism and parascript are yet to be measured. 
With this metaphor we shall mention two critics who have made 
the metaphor of parasitism famous and popular. I refer to J. Hiilis 
Miller, a boa deconstructor at Yale in the late 1970s ("The Critic as 
Host" 1979 [1977]) to 1980s, and Michel Serres, the science historian 
turned literary critic at Sorbonne (Le Parasite 1980V Miller's article 
was first published in Critical Inquiry as a rejoinder to the prolonged 
debate on cultural pluralism and interpretation, which involved major 
literary critics on both left and right wings, including M. H. Abrams, 
Wayne C. Booth, and others. 
Michel Serres may not have read Miller's essay because his book-length study 
of parasitism, to date the only one of its kind, was published immediately after­
wards as a sequel to his multi-volumed Hermes. Serres's definition of parasite is 
rather liberal. In addition to biology (and literature, mainly 17th-century French), 
his parasitism as a grand récit or master-code incorporates the insight of thermo­
dynamics, cybernetics, and linguistics. Interestingly, in French (as well as 
English) there is the linguistic phenomenon of phonological parasitism, e.g., a 
sound inserted in the middle of a word. It is therefore regarded as a noise with 
which Serres takes much pleasure in playing. 
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The debate concerns the authority of textual interpretation. A 
traditionalist like Abrams believes that there is an obvious and uni-
vocal reading of a work, and other readings, such as deconstructive, 
are but "parasitical". In a strategy resembling Derrida's critique of 
Austin cited above, Miller launches an attack by dismantling the 
fictitious opposition of host and parasite. He resorts to etymology and 
dress rehearses the Derridian dissemination of lexical signs, in parti­
cular, the para- family, and host and guest, to deconstruct the 
differentiation of host and parasite. One of the conclusions is neither 
the obvious and univocal reading nor the deconstructive reading can 
claim the status of host because both are parasitic on the poem which, 
in turn, is parasitic on an infinite number of other poems and texts 
before it. Throughout the essay, Miller engages some binary oppo­
sitions commonly held to be true, such as host/alien, inside/outside, 
and he plays on the logic of the Greek prefix para which gives rise to 
each word its double: 
Each word in itself becomes divided by the strange logic of the 'para,' 
membrane which divides inside from outside and yet joins them in a hymeneal 
bond, or which allows an osmotic mixing, making the stranger friend, the 
distant near, the Unheimlich Heimlich, the homely homey, without, for all its 
closeness and similarity, ceasing to be strange, distant, and dissimilar. (Miller 
1979:221) 
The linguistic logic certainly applies to many words and the notions 
they articulate, such as text/paratext. criticism/paracriticism, etc. One 
of the dangers of this kind of lexical extravagance is that it will carry 
us away. For example, among the words given by Miller, the para- in 
parachute, parasol and parapluie is from the Italian root, meaning 
"ward off," rather than the Greek root in paragon and paradox and 
parasite (Miller 1979: 219-220). Another danger is the irreversibility 
of the generative-disseminative rule. For instance, one can certainly 
retrieve text from paratext, but one cannot do the same from parasitos 
to si tos. Why? Because the word text generates paratext not only 
through the mechanism of syllabic and morphemic combination, but 
also through semantic reduplication, thanks to the mysterious self-
reflexive prefix para. That's why we have paralinguistics and para­
psychology. both in name and in matter, but not paraparasitology. Of 
course we could, but the condition is that we solve the problem of 
lexical semantics. The Greek word at год is not loaned by English or 
French and as such does not have a life of its own. As a morpheme, it 
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is brought to life, so to speak, in English by another Greek morpheme 
кара. If there were no morphemes (or semes) para and sitos, there 
would be no parasitos. One could argue that if there were no text, 
there would be no paratext, but the lexical rules are completely 
different because text can serve both as morpheme and as word. 
What about the biological parasite? How successful is it as a 
metaphor? What kind of economy is involved in this "curious system 
of thought, or of language, or of social organization?" (Miller 1979: 
220). As far as literature is concerned, Miller believes the relationship 
of parasitism is triangular rather than binary. That is, the poem plays 
host and both the rightist and leftist readings are parasitic on the host 
poem. 
Both readings, the 'univocal' one and the 'deconstructive' one, are fellow 
guests 'beside the grain,' host and guest, host and host, host and parasite, 
parasite and parasite. The relation is a triangle, not a polar opposition. There is 
always a third to whom the two are related, something before them or between 
them, which they divide, consume, or exchange, across which they meet. 
(Miller 1979: 224) 
This is very well said indeed. And it goes perfectly well with the 
relation between fellow-parasitic interpreters. But then the relation 
cannot be a triangular one because insofar as they are co-parasites, 
their relationship to the host is still dyadic rather than triadic. It's not 
Peircean because of the lack of a Thirdness. The host cannot be a 
Third, as Miller suggests, but may be a First, which the parasite as 
Second invades. The host and the parasite have to interact on the same 
existential or ecological or, more precisely, semiotic level to ensure 
their interaction, i.e., the host and/or parasite as reciprocal sign (repre-
sentamen) and object. What about the Third? The Third is probably a 
conceptual category on a higher level, whether the name is mutualism, 
commensalisms, symbiosis, parasitism, or even Umwelt, which serves 
to define the host/parasite relationship. 
With a stroke of genius, Miller gives an example of virus and that 
is where he is nearest to the life science. We have refrained from using 
biology because of the dubious status of the cell-less virus. 
One of the most frightening versions of the parasite as invading host is the 
virus. In this case, the parasite is an alien who has not simply the ability to 
invade a domestic enclosure, consume the food of the family, and kill the host, 
but the strange capacity, in doing all that, to turn the host into multitudinous 
proliferating replications of itself. The virus is at the easy border between life 
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and death. It challenges that opposition, since, for example, it does not 'eat,' 
but only reproduces. It is as much a crystal or a component in a crystal as it is 
an organism. The genetic pattern of the virus is so coded that it can enter a 
host cell and violently reprogram all the genetic material in that cell, turning 
the cell into a little factory for manufacturing copies of itself, so destroying it. 
(Miller 1979: 222) 
The invasion of virus that breaks into the membrane of cell, not to eat, 
but to copy and reproduce has rich biosemiotic implications which 
needs further development. 
Unfortunately, instead of tilling this fertile ground, Miller, in the 
final part of his essay, which is an analysis of Shelley's Triumph of 
Life, focuses on plant parasitism and thus loses the impetus. At any 
rate, botanical parasitism always looks less ugly than animal para­
sitism, especially endoparasitism. To be fair to Miller, and to render 
justice to his service, the American critic has rightly dismantled the 
opposition traditionally accorded to parasite and host, and 
demonstrated that their relationship can be displaced, and has iden­
tified, instead, the two parties' reciprocal obligations in food-giving 
and food-receiving (Miller 1979: 225). But this is to miss an important 
element in parasitic relationship. Miller is in fact discussing biological 
mutualism or symbiosis rather than parasitism because the latter 
involves the host's disease and death, putting an end to semiosis. The 
irony is that Miller's recourse to the metaphor of parasitism is useful 
for the deconstruction of cultural binarism. but not useful for bio­
logical parasitism, which is a matter of life and death. 
4. Two semiotic themes: 
Life cycle and host/parasite interaction 
It is to the late Jakob von Uexkiill that we owe a debt of gratitude for 
the genesis of meaning in animal life. Although Uexkiill did not dwell 
on the phenomenon of parasitism, the comprehensive scope of his 
ecology anticipated many subsequent developments. There are ran­
dom references to parasitism in his English translations. In Theoretical 
Biology (1926), the author discusses the food-circle and enemy-circle 
of living organisms, and observes how the malaria parasite takes 
altogether unlike hosts as food-circle. "This minute unicellular animal 
has the power not only to adapt itself to the totally different tissue-
juices of the mosquito and of man, but is able to find its way about in 
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the anatomy of these two very unlike hosts" (Uexkiill 1926: 165). On 
another occasion, he mentions the parasites 1  function of inner-
adjustment: "In parasites we find prehensile feet which are exactly 
inter-adjusted with the tissues of the hosts furnishing them with a 
medium" (Uexkiill 1926: 162). This, in parasitology, is called 
anchorage, one function of biomechanics that helps the parasite to 
construct its habitat in the host's body. Put in semiotic terms, this 
biophysical indexical sign points to a higher order of symbolic sign, 
i.e., the structural interface of the parasite/host Umwelt. 
The interaction of the animal and its environment, specifically, the 
interaction of its world of sense and its world of action, is defined by a 
number of function-circles. The chain composed by indicator, recep­
tor, and effector on the one hand, and the surrounding world (world as 
sensed plus world of action) and inner world on the other, suggests a 
self-contained Umwelt. For all its pretension to autopoeisis, the Um­
welt of an animal is not a closure and is constantly engaged by stimuli 
and actions from without. Such actions can be incited from different 
sources and can assume different forms, prédation being an obvious 
one. As Uexkiill says, "If this [function] circle is interrupted at any 
point whatsoever, the existence of the animal is imperilled" (Uexkiill 
1926: 127). 
Other than prédation, parasitism offers an extremely fascinating 
case because it is in here that we see the overlapping and interface of 
two Umwelten, that of the parasite and that of the host. From a casual 
observer's point of view, the parasite and the host, so long as they 
reside together, can be said to share one world from which is 
constructed two interlocked Umwelten. The host provides the parasite 
with food and habitat at the expense of its own life, and the parasite 
constructs the food and habitat sectors of its function-circle, tempo­
rarily or permanently, in another's body. In reaction to this invasion of 
the parasite, the host tries to protect itself by mounting various defense 
mechanisms, such as immunity, mediated either by antibodies or by 
cells, meanwhile the parasite tries hard to evade the host's immunity, 
so as to get the upper hand of its victim. An example of this exchange 
is the phenomenon of molecular mimicry, which shows the parasite's 
ability to produce surface antigens that are similar to those of its host 
(Damian 1964, qouted in Ahmadjian, Paracer, 1986: 148). It can be 
said that a measure of a parasite's success is its ability to evade the 
response from the host, which is aimed at the parasite's elimination. 
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Thus the ecology of parasitism is based on and represented by a 
unique situation of double Umwelt, a Derridian différance, so to 
speak, made possible by the temporality of colonization during the 
parasite's life cycle, as well as the interfacial space in which occurs 
the structural coupling of two living systems. How could the semio-
tician resist the temptation to decode (as he encodes) this marvellous 
phenomenon? Maturana and Varel a would term the phenomenon 
"mutual ontogenic structural coupling" when these two living systems 
interact recursively, the host becoming a medium for the parasite's 
realization of its autopoiesis, while the parasite laying constraints on, 
indeed threatening, the host's chances of autopoiesis. Although the 
notion of autopoiesis seems incompatible with parasitism, structural 
coupling can be useful in representing, as a Peircian symbolic sign, 
the life process of a parasite, be it viral, bacterial, protozoan, 
platyhelminth, nematodian, or arthropodan. 
We are told that an animal's life is an autopoietic cycle, so is its 
Umwelt. That cycle becomes all the more complex when the animal is 
a parasite because on the one hand its life cycle consists of disrupted 
parasitic, meta-parasitic, and free-living stages, and on the other, it 
gets involved with the life cycle of another life, or several other lives, 
which also tries to maintain its autopoiesis. Maturana and Varela 
(1987: 88) discuss what may happen to two autopoietic cellular unities 
in symbiosis. Structural coupling through recurrent interactions may 
drift in two directions. One direction moves towards the inclusion of 
boundaries; the other towards metacellularity where participating cells 
can preserve their individual limits but a new coherence is formed. 
Through structural coupling, the ontogenic process of life gives way 
to the phylogenic coevolutionary process of both living systems. 
We should be aware that parascript, Umwelt, autopoiesis, struc­
tural coupling can be all regarded as Peircian interprétants in linguistic 
constructs to "represent" natural phenomena which some assume to be 
transparent. But the truth is that these natural phenomena were already 
encoded in language when first made available and known to us. 
Naming and taxonomy are good examples of language's initial 
encoding of nature, an act which serves as the foundation for second-
order scientific studies. The quotation from Hamlet in Section 1 above 
clearly shows the clash of naming systems. If so, these linguistic 
tertiary symbolic signs, such as Umwelt and structural coupling, are 
but instances of metalanguage whose job it is to model and articulate 
the object-language of life. Therefore, very little distinction can be 
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made between nature and culture, or for that matter, the nature and 
culture of parasitism. 
Instead of pushing the arguments of Umwelt and structural 
coupling further to account for the parasite/host relationship, I would 
like to reinstate an old semiotic model of value exchange developed 
from A. J. Greimas's structural semantics (1983; 1987). For the para­
site, the value consists of two elements, nutrition and habitat. If we 
retain Uexkiill's preferred nominal for the living organism as subject 
rather than object (Uexkiill 1926: 126), then the values it "desires", 
out of biological instinct, such as medium and food, serve as its 
object. This subject-seeking-object process then forms an elementary 
syntagmata in signification, comparable to Uexkiill's interaction of 
world as sensed by a subject and its world of action. This subject-
object relation is coupled with another sender-receiver relation, thus 
constituting the communicative-performative syntagm of living 
organisms. 
The exchange of value may first seem to be unilateral in that the 
host serves only as sender (expéditeur) and the parasite receiver 
(destinataire); but one could expand the realm of value to include 
other information-contents or messages, such as immunity, then the 
communication becomes bilateral or reciprocal. In fact, the relation­
ship of sender and receiver can be reversed, depending on the contents 
of information emitted from the sender, be it food-resource or survival 
threat. This act of communication takes place in the shared Umwelt of 
the two subjects, or in the interfacial space of two Umwelten, and is 
performed by two actants in a reciprocal operation. To paraphrase 
Greimas, the doing of Subject 1 (Receiver) constitutes the perfor­
mance component, while the doing of Subject 2 (Sender) constitutes 
the "retribution or sanction" component, either positive or negative 
(Greimas, Courtés 1979: 110). 
In the world shared by parasite and host, insofar as the host sends 
the message to the parasite like an invitation to the Eucharist, the 
receiver will unlikely turn down the offer. See what the 17th-century 
poet George Herbert (1593-1633) has to say about this spiritual 
parasitism. 
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Love bade me welcome, yet my soul drew back, 
Guilty of dust and sin. 
But quick-ey'd Love, observing me grow slack 
From my first entrance in, 
Drew nearer to me, sweetly questioning 
If I lack'd anything. 
"A guest," 1 answer'd, "worthy to be here"; 
Love said, "You shall be he." 
"I, the unkind, the ungrateful? ah my dear, 
I cannot look on thee." 
Love took my hand and smiling did reply, 
"Who made the eyes but I?" 
"Truth, Lord, but 1 have marr'd them; let my shame 
Go where it doth deserve." 
"And know you not," says Love, "who bore the blame?" 
"My dear, then 1 will serve." 
"You must sit down," says Love, "and taste my meat." 
So I did sit and eat. 
(Herbert, "Love", III [1633]) 
Michel Serres unravels the myth behind the ritual of daily greetings in 
Greece; "ПаракаХш"[By your grace!] "Eu/apiaia)!" [Thanks (for 
the Euchrist)!] (1982, 46) Once approaching or in the host body, the 
parasite sends a message, signaling invasion, then the host receives it 
and takes arms against it. This communicative-performative syntag­
mata not only accounts for the parasite/host interaction, but from a 
macroscopic perspective, with the departure and return motifs charac­
teristic of journey narratives, defines the life cycle of a parasite. What 
emerges is a mysterious £/r-parasitic narrative (and narratology), 
manifesting itself under varied disguises in the Umwelten of parasites, 
in nature as well as in the cultural texts of Hamlet, The Duchess of 
Malfi, and "The Flea"/1 
6 This paper was presented at the Third Gathering of Biosemiotics in 
Copenhagen, 11-14 July 2003. 
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К семиотике паразитизма 
Метафора паразитов или паразитизма доминировала в литературно-
критическом дискурсе начиная с 1970-х годов (наиболее известны 
Мишель Серр во Франции и Дж. Хил лис Миллер в Америке). В их 
работах соотношение между текстом и паратекстом. литературой и 
ее анализом, интерпретацией и критикой часто связывается с отно­
шением между питающим организмом и паразитом, поэтому может 
быть деконструировано. Эти работы, наряду с трудами Деррида. 
Барта и Тома, наводят на мысль о возможности создания семиотики 
паразитизма. К сожалению, никто из этих авторов не углубляется в 
биологические основы паразитизма. Странно, что даже в биологии 
паразитизм трактуется как метафора, где означаемое экологического 
феномена, содержащего два организма, выражается означающим 
"[поедание] пищи с чужого стола". В данной статье дается несколько 
предварительных замечаний по поводу семиотики паразитизма, 
основывающейся на понятии умвельта Якоба фон Юксюолла и 
понятии структурного сцепления Матураны и Варелы, а также 
подчеркивая феномен коэволюционного процесса в аспекте экологии 
сообществ. Что касается эмпирической истории, мы даем краткий 
обзор литературных и медицинских примеров из истории Англии 17 
Notes towards a semiotics of parasitism 439 
века, где большое число произведений упоминают паразитизм, что 
было глубоко укорено в религиозной практике (напр., евхаристия) и 
политической жизни (напр., отношение двора и монарха) этого 
времени. Наконец, намечаются возможности "паразитической" связи 
между языком и биологией. 
Parasitismi semiootikast 
Parasiitide või parasitismi metafoor valitses kirjanduskriitilist diskursust 
alates 1970ndatest aastatest Tuntumad on Michel Serres Prantsusmaalt ja 
J. Hiilis Miller Ameerikast, kelle töödes seostatakse teksti ja parateksti, 
kirjanduse ja selle analüüsi, interpretatsiooni ja kriitika vaheline suhe tihti 
suhtega toituva organismi ja parasiidi vahel, võimaldades seega seda 
suhet dekonstrueerida. Need tööd, koos Derrida, Barthes'i ja Thomi 
omadega viivad mõttele parasitismi semiootika loomise võimalikkusest. 
Kahjuks ei süvene ükski neist autoreist parasitismi bioloogilistesse ai us­
tesse. Samas on kummaline, et isegi bioloogias tõlgendatakse parasitismi 
sageli kui metafoori, kus kaheorganismilise ökoloogilise fenomeni tähis­
tatavat väljendatakse tähistaja "söök võõralt laualt" abil. Artiklis visan­
datakse parasitismi semiootika lähtekohad, toetudes Jakob von Uexkülli 
omailma ning Maturana ja Varela struktuurse sidustuse mõistetele, samuti 
rõhutades koevolutsioonilise protsessi fenomeni koosluste ökoloogia 
aspektis. Antakse kirjanduslike ja meditsiiniliste näidete lühiülevaade 
XVII saj. Inglismaa ajaloost, kus paljud kirjutised mainivad parasitismi 
tolleaegses religioosses praktikas (näit. armulaud) ja poliitikas (näit. suhe 
õukonna ja monarhi vahel). Võimalik on mõista ka keele ja bioloogia 
omavahelist suhet kui "parasiitlust". 
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On the semantics of rhythm: 
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Abstract. The paper analyses the formal features of the characters of Oresteia 
in Greek tragedy. The protagonists and the minor characters are compared, for 
which the rhythmical liveliness and variability of the personages' utterances, 
the length and number of utterances, and the number of dialogue verses in the 
metrical repertoire of the corresponding personage are taken into account. The 
analysis revealed that the data of Sophocles and Euripides are more close to 
each other both in the respect of general "liveliness" and the "liveliness" of 
characters' utterances. Certain differences in the metrics and rhythmics of the 
main and minor characters' verses become most obvious when we compare 
Electra's part with minor characters (e. g., in Electra's part there is always the 
biggest proportion of lyrical parts, more unstandard settlements, more verses 
with splits than any other character). The index of liveliness of Electra's part 
is almost the same in all the authors. Although the same tendencies in Orestes 
are more schematical, the metrics and rhythmics of his utterances are rather 
similar to those of Electra. Thus, in respect of the proportion of lyrical verses, 
he always comes second after Electra; he also has quite many split verses. The 
parts of minor characters are usually made up entirely of iambic trimesters, 
the rhythmical variety of their speeches is higher than average, but there are 
no splits in their parts (except for Aegisthus). However, there are characters 
which parts have unstandard rhythm, e.g., the pedagogue in Sophocles or 
Chrysothemis, who is a contrast to Electra by her nature as well as her 
rhythmics. The contrast with other minor characters is even bigger. 
Clytaemnestra's part is both rhythmically and metrically intermediate: in 
Aeschylus her utterances consist entirely of iambic trimeters, but in Sophocles 
and Euripides she pronounces also a couple of lyrical verses. There are also 
some splits in her verses which usually do not occur in minor persons. 
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Introductory notes 
Literary theory has to share its object with other disciplines, above all, 
with literary criticism. Literary criticism considers the most diverse 
matters connected with literature to belong into its area of compe­
tence. In this sense, literary theory is always in worse position as 
compared to criticism — its field is more restricted and its statements 
are more reserved in all respects, sometimes they even seem to be 
redundant. If a scholar of literature attains results which have been 
earlier stated by a criticist, then the question arises: why did he even 
start this research? But if the results disagree with earlier declarations, 
then it is often explained in this manner that literary theory is engaged 
in castles in the air and not in reality. The difference lies not in more 
pithy and interesting statements, but in verifiability. The sophisticated 
statements of a criticist are the result of his intuition, taste, education, 
etc; in any case, they are individual and idiosyncratic, while the study 
of literature depends on materials, procedures, being therefore 
verifiable and independent of personal factors. 
Boriss Jarcho was one of the most radical formalists, who fought 
for the verifiability of the literary analysis. For him every statement 
had to be proved in the way they are proved in every other empirical 
discipline and. thus, the best and the most transparent procedure was 
the statistical analysis of data. While many other Russian formalists 
were most of all interested in obtaining the most novel and interesting 
information, then for Jarcho the greatest challenge was to prove the 
wide-spread opinions and thus to transfer them from the sphere of 
opinions to the sphere of knowledge. 
The study of the semantical and rhythmical structure of personages 
in drama was started by Boris Jarcho in his genre analysis that 
concentrated on the research of formal differences between tragedy 
and comedy. It is generally known that comedy differs from tragedy 
by its liveliness, abundance of action and commonness of thoughts, 
but also by distinct emotions of characters. Jarcho developed a method 
for determining reliable criteria to measure the above-named para­
meters. Thus, the basis for measuring liveliness in drama is the 
relationship between the number of utterances and the total amount of 
verses in a play, according to which the so-called index of liveliness is 
calculated; the density of action can be measured by the occurrences 
of personages acting in their own interests, but also by the frequency 
of physical action; the feelings of characters can be analysed on the 
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basis of vocabulary and motives of action; the thoughts of characters 
become evident, e.g., from the content of maxims'. The material for 
Jarcho's research were Pierre Corneille's (1606-1684) tragedies and 
comedies. It turned out that the index of liveliness in Corneille's 
tragedies is remarkably lower than in his comedies (0.15 and 0.276, 
respectively). As for the extent of action, then tragedy shows consi­
derably less action than comedy, since higher personages often entrust 
their deeds to other persons. There are differences also in characters' 
emotions: the vocabulary associated with fear, sorrow, hate and 
courage prevails in tragedy, while in comedy feelings of love, joy and 
happiness are more frequent. The content of maxims is rather different 
as well — in tragedy social thematics, time, elevated feelings prevail," 
while in comedy we find more maxims about joy, lying, wealth, 
poverty, literature and arts (cf. also Gasparov 1969: 510; Lill 1988: 
57-60). Such results are not novel and surprising at all, but they can 
be easily verified. 
While the main purpose of Jarcho's research was to define the 
differences between genres through characters, then Marina Tarlins-
kaja, who partly proceeded from Jarcho, concentrated explicitly on 
character analysis, in particular, on rhythmic differences between 
Shakespeare's characters (Tarlinskaja 1987: 135-176). Tarlinskaja 
used two different strategies in segmenting the dramatic texts: (1 ) 
form-oriented segmentation or the analysis of utterances of different 
length; (2) character-oriented segmentation, where the parts of 
different characters were studied. Form analysis consisted of two 
parts: (a) character exchanges inside a line or the so-called split 
verses; (b) comparison of utterances of different length. Character 
analysis concentrated on (a) the differentiation of characters through 
rhythm; (b) the evolution of characters. Tarlinskaja (1987: 345) 
concludes that Shakespeare uses specific rhythmical variations of 
Here it is important to conceive the limits of statistical method. Statistical 
method does not concentrate on single cases, but observes a case in a system 
within a prepostulated framework. Let us imagine, e.g., a situation where one 
character utters a maxim and another one repeats it ironically — the same maxim 
has here absolutely different meaning (the same can also be imagined in the 
lexical level, etc. Therefore, statistics is not a universal instrument to solve every 
problem, but qualifies only for certain aspects. As for the studies of semantics, it 
has an important role in increasing the verifiability and reducing the part of 
intuition. 
2 For emotions in Greek tragedy see, e.g., Stanford 1983; Taplin 1983. 
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iambic pentameter for different characters, whereby typologically 
similar characters display also similar rhythmical tendencies, being 
opposed to other characters, e.g., heroes to villains, the sophisticated 
to the impulsive, rulers to commoners, women to men, etc — it is 
typical that the iambic pentameters of the first numbers of the listed 
pairs are stricter, while those of the second members are looser. The 
regularities in the evolution of characters were manifested as well: as 
the character changed in the progression of drama, its rhythmical 
structure also changed, e.g., Othello, who at the beginning of the 
drama is a noble and harmonious person, deeply in love with 
Desdemona, and whose part is characterized by symmetrical and quite 
strict verses, becomes by the end of the drama jealous, chaotic, 
disharmonious and his verses become loose and asymmetrical as well. 
Accordingly, in Shakespeare more stringent and regular verse is 
associated with nobility, goodness, wisdom, peace and harmony, 
while looser forms are associated with lower features of character: 
villainy, stupidity, impulsiveness, inner discord and madness. 
The present study examines the characters of three ancient trage­
dies based on the plot of Oresteia: the Libation Bearers of Aeschylus 
and Electra of Sophocles and Euripides. The versions of Oresteia with 
some modifications can be found already in the early literary tradition: 
among others already in Homer, but later also in Stesichorus and 
Pindar. The legend itself can be briefly summarized as follows: after 
returning from Troy, Agamemnon has been murdered by his wife 
Clytaemnestra and her lover Aegisthus, who then take possession of 
the throne in Argos. Orestes, Clytaemnestra's and Agamemnon's son, 
lives in exile under the trusteeship of Strophius. When he becomes 
adult, he secretly returns to Argos to avenge his father. There he meets 
his sister Electra, who helps him to execute his plan. 
The plot of the tragedies is the same, but the three authors treat it 
rather differently: the same plot expresses different ideas and attitudes 
(e.g., the attitude towards oracle, matricide, etc), the same characters 
have utterly different natures and motives of action (cf. also Tucker 
1901: xi-xii; Winnington-Ingram 1980: 217ff; Goldhill 1992: 93-96; 
Lill 1994: 232-234). 
The purpose of the present study is to compare the formal features 
of characters, above all, their rhythmical structures, with main atten­
tion paid to the characters who are common to all three analysed 
tragedies, i.e. Electra, Orestes, Clytaemnestra and, of course, the 
chorus which, although slightly different in each tragedy, has schema­
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tically still the same function. Methodically, this analysis proceeds 
from the studies of Boris Jarcho and Marina Tarlinskaja: following the 
example of Jarcho, the indices of liveliness are calculated for each 
respective tragedy. In addition to that, also the indices of liveliness of 
the central characters are calculated in the present work. Following the 
example of Tarlinskaja, both the general form analysis and the cha­
racter analysis are carried out. 
1. The general analysis 
1.1. The relationship between the number of utterances and 
the total amount of verses in tragedy 
The index of liveliness in Libation Bearers of Aeschylus is 0.19, in 
Electra of Sophocles is 0.28 and Electra of Euripides 0.26. It appears 
that Sophocles and Euripides are in this respect closer to each other, 
while their difference from Aeschylus is almost as considerable as the 
difference between tragedies and comedies in Corneille's case. The 
Table 1 shows the indices of liveliness in different characters. 
Table 1. The indices of liveliness in characters of Oresteia. 
Author Aeschylus Sophocles Euripides 
Electra 0.26 0.25 0.29 
Orestes 0.18 0.47 0.45 
Clytaemnestra 0.38 0.21 0.21 
Chorus 0.14 0.28 0.13 
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In the case of Aeschylus it is notable that the roles of minor characters 
are more "lively". Thus, e.g. Clytaemnestra has a small, but at the 
same time an intense role. It is not so in the case of Sophocles and 
Euripides — rhythmically, the most lively part is that of Orestes, who 
is the second character in importance. The other characters of 
Sophocles and Euripides have also quite similar rates of liveliness. As 
the characters are actually quite different, then this aspect has no 
particular importance in the semantics of rhythm. 
The average length of utterances is in Aeschylus 5.3, in Sophocles 
3.6 and in Euripides 3.8; also according to these data Sophocles and 
Euripides resemble each other more. The most common length of 
utterances in all the three authors is 1 line: in Aeschylus 50.7%. 
Sophocles 44.9%, Euripides 66.3%. 
The minimum length of utterances in Aeschylus is 1 line, the maxi­
mum 66 lines. In Sophocles these data are respectively 0.25 (an 
utterance in a verse with a triple split) and 84, in Euripides 0.5 (an 
utterance in a verse with one split) and 85. 
The overwhelming majority of utterances in all the authors is 
formed by the short, i.e. 1-5 lines long utterances: 77.8% in Aeschy­
lus, in Sophocles (0.25-5 lines) 88.5% and in Euripides (0.5-5 lines) 
87%. The proportion of medium utterances (i.e. 6-20 lines) is 15.8% 
in Aeschylus, in Sophocles 7.4% and in Euripides 9.3%. The long 
utterances occur as follows: in Aeschylus (21-66 lines) 6.4%. in 
Sophocles (21-84 lines) 4.2%, in Euripides (21-85 lines) 3.4%. 
The division of dialogue and lyrical parts is the following: 58% of 
the total amount of verses in Aeschylus are dialogue verses (the metre 
of which is iambic trimeter) and 42% lyrical verses. Sophocles has 
75.5% dialogue verses and 24.5% lyrical verses, Euripides has 70.9% 
dialogue verses and 29.1 % lyrical verses. Aeschylus has more lyrical 
parts as compared to other poets, since the part of chorus is 
considerably bigger than in Sophocles or Euripides (which, of course, 
is not related to the metrics of the given tragedy, but to the general 
tendencies in the development of tragedy '). 
3 For the problems of dating see, e.g., Winnington-Ingram 1980: 231. 
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1.2. The proportion of split verses 
Aeschylus has no split verses, Euripides has some, in Sophocles we 
find them many. Table 2 illustrates the occurence of such lines which 
have one split. 
Table 2. Lines with one split. 
Author Electra Orestes Clytaemnestra Aegisthus Chorus 
Euripides 4 4 0 - 0 
Sophocles 26 20 4 4 4 
In other words, Euripides has only four verses of such kind, all split 
between Electra and Orestes. Thereby, three of them stand in succes­
sion in the recognition scene of the second act (Eur. El. 579-581): 
(НЛ.) ... ё%ю & аеХлтщ 
OP. кссЕ, ецог) у' ë%ei xpövcp. 
HA. OX)5étiot£ ÔoE,aa'. 
OP. oi>5' èyœ yàp rjÀ.ïïiaa. 
HA. ekeîvoç eî ai); 
OP. G\)(a.(ia%ôç yé aoi (lôvoç ... 
Sophocles has 29 verses split between two characters, 17 of them 
between Orestes and Electra, 4 between Electra and chorus. 4 between 
Electra and Clytaemnestra and 4 between Orestes and Aegisthus. 
While in Euripides' Electra all the split lines occur in dialogue verses, 
Sophocles uses this device four times also in lyrical parts (between 
Electra and the chorus). In Sophocles split verses are characteristic 
above all to the main characters, of the marginal personages Aegisthus 
is the only one who has splits; there are no such lines in the parts of 
Chrysothemis and the pedagogue. 
In Sophocles there occurs also a verse with a double split: Soph. 
El. 1502 
OP. TtôXX' ccvTicpcDveîç. f\ ô' ôSoç ßpaSvvetoa. 
àU' ёрф'. AI. ixpriyo-ö. OP. aoi ßaSiaxeov mpoç. 
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and even with the triple split: Soph. El. 845: 
HA. (peu XO. фей 5туи'- ôXoa yàp HA. бацар f]v. ХО. vai. 
There are also two cases of an utterance consisting of the second half 
of a verse and the first half of the following verse (these are utterances 
of Orestes and Clytaemnestra), e.g.. Soph. El. 1410-1411 : 
HA. iÔoi) цаХ' aî> 0poeî nç. KA. со îéxvov tékvov, 
oÏKiipe TÏyv teKovaav. HA. àXV о-ок èx aéBev ... 
Speaking of the split verses in Elektra of Sophocles, it is important to 
notice that they all occur in the second half of the tragedy (starting 
from v. 831), contributing thus to the rising tension of the drama. The 
average length of utterances becomes shorter (before v. 831 it is 6.3, 
after that 2.3) and, therefore, the index of liveliness in the second half 
of the tragedy is considerably higher (before v. 831 it is 0.16, i.e. 
comparable to the data of Libation Bearers of Aeschylus, but after that 
even 0.43). 
1.3. Metrical positions of splits 
Eunpides has only a few character exchanges inside verses and the 
metrical position of them is rather standard: in three cases out of four 
they occur in the position of penthemimeral caesura (i.e. the main 
caesura of iambic trimeter), while Electra's utterance comprises 
positions" A]-A3 and that of Orestes Вз-В 6. The fourth case of split is 
found after the second A position, where again first comes Electra's 
utterance (A|-A 2), which is then followed by Orestes' utterance (B 2-
B 6). This is to say that character exchanges occur in positions where 
syntagmatic word-ends are statistically more frequent. 
The division of verses with one split in Sophocles is displayed in 
Table 3. We see that most splits fall on the main caesuras (penthemi­
meral and hepthemimeral caesuras, i.e. the caesuras in the third and 
the fourth foot); there is only one case where it takes places on the 
verse foot boundary (after the utterance by Orestes). 
4 
'A' stands for a weak and B' for a strong position in a verse foot; indices 
show the number of a feet. 
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Table 3. Verse parts resulting from one split. 
A]-A3 A]-A4 C
Q CQ 
B 4-B 6  B 2-B 6  A,-B, L 
Electra 7 4 6 3 1 4 
Orestes 5 1 11 3 1 
Aegisthus 4 
Clytaemnestra 2 1 1 
Chorus 4 
2. Character analysis 
2.1. Electra 
Electra's character is quite different in every analysed author. In 
Aischylos she is a weak and unsteady personage, who feels passionate 
hatred against her mother and who is ruled by her emotions rather than 
her reason (cf. also Cockburn 2002). Electra in Aeschylus has 169 
verses altogether, 15.7% of the whole tragedy. Electra's utterances 
form 21.7% of the utterances in the whole tragedy (she has 44 
utterances), and in this respect she is the third after Orestes and the 
chorus. The majority of her utterances are short (81.8%), medium 
utterances compose 13.6% and long utterances 4.5%. The greater part 
of utterances are one line long (65.9%), the longest utterance consists 
of 29 lines. 
Table 4. The metrical structure of the characters in Libation Bearers of 
Aeschylus (per cent). 
Dialogue verses Lyrical verses Total amount 
Electra 74.6 25.4 100.0 
Pylades 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Orestes 87.9 12.1 100.0 
Servant A 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Clytaemnestra 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Servant В 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Chorus 18.6 81.4 100.0 
Nurse 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Aegisthus 93.3 6.7 100.0 
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Table 4 illustrates the metrical structure of the characters in Libation 
Bearers'. 
It appears that Electra has a higher proportion of lyrical verses than 
the other characters (except, of course, the chorus). The length of the 
role is not decisive here, since Orestes, whose role is somewhat longer 
than that of Electra, has a significantly lower proportion of lyrical 
verses (in fact, the number of lyrical verses in their roles is almost 
equal: Electra has 43 of these, Orestes 41, but the amount of dialogue 
verses in Orestes' role is bigger). 
Tables 5 and 6 show the occurrences of resolved verses (i.e. verses 
where a long syllable is replaced with two short ones) in different 
roles. 
Table 5. Resolutions in Libation Bearers of Aeschylus. 
1 reso­ 2 reso­ Total amount Total amount 
lution lutions of resolutions of verses 
Orestes 17 0 17 338 
Electra 10 1 11 169 
Chorus 1 0 1 446 
Servant A 1 0 1 1 
Clytaemnestra 4 0 4 48 
Nurse 2 0 2 39 
Servant В 1 0 1 11 
Table 6. Resolutions in Libation Bearers of Aeschylus (per cent). 
1 reso­ 2 reso­ Total amount of Total amount 
lution lutions resolutions of verses 
Orestes 5.0 0.0 5.0 100.0 
Electra 5.9 0.6 6.5 100.0 
Chorus 0.2 0.0 0.2 100.0 
Servant A 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 
Clytaemnestra 8.3 0.0 8.3 100.0 
Nurse 5.1 0.0 5.1 100.0 
Servant В 9.1 0.0 9.1 100.0 
5  There is no special analysis of the metrical structure of lyrical parts in the 
present work, for this, see, e.g., Jebb 1924: lxxii-xcii; Denniston 1998: 213-225; 
West 1990: 492-498. 
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It appears that in comparison with the other characters Electra has 
quite a lot of resolutions (Orestes has numerically more of them, but 
his part is also more than twice as long than that of Electra). Electra is 
the only character who has a verse with the double resolution. The 
analysis of the positions of resolutions revealed that almost all the 
resolutions in Electra's part occur in positions B] (6) and B^ (5), there 
is only one resolution in B 4. 
Electra of Sophocles is the central character of the tragedy; she is a 
strong, heroic and noble (EÔyEvrjç) woman, whose role in the drama is 
recurrent, but at the same time rather complicated (cf. also Winthrop 
2002; Hazel 1999: 4; Winnington-Ingram 1980). Electra's part in 
Sophocles consists of 643 verses, i.e. 44.4% of the total amount of 
verses. She has 166 utterances (40.8%), which is twice as much as the 
number of utterances by Orestes who is the second character in 
importance. Short utterances form 87.3% (0,25-5) of her part, 
medium utterances 7.8% and long utterances 4.8%. There are fewer 
one line long utterances than in Aeschylus (47%), but the longest 
utterance has as much as 69 lines. From the aspect of semantics such 
metrical repertoire adds special nuances to Electra's role, emphasizing 
her passion and intensity. 
Table 7 illustrates the metrical structure of the characters in Electra 
of Sophocles. 
Table 7. The metrical structure of the characters in Electra of Sophocles 
(per cent). 
Dialogue verses Lyrical verses Total amount 
Electra 72.4 27.6 100.0 
Pedagogue 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Orestes 87.9 12.1 100.0 
Chrysothemis 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Clytaemnestra 95.7 4.3 100.0 
Aegisthus 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Chorus 19.9 80.1 100.0 
Sophocles' Electra has also more lyrical verses than any other 
character (numerically, she exceeds even the part of chorus). Orestes 
shows almost the same data as in Aeschylus, but we should also 
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remember, that Electra's role is the biggest in terms of both the total 
amount of verses as well as utterances. The occurrences of resolved 
verses are presented in Tables 8-9. 
Table 8. Resolutions in Electra of Sophocles. 
Total 
1 reso­ 2 reso­ Total amount amount of 
lution lutions of resolutions verses 
Orestes 9 0 9 160.6 
Electra 14 1 15 641 
Chorus 2 1 3 191 
Pedagogue 14 0 14 149 
Clytaemnestra 6 0 6 114 
Chrysosthemis 1 0 1 156 
Aegisthus 3 0 3 33.3 
Table 9. Resolutions in Electra of Sophocles (per cent). 
Total 
1 reso­ 2 reso­ Total amount of amount of 
lution lutions resolutions verses 
Orestes 5.6 0.0 5.6 100.0 
Electra 2.2 0.2 2.3 100.0 
Chorus 1.0 0.5 1.6 100.0 
Pedagogue 9.4 0.0 9.4 100.0 
Clytaemnestra 5.3 0.0 5.3 100.0 
Chrysosthemis 0.6 0.0 0.6 100.0 
Aegisthus 9.0 0.0 9.0 100.0 
Considering both the facts that the occurrences of resolutions in 
Sophocles are somewhat more frequent and that Electra's part in 
Sophocles is almost four times as long as that in Aeschylus, we can 
say that in comparison with the latter, the verses of Electra in 
Sophocles are less varying and stricter (the proportion of resolved 
verses of Electra is 6.5% in Aeschylus' play and 2.3% in Sophocles' 
play). It should be noticed that Sophocles also allows a double 
resolution to occur namely in Electra's part, which is still quite a rare 
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occasion (besides Electra, such device is used only in the part of 
chorus). Sophocles, too, resolves in Electra's part mostly the position 
B 3  (8), positions A|, B b  B 2  and B 4  have two resolutions. 
Euripides' Electra, on the contrary to the noble and tragic heroine 
of Sophocles, is more commonplace, ordinary, human (Tucker 1901 : 
lvi); some researchers have even seen her as a neurotic, disturbed 
woman, embittered by her own sufferings as well as by the hatred 
against her mother, there have been also implications to her sexual 
frustration resulting from the unconsummated marriage (cf., e.g., 
Hazel 1999; Winnington-Ingram 1980: 231). Electra of Euripides 
utters 467 verses (i.e. 34.6% of the whole tragedy), which are divided 
into 136 utterances (38.4%) — she has more utterances than any other 
personage in the tragedy (she is followed by Orestes with 103 
utterances). Most of the utterances are short (0.5-5) — 88.2%, 
medium utterances form 8.8%, long ones 2.9%. The majority of 
utterances in the part of Electra in Euripides consists of one-line long 
utterances (70.6%), the longest speech comprises 56 lines. 
Table 10 shows the metrical structure of characters in Electra of 
Euripides. 
Table 10. The metrical structure of characters in Electra of Euripides (per 
cent). 
Dialogue verses Lyrical verses Total amount 
Electra 76.7 23.3 100.0 
Peasant 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Orestes 81.8 18.2 100.0 
Old man 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Clytaemnestra 97.3 2.7 100.0 
Castor 62.8 37.2 100.0 
Chorus 8.4 91.6 100.0 
Messenger 100.0 0.0 100.0 
While in the dramas by the other two authors the biggest proportion of 
lyrical verses belongs to Electra, in Euripides such verses are most 
characteristic of Castor, one of the dioscuri, of whose part almost 40% 
is lyrical. Nevertheless, Electra of Euripides is rather similar to the 
heroine of Aeschylus and Sophocles: she differs from them only 
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slightly (we should not forget, however, that conceptually the roles of 
Electra in the three studied tragedies are rather different, thus, here as 
well, the relation to semantics is weak). In Euripides also Electra is 
followed by Orestes, although he has less dialogue verses than Orestes 
in Aeschylus or Sophocles. 
Data of the resolved verses in Electra of Euripides are presented in 
the Tables 11-12. 
Table 11. Resolutions in Electra of Euripides. 
Total Total 
1 reso­ 2 reso­ 3 reso­ amount of amount of 
lution lutions lutions resolutions verses 
Orestes 25 1 0 26 225 
Electra 63 6 1 70 467 
Chorus 3 0 0 3 227 
Peasant 21 1 0 22 90 
Clytaemnestra 14 1 0 15 75 
Old man 17 l 0 18 88 
Messenger 15 4 0 19 91 
Castor 12 1 0 13 86 
Table 12. Resolutions in Electra of Euripides (per cent). 
Total Total 
1 reso­ 2 reso­ 3 reso­ amount of amount of 
lution lutions lutions resolutions verses 
Orestes 11.1 0.4 0.0 11.6 100.0 
Electra 13.5 1.3 0.2 15.0 100.0 
Chorus 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.3 100.0 
Peasant 23.3 I.I 0.0 24.4 100.0 
Clytaemnestra 18.7 1.3 0.0 20.0 100.0 
Old man 19.3 1.1 0.0 20.5 100.0 
Messenger 16.5 4.4 0.0 20.9 100.0 
Castor 14.0 1.2 0.0 15.1 100.0 
In comparison with the other authors the rhythmical structure of Euri­
pides' tragedy is quite dissimilar (cf. also West 1982: 85). Probably 
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the most conspicuous is the frequency of resolutions and the admit­
tance of three resolutions per verse line (in this tragedy only once, in 
Electra's part). The proportion of resolved verses in the part of Electra 
is several times bigger than that in Aeschylus' drama: 15%. 
Like in the earlier authors, Electra of Euripides resolves mainly in 
the position B3 (41), there are also quite many resolutions in A| (14 
times) and B2 (10 times), in addition to that there are resolutions also 
in positions B4 (7), B] (5) and A3 (1). 
2.2. Orestes 
Orestes of Aeschylus is strong, resolved, an equal adversary to 
Clytaemnestra (Cockburn 2002). His choice is not simple, but he 
understands that leaving his father unavenged is worse than killing his 
mother (Jebb 1924: xxx). Nevertheless, he has a moment of inner 
struggles (v. 898), yet he dismisses them with the help of Pylades, 
who reminds him of Apollo's oracle. Orestes' part consists of 340 
verses, which is 31.6% of the whole tragedy. As for the amount of 
utterances, Orestes holds the second place after the chorus: he has 62 
speeches (30.5% of the total amount of utterances). Most of his 
utterances are short (74.2%), there are 17.7% medium utterances and 
8.1% long ones. The proportion of one-line utterances is smaller than 
that of Electra (45.2%), the longest utterance is 37 lines. 
As it has already been said, with respect to the proportion of lyrical 
verses, Orestes of Aeschylus comes second after Electra (cf. also 
Table 4). There are also relatively many resolved verses in his part 
(5%, cf. also Table 5). Most of the resolutions occur in positions B3 
(6) and A, (5), then В i (3), B 4  (2) and B 2  ( 1 ). 
Orestes as portrayed by Sophocles is, in a way, a contradictory 
personage. On the one hand he is a determined and unhesitating 
character, but on the other hand he has been interpreted as a naïve, 
childish person, who is motivated not by the sense of justice, but by 
Apollo's orders and who accomplishes a certain maturity only at the 
end of the drama (cf., e.g., Winthrop 2002). Orestes' vengeance is the 
re-establishment of justice which evokes no moral hesitations (cf. also 
Goldhill 1992: 94). In comparison with Orestes of Aeschylus his part 
is much smaller: 160.6 verses, i.e. 11.1% of the tragedy, are divided 
into 76 utterances (18.8%), which make him the second character after 
Electra. The absolute majority of Orestes' utterances are short (0.3-5): 
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91.4%, there are very few medium and long utterances (i.e., both 
comprise just 1.3% of his part). There, too, the most preferred length 
is one line (47.4%), the longest part consists of 54 verses. 
The proportion of resolved verses in Orestes of Sophocles is 
slightly bigger than that of Aeschylus: 5.6%, mainly, these occur in 
the position B 3  (5), also in B 2  (2), A, (1) and Bi (1). 
Euripides takes from his Orestes the heroic aureola: Orestes is a 
weak man, who arouses sympathy in spectators, being only an instru­
ment in god's hands, not acting upon his own free will. Electra's part 
in the revenge is bigger (Jebb 1924: lii). Orestes of Euripides has 103 
utterances (29.1%), all in all 225 verses, i.e. 16.7% of the whole tra­
gedy. The occurrence of the short utterances is 93.2%, that of the 
medium utterances is 4.9% and long utterances 1.9%. 75.7% of 
utterances are one-line long, the longest utterance is composed of 34 
lines. 
Considering a relatively high proportion of resolutions in Euri­
pides. their occurrence in the part of Orestes is rather low: 11.6%. The 
substantial part of them is found in the position B3 (13), then in B, (4), 
A, and B2 (3 in both), B4 (2), A2 and B5 (1 in both). 
2.3. Clytaemnestra 
In the case of Clytaemnestra of Aeschylus we must take into con­
sideration that her personage was created already in the first part of 
the trilogy (Agamemnon). Aeschylus portrays Clytaemnestra as a 
complicated and controversial character who. in a way, is the anti-
ideal of motherhood and femininity (cf.. e.g., Winnington-Ingram 
1983: 84 or Winnington-Ingram: 102), yet, at the same time, a good 
mother who avenged her daughter's murder (Cockburn 2002). Her 
part is rather short: 48 verses (4.5%), which are divided into 18 utte­
rances (8.9%). Therefore, Clytaemnestra comes in this respect fourth 
after Electra. Orestes and the chorus. There are no long utterances in 
her part; 83.3% are short utterances and 16.7% medium utterances. 
72.2% of her part consists of one-line utterances, the longest utterance 
has 12 lines. 
Seemingly, the rhythmics of Clytaemnestra's part is the most 
variable in the drama: resolved verses make up as much as 8.3% of 
her part. However, her role is short and the actual amount of resolu­
tions is not big: there are three resolutions in the position B3 and one 
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in B 4. Metrically, it is significant that Clytaemnestra's part consists 
100% of iambic trimeters. 
Clytaemnestra as treated by Sophocles is, on the one hand, a cruel, 
ruthless, arrogant and overbearing woman, but she has a softer side as 
well: receiving a false message of Orestes' death, she feels genuine 
maternal grief (Jebb 1924: xliv, Winnington-Ingram 1980: 232), she 
also tries to justify her crime by saying that it was motivated by a wish 
to avenge her daughter. Clytaemnestra's role in Sophocles consists of 
114 verses (7.9%). The total percentage of her utterances is 5.9%, of 
which 87.5% are short, 4.2% of medium length and 8.3% long. Only 
the pedagogue and Aegisthus have less utterances than Clytaemnestra. 
Surprisingly, the most preferred type of utterance in Clytaemnestra's 
part is a two-lined utterance. The longest speech has 36 lines. 
While the part of Clytaemnestra in Aeschylus consists only of 
dialogue verses, then in Sophocles Clytaemnestra utters also lyrical 
verses (4.3%). As for the rhythmics, it is interesting to note that most 
of the variations occur in the position A 4  (3), which is a rather unusual 
place for resolving. There are two resolutions in the position B 3  and 
one in В]. 
Similarly to other characters in Euripides' Electra, also his 
Clytaemnestra is more human and lifelike than the one portrayed by 
Sophocles or Aeschylus. Aegisthus is more responsible for the crime, 
Clytaemnestra is weaker and less consistent (Tucker 1901 : Ixi), but 
therefore less repulsive than that of Sophocles (Denniston 1998: xxx). 
As in the other authors, the role of Clytaemnestra in Euripides is quite 
short: 75 verses, i.e. 5.6%, and composed of 16 utterances (4.5%; only 
the messenger, Castor and the peasant have less than that). 75% of 
them are short utterances, 18.8% medium and 4.2% long ones. The 
most frequent are the one-line long utterances (68.8%), the longest 
one consists of 40 lines. 
Although the substantial part of Clytaemnestra's role is in iambic 
trimeters, she also has two lyrical verses. Considering the average rate 
of resolutions in Euripides, the variability in her part is quite high 
(20%), there are seven resolutions in B 3, four in A,, two in B 2  and A 4  
and one in A 3. 
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2.4. The chorus 
The chorus of Aeschylus is made up of fifteen Trojan captives. Their 
attitude is quite clear: they favour Electra, being her counsellors and 
supporters. The chorus also emphasises the will of gods and the 
inevitable reestablishment of justice (Jebb 1924: xxxi). The chorus has 
the biggest part in the tragedy: 447 verses, i.e. 41.6%, it also has the 
biggest number of utterances: 63 (31%). Furthermore, the longest 
utterance of this tragedy belongs to the chorus. However, the most 
preferred are the short utterances (76.2%), of which 36.5% are one-
line verses, 17.5% of medium length and 6.3% long. 
The chorus of Sophocles consists of fifteen free women of 
Mycenae. They are also sympathetic to Electra, but the background of 
such attitude is different: the chorus is characterized by patriotism and 
hostility against usurpers. The restoration of the continuity of power is 
in the interests of the chorus and therefore they support Agamemnon's 
son (Jebb 1924: xxxi). The part of the chorus consists of 191 verses, 
i.e. 13.2%. As for the number of utterances, then here the chorus is the 
third (53 speeches; although Crysothemis has the equal amount of 
utterances, the total number of verses in her part is smaller), 83% of 
the utterances are short, 13.2% of medium length and 3.8% long. The 
one-line utterances are the most frequent (28.3%), the longest 
utterance consists of 36 lines. 
Euripides forms his chorus of the friendly Argive countrywomen. 
The part of chorus is somewhat longer than that of Electra by 
Sophocles, but still almost two times shorter as compared with the 
tragedy of Aeschylus: 227 verses, i.e. 16.8%. At the same time the 
number of utterances is the smallest in all the analysed tragedies: 30 
utterances (8.5%). 66.7% of the utterances are short, 26.7% medium 
and 6.7% long. 
It is obvious that in all the studied tragedies the substantial part of 
the chorus consists of lyrical verses. Still the chorus sometimes 
intervenes in the dialogue parts: the data of Aeschylus and Sophocles 
are here almost the same — a little less than 20% of the verses, but in 
Euripides considerably less — 8.4%. Naturally, the chorus has the 
fewest amount of resolutions: only once in Aeschylus (B3), four times 
in Sophocles (Bb B2. B3 and B5) and three times in Euripides (two of 
them in B^ and one in B2). 
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2.5. Minor characters 
Less important characters in Aeschylus are the following: 
(a) Pylades, Orestes' friend, who has one three-lined utterance (0.3% 
of all the verses); 
(b) a servant, who opens the door to Orestes and Pylades and thereby 
pronounces one utterance, comprising one line (0.1%); 
(c) a servant of Aegisthus, who has two utterances (one- and ten-lined; 
1%); 
(d) Aegisthus, who also has a very short role (1.4%; i.e. it consists of 
only 15 verses and three utterances, of which one is only a gasp of 
distress — v. 868: e e, otototoi); 
(e) the nurse, whose role in the tragedy is to deliver a message to 
Aegisthus. The nurse has seven utterances and 39 verses altogether 
(3.6% of the whole tragedy). The most frequent are one-line 
utterances (71.4%), the longest utterance in her part has 32 lines. 
As for the metrics, it is noteworthy that, as a rule, the minor characters 
speak in iambic trimeters, the only exception being Aegisthus, in 
whose part we also find a lyrical verse (the above-mentioned gasp of 
sorrow). Resolutions occur only in the parts of both servants (they 
both have one resolution in the position BO and the nurse (twice in 
B3). 
Sophocles has only three minor characters: 
(a) the pedagogue, whose role is relatively short, yet, at the same time 
includes the longest utterance of the given tragedy, consisting of 
84 lines. The pedagogue of Sophocles has 149 verses (10.3%), i.e. 
18 utterances altogether (4.4%), of which the most preferred are 
one-line utterances (44.4%); 
(b)Electra's lovely, but weaker sister Chrysothemis provides contrast 
with the heroic nature of the protagonist (Jebb 1924: xlii; 
Winnington-Ingram 1980: 239). Her part is not small at all: she 
speaks all in all 53 mainly one-line (67.9%) utterances, i.e. 156 
verses (10.8%). The longest utterance of Chrysothemis has 28 
lines; 
(c) the part of Aegisthus is in Sophocles also very small (33.3 verses, 
i.e. 2.3% of the whole tragedy). Aegisthus has 17 utterances 
(4.2%), of which 29.4% are one-line long. He has no long 
speeches, the longest ones in his part are two six-line utterances. 
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As in Aeschylus, the minor characters of Sophocles speak mainly in 
iambic trimeters. Rhythmically, the most important part is that of the 
pedagogue, who has the biggest proportion of resolved verses (9.4%) 
and unusual locations of resolutions (six times in A,, three times in B, 
and A 4  and only two times in B 3) — he is the only character whose 
most preferable location of variations is the first foot. Chrysothemis 
and Aegisthus have both one resolution (considering the latter's short 
part in the tragedy, it is not surprising, however, in the case of 
Chrysothemis one would expect more). 
Euripides has four minor characters: 
(a) the husband of Electra, who is called simply the peasant 
(aino-upycx;) and whose monologue of 53 lines opens the tragedy. 
All in all, he utters 90 verses (6.7%) or 11 utterances (3.1%), of 
which the one-line utterances are the most frequent (36.4%); 
(b) a former servant of Agamemnon, who is called the old man in the 
drama — his part is quite lively: 88 verses (6.5%), which make up 
as much as 45 speeches (12.7%). Thus, the old man has a rather 
big proportion of one-line utterances (82.2%), the longest one has 
16 lines; 
(c) Castor6, who appears ex machina and whose tacit companion is his 
twin-brother Pollyx. has altogether 86 verses (6.4%) or 9 
utterances (2.5%), the most common type of which has two lines 
(33.3%) and the longest consists of 54 lines; 
(d) the messenger, who is a servant of Orestes and who brings the 
message of the death of Aegisthus. utters 91 verses (6.7%) in only 
four speeches (1.1 %), of which two are one-line, one four-line and 
one 85-line long (being also the longest utterance in this tragedy). 
The minor characters also in Euripides utter generally dialogue verses; 
the rate of resolutions in their parts is rather high as well, thus, e.g., in 
the peasant's case it is as much as 24.4%, in the other characters 
except Castor it also exceeds 20% (there are only 15% of them in 
Castor's part and in this respect he is equal to the protagonist; this 
could also be the argument for excluding Castor's part from the 
original version; in addition to that, it is not in correspondence with 
the general metrical data of the tragedy, cf. Table 8). Minor 
personages prefer to resolve the first foot (the only exception here is 
6 T. G. Tucker is convinced that the part of dioscuroi does not belong to the 
original version, but is a later supplement (cf. also Tucker 1901: xxxii). 
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the messenger; in the case of the main characters the primary location 
of resolution is the third foot). 
Conclusion 
Although the material of the present research is not sufficient for the 
more general conclusions concerning the rhythm of characters, 
comprising, e.g. their gender, social status, positive or negative traits 
of character, some regularities were found after all. Thus, certain 
differences can be observed in the metrics and rhythmics of the main 
and minor characters. 
These tendencies become most obvious when we compare Electra 
with minor characters. Namely, Electra of all the analysed tragedies 
has several features in common. First, she has always the biggest 
proportion of lyrical parts (in Euripides she is exceeded by Castor, but 
he is most probably a later supplement). As for the rhythmics, Electra 
has more unstandard settlements, e.g., she is the only character in 
Aeschylus and Sophocles who has verses with a double resolution, 
while in Euripides, whose Electra is the most resolved character 
whatsoever (if not to consider Castor), even a triple resolution can be 
found. Here it is also important to notice the indexical relationship 
between the rhythm and semantics: the more commonplace and less 
typical of tragedy the character is, the closer is its rhythmics to that of 
comedy. Electra has also more verses with splits than any other 
character. The index of liveliness of Electra is almost the same in all 
the authors (despite that, proportionally, it is one of the highest in 
Aeschylus, but quite average in Sophocles and Euripides). 
Although the same tendencies in Orestes are more schematical, his 
metrics and rhythmics are rather similar to those of Electra. Thus, in 
respect of the proportion of lyrical verses, he always comes second 
after Electra; he also has quite many split verses. 
At the same time, the parts of minor characters are usually made 
up entirely of iambic trimeters. The rhythmical variety of minor 
personages is higher than average, but there are no splits in their parts 
(except for Aegisthus). However, there are characters with unstandard 
rhythm, e.g., the pedagogue in Sophocles or Chrysothemis, who is a 
contrast to Electra by her nature as well as her rhythmics: the 
proportion of resolutions is almost four times smaller than that of 
Electra. The contrast with other minor characters is even bigger. 
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Clytaemnestra is both rhythmically and metrically an intermediate 
character: in Aeschylus her part consists entirely of iambic trimeters, 
but in Sophocles and Euripides she pronounces a couple of lyrical 
verses as well. There are also some splits in her verses which usually 
do not occur in minor persons. 
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О семантике ритма: 
формальные особенности в речах персонажей Орестеи 
Целью работы является анализ формальных особенностей речей 
персонажей Орестеи у Эсхила, Софокла и Еврипида. Сравниваются 
речи главных действующих лиц с репликами второстепенных персо­
нажей; учитывается динамика и вариативность ритма, количество 
реплик, их длина, а также удельный вес речевого стиха в метри­
ческом репертуаре персонажа. 
Выяснилось, что показатели по Эсхилу и Софоклу оказываются 
близкими как с точки зрения общей динамики ритма («живость» 
ритма по Б. И. Ярхо; этим термином пользуются также М. Л. Гаспа-
ров и 
М. Тарлинская), так и по динамике ритма у отдельных персо­
нажей. Существенные различия обнаруживаются в речах главных и 
второстепенных действующих лиц. Особое место во всех трех 
трагедиях занимают монологи и реплики Электры, причем это ка­
сается как их метрических, так и ритмических параметров. Так, во 
всех трех трагедиях Электра чаще других персонажей использует 
лирические метры; что касается ритмики, то реплики Электры хара-
теризуются нестандартными формами: так в целом в ямбическом 
триметре избегаются стихи, содержащие более одной резолюции 
(двусложная реализация односложной позиции), в то время как в 
речах Электры у Эсхила и Софокла встречаются стихи с двумя 
резолюциями, а у Еврипида — с тремя. Начала и концы реплик 
Электры часто не совпадают с границами стиха. Речи Ореста 
демонстрируют те же тенденции, однако в менее выраженной форме. 
Реплики второстепенных персонажей не содержат лирических форм, 
их 
ритмика лишена индивидуальных особенностей, хотя в целом 
характеризуется более высокой по сравнению с основными персо­
нажами вариативностью. Начала и концы реплик совпадают с грани­
цами стиха. 
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Rütmisemantikast: formaalsed erinevused karakterite vahel 
tragöödia Oresteia erinevates versioonides 
Töö eesmärgiks on analüüsida Oresteia karakterite formaalseid omadusi 
Aischylose, Sophoklese ja Euripidese käsitluses. Võrreldakse pea- ja 
kõrvaltegelasi, milleks võetakse arvesse tegelaste kõnede rütmilist elavust 
ja variatiivsust, repliikide arvu ja pikkust, samuti kõnelemisvärsside 
osakaalu vastava tegelaskuju meetrilises repertuaaris. 
Analüüsist selgus, et Sophoklese ja Euripidese näitajad on üksteisele 
tunduvalt lähedasemad nii üldise "elavuse" poolest kui ka karakterite 
kõnede "elavuse" poolest. Kindlad erinevused ilmnesid pea- ja kõrval­
tegelaste repliikide meetrikas ja rütmikas. Kõige selgemini tulevad need 
tendentsid välja Elektra ja ebaolulisemate tegelaste võrdlemisel. Nimelt 
on kõigis kolmes tragöödias Elektral mitmeid ühiseid jooni. Nii on temal 
alati kõige enam lüürilisi osi. Mis puudutab rütmikat, siis on Elektra 
värssides suhteliselt rohkem ebastandardseid lahendusi, nt on ta ainus 
tegelane Aischylosel ja Sophoklesel, kelle jambilistes trimeetrites tuleb 
ette kahekordset resolutsiooni, samas kui Euripidesel, kelle Elektra on 
üldse kõige enam resolveerunud tegelane (kui Kastorit mitte arvestada), 
võib tema osast leida koguni kolmekordse resolutsiooniga värsi. Samuti 
on Elektra tekstis kõikidest tegelastest kõige enam jagunemisi. Elektra 
"elavus" on kõikidel autoritel peaaegu võrdne (kuigi proportsionaalselt on 
see Aischylosel üks kõrgemaid. Sophoklesel ja Euripidesel keskmine). 
Orestesel on samad tendentsid küll skemaatilisemad, kuid siiski on 
tema osade meetrika ja rütmika suhteliselt sarnane Elektra omale. Nii on 
ta lüüriliste värsside osakaalult alati teisel kohal Elektra järel, samuti on 
tal küllaltki palju jagunenud värsse. 
Samal ajal koosnevad kõrvaltegelaste osad reeglina täielikult jambilis-
test trimeetritest. Vähemtähtsate tegelaskujude repliikide rütmiline varia­
tiivsus on keskmisest kõrgem, kuid jagunemisi nende osades üldiselt ei 
leidu (erandiks on Aigisthos). Samas eristub teiste seast ebastandardse 
rütmiga tegelasi, nt Sophoklese Chrysothemis, kes kontrasteerub Elektra-
ga nii loomuomaduste poolest kui ka oma rütmikalt: tema tekstis on 
resolutsioonide osakaal ligi neli korda väiksem kui Elektral. Kontrast 
teiste kõrvaltegelastega on veelgi suurem. 
Klytaimnestra roll on rütmiliselt ja meetriliselt vahepealne: Aischy­
losel koosneb tema osa küll sajaprotsendiliselt dialoogivärsidest, kuid 
Sophoklesel ja Euripidesel toob ta kuuldavale ka üksikuid lüürilisi värsse. 
Samuti on tema osas ka mõned värsiridade jagunemised, mida kõrval­
tegelaste! üldiselt ei esine. 
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Abstract. Alexej Remizov is usually regarded by literary critics as a 
Symbolist rather than a Futurist writer. However, I would posit that Remizov 
similarly to the Futurists viewed language as "logos," bozhestvennii glagol. 
According to the mystical interpretation of the famous words "At the 
beginning there was Word and the Word was with God and the Word was 
God", when God was creating the world he named the objects, and these 
abstract names became a force for the appearance of an object in physical 
reality. In the light of these words, The Medieval mystical and magical philo­
sophers claimed that one could restore the divine language of Creation, 
possess the ability to create objects anew, and thereby become Creator 
himself. One can argue that a major goal of Remizov was similar to that of his 
Medieval predecessors: to reveal the mystical power of language in order to 
create, not to describe reality. The paper analyzes three chapters from Alexej 
Remizov's Rossiya v pis'menah, a book which can be read as a manifesto of 
Remizov's attitude toward language and reality, and discuss possible sources 
that might have influenced Remizov in his attitude towards language. 
Alexej Remizov is usually regarded by literary critics as a symbolist. 
Although critics sometimes compare Remizov's work to Futurist 
writings, especially to Hlebnikov, at first glance there is not very 
much in common between the art of Remizov and that of the Futurists. 
Remizov's aim is to reveal the language of the Old Russian times; the 
works of Futurists are full of neologisms. Remizov is looking into the 
past, while Futurists are mostly interested in the future. However, 
upon careful analysis of Remizov's works, one can observe a strong 
similarity between the attitudes of both the Futurists and Remizov 
toward the role of language and reality in literature. It has been 
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already mentioned by H. Baran that both Remizov and Hlebnikov 
were interested in the study of myth (Slobin 1987: 190). Baran notes 
that both Remizov and Hlebnikov are trying to create new myths on 
the basis of old ones. He connects this tendency with the fact that 
these writers also try to create new words using old roots and to play 
in both slovotvorchestx'o and mifotxorchestvo (Slobin 1987: 191). 
However, the interest in the creation of neo-mythology was not just a 
feature of Remizov or Hlebnikov's works. One can argue that this 
interest was among the most dominating in the artistic perception of 
the Silver Age in general, from symbolists to futurists. 1  I would argue 
that it is not quite "mytho-" but mirotvorchestvo that unites Remizov 
and the Futurists, that is to say, the similar attitude of Futurists and 
Remizov toward language as a tool for the creation of a new personal 
world through their own personal language. I would posit that Re­
mizov as well as the Futurists viewed language as "logos", bozhest-
vennyj glagol, the mystical word of God, about which St. John talks in 
his Gospel. According to the mystical interpretation of the famous 
words "At the beginning there was Word and the Word was with God 
and the Word was God" when God was creating the world he named 
the objects, and these abstract names became a force for the 
appearance of an object in physical reality. This conception of logos, 
although existing from the third century, became extremely popular in 
the Middle Ages and early Renaissance. Medieval mystical philo­
sophers. especially those connected with magic and alchemy, claimed 
that one could restore the divine language of Creation. If one were to 
succeed in doing so. he would possess the ability to create objects 
anew. thereby becoming a Creator himself. 
One can argue that a major goal of Remizov as well of the 
Futurists was similar to that of their Medieval predecessors: to reveal 
the mystical power of language in order to create, not to describe 
reality. In my paper I will analyze three chapters from Alexej Re­
mizov's Rossiya v pis'menah, a book which can be read as a mani­
festo of Remizov's attitude toward language and reality. I will also 
discuss possible sources that might have influenced Remizov in his 
attitude towards language, especially those that have their roots in the 
mystical linguistic doctrine of Kabbalah. 
Kabbalah (originally the Hebrew word tradition) is an esoteric 
philosophy that developed among Jewish philosophers in Spain in the 
early Middle Ages. The central teaching of this philosophy is the idea 
1 See for example, Mints 1979. 
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that God manifests himself in the form of infinite Light, in Hebrew 
zohar. The principal idea of Kabbalah lies in the conception of 
Creation. The whole process of creation is shown as a process of ten 
impulses of the Divine Light, each one of which marks a new stage in 
the creation. These ten stages are called spheroth. Kabbalah claims 
that the Divine light manifests itself in the form of the divine Word, 
Logos. 2  This belief resulted in the concept of linguistic mysticism, and 
in the fact that by the beginning of the sixteenth century Kabbalah 
began to develop into two branches: the theoretical and the practical. 
While the aims of theoretical Kabbalah were purely moral and led by 
the wish to find the answers to questions about the nature of Humanity 
and the role of God in Nature, practical Kabbalah was interested 
mainly in the linguistic mystical doctrine of zohar. The Jewish 
practical Kabbalah later developed into a Christian one, which was a 
combination of original Kabbalah, Neo-platonic philosophy and 
Christian mysticism. It brought forth the Neo-Kabbalistic belief that 
all the secrets of divine and earthy beings can be decoded and revealed 
by the manipulations of various letters in the alphabet. Practical 
Kabbalists asserted that each letter in Language represented a physical 
or spiritual quality of either God or a Human, and claimed that if one 
took letters as a secret code of creation, by manipulating them one 
could find the original Divine Word for an object, and, with its help, 
create this object anew. The following passage from the book Hayye 
ha Olam kha Baa written by the famous Jewish Kabbalist philosopher 
Abraham Abulafia may serve as an example of the linguistic mystical 
approach to Kabbalah: 
Let your garments be white. If it's night, let everything be illuminated by 
numerous lamps. Then start combining the letters individually or a few at a 
time. Move them around until passion ignites in your heart. When the flame of 
passion has been lit in your heart by moving the letters, you will understand 
things that you ordinarily wouldn't be able to see. 1  (Eco 1998: 214) 
In their mystical attempts, Jewish Kabbalists preferred to use the 
interpretations of the ancient Hebrew texts rather than newer Jewish 
writings because of the belief that the Past is closer to the revelation of 
the divine secrets than the Present. In Christian Kabbalah the inter-
For a detailed study of Kabbalah see Sholem I96l. See also Idel 1988. 
3  All the translations presented above are mine, except for the translation of the 
quote from L. Tolstoj's War and Peace. 
20 
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pretations of the ancient Jewish writings were replaced by the inter­
pretations of early Christian Apocalyptic texts. 
Magicians and alchemists called Kabbalah "the secret knowledge," 
which they alone possessed. However, this "secret knowledge" was 
widely propagated in a number of manuscripts, which later became 
very popular among the German mystics and Pietists and reached Rus­
sian intellectuals through Free-Masonic contacts in the mid-eighteenth 
century. It would be appropriate here to quote a passage from a book 
by German Ficktauld. Kabbalah Mystica Naturae, presented in the 
archive of the famous Russian eighteenth-century Mason Count 
Elagin. The following description of Kabbalah cited from the book 
explains how Elagin might have seen Kabbalistic philosophy: 
Kabbalah is a natural philosophy which is devoted to the understanding of the 
soul, astral bodies, celestial spints. elements, and, most of all, the divine light. 
Letters and syllables are the most significant pan of Kabbalistic studies 
because letters are the home of spirits and every spirit originates from a 
specific letter.5 
The age of Modernism was a time of strong revival of the interest in 
everything mystical and magical. The birth of French symbolism in­
volved. using the words of Bernice Rosenthal (1997: 21) "a redisco­
very and popularization of alchemy, magic and Kabbalah". This 
revival owes much to the efforts of Eliphas Levi, a Catholic priest, 
who. using a Jewish pseudonym, both translated the most famous late 
Medieval and early modern books on occultism, such as the works by 
Agrippa. Paracelsus and Boehme. and wrote his own books on magic 
and practical Kabbalah. The French interest was quickly carried to 
Russia where, as Rosenthal notes in the introduction to the book The 
Occult in Russian and Soviet Culture: 
The occult was a remarkably integral part of pre-revolutionary Russian 
culture. Occult doctrines appealed to artists, writers, and political activists. 
Avant-garde poets and painters were intrigued by the idea of a fourth 
dimension. Philosophers and lay theologists explored the occult in their quest 
for new religious truths. (Rosenthal 1997: 21 ) 
4 For a deeper analysis of the influence of Jewish mysticism on late Medieval 
and Renaissance magical practices see Faivre 1992. Also, an interesting view of 
the relations between Jewish Kabbalah and Christian Kabbalah is presented in Idel 
1992. 
5 The quotation is from an unpublished manuscript source from the P. M. 
Kaznacheev archive, a private collection of B. Kerdimun. 
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It was the Modernists and especially the Symbolists who returned to 
the belief of the magic power of the Word, a creed that traces back to 
Kabbalist linguistic mysticism. In the mid-1880s, A. Rimbaud came 
up with the idea that sounds can express emotions just as words do, 
and that they can even have colors. The idea was followed eagerly in 
Russian Modernist literature, not only in symbolist poetry but in such 
"younger" movements as akmeism and futurism. For example, in his 
poem Na Venere, akh, na Venere Nikolaj Gumilev expresses the 
similar belief that sounds can express emotions: 
На Венере, ax, на Венере, 
Нету слов обидных и властных, 
Говорят жители на Венере 
Языком из одних только гласных. 
(Gumilev 1987: 185) 
The same idea can be seen in the Modernist literature up to the early 
twenties. In 1921, a symbolist Fedor Sologub, for example, shows his 
longing for "vowel language" in a following way: 
Родился бы я на Мадагаскаре 
Говорил бы наречием где много "а" 
Слагал бы стихи о любовном пожаре 
О нагих красавицах на острове Самоа. 
(Schmid 1999: 645) 
The symbolists' and akmeists' attempt to prove that not only words 
but also letters can bear emotional and even semantic power, was 
followed by the futurist writers. Futurists revived the linguistic theory 
of creation, declared that Art is not objective but creative and not only 
brought back the Kabbalist idea that the Divine language differs from 
the human one, but also argued that, using the words of A. Kruche-
nych "художник волен выражаться своим собственным языком 
ибо творец индивидуален" (Shklovskij 1991: 179). In 1919, V. 
Shklovskij directly compares transrational language to an incantation, 
i.e. to a linguistic segment, which seems meaningless but actually 
bears an important secret meaning: a meaning, which is creative, and 
not descriptive. 6  The interest in the occult power of language went 
hand in hand with the interest in everything old and long-forgotten: 
f l  For the development of the similar practices in the Renaissance kabbalistic 
magic, see Yates (1964). 
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medieval legends, fairy tales and especially old books and manu­
scripts. As G. Meyrink observes: "Strange things of mysterious 
origin — parchments covered with secret signs, tattered manuscripts 
[...] they draw our attention like magnets by creating a mysterious 
connection with the yet undiscovered depths of the human soul" 
(Meyrink 1992: 19). 
Rossiya V pis'menah by A. Remizov appeared at the peak of this 
interest. The book is composed as a chain of old documents and 
engravings, discovered and re-told by the author. In the book 
Remizov's Fictions: 1900-1921. G. Slobin finds that "in his utmost 
regard for the word in all its facets, including its magic and music, 
Remizov was close to the symbolist notion of language as a tool of 
creative cognition" (Slobin 1991: 30). In the article "Неизданная 
книга Мерлог", D'Amelia notes that "The very name of the book 
leads the reader to the idea about the recreation of the reality through 
the language in which lexical meaning is united with the image 
created by the disposition of letters and words on a page" (Slobin 
1991: 148). However, neither D'Amelia nor other critics have noticed 
that in such an approach to old texts Remizov follows the ideas of the 
practical Kabbalistic theory and regards the language as a mystical 
and magical tool that helps to reveal the secrets of the long-forgotten 
Past. A good example of this role of language is the chapter called 
"The Trunk" ("Сундук"). 
The trunk of Remizov's story is clearly a bearer of something 
secret and long-forgotten. As the narrator says: "There was only one 
thing known about the trunk, that it bore the belongings of our great-
great-grandfather Dmitri Filosofov — some old rags ('какая-то 
ветошь')" (Remizov 1982: 82). This trunk has outlived all its owners, 
the first of whom died in 1779. However, nothing of what was placed 
in the trunk, has survived decay. When the trunk is opened, one 
cannot find anything in it. except for old rotten garments. The only 
way to reveal the secret and to find out what was in the trunk is 
through language: the list of belongings that was left inside and is still 
in good condition. This is strange because paper is no more resistant 
to decay than other materials. It seems that the survival of the list 
bears a significant symbolic meaning: the only thing that has been left 
from the past is the text. This text, a simple list of belongings, is 
transformed into a magical document, which helps to re-construct 
something been dead for centuries. The idea of the list as a magical 
spell finds support again in the last lines of the story. "От сундука 
ничего не осталось, а записка у меня, и хранит ее ъолк-самоглот"' 
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("Nothing is left from the trunk but the note guarded by a fairy wolf-
samoglot") (Remizov 1982: 84). The wolf, although a toy-figure, is 
definitely a fairy-tale guard, which protects a magical treasure. This 
notion only stresses the fact that for the narrator the list, "zapiska" is 
clearly such a treasure. 
"Reality is created by Art" (Kodryanskaya 1959: 197), Remizov 
writes in one of his notes. He declares that "the retelling is never a 
reproduction but an attempt to recreate a living being" (Kodryanskaya 
1959: 196). In his attempt to re-create the past and to create the new 
"past in the present" suggested by Sunduk, letters for Remizov are of 
no less, if not of more importance than words. Much has been written 
about Remizov's interest in the graphical side of a letter. D'Amelia, 
for example, claims that for Remizov semantic meaning can be 
present in a letter just as in a whole word. She compares Remizov's 
view of the role of letters to Hlebnikov's and Kruchenych's manifesto 
"Letter as Such", saying that "Remizov deconstructs a page into 
separate parts like Hlebnikov in his manifesto on the deconstruction of 
language or Filonov in his art works" (Slobin 1986: 147). From this 
comparison it is only one step to Shklovskij's definition of trans-
rational language, in which a letter revives its symbolic origin, and, in 
this way, everything that seems meaningless at the first glimpse 
becomes a bearer of creative mystical power. 7  However, D'Amelia 
does not take this step. She sees an origin for Remizov's attitude 
toward the "meaningful letters" in the Japanese or Chinese art of 
hieroglyphics. Yet the hieroglyphics themselves do not bear any 
mystical power. They are used to describe and not to create. For 
Remizov, on the other hand, a letter is always an entrance into a living 
life of language, an exit from three dimensions into four. It seems that 
in order to understand the role which letters play in Remizov's work, 
one should consider the major interest of his whole life: a passion for 
the glagolitic alphabet. 
J. Obatnina finds that "The glagolitic alphabet became a passion 
for Remizov, who at the beginning stages of his studies filled an entire 
notebook with his glagolitic exercises. For Remizov, the glagolitic 
alphabet played the role of a sacred language" (Obatnina 1996: 183). 
The same idea can be seen in Remizov's Fictions: 1900-1921 by G. Slobin. 
Slobin compares Remizov to his contemporaries Belyj and Hlebnikov, and says 
that just like them Remizov "rediscovered the magic of sounds and words" in a 
process of literary creation akin to a shaman's "transcendence of the profane 
condition". 
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However, the glagolitic alphabet originally bore sacred and 
mystical elements. In the article "Славянская азбука" L. Savelieva 
explains that glagolitsa is a reflection of the spirit of Medieval 
linguistic mysticism on the Slavic ground, which maintains "a deep 
mystical union of letters being bounded to each other" (Savelieva 
1994: 213). According to the symbolic interpretation of Savelieva, 
each letter in glagolitsa has a semantic meaning. When placed in order 
as a text and translated into Modern Russian, these letters look like a 
prayer or a poem with powerful philosophic implications. Moreover, 
besides the direct semantic meaning, each of these letters bears not 
only a symbolic semantic but also a numerical connotation. Of parti­
cular importance in the glagolitic alphabet is the letter Az. It differs 
considerably from the Greek Alfa, and looks more like a transfor­
mation of the Hebrew alef a mystical letter suggesting the beginning 
of creation. In Medieval Hebrew, used by Christian as well as Jewish 
Kabbalists, the letter alef represented both ani (myself, i.e. everything) 
and ein (nothing), and was considered "the symbol of everything 
which is both below and above and which is the beginning of 
everything" (Sholem 1991: 37-39). In a description of the meaning of 
A, Savelieva strongly echoes the Hebrew symbolic explanation of alef 
noting as follows: 
A cosmogonie model of the letter 'Az' is a pattern connected with spatial 
onentation, where up and down are regarded as spritual and material, 
respectively. 'Az' becomes a symbol of human ego and at the same time an 
allegorx for the origins of human development. Thus, one understands the first 
and. undoubtedly, the most sacred letter of the glagolitic alphabet as a symbol 
of world building founded by the creator of the Russian tradition of the 
written word in the alphabetical text. (Savelieva 1994: 213) 
Only through the understanding of "azbuka" as a sacred mystical text, 
can one understand the significance of Azbuka in Rossiya v pis'menah. 
Azbuka concludes Rossiya vpis'menah. V. Hlebnikov argues in his 
"Letter as Such" that letters can have semantic meanings. Each letter 
means a different emotion or a different force. This makes language a 
living being, a symbol of life. The same attitude toward the role of 
letters in language can be seen in Remizov's Azbuka. While describing 
his work on the book, Remizov writes in a note that his aim is to 
represent Russia as a living being: "как живое существо" (Slobin 
1986: 147). The last chapter of Rossiya v pis'menah becomes the 
terminating symbol of the whole text: of Russia as a living being, 
where the moral symbolic concept of this being is based on the 
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Russian language, in the Azbuka. Thus, the alphabet becomes the 
symbol of life. For Remizov, like for Cyril, the inventor of the 
glagolitic alphabet, the central letter of this "life" is "AZ," the letter of 
creation. "Аз есьм свет миру" (Az is the Light of the world), the 
narrator declares, and develops this statement by showing the creative 
power of this letter: 
Сколько слез — тех когда стукнулся — отделился от вещи другой — 
нет, изволь из воздуха создать новую вещь. И этот "аз" тебе меняет лицо, 
глаза, взгляд. (Remizov 1982: 210) 
In Azbuka Remizov plays with letters just as the followers of the 
grapho-semantic conception of Kabbalist writings did in their attempt 
to find a spell that would help to create a new object. He places 
together in three rows words with identical meanings, written in four 
different "azbukas" in German, and in Russian, as in order to discover 
whether or not the reality would differ if the form of the letter had 
been changed. He also places together in parallel rows letters from 
distinct languages that differ in their graphic form but are vocally 
similar, as if he tries to check whether the reality depends on the letter 
or on the sound. German and Russian interrupt each other not only in 
the azbuka, but also in the text of the novella itself, creating a mixture 
of languages. It seems that letters, sounds and even graphical devices 
become for Remizov more important than the semantic meaning of the 
words. In these letters and sounds he sees a union that creates "живое 
слово", a word which is not descriptive, but creative, a living being. 
As Remizov himself says: "Загадка языка, буквы прописные, 
строчные, сложи двоеписьменные, сложи троеписьменные, титла, 
ярок, кавыка, удивительная, вопросительная, вместительная" (Re­
mizov 1982: 212). 
Upon looking at the text of Remizov's Azbuka one can see it not as 
a literary, but more as a mathematical text, a formula.8 As has been 
mentioned above, in both Christian and Jewish Kabbalah the semantic 
meaning of the letter also depends on the number it represents. 
Numerology is one of the major features of any linguistic mystical 
theory. That may be the central reason why numbers played such an 
The passage given above shows Remisov's interest not only towards letters 
but also towards the graphical signs, which were used in early Old Church 
Slavonic to show a grammatical category of the word or a correct pronunciation. 
The device can be paralleled to the system of graphical signs, nekudot, used in 
Hebrew and widely exploited by practical Kabbalists. 
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important role for the futurists, especially Hlebnikov. 9  In numbers the 
Futurists saw an active power, which could help them to reveal the 
secret of creating a new world. It seems that the corresponding 
numbers of the letters in three different alphabets are also important 
for Remizov, and that he is well aware of the numerological side of 
language. The chapter Tsifry, which is significant for an understanding 
of "Rossiya v pis'menah" as a whole, supports this idea. 
Tsifry expresses Remizov's strong interest in numerology. 
"Прельстительная слагаемость цифр, тайность знаков, сколько 
страсти и какая волшебная притягательность'" (Remizov 1982: 
192). The chapter shows not only Remizov's interest in numerology, 
but also some practical knowledge. Remizov seems to know the 
Kabbalistic meanings of some of the numbers: 6 — earthy life, 7 — 
the kingdom of angels, 3 — heavenly knowledge, 666 — the number 
of mankind (страшное число человеческое) (Remizov 1982: 192). 
Christian magical Kabbalistic numerology is based on the system 
3-7-12. where seven means the number of angels sitting at the foot of 
the divine throne, three stands for the Trinity, and twelve symbolizes 
the unity of life both on heaven and earth. 3+7+12 equals 22, the total 
number of the faces of the Deity. Multiplied by the number three, the 
symbol of the Trinity, these numbers equal 66. This 66. which later 
started to be written 666 (probably to stress again the importance of 
the Trinity) is the number that symbolizes the Creation. 1 0  In Hebrew 
all letters already bear simultaneous numeral meanings. Other 
languages, and among them Russian, had to be deciphered so that 
each letter would receive a parallel, mystical, number. In Russian this 
work has been done through glagolitic, not through the Cyrillic 
See Nikolaj Bogomolov's "Об одном из источников диалога Хлебникова 
Учитель и Ученик" in Bogomolov 1999: 264-270. The interest towards numbers 
as a vivid part of language can be seen not only in Futurists but in the poetics of 
the Silver Age in general, for example in Gumilev's poem Slovo. Such an attitude 
again shows the intend of the writers of the time to follow the Renaissance pattern 
of the kabbalistic magic which regarded both numbers and letters (sounds) as two 
parts of one magical language. (See, for example, Reuchlin 1987, or Agrippa of 
Nettesheim, De Occulta Philosophia. See also Papus, Quabala as a later example 
of such a tradition.) However, Gumilev regards numbers as the subordinate part of 
the language, not as important as sounds are (не решаясь обратиться к 
звуку/тростью на песке чертил число...). Such view was quite common for the 
Silver Age poetics, and was changed only in futurist literature. 
1 0  For a more detailed analysis of the role of numerology in Kabbalah see 
Sholem 1941. For the Christian magical interpretation of Kabbalistic numerology 
see. for example, Mathers 1989. See also Idel 1992. 
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alphabet, so Remizov's interest in the mystical side of glagolitsa 
could have reinforced his interest in this subject as well as helped him 
in his knowledge of the numerical side of azbuka. Remizov's use of 
numerology in "Tsifry" also shows his knowledge of the role it has 
played in interpreting the Apocalyptic texts. He quotes the words from 
St. John's Apocalypse: "w послал мирови ангела кроткостьГ 
(...and he sent an angel of kindness to the world...), noticing that 
"according to the church calendar, every letter has a corresponding 
number. The sum of the numbers corresponding to the letters in 
Apocalypse produces the year of the birth of the emperor (Alexander 
I)" (Remizov 1982: 194). One can also notice the similarity between 
Remizov's interest in predicting or explaining things with the help of 
the numerological side of a text and the similar interest of Hlebnikov, 
for whom the mystical power of numbers went hand in hand with the 
desire to predict the Future. 
In light of everything presented above, one can argue that Rossiya 
у pis'menah shows that, in his ideas about language and reality, 
Remizov may indeed be more closely aligned with the Futurist literary 
philosophy than with that of the Symbolists. Rossiya v pis'menah is a 
book about the priority of language over reality. The major problem 
that Remizov's book deals with is the ability of a writer to re-create 
something lost long ago or even to create his own reality through 
language, using both the literary and the numerological sides of it. 
Given such a task, the role of a writer becomes akin to that of a 
magician or a wizard, and Remizov himself is fond of such a 
definition. In his notes he mentions that he sometimes feels that 
through his works he gains access to "a strange, secret life of fantastic 
and unreal". In a note dated 1921, he suggests that he himself might 
have magical power. He mentions a day when he wished, leaving a 
building in which he had been strongly offended, to burn this house 
down — and the next day the building was really burned to the 
ground. The literary parodies of the first decades of the century always 
stressed this interest of the writer in magic and even demonism. One 
of the critical articles pictured Remizov as a lonely old man who 
lives in a half-dilapidated little house and only admits those on whom he has 
placed a terrible and mysterious spell. He writes in a small dark room in front 
of a soot-covered hearth [...] a black cat rubs up against his feet, and the 
silence is suddenly disturbed by the harsh cries of an old owl. When he writes 
he dips his pen in a white skull filled with blood. What a horrible sight! 
(Obatnina 1996: 189) 
21 
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The question is whether Remizov could really be aware of the lin­
guistic philosophy of practical Kabbalah, which would support the 
aforementioned observations. I believe that such a possibility may 
exist. The mystical trends that became popular in Russia during the 
first decade of the twentieth century resulted in the strong interest of 
Russian artistic intellectuals in Kabbalah, both Christian and Jewish. 
Theologists such as Pavel Florenskij and Sergei Bulgakov refer to 
Kabbalah when they look for the origins of the mystical concept of 
Sophia. The Jewish origin of Sophia is also presented in the works of 
Vladimir Solov'ev, whose concept of Sophia presents Sophia-Wisdom 
as Kabbalist Hokhmah. the second and the closest to God. sphera, 
which symbolizes the Divine Wisdom. J. Kornblatt in her article on 
Vladimir Solov'ev argues for the possibility that Solov'ev might have 
studied original Jewish Kabbalistic manuscripts in the library of 
British museum in London. She says in particular that 
Kabbalah actually refers to a mystical practice that involves contemplation of 
the names of God found in Hebrew Scripture, often through numerical 
manipulations of the letters of the Hebrew alphabet... Its most development 
came in thirteenth century Spain, with the dissemination of the book of Zohar. 
The Zohar, which Solov'ev probably read in Latin translation, was written or 
perhaps partially complied by Moses ben Shemtov de Leon, but it was attributed 
to a great sage of the talmudic period. Shimon Bar lohai. (Rosenthal 1997: 79) 
However, with its general interest in magic and the occult, modernism 
primarily paid attention not to moral spiritual Kabbalistic concepts, 
like that of Sophia/Hokhmah. but to practical, mostly Christian, 
Kabbalah." By the end of the first decade of the century all of the 
major works of a French writer Papus, the central nineteenth-century 
popularizator of Christian Kabbalah, were introduced into Russian 
society. Remizov's profound interest in magic paralleled with his 
good knowledge of French, would most probably have led him to 
these works or to their interpretations in contemporary criticism, 
especially since they were very popular. In her article "Обезьянья 
великая и вольная палата: игра и ее парадигмы", J. Obatnina notes 
that Remizov often sighed his letters and documents with the name of 
an imaginary king, Abrasacks. She argues that the origin of the figure 
of Abrasacks might be an article by I. Mansvetov, which Rerruzov 
1 1  For the detailed study of the occultism and the Silver Age culture in Russia 
see Carlson (1993). 
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read between 1907-1917. The article analyzes the Gnostic numeral 
explanation for the name of the Deity. According to Obatnina, 
It follows from this article that the Kabbalistic name of the gnostic deity 
Abrasacks, when converted into corresponding numbers, corresponds in turn 
to the gnostic pleroma, which contains 365 eons, a reflection of the number of 
days in a year. Therefore, the mystical name of the king Abrasacks can also 
correspond to the main idea of Remizov's book Posolon which describes the 
calendar year. (Obatnina 1996: 196) 
Another way in which Remizov might be acquainted with Kabbalistic 
linguistic theories, either original or Christian, is Free-Masonry. 
Remizov seemed to know Masonic symbolism quite well through his 
friends who were involved in Masonry, for example M. Tereschenko 
who held a high rank in the Masonic lodge "Великого Востока 
народов России". The ideology of this lodge was influenced by 
Papus's own lodge in Paris. 1 2  Some of Remizov's drawings express 
symbolism, that was strongly wide-spread in origin in Masonic or 
alchemic works, for example a snake that eats its own tail. 1 3  In his 
letters, for example one dated February 1923, he even mentions his 
interest in Kabbalah, although he refers to it as the knowledge of 
ancient Persian magicians later adopted by Masonic philosophers. 
Moreover, in the chapter Tsifry one finds an interesting similarity 
between the numerological interpretation of the text about the 
Emperor Alexander with that of the similar interpretation of a 
Masonic text found by Pierre in a well-known passage from Tolstoj's 
War and Peace. In particular. Tolstoj writes that: 
One of his brother masons had revealed to Pierre the following prophecy 
relating to Napoleon, and taken from the Apocalypse of St. John. 
In the Apocalypse, chapter thirteen, verse seventeen, it is written: "Here is 
wisdom...count the number of the beast, for it is the number of the man, and 
his number is six hundred three score and six..." 
And in the fifth verse of the same chapter: "And there was given unto him 
a mouth speaking great things and blasphemies, and power was given to him 
to continue forty and two months." 
For the influence on Papus' activities on Russian artistic milieu of the Silver 
Age and for the history of his Martinist Lodge in Russia see Serkov 1997. 
1 3  For the use of this emblem in alchemic symbolism see Rabinovich 1979. 
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If the French alphabet is treated like the Hebrew system of enumeration, 
by which the first letters represent the units, and the next the tens and so on, 
the letters have the following value:-
a b с d e f g... 
1 2 34 5 67... 
Turning out the words l'empereur Napoléon into ciphers on this system, it 
happens that the sum of these numbers equals 666, and Napoléon is thereby 
seen to be beast prophesied in the Apocalypse. This prophecy made a great 
impression on Pierre. He frequently asked himself what would put an end to 
the power of the beast, this is of Napoléon: and he tried by the same system of 
turning letters into figures, and reckoning them up to find an answer to this 
question. (Tolstoj 1995: 621) 
V. Shklovskij even notes that a famous fraternity, "Великая 
Обезьянья Палата", "was created by Remizov in the style of a 
Russian Free-Masonic Lodge" (Shklovskij 2000: 24). The palata was 
definitely a game, but a game which bore many symbolic features, and 
had much in common with a Masonic lodge. It was ruled by a council 
of seven Monkey Counts and governed by a King named Asyka. The 
entrance to the fraternity could be reached only with the knowledge of 
three passwords. Remizov used the glagolitic alphabet and a special 
signature to write and to sign documents connected with the fraternity. 
J. Obatnina believes that Remizov's fraternity was a parody of a 
Masonic union and that Masonic symbolism did not have a serious 
influence on Remizov's literary art. However. I would argue that most 
of the symbols created by Remizov in "Великая Обезьянья Палата", 
max be explained only through the perspective of his literary works, 
and especially through Rossiya v pis'menah. The council of seven 
counts in palata may well have its origin in Masonic ranking, but also 
strongly echoes the seven angels at the divine throne from Tsifry. In 
Tsifry one can also find the explanation of three magical words that 
confirmed the membership to both the palata and a lodge, since the 
number three is the symbol of Trinity, i.e. of "небесное знание" 
(heavenly knowledge). In the light of this, the numeral and the 
linguistic symbols that Remizov uses in both his life and literature 
seem less like a parody and more like an attempt to form a new 
esoteric mystical theory on the basis of the old existing ones and to 
build his own magical school, a school which would help him to 
create a new reality as well as to recreate the past. 
In his manifesto "Letter as such", V. Hlebnikov claims that should 
writers submit to their native mystical language, a mystical union 
would occur between people and their land, since "number is a true 
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side of a letter, and the aim of a writer is to reveal that side" 
(Hlebnikov 1983: 119). One can argue that Remizov's book adheres 
very closely to Hlebnikov's idea. Lines of words in Azbuka and 
repetitions of numbers in Tsifry, which seem meaningless at first 
glance, are intended, just as does transrational language (zaum), to get 
to the original rhythmic power of language. Azbuka, Tsifry and Sunduk 
help the reader to feel the force of language through which it has its 
strength to create reality. Based on the example of these chapters, one 
can see how Remizov tries to replace the everyday words designed to 
describe reality with his own language, which is constructed of 
semantically meaningful letters, sounds and numbers, and which has 
the power to create. However, Remizov's aim is different from that of 
the Futurists. 1 4  Remizov does not try to change the world or the 
Future. In his search for a hidden mystical creative side of language, 
he, like Cyril, the creator of the glagolitic alphabet, is trying to reveal 
the divine morality, пробудить в душе человеческое. It seems to me 
that both Rossiya v pis'menah and Obez'yan'ya palata are but two 
sides of this attempt at linguistic symbolic enlightenment, the two 
sides that help understand one another. It is true that Remizov's use of 
glagolitic tainopis', his Kabbalistic pictures, and his playing with the 
language in Azbuka. are but the components of a game he played his 
entire life; yet through this game the writer raises serious questions 
about the moral role of language in human life. "A wanderer on the 
ways of a word", a strong believer, Remizov perceives language as 
mystical Logos, a living being in which letters, sounds and numbers 
are vivid components. For Remizov such a view of language goes 
hand in hand with his aim in writing Rossiya v pis'menah: to revive 
the dead Past, to create the New which is but a recreation of the Old, 
and to fill this New by the old light of God's morality. 
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Проблема языка и реальности в русском модернизме: концепция 
миротворчества в "Россия в Письменах" Алексея Ремизова 
Статья рассматривает литературный проект Алексея Ремизова Рос­
сия в Письменах с точки зрения общего отношения Серебрянного 
века к лингвистической символике и семиотике языка как к "бо­
жественному глаголу", то есть магическому орудию для создания 
окружающей реальности. Евангельскую концепцию "в начале было 
Слово" Ремизов представляет как магическую и мистическую кон­
цепцию власти языка над реальностью, и пытается в своем про­
изведении доказать это предположение через восстановление реалий 
российского прошлого с помощью симбиоза букв и цифр, бес­
смысленных на первый взгляд, но обладающих, согласно Ремизову, 
скрытым магическим смыслом. 
На мой взгляд, данная интерпретация концепции власти языка 
над реальностью близка доктрине так называемой магической 
Каббалы. Статья анализирует теорию магической Каббалы, рассмат­
ривает 
интерпретацию и практическое применение этой теории в 
поэтической идеологии Серебрянного века, и анализирует книгу Ре­
мизова как пример использования этой теории в русской литературе 
начала двадцатого века. 
Keele ja reaalsuse probleem vene modernismis: mirotvorchestvo 
mõiste Aleksei Remizovi raamatus "Rossija v pismenah" 
Vaadeldakse Aleksei Remizovi kirjanduslikku projekti Rossija v pis­
menah Hõbeajastu kontekstis, kus lingvistilisse sümboolikasse ja keele-
semiootikasse suhtuti kui "jumalikku kõnesse", st vaadeldi seda teatud 
maagilise vahendina ümbritseva reaalsuse loomisel. Remizov mõtestab 
evangeeliumi "alguses oli Sõna" lahti kui keele reaalsuse üle valitsemise 
maagilise ja müstilise kontseptsiooni ning püüab oma teoses seda väidet 
tõestada, taastades vene mineviku reaaliaid esmapilgul mõttetute (kuid 
Remizovi järgi varjatud maagilist mõtet kandvate) tähtede ja arvude 
sümbioosi abil. 
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Autori arvates on taoline keele reaalsuse üle valitsemise kontsept­
siooni tõlgendus lähedane nn maagilisele Kabbalale. Artiklis analüüsitak­
se maagilise Kabbala teooriat, selle teooria tõlgendust ja praktilist raken­
dust Hõbeajastu poeetilises ideoloogias. Remizovi teost vaadeldakse sel 
foonil kui antud teooria kasutamise näidet vene kahekümnenda sajandi 
alguse kirjanduses. 
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Abstract. This article attempts to analyse Russian postmodernist poetics, 
proceeding from the concept of the "trans-semiotic stairs", as presented by J. 
Faryno for describing the avant-garde. Examples from various texts are used 
to demonstrate how postmodernist texts contain divergent processes: the 
culturally specific and unique dissolves in tautology, meaningful entireties are 
dispersed into atomized empty particles. The significant teleological model of 
the avant-garde ceases to function here. A play by J. Brodsky, Marble, is 
examined on this background, as well as the position of the author that differs 
from the "postmodernist" context.' 
1. 
The question of what the universal qualities of poetry are. what 
distinguishes the poetic trends and epochs from each other, and 
wherein the individuality of a definite poet manifests itself is quite a 
complicated one. Hence the theorizing of "recurrences", quests for 
historical analogies, composing of diverse typologies. 
Thus the peculiarity of literary postmodernism is often questioned 
by means of the argument that "we've already seen it all" (for 
example, Umberto Eco thinks that each epoch has its own "post­
modernism"), while mixing up the skepticism of the very postmodern 
culture towards innovation and the possibility of "newness" with 
1 An earlier version of this paper, "A post-modern poet 'on the stairs of avant-
gardhas been read at the jubilee conference of Prof. Jerzy Faryno, "Literature 
as literature" (Bydgoszcz, Poland, 2001). 
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postmodernism as a historical-cultural phenomenon. As it happens, 
there is nothing new in such a disposition itself — for the realistic 
qualities of literature (especially that of antiquity) were discussed long 
before the emergence of realism, whereas the terms modernism and 
avant-garde, besides their historical-cultural meaning, were often 
applied to denote certain qualities of cultural artifacts or ideologies. 
Various modes commonly used in theoretical and critical writing 
for describing the postmodernist paradigm on the background of 
modernism, involuntarily contribute to the formation of the idea about 
the independence of postmodernism (see, for example, Spears 1970; 
Eagleton 1983; Fokkema 1984; Spanos 1985; Hassan 1987). Post­
modernism is often characterized through negation (cf. absence, 
refusal, death, deconstruction. uncertainty, indeterminacy), or else via 
oppositional pairs, as, for instance, in the well-known schema of Ihab 
Hassan, in which modernism and postmodernism are viewed as two 
systems, the qualities of the one being juxtaposed with those of the 
other: "plan, program — changeability", "hierarchy — anarchy", 
"distance — participation", "synthesis — antithesis", "semantics — 
rhetoric", "presence — absence", "signified — signifier", "deter­
minism — indeterminism", "transcendence — immanence", etc. (Has­
san 1987: 91-92). It is not fortuitous, though, that the question of 
whether postmodernism is the last epoch of modernism ("the fatigued 
avant-garde") or the beginning of a new one, a cultural cycle opposed 
to modernism, cannot be answered unequivocally. For the first time in 
the history of literature, we are faced with a phenomenon that is so 
elusive and indeterminable, defying all identification, paradoxically 
open and closed at the same time, focused on itself and destroying 
itself (Hutcheon 1989). The description of this phenomenon through 
comparison/juxtaposition of its constructive principles with the 
preceding tradition does not yield us necessary opportunities to delve 
into it. It is difficult to describe the structure of the object that 
demonstrates the destruction of the structure, especially without the 
necessary temporal distance. What facilitates our task, however, is an 
awareness of the simple truth that in any chaos, especially the one 
constructed by the creative imagination of a poet, there exists certain 
regularity. The destruction of a system presupposes a system of 
devices for that destruction. 
In order to define postmodernism from the semiotic point of view, 
the terminological apparatus of deconstruction is most frequently 
applied, in which process the philosophical and poetic discourses 
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often merge, and the "localization" of deconstructive universal prin­
ciples of text-reading takes place, wherein the latter become to be 
viewed as qualities of the particular type of texts. The standard 
definition of postmodernist discourse claims that it is the play of 
signifiers without the signified (here, as before, we detect a certain 
confusion in terms — the transcendental signified (Derrida, Deleuze) 
and the doubt in the strict ties between the signifier and the signified 
within the structure of the sign as an element in the sign system should 
be kept apart). If we wish to describe the respective literary practice 
from this point of view, we should not ignore the self-sufficient nature 
of the poetic expression. 
2. 
The present article endeavours to present one of the possible inter­
pretations of the "working mechanism" of the texts of Russian post­
modernism, using as an example the attempt of Jerzy Faryno to 
describe how the avant-garde text "works". The main attraction of 
Jerzy Faryno's approach for us lies in the fact that he does not engage 
in drawing up the catalogue of the characteristic features of Russian 
avant-garde. Instead, he views the text as an "event", i.e. as a process 
of contemplation. 
As is generally known, Jerzy Faryno bases his work on the 
theoretical treatment of the function of language by Roman Jakobson 
and his model of communication. Besides, he also relies on the model 
of semiosis by Juri Lotman. We could consider Faryno's concept as 
the elaboration of the ideas of Lotman on the principles of reencoding 
as the principles of generating meaning in the poetic text. In his 
Structure of the Poetic Text, Juri Lotman writes the following: 
[...] meaning occurs only in those cases when we have at least two different 
chains-structures. In ordinary terms, one of those could be defined as the plan 
of expression, and the other as the plan of content. In the process of 
reencoding between definite pairs of elements that are different in character, 
correspondences are formed, while one element in its system will be perceived 
as equivalent to the other one in its system. Such crossing of two chains of 
structures at a certain common twofold point will be termed as sign, while the 
second of the chains — the one with which the correspondence is formed — 
486 Ülle Pärli 
will act as content, and the first one — as expression. Accordingly, the 
problem of content is always a problem of reencoding." (Lotman 1970: 48) 
The meaning might be generated either by the internal — i.e. syntag-
matic (as in the case of literary romanticism) — or the external — i.e. 
paradigmatic reencoding (prevalent in realism). While developing the 
ideas of Jakobson on equivalence, Lotman writes: 
[...] it is necessary we give up the common idea, according to which the 
world of denotations of the secondary system is identical with that of the 
primary ones. The secondary modelling system of the artistic type constructs 
its own system of denotations which is not a copy but a model of the world of 
denotations in the general linguistic sense. " (Lotman 1970: 63) 
Studying the poetics of the avant-garde, Jerzy Faryno discovers 
certain characteristic regularities which, on the one hand, retain the 
connection with the classical semiosis, while at the same time 
contradicting it, in which he sees the peculiarity of the avant-garde. 
In his article "Deciphering", Faryno presents the thesis of the 
avant-garde text as a reversed act of communication which "instead of 
initiating a contact, presupposes its disruption and ends the commu­
nication" (Faryno 1989: 21), and in which the functions of the sender 
and the recipient of the message merge (the real sender is the world-
generating instance itself). The content of the message is the entire 
communicative act: "[...] avant-garde, denying the poetic function, 
ascends the same stairs, but one step higher, turning into metapoetry, 
i.e. realizes the metapoetic function" (Faryno 1989: 47). 
"[. J значение возникает в тех слу чаях, когда мы имеем хотя бы две раз­
личные цепочки-структуры. В привычных терминах одну из них можно 
определить как план выражения, а другую — как план содержания. При 
перекодировке между определенными парами элементов, разными по своей 
природе, будут устанавливаться соответствия, причем один элемент в своей 
системе будет восприниматься как эквивалентный другому в его системе. 
Подобное пересечение двух цепочек структур в некоей общей двуединой 
точке мы будем называть знаком, причем вторая из цепочек —та. с которой 
устанавливается соотвегствие. — будет выступать как содержание, а 
первая — как выражение. Следовательно, проблема содержания есть всегда 
проблема перекодировки.'' 
3  "[...] необходимо отказаться от традиционного представления, согласно 
которому мир денотатов вторичной системы тождествен миру денотатов 
первичной. Вторичная моделирующая система художественного типа 
конструирует свою систему денотатов, которая является не копией, а 
моделью мира денотатов в общеязыковом значении." 
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The very metaphor, "ascent on the stairs'", becomes the wording by 
which Jerzy Faryno discloses the mechanism of reference in the avant-
garde text. It is certainly a process: the simultaneous "esthetization — 
de-esthetization", as it is called in The Trans-semiotic Stairs', a move­
ment from the conceptual world to the speech- and world-generating 
instance where the new language and new creativity dwell. A text like 
this is always "in a state of displacement". Faryno examines in great 
detail this displacement that disrupts the interior integrity of the sign 
(the liberation of the signifier from the signified, the disruption of the 
referential connection as such). 
This imperfect sign, being in the state of transformation, is always 
identical with and different from itself at the same time. In the first 
case we have the signified without the signifier (meaning without 
sign), and in the second case — the signifier without the signified. The 
text, however, turns into a series of transformations. 
Once we have a series of such conditions-transformations-metamorphoses, we 
are dealing not with semiotics, but with the semiotics of semiotics, or — to be 
more exact — the trans-semiotic paradigm of the object, concept or word, 
phoneme or sound where every single condition is detected as a sign of the 
same (of itself), but within the framework of another semiotics or another 
ontology, but its meaning is not confined to that, since it does not in fact 
belong to any of those, nor does it entirely realize in any of them. (Faryno 
1992: 10-11) 
The structure of such stairs can be most generally specified as a 
vertical construction with fixed intermediate horizontal stages, each 
step being its substructure. If we interpret this image in terms of 
"paradigmatic — syntagmatic", it is a chain of transitions from one 
"syntagmatic stage" to the next, a higher one, by means of para­
digmatic "ascents". We could, respectively, translate these transforma­
tions into terms of rhetoric and grammar, rhetoric and stylistics (Lot-
man 1992). We could also infer that "on the stairs", in the 
transformations-metamorphoses (of which a text like this actually 
consists of), those two principles of organization penetrate into one 
another, which is exactly what renders the text its transitional nature at 
any moment. This is one of the paradoxes of the "trans-semiotic" 
stairs. 
Both Lotman and Faryno proceed from the concept of the dual 
nature of the sign as formulated by Saussure. Despite certain diffe­
rences of opinion, their general understanding of how the sign "ope­
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rates" in the poetic text, in the virtual world, still remains pretty close 
(especially if we regard the latest works of Lotman). Jerzy Faryno's 
writings display a certain similarity to the so-called "pure rhetoric" or 
"infinite semiosis" of Peirce. 
This way, the interpretation of the sign does not lead us to its 
meaning but, instead, to another, more advanced sign, the inter­
pretation of which gives us in its own turn the third sign, etc. 
The steps of the "stairs" of avant-garde refer by this to the uni­
versal semiotic description of the structure of the metaphor. See, for 
example, the remark of Faryno that the metaphor "is not created by the 
violation of semantics, as is generally believed, but by the violation of 
referentiality, and therefore by semiotic displacement" (Faryno 1989: 
48). 
Which is to say that this mechanism of generating meaning as 
described by the example of avant-garde, could well have a more 
universal character (cf. the idea of Dernda, so often repeated in 
postmodernist criticism, according to which it is impossible to strictly 
distinguish between the signified and the signifier, that the signified is 
never present in the sign, and that it is impossible to acquire a definite 
idea of the world through it). 
In the light of the afore-said, one should not take the idea of the 
disruption of the referential connection either in the avant-garde text 
or in the poetic practice of postmodernism too literally. Firstly, the 
reference in a poetic text does not principally coincide with that of the 
so-called primary semiotic systems. The sign does not represent here 
the object as such, but an element of the "imaginary world", it does 
not refer to the world of reality (to the real world of ideas and texts). 
Instead, it refers to the world as it is embodied in the images of the 
conception of the author about the world, i.e. in principle, is not equal 
with itself. 
3. 
One of the possible ways of delineating the avant-garde and post­
modernist strategy could well be the very elucidation of the character 
and results of the above-mentioned "rupture" of the referential con­
nections. Thus, in the avant-garde poetics as described by Faryno, the 
disruption of the signifier-signified generates the gradation of the text 
and produces a series of changes in its ontological status, "a 
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permanent increase in the semiotic rank of the world". The text 
possesses a clearly teleological nature — it is always moving towards 
its next meaning. In accordance with the spirit of structuralism, here, 
too, the author needs a congenial reader. 
The postmodernist text is constituted as a world without centre and 
vertical, as expressed in the strategy of the destruction of traditional 
poetic and linguistic structures, the change of the position of the 
author in the text, who is alienated and ceases to control the text. A 
special type of subjectivity and biographical content is created here: 
on the one hand, the poet does not claim the role of the Creator or a 
medium, rarely allowing the reader to glance into the depths of his/her 
soul, ironically abstaining from assessments and preferences. On the 
other hand — in the poems (for example, the poems of Brodsky, 
Kibirov, Prigov, Krivulin, etc.) there are many details connected with 
the daily "non-poetical" life of the poet in his intimate space (e.g., the 
common motifs of the room, the corner) in the closed circle of 
relatives and friends. The poems are often written in the form of a 
message, they are dedicated to somebody, containing details known 
only to the "initiated", sharing the "common language" with the 
addressee, which makes them somewhat hermetic. This can be viewed 
as a kind of peculiar compensation of the poet for abstaining from the 
role of the creator of the world and life. 
It is possible that postmodernist literature realizes and at the same 
time takes to the extreme the two types of linguistic aphasia as 
described by Jakobson — the violation of the relation of similarity and 
agrammaticism as two-sided processes not just in the language but 
also on a wider scale — in culture. It is intriguing in this connection 
that there exists difference of opinion as to the prevailing metaphorical 
or metonymical type of writing in postmodernism. When discussing 
the rhetoric nature of postmodernist culture, one has first and foremost 
in view its total metaphorization, the principle of metonymy is 
mentioned considerably less often, at least directly. However, it is 
included indirectly in such assessments as fragmentation, absence of 
entirety, parity, coexistence of the systems of ideas and viewpoints. 
For instance, the afore-mentioned comparative paradigm of Hassan, 
"modernism — postmodernism", includes among others also certain 
features that are specifically indicative of the metonymical nature of 
postmodernism and the metaphoric character of modernism, cf.: 
"modernism — metaphor, selection, paradigm / postmodernism — 
metonymy, syntagm, combination" (Hassan 1995: 91-92). It might 
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well be that the peculiarity of postmodernism still consists in the fact 
that among other binary oppositions the above-mentioned opposition 
ceases to function as well, and the two-fold transgressive relations 
between metaphor and metonymy will prevail, which creates the 
impression of total destructuralization and loss of sense of the world-
text. 
The intratextual movement is not gradational here — in the 
direction of "ever more text", "ever more art". It is rather a circular 
movement: the centripetal force endeavours to merge all difference of 
the world into a single point, to turn it into an alloy, in which 
everything coincides with analogies, fuses into tautology, while the 
centrifugal force disperses the language/culture into meaningless 
atomic particles. We witness the disintegration of culture without 
achievements — the combining of elements of the destroyed systems 
does not yield new languages, the piling of cultural codes on each 
other does not form a hierarchical structure. Often the text is built on 
the model of the growing energetic impulse, accompanied by ever 
intensifying desemiotization. In the extreme case, this leads to the 
silence of language, void. 
For example, a number of works by Vladimir Sorokin are built 
upon the principle of acceleration, where not only the textual reality is 
destroyed in the end, but also the language as the means of creating 
this reality ceases to exist in its nature as a system of signs. Thus Part 
Five of Norms [Норма] ends with the destruction of articulated 
speech, leaving behind the cry "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa", which 
sounds on several pages; the ending of the novel The Thirtieth Love of 
Marina [Тридцатая любовь Марины] drowns — on more than 
twenty pages — as does the heroine herself, in the absurdity of the 
Soviet propaganda; but in Novel [Роман] — it is the death of the 
protagonist, genre and the Russian novel as "norms". In the parallel 
manner, the phrase gets reduced — at first the singular subject actions 
remain — in Novel — verb and direct object, but then only the ele­
mentary syntactical construction: subject (=Novel) + verbal predicate 
in the perfect aspect. Everything ends with the phrase, "Novel has 
died". 
Or Махротъ всея Руси [untranslatable word-play] by Prigov, in 
which the classical culture dissolves in erotic ecstasy: 
Она поет, поет, хоры подхватывают, растут, разрастаются, ширятся, звук 
нарастает, нарастает, становится невыносимым, и каждая поющая точка 
сама прорастает поющим хором, который тут же вступает и сам 
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разрастается поющими точками, все все тонет, тонет и само в себя все 
захватывает, все дрожит, содрогается, исторгая звуки на пределе звеня­
щие: Слава! Слава! Радость! Радость! — это ода радости, это Бетховен, 
тема и Бетховен, Бах. Чайковский. Баховен. Баховский. Бетбах. Бе-
товский, бетчайбах, чайбахвен. бетхачабахскиофьев. стравинхабехо-
шостский. шостербухкетжов. шенбухсстрашопцарт. Шоцарт. Царт. 
Ский. Кий, Ий. Ой. Ай, Охаминадроза, Охали. Кали! О! О! О! О! (Prigov 
1990: 97) 
Or else his own Obituaries [Некрологи] or other genres, levelling the 
culturally different, the power of discourse, stereotype and cliché as 
demonstrated by Prigov. Or, for example, The Yellow Arrow [Желтая 
стрела] by Pelevin, in which the simultaneous presence of various 
codes essentially empties the text, or a sequence of incarnations in The 
Life of Insects [Жизнь насекомых], void as the theme and device in 
Chapaev and Void [Чапаев и Пустота]. Or the application of mu­
tually revoking verbal and figurative devices of expression by Ilya 
Kabakov, or his often used device of ending series with white empty 
sheets. Pause as a zone of freedom from language in the catalogues of 
Rubinshtein. This is the "empty action" in the performances of the 
group "Collective Actions" of the 1970s, where depiction was prac­
tically reduced to zero and merged with the background; but also their 
"empty field" in the actions based on the experience of expectation: 
The real field can be brown, green, even, uneven, etc., but it is very obvious 
that at this moment its main peculiarity for the man that has previously 
experienced expectation and is still experiencing it, lies in its "emptiness". 
(Monastyrsky et al. 1998: 22) 
In one of his discussions of the acts of "Collective Actions", Sergey 
Letov says the following: 
Like the ball of threads: you start to unravel it, but there's not just one thread 
in it but many, and sooner or later all of them will break. But this is not the 
problem. It is not only here, but on the whole, new art tends towards what 
ends up in NOTHING. On the level of consciousness, man appears to be in 
contact with language, with this habitual world of his — well-ordered, etc. 
But on the level of the subconscious, what he gets under this appearance is 
regular NOTHING. (Monastyrsky et al. 1998: 322) 
The poetics of the conceptualists of Moscow is based on the very 
demonstration of the empty "shell" of the linguistic sign: expressions 
that hitherto seemed meaningful are turned inside out, structures as 
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dead skeletons emerge, incapable of generating new living meanings. 
As Vladimir Sorokin writes about literature: "Literature as I see it — 
it's paper, covered with some kind of marks. Literature in general — 
it's a dead world. Any textual utterance or any poetic writing is in 
origin dead and false" (quoted in Roll 1996: 117). 
It is often claimed in various writings that the principle of arrange­
ment or collage governs postmodernist literature. Actually, this is 
contradictory to the very nature of postmodernism. Indeed, at first 
glance the "textual multiplicity" might outwardly resemble the avant-
garde arrangement, but the process of boundaries losing their meaning 
does not allow us to consider it similar to the avant-garde effect. The 
boundaries of compositional fragments, quotations, and various 
communicative levels are desemioticized. The process of tautological 
aspect-changes gets thematized, whereby the ways of expression are 
changed, yet not the expressed. Repetitions that are tautological by 
nature — versions, variants, and copies do not themselves include any 
new information about a fact or object. Despite the seeming diversity 
of phenomena, the world is still invariant, and no variability of 
discourses or codes rids us of the feeling that it is "always the same". 
According to Brodsky, "the diversity of strivings is completely 
reduced by the tautological nature of the result". If we abstract from 
the world definite bodies and events, the habitual space of the poet 
changes into the Euclidean one. the landscape into a geographical 
map. speech into linguistic categories, separate opinions into formulae 
(v. also his numerous definitions and images of "multitude" and 
"common denominator"). The motif of the wrong or back side of a 
thing is quite common in Brodsky's poems — as a rule, depth or the 
reverse side do not contain a secret: the reverse side of the icon turns 
out to be just crude cardboard. 
One of the favourite devices of Brodsky's poetics — enumera­
tion — is perceived in this connection as an attempt of the poet to 
"rescue things" in their singularity. Although this attempt, too, is in 
vain, since the replacement of things by words in writing already 
means loss of uniqueness. Cf. the ending of the poem by Lev Losev, 
Joseph Brodsky, or Ode to 1957 as a kind of catalogue of the more 
important words of Brodsky's poetic vocabulary: 
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Но главное — шумит словарь. 
словарь шумит на перекрестке. 
Душа крест человек чело 
век вещь пространство ничего 
сад воздух время море рыба 
чернила пыль пол потолок 
бумага мышь мысль мотылек 
снег мрамор дерево спасибо.
4  
(Losev 1996: 27) 
The above-mentioned tendencies are intertwined in an interesting 
manner in Brodsky's play Marble [Мрамор]. The theme of tautology 
acquires a central role in it. Everything in the depicted world is in a 
state of repetition, fluctuation, everything is equal to everything, and 
at the same time nothing is equal to itself. The first stage direction in 
Act I describes the time and place of action in the Tower — the 
prison. It is 
[...] идеальное помещение на двоих: нечто среднее между однокомнат­
ной квартирой и кабиной космического корабля. Декор: более Палладио. 
чем 
Пиранезе. [...] Вид из окна должен передавать ощущение значи­
тельной высоты (скажем, проплывающие облака), поскольку тюрьма 
расположена в огромной стальной Башне, примерно в километр высотой. 
Окно — либо круглое, как иллюминатор, либо — с закругленными угла­
ми. как экран. В центре камеры — декорированная под дорическую 
колонна или опора: внешняя сторона ствола, внутри которого — лифт. 
Ствол этот проходит через всю Башню как некий стержень или ось.Он и 
в 
самом деле стержень: все появляющееся в течение пьесы на сцене, и 
все. с нее исчезающее появляется или исчезает через находящееся в этом 
стволе отверстие, являющееся помесью ресторанного лифта и мусоро­
провода.
5  (Brodsky 1995, IV: 247) 
J  But most important — dictionary shouts, / the dictionary shouts at cross­
roads. / soul cross man forehead / century thing space nothing / garden air time 
sea fish / ink dust floor ceiling / paper mouse idea moth / snow marble tree thank 
you. 
[...J an ideal room for two: something in between a one-room apartment and 
the cockpit of a space ship. Décor: more like Palladio than Piraneze. [...] The 
view from the window should create the impression of being very high (say, 
clouds float by), since the prison is in a huge steel Tower, about a kilometre high. 
The window — either round like a porthole, or — with rounded corners like a 
screen. In the centre of the cell — a column or pillar decorated in the Doric style: 
the outside of a tube in which there is a lift. This tube extends through the entire 
Tower like some wake or axis. It is a wake, indeed: all that appears on the stage 
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The description of the Tower offers simultaneously different clues for 
reading — from ancient myths to Freudian symbolism. However, we 
are interested in the form of the circle itself. The following concentric 
model emerges in the play: cosmos — empire, that embraces the 
entire earth — Rome as the centre of the Empire — in the centre of 
Rome, the Tower — in the centre of the Tower, a lift. There are two 
men in the cell — prisoners of the Empire, of their own body and way 
of thinking. There is also a cage with a canary in it, a kind of 
miniature prison, reduction to a formula. "Hieroglyph. Sign" (v. also 
the discussion of a wasp under a glass as a miniature version of a 
gladiator on an arena). When at the end of the play Tullius falls asleep, 
Publius feels himself like a point in the P-R-Square, drawn by dividers 
(elsewhere a square is mention, the sum of its angles equalling the 
circle). Thus the circle and square are mutually transferable, these 
elementary spatial forms correlate as symbols of eternity and time. 
Tullius regards everything spatial as tautological, and as the 
same, — empires, North and South, East and West, streets of the 
town, rooms: 
Нужник. Публий, от Персии только размером и отличается. Хуже того, 
человек сам и есть тупик. Потому что он сам — полметра в диаметре 
f...] Вещь в себе. Клетка в камере. Оазис ужаса в пустыне скуки. Как 
сказано у поэта/ 1  (Brodsky 1995. IV: 278) 
There is nothing but twins and doubles, so that passion, too, becomes 
meaningless (toposexuality, as if with oneself). Man's life is like the 
song, "The priest had a dog once...". And the Tower represents fight 
with space, with its very ideas. For Tullius, it is "nothing". There is 
nowhere to run from the Tower, except pure time. Tullius escapes to 
reading classics and sleep. His typical expressions are, "it's all the 
same", "no difference". He needs the other only for thinking his 
thoughts to the end. He perceives time as an abstraction that exists 
separately from the world, as a condition "in which" objects exist. 
Publius cannot accept imprisonment, he needs Lebensraum. He 
considers important and remembers that which exists in his own 
during the play, and all that disappears from it. appears or disappears through an 
opening in the tube, which is a mixture of a dumb waiter and a rubbish chute. 
6  Publius, the lavatory differs from Persia only in its size. Worse still, man 
himself is a blind alley. Because he himself— his diameter is of half a metre [...] 
A thing in itself. A cage in a cell. An oasis in the desert of boredom. As the poet 
put it. 
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(emotional, physical) experience. The most terrible thing for him is to 
know the place of his death, and if he considers escape from the 
Tower, it is only from it as the place of the forthcoming death. 
Contrary to Tullius who is a Roman, Publius is a barbarian and a 
former soldier. He takes care of his body, he needs physical contact 
with the other in order not to start doubting his own existence. His 
memory is full of concrete events, time is spatial for him, where 
"before" and "after" exist. He quotes poets, most often the Scythian 
ones, from Eastern Europe, he mimics the canary. The theme of voice, 
live sound, and speech is also connected with him. Tullius calls his 
stylistics melodramatic. While Tullius needs the other in order to think 
his thoughts to the end, Publius is "too lazy" for that. In the dialogue 
of the two characters, he mostly asks questions and tells spicy stories 
that he has witnessed. It is Tullius that forms abstract conclusions, 
reducing everything to the common idea, "it's all the same" (cf., for 
example, their way of reasoning about the probability of life on Sirius 
and Canopus: Publius thinks that if there were life, "we'd hardly see 
them. Especially at night. One switches off lights and goes to bed at 
night", but by life he means — "It's when you put out the light — and 
then — woman". Tullius agrees with him that "Темнота таки дейст­
вительно форма жизни. Так сказать, состояние света [...] а свет 
[...] — форма энергии, источник жизни" 7  (Brodsky 1995, IV: 271). 
The characters of Marble discuss the idea of becoming one brain 
(not excluding the possibility of a computer brain), thus suggesting 
one of the possible interpretations of the play, according to which 
Publius represents thinking with the right hemisphere of the brain, and 
Tullius that with the left one. Considering the homonymous character 
of the word "hemisphere" (hemispheres of the brain and the Western 
and Eastern hemispheres on the geographical map), well practised in 
Brodsky's poems, this interpretation does not contradict the generally 
accepted point of view, according to which the author clashes the 
ancient, Roman, and the contemporary, barbarian (as Scythian, 
eastern) visions of the world. In either case, Publius is predominantly 
a man of experience, and Tullius — that of ideas. (In The Twenty 
Sonnets to Mary Stuart [Двадцать сонетов к Марии Стюарт], 
Brodsky writes: "What makes History? — Bodies. / Art? — Beheaded 
Darkness is still a veritable form of life. Which is to say, a state of light [...] a 
light (...] — a form of energy, a source of life. 
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body" [Brodsky 1992, III: 341], in Marble, Tullius reads classics and 
keeps their busts in his cell — "the cut heads of mankind".) 
The play contains a highly sophisticated play on signs in it. Assess­
ments, substantiated by experiences and emotions (fear of death, 
desire) — but "an emotion is always a simple predicate" (Peirce 1992; 
Brodsky 1992, I: 44), — correlate with abstractions, "thoughts about 
thoughts". The play is constructed as a system of projections and 
mirror reflections: the characters are unable to distinguish between the 
boundaries of the real world and the one they themselves have trans­
mitted by TV cameras, they feel uncertain about the boundaries of the 
external and the internal. As a peculiar kind of auto-communication, 
the play may be interpreted through the psychoanalytical concept of 
the mirror-effect, the mutual representation of signifiers in the spirit of 
Lacan, or be translated into the meta-language of "seriality" according 
to Deleuze. But the double structure of the work is further made more 
complex by a third constituent — "the word of the poet", which is 
beyond either of the characters, and which in its own turn correlates 
with the aesthetic reality of the play on the whole as "the word of 
Brodsky". The poetic word forms the background to the conversations 
of Tullius and Publius, forcing them to acknowledge the ^sub­
stantiality of their own talks. "The word of the poet" is narcissistic by 
its nature, though, symbolized in Marble by lines reminiscent of 
Akhmatova, which introduces yet one more mode of mirror-effect into 
the text: 
И лебедь, как прежде, плывет сквозь века. 
любуясь красой своего двойника/ 
(Brodsky 1995, IV: 272) 
Publius repeats those lines after Tullius, but the poetic expression 
itself is unrepeatable, this alone can make the experience ("the mono­
tony of art") valuable and escape tautology. 
The meta-position of Brodsky towards the postmodernist type of 
writing is based on the very close connection of him with the poetic 
tradition, including the avant-garde, which by now has also become 
classic. In this connection, to return to the beginning of this article, we 
would like to quote the description of the stairs in the play, Marble: 
8 And the swan, as before, floats through the century, / admiring the beauty of 
its double. 
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А поэт там начинает, где предшественник кончил. Это как лестница; 
только начинаешь не с первой ступеньки, а с последней. А следующую 
сам себе сколачиваешь...' 1  (Brodsky 1995, IV: 273). 1 ( 1  
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О постмодернизме, "лестнице авангарда" и Бродском 
Статья предлагает анализ поэтики русского постмодернизма, от­
правляясь от концепции "транссемиотической лестницы" Е. Фарыно 
как механизма работы авангардрого текста. Автор пытается пока­
зать. что в постмодернистских текстах происходят двусторонние 
процессы опустошения смысла: или слияние культурно разного в 
тавтологии или разложение на атомарные обессмысленные частицы. 
Телеологическая модель лестницы перестает здесь работать. На этом 
фоне, на примере пьесы "Мрамор" рассматривается позиция Бродс­
кого как несовпадающая с "постмодернистским" контекстом. 
Postmodernismist, "avangardi trepist" ja Brodsky'st 
Artiklis on tehtud katse analüüsida vene postmodernismi poeetikat lähtu­
valt J. Faryno poolt avangardi kirjeldamiseks pakutud "transsemiootilise 
trepi" kontseptsioonist. Tekstinäidetele toetudes kirjeldatakse, kuidas 
postmodernistlikes tekstides toimuvad erisuunalised protsessid: kultuu­
riliselt eriline ja unikaalne sulandub tautoloogias, tähendust omavad tervi­
kud pihustuvad atomaarseteks tühjadeks ühikuteks. Avangardi tähendust-
loov teleoloogiline mudel lakkab siin töötamast. Lähemalt vaadeldakse, 
kuidas nimetatud tendentsid kajastuvad J. Brodsky näidendis "Marmor". 
Brodsky positsiooni eristab vaadeldud "postmodernistlikust" kontekstist 
usk poeetilise sõna tunnetuslikesse võimalustesse (ühendades unikaalset 
ja korduvat väärtustab see tundeelamusi ja päästab tautoloogiast). 
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Abstract. The paper is devoted to the problem of the linguistic grounds of the 
semiotic model of history, according to which history is described as a com­
munication process circulating within a society. An analogy of principle 
between language and culture is the theoretical premise of that semiotic 
approach. Proceeding on this assumption semiotics (B. Uspensky's case for 
instance) regards historical process as the process of text outcome and 
reading, while at the same time control over communication is provided 
through the cultural code or in other words — through the grammar of history. 
But the description of history as just the functioning of a single and unified 
grammatical code doesn't make it possible to explain the appearance of new 
meanings or history par excellence. J. Lotman interpreted the rhetorical 
mechanism of text outcome as the working of two (at a minimum) inter-
playing semiotic systems. It is the principle of its working that he lakes as a 
basis of his semiotic version of cultural diachrony. And at the very point 
semiotics finds itself in front of the choice: either to slop at the decomposition 
the rhetorical machine on separate cultural codes and at the description their 
separate grammars, or to conceptualize a historical event as un-grammatism, 
grammatical error, "wrong text". The analytical way leads to an extremely 
reduced theoretical construction; the synthetic way undermines status of the 
semiotic model of history as a positivistic scientific project. 
The theoretical premise of the semiotic approach is the analogy in 
kind between text and the universal object of culture as well as the 
corresponding analogy between the functioning of language and 
cultural processes. This extrapolation of the structural isomorphism of 
static objects to their dynamic projections became possible owing to 
the dissemination of the principles of synchronic description to 
diachronic studies. This extrapolation has its own history and proceeds 
24 
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from J. Tynyanov and R. Jakobson's declaration, "The history of a 
system is in its turn a system" (Tynyanov, Jakobson 1993: 149). How­
ever. when it is regarded as the conceptual base in the studies of 
historical changes, the concept of system also puts a restriction on the 
analytical perspective of semiotics. The study of history as a system 
produces concepts of historical regularity, norm or logic of history as 
its "optical" effect. This historical logic has to provide a selection of 
historical facts as well as to organize them into syntagmatic se­
quences. Inside this metalinguistic metaphor the laws of historical 
evolution find their analogy in linguistic code while historical process 
finds one in speech communication. 
This paper is devoted to the problem of the linguistic grounds of 
semiotic model of history, according to which history is described as a 
communicative process unfolding in a society. When we say "lin­
guistic grounds", we have in mind the dependence of the semiotic 
paradigm on some basic but at the same time competing metalin­
guistic strategies that stress different mechanisms of meaning produc­
tion. These metalinguistic strategies are grammar and rhetoric. Gram­
mar comes from a closed totality of relations among elementary 
language units and forms a set of rules about text production and text 
perception. Rhetoric is an open and fundamentally incomplete set of 
transforming abilities. While for grammar the phenomenon of lan­
guage is the primary one and successful communication requires the 
unity and homogeneity of the linguistic code, rhetoric is primarily 
grounded in the text and the success of communication depends on the 
intensity of code translation from one language to another. Thus the 
grammar of the historical code and the rhetoric of the historical event 
constitute two possibilities or, in other words, two extreme cases of 
the semiotic description of history. I consider B. A. Uspensky and J. 
M. Lot man to be the cases exhausting the analytical resources of the 
semiotic approach to history (at least in the historical limits of the 
Moscow-Tartu Semiotic School). As a result, in the context of this 
report they are not names but cases, or using Derrida's phrase: "not 
author's names but problem's names". Moreover, Uspensky is taken 
as a neutral, invariant case of semiotic historiography while Lotman's 
case is regarded as a non-manifest drift to poststructuralism or to 
semiology in Barthes's sense of the term. 
The most general version of semiotic model of history was 
suggested by B. A. Uspensky in his article "History and semiotics" 
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(1988); 1  previously the fundamental ideas of this work were expressed 
in the paper concerning the epoch of Peter the Great, "Historia sub 
specie semioticae" (1976)/ 
"A historical process in the semiotic perspective may be re­
presented [...] as a communicative process, in which permanently 
received new information conditions one or another response from a 
social addressee" (Uspensky 1994c: 10). It is characteristic that 
although the status of the message receiver is strictly defined, Us­
pensky consciously avoids the sender's specification, because this 
specification would lead him to include some exterior (extra-histo­
rical) power into the communicative model of historical process, a 
power resembling such concepts of classical metaphysics as trans­
cendental subject or Absolute Spirit. As Uspensky puts it, "It doesn't 
fundamentally matter who is the addresser [...]. It could be some 
individual, God, fate, and the like" (Uspensky 1994c: 10). 
Thus Uspensky builds his model of historical process according to 
the analogy with speech activity; moreover "the point of departure is 
the notion of language (understood as a mechanism of text produc­
tion)" (Uspensky 1994c: 11). The "language" or the code in this view 
is the prevalent system of the symbolic ideas pertaining to the parti­
cular society. The relation between historicity and sociality, which 
determines the actual development of the process, finds its parallel 
with Saussurian opposition between speech (parole) and language 
(langue), where the latter is axiologically marked, as is common for 
structuralism. According to the semiotic project, history arises from 
the selection and organization of information coming from outside. 
This selection is accomplished with the "language" whose agent is 
society. In that case, Uspensky's statement that "the text of events is 
read by society" (Uspensky 1994c: 10) does not seem to quite follow 
from the movement of his own thoughts because, judging by his logic, 
one may say that the society not only reads the text of history but also 
invests an event with textual status. As Uspensky writes. "It is 
important how appropriate events are interpreted, with what meaning 
they are invested in the system of social consciousness" (Uspensky 
1994c: 10). Since everything is determined by mechanisms of reading 
and not of utterance, it's possible to conclude that, from this point of 
1 Uspensky 1994c. 
Uspensky 1994b. 
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view, history is textual not by itself but it becomes textual under the 
regulating pressure of sociality. 
" However, in the framework of the model that depicts historicity as 
absolutely repressed by the language of social concepts, there is no 
possibility of constructing history because it is impossible to explain 
in a rational way the appearance of the new. 
This is evident in the work by the same author ("Historia sub 
specie semioticae", Uspensky 1994b), which is concerned with the 
most critical moment of Russian history (therefore with history par 
excellence), with the age of Peter's reforms. Uspensky suggests two 
interpretations, from the inner position of the contemporaries and from 
his own metaposition. In the first case, i.e. from the point of view of 
the medieval consciousness, the new is conceived as a number of 
excesses resisting any textualization. Peter marries Catherine the First 
who was his son's (Aleksey Petrovich's) god-daughter, i.e. he marries 
his grand-daughter. Since Peter headed the Church and took the title 
"pater patriae", his contemporaries conceived him as a patriarch. 
Placing Peter's portrait among icons, his associates worshipped it as 
an icon. Each of these reasons, and. moreover, their aggregate totality, 
made Peter's contemporaries interpret him as Antichrist, i.e. as a being 
that cannot be a text bearer for the religious consciousness (Uspensky 
1994b: 51-56). Yet from the observer's position, history (innovation) 
turns out to be the mere travesty of the tradition (the old), a corrupted 
sociality, an anti-text or a minus-device. As Uspensky writes: "Peter's 
behavior, however paradoxical it might seem, for the most part did not 
cross the boundaries of traditional notions and norms: it remained 
inside those frames, only with a negative mark" (Uspensky 1994b: 
56). Thus, from the semiotic point of view, history is either non-text 
(contemporary's position) or anti-text (scholar's metaposition) — an 
innovation is repressed either as a perversion (a negation of crystalline 
social structure accomplished with its own symbolic language) or as 
an inversion (the destruction of stable connections between the realm 
of the content and the realm of the expression, the destabilization of 
the symbolic structure of the tradition). 
So, the semiotic model of history suggested by Uspensky repre­
sents its object as a communicative system that provides the 
diachronic identity of culture. This system works as a machine that 
perpetually converts the transcendent into the immanent — meanings 
that originate from the forces outside society such as God, fate, a 
"historical genius", and so on are filtered and interpreted by the 
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linguistic code of proper tradition. The addresser, then, constitutes a 
latent threat to the symbolic structure of society but this threat's 
semiotic danger is sublimated by the work of language — an inno­
vation gets restructured in terms of tradition. And it seems to be quite 
evident that the system that attends to the needs of communication and 
has an appropriate vocabulary and rules of text-production and text-
perception can be likened to natural language. Natural language (or 
canonical art as its structural variant) is taken by Uspensky as the 
analytical model for the conceptualization of history. 
The modeling of history, by analogy with the system of natural 
language or the system of canonical art (so that Uspensky compares 
the perception of history to the perception of icon), implicitly but 
inevitably introduces the phenomenon of automatism to the structure 
of the object. As Lotman noticed in his article "Canonical art as an 
informational paradox": if the text in a natural language is produced 
with the complete automatization of the expressive plan, then texts 
belonging to canonical arts communicate quite automatic content 
(Lotman 1992b: 243-244). It might seem that automatization is the 
semantic context, on the background of which history appears as 
deautomatization, as a semantic drift — the historical event is a 
message that "makes strange" its own language. However, Uspensky's 
model canonizes not only the linguistic context of the message — not 
only its condition — but also its result. The mechanisms of reading, as 
I said above, provide the closed character of the communicative circuit 
controlling the relations between the code and the message. Uspensky 
interprets history as a space of absolute semantic superfluity wherein 
the code is the main content of the message: pushing away from the 
natural language model, the semiotic model of history comes close to 
the model of the authoritarian genre. A "foreign" element either is not 
read because of its non-systematic character or is read in terms of the 
"native" system, but either way it is incapable of actualizing the other 
system as a whole, having restructured the code of the previous 
tradition. Within the framework of this approach, an alteration of a 
social code may be apprehended only in the language of the Apoca­
lypse, as an ecological catastrophe, a fire in a folk-museum. It is well 
demonstrated by Uspensky's analysis of Peter's reforms, in which the 
contemporaries' horror is reflected in the scholar's skepticism. The 
position of the "authentic semiologist" or, in other words, the position 
of an immediate witness of the reforms who is expecting the end of 
the world reveals the latent eschatology of the semiotic metaposition. 
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The description of history in linguistic terms also determines the 
description of its regularities in grammatical terms. The semiotics of 
history tends to create its grammar, i.e. a universal model that includes 
a final totality of rules providing, on the one hand, the possibility of 
adequate definition and, on the other hand, the predictability of its 
results. And the problem is more extensive than the particular case of 
Uspensky. 
The primary analytical procedure of semiotics may be reproduced 
in the following simplified picture. In the beginning, it is necessary to 
single out the elementary units of the system (the vocabulary of the 
system) and then to determine the functional causation among them 
(the grammar of the system). To single out certain units is possible 
only due to their recurrence and to ascertain their functional meanings 
is possible only due to the integrity and stability of the whole system. 
These very demands make history the least accessible object for 
semiotics. Firstly, the condition of recurrence excludes from the 
semiotic model of history such events, texts, and meanings that fall 
out of a rhythmical chain of ritual. In the semiotic perspective, history 
starts working like a ritual — the maintenance of its grammatical 
order reproduces cultural stability while non-observance thereof 
brings it to collapse. Secondly, the condition of the completeness of 
the object alienates from history its general attribute — historicity, 
reducing history to past perfect. Eikhenbaum produced that very 
procedure when he wrote, "We're not interested in the past as such 
[...] History gives us what modernity cannot give — the completeness 
of object [or, in other words, the whole — I.K.Y (Eikhenbaum 1927: 
146). Both early and late structuralism associates history with the past 
but not with modernity since the past can be described as a finished 
and stable system. 
Semiotic stress on historical grammar, on cultural self-identity, on 
mechanisms controlling the communicative process has also some 
latent ideological meaning for it axiologically marks the direction of 
history. Grammar not only describes language, it also executes some 
functions of codification. The grammar of language and its history are 
permanently in a state of competition in the struggle for domination in 
the linguistic field. Grammar strives towards the hampering of 
language dynamics, but at the same time the history of language 
perpetually puts into question grammar's ability to describe its object. 
Talking about these processes in terms of Hegelian dialectics, one may 
say that grammar is the system's ability to realize its own inevitable 
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regularities. Grammar arises as a reflective act that puts an end to all 
chaotic linguistic processes. The act of the system's self-reflection 
turns out to be the end of its history. The grammar of history based on 
its retrospective view illicitly presupposes historical finality. Apoca­
lypse in that sense is the obligatory context in which the only 
grammatical description of history can be accomplished. So, the 
approach to history from a normative grammar point of view represses 
history, conceptualizes it as chaos, "noise residue", text distortion, 
hindrance in a communicative channel, and so on. History is seen as a 
"black box", which semiotics approaches with the hope that it is 
Encyclopedia Britannica but which turns out to be Finnegan's Wake. 
Lotman's case may be seen as an alternative version of this 
semiotic model. If Uspensky excludes historicity from his historical 
model, Lotman problematizes the possibility of constructing such a 
general, grammatical model of history. He compares history to 
phenomena that can hardly be conceptualized. According to this 
position, one can only catch the essence of history in a metaphorical 
way by comparing it to poetical inspiration, to the abruptness of an 
explosion or to a madman's behavior (Lotman 1992e). However, the 
use of metaphors as concepts does not say anything about the 
weakness of the science or about its inability to create an abstract 
metalanguage — rather, it demonstrates an epistemological doubt in 
the adequateness of such a language to its object — history. 
Discussing history, Lotman brings an accent from the past (i.e. the 
closed structure represented in a teleological narrative) to the moment 
of "modernity", to the point of bifurcation that is realized in the 
accidental choice of one of the potential variants. As Lotman (1992e: 
28-29) puts it, "The present includes all possible future paths of 
development. [...] The selection is not determined by the laws of 
causality — in the moment of an explosion all such laws are switched 
off'. The choice of the future is realized as an accident. So, history is 
not considered the tautological realization of tradition. Instead, it is 
considered as a space for the interplay and crossing of different lin­
guistic codes, as the mechanism of their mutual translation. "The 
moment of an explosion makes the incompatible into the adequate, the 
untranslatable into the translatable" (Lotman 1992e: 40-41). It is the 
mechanism of translation as the main mechanism of history that 
transforms the grammatical analogy of history (that is, language into 
the rhetorical analogy of history) to text (and, moreover, a literary 
text). 
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The mechanism of translation conceptualizes a transfer or 
metaphor as the structural kernel of the historical process. A metaphor 
is a figure appearing on the border between two languages. "A trope is 
not a decoration belonging just to the realm of expression, [...] it is the 
mechanism that allows one to construct the content that cannot be 
constructed within one language" (Lotman 1992c: 174-175). Con­
sequently, history is not merely a result of the realization of the gram­
matical code but it is, first of all. the result of translation from one 
language to another. While according to Uspensky's model an element 
of the alien structure is defined as external to the system and for that 
reason unreadable, Lotman's model sees in this element a productive 
problem of translation. The difficulty of this translation, its creative 
inexactness, are the very factors that provide a great increase of 
information while the grammatical mechanisms just reformulate some 
constant content. 
History has a rhetorical structure that consists in bringing into the 
text the organizational principles that are perceived as alien in relation 
to the structural principles of the primary linguistic code. As Lotman 
noticed. "The rhetorical organization appears in the space of tension 
between 'organic' and 'alien' structure, and for that reason its 
elements can be doubly interpreted" (Lotman 1992c: 180). It is in the 
terms of this double rhetorical interpretation that it is possible to 
suggest another description of the historical comprehension of Peter's 
reforms. His contemporaries read the emperor's behavior using the 
transformational potential of mythological metaphor (combining 
paradigmatically the earthly and the celestial) but. for the emperor 
himself, the mechanisms of metonym (combining syntagmatically the 
original and the alien) or irony (in the cases when he confronted the 
tradition) were more relevant. The elements that for Peter were 
baroque "figures of speech," his contemporaries could read as 
apocalyptic "figures of thought". In any case, history arises as a result 
of hampered comprehension, as the realization of the trope and not of 
the tautology. 
This shifting of the stress from the grammar of natural language to 
the rhetoric of a literary text leads to the rethinking of the com­
municative model. While in Uspensky's model history is broadcast in 
the communicative channel: "I - he", Lotman by contrast pays 
attention to the communication of "I - I" type (Lotman 1992d: 76-
90). In the latter case one can interpret traumatic moments of history 
not through the phenomenon of miscommunication (when a 
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totalitarian discourse of an addresser runs into an addressee's 
resistance) but instead through the phenomenon of autocommunica­
tion. So, for example, the communication Peter —• the society may be 
reformulated in terms of autocommunication where one message is 
restructured through different codes and the historicity itself is 
established not by victorious canonical reading but through the 
fluctuating multitude of interpretations actualizing the multitude of 
cultural codes. An autocommunicative process is at the same time the 
process of reshaping cultural identity. So while for Uspensky the basic 
conceptual metaphor is the principle of distribution, for Lotman it is 
the complementarity principle. 
The grammar of history, which is responsible for cultural identity, 
and rhetoric, which provides cultural change, are two versions and at 
the same time two aspects of the semiotics of history. But at this very 
"point of bifurcation" semiotics finds itself confronted with the 
choice: either it can dwell on the decomposition of the rhetorical 
machine into separate cultural codes and the description of their 
separate grammars (as Uspensky does, making distinction between a 
diglossia and a bilingualism), or it can conceptualize a historical event 
as agrammatism, grammatical error, "wrong text" (without evaluative 
discrimination of attributes). The analytical way leads to an extremely 
reduced theoretical construction; the synthetic way undermines the 
semiotic model of history as the positivistic scientific project and 
leads to the involuntary admission of rhetorical isomorphism between 
the language of the object and the metalanguage that has pretensions 
to its adequate description. 
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Семиотическая модель исторического процесса: 
история — между грамматикой и риторикой 
Статья посвящена проблеме лингвистических оснований семиоти­
ческой модели истории, согласно которой история описывается как 
циркулирующий внутри общества процесс коммуникации. Теоре­
тической предпосылкой такого семиотического подхода является 
принципиальная аналогия между языком и культурой. Исходя из 
этого семиотика (например, в случае Б. А. Успенского) рассматри­
вает исторический процесс как процесс производства и чтения текс­
тов. причем контроль над коммуникацией осуществляется благодаря 
культурному коду или. иными словами, благодаря грамматике исто­
рии. Но описание истории исключительно как функционирования 
единственного и унифицированного грамматического кода не поз­
воляет объяснить возникновение новых значений, то есть историю 
par excellence. 
Ю. M. Лотман интерпретирует риторический механизм тексто-
порождения как работу двух (как минимум) взаимодействующих 
семиотических систем. Принцип работы такого механизма он и 
кладет в основу своей семиотической версии культурной диахронии. 
Но именно 
в этой точке семиотика сталкивается с необходимостью 
выбора: или остановиться на декомпозиции риторической машины 
на отдельные культурные коды и на описании их автономных грам­
матик. или концептуализировать историческое событие как а-граи-
матизм. грамматическую ошибку, "неправильный текст". Аналити­
ческий путь ведет к исключительно редуцированной теоретической 
конструкции: синтетический путь подрывает статус семиотической 
модели истории как позитивистского научного проекта. 
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Ajalooprotsessi semiootiline mudel: 
ajalugu — grammatika ja retoorika vahel 
Artiklis käsitletakse ajaloo semiootilise mudeli lingvistilisi aluseid, mil­
lest lähtuvalt ajalugu kirjeldatakse kui ühiskonna sees ringlevat kom-
munikatsiooniprotsessi. Taolise semiootilise lähenemise teoreetiliseks 
eelduseks on põhimõtteline analoogia keele ja kultuuri vahel. Nii vaatleb 
semiootika (näiteks B. A. Uspenski) ajalugu kui tekstide tekitamise ja 
lugemise protsessi, kusjuures kontrolli kommunikatsiooni üle teostatakse 
tänu kultuurikoodile, või, teiste sõnadega, tänu ajaloo grammatikale. Kuid 
ajaloo kirjeldamine vaid ühe, unifitseeritud grammatilise koodi talitlemi-
sena ei võimalda seletada uute tähenduste teket, st ajalugu par excellence. 
J. Lotman tõlgendab tekstiloome retoorilist mehhanismi kui (mini­
maalselt) kahe semiootilise süsteemi vastastikust koostööd. Taolise 
mehhanismi tööprintsiibi võtab ta ka oma kultuuridiakroonia semiootilise 
versiooni aluseks. Kuid just selles punktis pannakse semiootika valiku 
ette: kas piirduda retoorilise masina lahtivõtmisega eraldi kultuurikoodi-
deks ja nende autonoomsete grammatikate kirjeldamisega, või kontsep-
tualiseerida ajalooline sündmus kui a-grammatism, grammatiline viga, 
"mitteõige tekst". Analüütiline tee viib redutseeritud teoreetilise konst­
ruktsioonini, sünteetiline õõnestab semiootilise ajaloomudeli kui positi­
vistliku teadusprojekti staatust. 
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Abstract. The present paper is devoted to the relation between changing 
historical identity of Russian Formalists in the second half of the 1920s and 
their individual evolution — as writers, members of society, figures of culture. 
Formalists with their aggressive inclination to modernity are opposed here to 
structuralists, the bearers of a conservative, traditional ideology (relating to 
the idea of Revolution). It could be explained by the specific "romantic" 
identity of Russian Formalists whose purpose was to appropriate cultural 
values renamed and renewed by their revolutionary theory. As a revolutionary 
ideology, formalism was imported from the West. But the Stalinist 
"Renaissance" made the idea of Revolution both in mind and society senseless 
at the end of the 1920s. That is why Russian Formalism lost its mainstream 
positions and began to work out a new, adapted form of intellectual resistance 
(private life, domestic literature) in the next decade. 
Rhetorical temptation. Of course, the given title is vulnerable to 
criticism. First of all, it traditionally discriminates against women in 
Russian literary theory, because the very usage of the grammatical 
masculine is repressive and ignorant of the names of Lydia Ginzburg 
or Olga Freidenberg. But at the same time we have to admit that 
Russian Formalism as a kind of avant-garde theory hardened by 
revolution had a masculine consciousness par excellence. We cannot 
find any feminine traits in either early machine-oriented or in late 
organism-inspired formalism1. And we have not been surprised by the 
1 Being oriented towards a scientific Utopia, the Russian Formalist School 
functioned as a surrogate of literary practice. From the diachronical standpoint the 
development of Russian Formalism as a trend of knowledge passed through three 
stages of subject understanding — machine, system, organism. These basic 
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fact that the formalists treated an obviously feminine notion of 
"history" as gentlemen. It means history as oppressed and glorified, as 
a most indispensable, but also most uncomfortable and uncertain 
theoretical notion. The early formalism rejects history, the latest 
returns and takes its oath. Remembering the polemic article of 
Nikolay Chernyshevsky "Russian man on rendez-vous" 2  devoted to 
the weakness of Russian noble intelligentsia, one can signify my 
theoretical issue as "Le formaliste Russe au rendez-vous avec 
l'historié", also devoted to formalist weakness "on the trial" (in 
specified historical terms of Arnold Toynbee3). 
Toward the subject. The present notes do not claim to comprehend 
the topic, which could be conventionally called as "Russian Forma­
lism and its relation to History". Here I emphasize a single aspect of 
this field and to specify the issue of scholarship as a form of 
intellectual management, a powerful practice oriented to explanation 
of things. Of course, Formalists were the first in Russian scholarship 
who demonstrated a possibility to analyze literature in a strong and 
consistent way; their methods remain very influential and productive 
for the 20th century philology. But they also constructed a kind of 
community that had its own ideology, policy, and, last but not least, 
history. Their way in literature and scholarship is a fascinating subject 
itself. Using the term "scholarship" I deliberately separate it from 
"science" although formalists just aspired to turn literary theory and 
history into a scientific discipline. But both "science" and "scholar­
ship" have been shaping a specific type of secular mentality inherent 
in the Enlightenment (in terms of Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer) in which Person, or active subject, assimilates cognition 
as alienation (in Marxist terms, Verfremdung). Science and scholar­
ship are ways of organizing and managing social space, especially if 
metaphors while working as theoretical mediums are described and interpreted in 
Steiner 1984. 
: Emphasis is mine — J. L. 
3 Trial of history blames European civilization for inability to comprehend its 
widest historical horizon. The European intellect is quietly satisfied with narrow 
historical vision, which could be compared with horse's sight between its blinkers 
(Toynbee 1948: 150, passim). Unlike unfortunate Europeans Russian Formalists 
were active participants in this judicial process, who became its victims very soon. 
They successfully described a kind of historical logic that means suicidal results 
to them. Perhaps this is the destiny of any judge. 
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we talk about humanities, a sphere of word production. Researchers 
have been affirming this view on formalist doctrine during the last two 
decades, although Pavel Medvedev, inspired by Mikhail Bakhtin. 
already in 1928 performed an original ideological deconstruction of 
the formalist doctrine as a social phenomenon. The elaboration began 
with a gradual slowing down of the structuralist project, when the idea 
of social determination of the literary and cultural process became 
leading again. Here I have to emphasize that the question lies in the 
Russian version of structuralism, which is quite different from its 
Western namesake. Whereas structuralism was most fashionable in 
scholarship, the legacy of formalism was interpreted otherwise. 
The Formalist Riot. Traditional description of formalism in terms of 
"pure" poetics has resulted in an aberration of the historical picture. 
Supporters of structuralist views ascribed to Formalism the role of a 
slightly mistaken predecessor, which prepared a birth of "the only 
scientific method" in humanities (that is the way how structuralism 
positioned itself). 4  But the declared independence from world outlook 
of the structuralist method was no more than inevitable abstraction. 
Being generalized it could be easily converted into indifference to the 
subject. The subject is the only bearer of the method that is one of the 
functions of cultural consciousness. The border of historical reflection 
is an invisible point where structuralist competence of synchronic 
description is over. This border presupposes attention to the category 
of "self' in principle ignored by structuralists. Consequently, their 
personal view on Formalism as a school of scholarship was shaped by 
their implicit ideology. Structural theorists were demonstratively 
distant from politics; they formed a more or less silent opposition to 
the ruling power and followed a mission preservation of true cultural 
values. Speaking in very rough terms, Formalism was oriented to 
breaking the rules of the cultural tradition and towards coordination 
with the Revolution in its general reorganizing sense 5. Russian 
4  One can find the symptomatic kind of Soviet structuralist discourse in the 
Introduction of Lotman 1968. Oppositely, Vyacheslav Ivanov, who has always 
been "the only consistent semiotician" (defined by Alexander Pyatigorsky) calls 
members of OPOYAZ "our forerunners" (Ivanov 1991: 11). There is no reason to 
develop the thought that "semiotics" is not a synonym of "structuralism", and vice 
versa. 
For example, see the memoirs of Viktor Shklovsky: in particular, the first 
chapter titled "Revolution and front" in Shklovsky 1970. 
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structuralists could not be nice to the Revolution and its aftermath, but 
they could perceive its contemporaries in the corresponding context. 
That is the way they did not follow. 
While formalists were very sensitive to modernity, structuralists 
intended to shun any its manifestations. In other words, the 
iconoclastic origin of Russian Formalism caused quite a reserved 
attitude from structuralists who had often been oriented towards resto­
ration of the culture ruined by the Revolution. The very distinctive 
difference between formalist and structuralist types of consciousness 
is the anti-conservatism of formalists and its conflict with the philo­
logical tradition constituted by conservative values. Nevertheless, 
structuralists borrowed some theoretical ideas from formalism in order 
to arrange them as their own achievements (for example, talks on 
"device" and "conventionality" in Lotmanian Lectures on Structu­
ralist Poetics). They actualized the theoretical legacy of Formalism 
out of touch with its revolutionary context. This circumstance is 
important to a great extent. The specific formalist outlook was 
determined by cultural changes of the period. In addition, formalists 
were much closer to living literature, while structuralists intended only 
to research cultural practices, not to take an active part in them6. They 
were ready to excuse formalists as victims of power (in part this was 
actually right). But the willing capitulation of the formal method at the 
turn of the 1920-1930s was perceived as renegade and considered a 
manifestation of conformist behavior. Thus, ideological hostility 
determined conceptual mistrust. When structuralism started to realize 
its limits from the inside, its leaders applied to revise the former 
explanatory models. Even if they did not turn to modernity, the 
revision in a whole could be interpreted as "a search for the Other' 
(Gasparov 1995). Also, it was a way to change the reputation of 
Russian Formalism. Starting from the second half of the 1970s 
reading formalists and rewriting their place in Russian culture had 
begun. 
Romantic identity. In fact, Russian formalists were inspired by the 
formal theories of arts originated from the ideas Hans von Marees and 
Dietrich von Hildebrand. It is difficult to separate the thoughts of a 
painter from the concepts of a critic. Although academic masters (e. g. 
6 The brightest picture of the structuralist creative sublimation was recon­
structed in: Uspensky 1992; Uspensky 1995. 
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Heinrich Wolflin) adopted some versions of German artistic theory, it 
was created by the romantic mind. Being originally dealt with Avant-
garde, Formalism in Russia was also a form of romantic outlook. 
Formalists (especially Shklovsky and Eikhenbaum) considered 
literature as a way of existence, but tried to describe it in abstract 
terms. This paradox resulted in conceptual (not ideological) nearness 
with Western scholars, which can only emphasize the total split with 
academic tradition in Russia. Traditional literary historians from 
Petersburg University and impolite formalists that began to revise 
their habitual field here confronted from the very beginnings of the 
school. Formalists were oriented towards creation of new knowledge 
and new culture, not towards preservation and protection of the old 
one. They declared estrangement as a basic principle of art: Shklovsky 
referred to the authority of Aristotle and quoted that poetic language 
has to be strange, astonishing, it has to be actually strange one as 
compared with language of everyday life . The very difference from 
something clear and habitual became the content of cultural message. 
During the period of revolutionary changes in Russia the declarative 
"otherness" of Formalists played an important role in their actua­
lization on the market of symbolical production. They could argue 
with distant German academics, but they ignored close opponents in 
Russia on principle, being turned to a radical reconstruction of art (not 
only its notion). Their purpose was to appropriate cultural values 
renamed and consequently renewed by their new theory. The essential 
feature of the Formalist consciousness is the absence of gap between 
art, history and life itself. Reflecting on the primary results of the 
Revolution, Boris Eikhenbaum wrote that his generation has had to 
survive in this new world to reach the "moment of consciousness" 
It means that things were being described just like for the very first time. 
"This key role of time in Shklovsky's theory (a first time, an aesthetic expansion 
of duration) is later complemented by his concept of device as the "rotation" of an 
object in its semantic space (like "turning a log on the fire"), the shifting of the 
object out of its typical association into radically different ones, thus presenting a 
fresh and uneffaced side ina sort of textual space for our perception" (Crawford 
1984: 210). The device of "estrangement" ("making strange") encountered a 
critical attitude because of its "pure" perceptual nature. Insensibly for himself, 
Shklovsky represented more "reflexological" than proper "formal" approach. 
Thus, from the point of view of "New Criticism", "Shklovsky accepts the view 
that art is to restore the feeling for life. [...] The process of apprehension becomes 
an art, becomes its aim, and art is a means, to experience the making of a thing, 
that which is made being an important in art (Wellek 1991: 328). 
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(Eikhenbaum 1921: 10-1 I ). It means that History is here, and they are 
historical people that have to live and write the history of their days, 
essentially the history of the self, not private, but individual history. 
The idea of self as a subject of historical process essentially separates 
Formalism from the so-called "pure study". Its frankly conquering 
policy demonstrates a high resemblance to revolutionary politics. 
Practices of Russian revolution stimulated to a high degree the artistic 
practices of the Avant-garde the theoretical basis of which was 
essentially supported by Formalism. 
In this respect, the Western bias of Russian Avant-garde criticism 
corresponds with the ideology of the Revolution imported from the 
West. Hence the Avant-garde goes through a short triumph after 1917, 
when outsiders and marginal brawlers find themselves in the center of 
official art made sacred by the new state. The rejection of the Avant-
garde coincides with a return to bourgeois forms of art that could be 
seen at the end of the 1920s. The Russian revolution realized the 
theoretical identity of real and symbolic values and abolished itself by 
removal of innovation. The fact of the revolution itself was the most 
radical innovation after which nobody could pretend to surpass it. 
Destruction of cultural borders between Russia and Europe turned out 
to be their fortification, including intellectual xenophobia. 
After the storm. From the beginning of the 1920s formalists won the 
leading positions in the new establishment following the masters of 
the avant-garde (V. Mayakovsky, V. Tatlin, A. Rodchenko. etc.). The 
short age of "Combat Communism" (1918-21) was the most produc­
tive period when Formalist theory was completely shaped. A little bit 
later most of the formalists actively participated in the projects of the 
Russian Institute of Art History formed by Earl Viktor Zubov just 
before World War I. It was a brilliant and successful rival to the nearly 
dead university (Shapovaloff 1972). When the bourgeois restoration 
(New Economic Policy) began, they could choose between two 
different ways. The first way assumed they would stay on the path 
taken by the Revolution and to continue revision of scholarship. The 
second one was to merge with the former intelligentsia and its idea of 
neutral learning. Formalists were no artists in a whole sense; they 
created a field of art service. They could not supply themselves with 
an inner creative energy, because literary theory is, so to speak, a 
parasite on artistic value (like practical language relating to poetry in 
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early Formalism). 8  Realizing the crisis of identity, formalists begin to 
break the circle. So, Roman Jakobson leaves Russia for Prague, Viktor 
Shklovsky escapes to Finland, then finds himself in Berlin and in the 
end returns to Russia. Boris Eikhenbaum works on his important book 
The Young Tolstoy (published in 1922) in which he strives to over­
come his age crisis and academic temptations. At least, Juri Tynyanov 
begins collecting materials for his first historical novel. At the same 
time, Formalism had a very powerful initial impulse and effectively 
succeeded on the background of pre-revolutionary culture. By the 
middle of the 1920s, formalism as a school represented a bright 
example of a pop-science, the fashionable way of thinking. In other 
words, it was in demand as a way of cultural production and remained 
the most influential style in constituting the modern "literary field'' (in 
terms of Pierre Bourdieu). Formalists have found resources to 
reconstruct their doctrine from the inside and have confirmed their 
abilities to remain against conservatism. 
It could be claimed that Formalism was such a popular trend in the 
middle of the 1920s, that the fact of being taught by Tynyanov, 
Shklovsky and Eikhenbaum was enough to make one feel oneself at the 
top of "high" scholarship. As it is displayed in memoirs and evidences 
from the period, their personal charisma was exceptional.9 Thus 
formalists turned to be victims of historical logic. On the one hand, they 
refused to be academics. On the other hand, they could not resist this 
phenomenon governed by natural laws. Searching for new fields and 
contexts, formalists elaborated the contradictory and short-lived strategy 
of "second profession".10 It means that in order to survive formalist has 
to choose something different from literary theory as a field of theore­
tical and practical efforts. Thus, formalists have been occupied within 
film production (especially in screenwriting), journalism and literary 
fiction. In spite of the traditional notion of literature as an object of 
Cf.: "Not symbolists, but the symbolist and futurist contemporaries created 
our new scholarship. They are bad poets, amateurs who combined their poor 
poetic experience, which is necessary to be joined to conventional magic of poetic 
profession, with psychological possibility to repress this experience and to place it 
under pure research and generalization" (Ginzburg 2002: 35; my transi. - J. L.). 
"Our life would be another if there were no Eikhenbaum and Tynyanov. That 
is to say I would be another one, 1 would have another ways of thinking, feeling, 
working, acting with people and seeing entities" (Ginzburg 2002: 56). 
10 The complete version of this idea, see Shklovsky (1978: 84-85). The most 
detailed research on this subject is presented in Dohm (1987). 
5 1 8  J a n  L e v c h e n k o  
study, formalists have understood it as a subject, or a way of world 
construction. Borderlines between scholarship and invention are 
constructed pragmatically — nobody can say where the first one is over 
and the second one starts. In particular, Eikhenbaum does not analyze 
poetics anymore, he is interested in the social and historical identity of a 
person (studies on Leo Tolstoy's diaries); Shklovsky writes "I dance by 
my studies" (Shklovsky 1978: 68) and prefers an interpretation of his 
own poetics in a semi-artistic, semi-analytical manner. Indeed, this 
professional trick of a tail could not be long-lived. Representing one of 
the latest versions of romantic outlook and romantic behavior, forma­
lists aspired to work out an ideal positive method. They were bearers of 
a romantic consciousness, but they also believed in historical deter­
mination (Hegel's influence and Marxist reference") and preserved 
illusions of modernist idea of progress. At the same time they could not 
realize these illusions with reference to their private life. The school of 
revolutionary science turned to be a school of existential philosophy. 
In order to fill the gap between historical and biographical realities, 
formalists have decided to imitate the school's institutional revival. At 
the end of 1928 Tynyanov and Jakobson published their famous 
manifesto in Novyi LEF. the journal of leftist arts founded by V. 
Majakovsky. Not only did this short abstract represent an intellectual 
power in new cultural conditions, but it was also notified as a 
theoretical medium between Russian and European humanities (at the 
moment Jakobson was already known as founder of the Prague 
school). Everything was done to declare an opposition to the social 
climate. I do not reject the conceptual components of "Theses", but 
consider its ideological message as a very important gesture at the end 
of the 1920s. This publication combines two tendencies. Firstly, 
theoretical reflection on the literary field remains real and the same for 
formalists, who are not afraid of free competition of ideas, which was 
typical of the ideology of the middle 1920s, during the second rise of 
the formalist school. Each following theory appeared within the 
community to abolish its predecessor, but formalists did not refuse the 
very principle of theoretical innovation associated with a category of 
success. Secondly, every formalist's private biography testifies that he 
is a bearer of culture and in this quality he projects against the state. 
This situation unintentionally groups the formalists together with the 
11 The topic of convergence with the main ideology of the period is discussed in 
Mitchell 1976. 
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Russian intellectual tradition. In this respect, the title of the conclusive 
collection of articles published by Juri Tynyanov in 1929 "Archaists 
and innovators" 1 2  becomes surrounded by the social and political 
context of the period. History proves to be stronger than modern 
innovative intentions. Besides its conceptual content, "Theses" reveal 
a kind of provocative opposite posing. It could be interpreted as a 
paradoxical reminder of formalist revolutionary strategy. Social defeat 
correlates here with intellectual success: "Theses" appeared not for 
something but rather against it. 
Toward the formalist tradition. Formalists demonstrate a similar same 
readiness to different ways of self-identification in history. If their 
ignorance towards social climate would not reflect on their everyday 
work, the further development comes as logically successful. The present 
case means periodical changes between conceptual revolutions and 
"normal science" (in terms of Thomas Kuhn), which stabilize reputation 
of scholarship as one of the most authorized arbiters of cultural industry. 
If this direction were not realized, the social climate itself would be much 
more repressive than anybody can foresee, the formalists remain in 
history and prepare a mixture for posterity. That is the text of "Theses" 
which formulates the latest formalist (or early structuralist) ideas without 
any unnecessary words. "Theses" formulate the model of evolution as a 
struggle and change, and we cannot argue with Peter Steiner's statement 
that the evolutionary model forced structuralism to be a conflicting 
successor of the formalist method. 
As we know, the second scenario was realized. As the formalist 
expulsion from intellectual power, it could be understood as "the end 
of history" in its formalist interpretation. The problem is that history 
itself means free ideological and conceptual competition. The absence 
of the latter demonstrates a delay of historical mechanism. During the 
1930s the former formalists continued unofficially, or, so to speak, 
"domestic" communication. It takes off any claims to symbolical 
power and intellectual management. There was no need of cultural 
legitimacy of the school. Only when ideological pressure had grown 
weak by the end of 1950s, and symbolic capital had been redistributed 
1 2  Shklovsky inclined both to sharpen and to dynamize this dichotomy: 
"archaists — innovators". He thought it would be "clearer" (see Comments by A. 
Chudakov, M. Chudakova and E. Toddes in Tynyanov 1977: 568). Actually, the 
presence of the dash represents an endless swing of pendulum, in which synonyms 
turn to opposite poles, and vice versa. 
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again, the formalist doctrine was salvaged from oblivion not only 
because its usefulness for scholarship, but also because of its repu­
tation of prohibited knowledge. 
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Русский формалист на rendez-vous со своей историей 
Настоящая работа посвящена взаимоотношениям между изменяю­
щейся исторической идентичностью русских формалистов во второй 
половине 1920-х гг. 
и их индивидуальной эволюцией в качестве пи­
сателей, членов общества, деятелей культуры. Формалисты с их 
агрессивным тяготением к современности противопоставлены здесь 
структуралистам, носителям консервативной, традиционной идео­
логии (которая является таковой в отношении революционных 
идей). Это можно объяснить специфически "романтической" иден­
тичностью формалистов, в намерение которых входило присвоить 
культурные ценности, переименованные и обновленные горнилом их 
революционной теории. Она, как и революционная идеология, была 
результатом Европейского импорта. Однако сталинский "ренессанс" 
обессмыслил идею Революции как в сознании людей, так и в самом 
обществе. Именно поэтому русский формализм отошел в маргиналь­
ный культурный поток и начал разрабатывать новые, адаптирован­
ные формы интеллектуального сопротивления (частная жизнь, до­
машняя литература), ставшие актуальными в следующем десяти­
летии. 
Vene formalist rendez-vous^ oma ajalooga 
Artiklis käsitletakse seoseid vene formalistide muutuva ajaloolise identi­
teedi ja nende individuaalse evolutsiooni (kirjanike, ühiskonna liikmete, 
kultuuritegelastena) vahel 1920ndate aastate teisel poolel. Formalistid 
oma agressiivse suunitlusega kaasajale on siin vastandatud strukturalisti­
dele, konservatiivse, traditsioonilise ideoloogia (mis on selline revolut­
siooniliste ideede suhtes) kandjatele. Seda võib seletada formalistide, 
kelle eesmärgiks oli omastada kultuuriväärtused, mis on ümber nimetatud 
ja uuendatud nende revolutsioonilise teooria sulatusahjus, spetsiifilise 
"romantilise" identiteediga. See identiteet, nagu ka nende revolutsioonili­
ne ideoloogia, oli imporditud Euroopast. Kuid stalinlik "renessanss" muu­
tis mõttetuks Revolutsiooni idee nii inimeste teadvuses kui ka ühiskonnas 
endas. Just seetõttu suubus vene vormikoolkond marginaalsusse ja hakkas 
välja töötama uusi, adapteeritud intellektuaalse vastupanu vorme (eraelu, 
kodukirjandus), mis muutusid aktuaalseks järgmisel aastakümnel. 
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Aesthetic conception of Russian Formalism: 
the cognitive view 
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Bredowstr. 52, 44309 Dortmund, Germany 
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Abstract. At present the theory of Russian Formalism becomes actual once 
again owing to the rapid development of cognitive science. Aesthetic theories 
recently put forward within the framework of cognitive science turned out to 
be consonant with the Formalist's views on the general principles of artistic 
activity. In my paper I argue that (1) the theory of Russian Formalism contains 
a number of methodological assumptions that are close to a cognitive 
approach; (2) some of the main principles of the Formalist theory (e.g., 
"elimination of automatism of perception" or "the dominant") permit the 
reformulation into cognitive terms; (3) such reformulation is not only 
possible, but useful because it makes the theory more powerful for 
explanation of the artistic phenomena. The findings from the new field of 
cognitive science not only prove some Formalist theses, but deepen and 
specify them as well. 
The theory of Russian Formalism continued to be productive during 
the whole twentieth century. Although the group existed for a relati­
vely short period and in difficult political circumstances, the ideas of 
Formalism were put into active intellectual circulation and proved to 
be capable of repeated "translations" into the languages of subsequent 
theories. 
One cannot say that this translation was always smooth and un-
problematic. As W. van Peer (1996) remarks, Formalism has "not 
fared well in the second half of the twentieth century: it has been 
misinterpreted (by the Post-Structuralists), misunderstood (by the New 
Critics), and stigmatized (first by the Marxists, now by various 
schools of 'ideological' critique). It has been declared 'superseded', 
'out of date', and 'dead'". The abundance of not fully adequate inter­
pretations testifies, however, to the rich potentialities inherent to the 
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Formalist theory. And the view that the ideas of Formalists are "out of 
date" and "dead" is exactly the point I would like to discuss. In this 
article I will argue that at least some of the key notions of the Forma­
lism are now obtaining one more realization, though in a quite diffe­
rent appearance and in a rather unexpected area: cognitive science. 
Cognitive science has been a major interdisciplinary enterprise of 
the last few decades; among its most important components are 
psychology, linguistics, philosophy, neuroscience and artificial intelli­
gence studies. Cognitive science mainly explores human mental abili­
ties and processes. The common methodological basis for this 
research is the assumption that mental phenomena can be accounted 
for as information-processing activities. 
The placement of the Formalist conception of arts into the cogni­
tive paradigm cannot be regarded as something totally unexpected. 
The Formalist conception contains a number of methodological 
assumptions which relate it more to science than to the humanities and 
put it in the intermediate position between this both poles of know­
ledge. Let us enumerate the most important of them. 
1. The separation of the research object from adjacent and interlacing 
areas. One of the central claims of the Formalist program was to 
distinguish literariness as an independent research object, to isolate it 
from interconnections with social, historical, etc. factors. Although 
this approach was criticized, for example, by Medvedev for the 
"underestimation of ideological values, phenomena of social reality 
and history" (Medvedev 1978: 26), this Formalist position can be 
regarded as procedure of abstraction that is normal in the natural 
sciences and is usually applied if the nature of the object under 
examination exceeds certain grade of complexity. 
2. In regard to the research object itself, the Formalists tended to 
dissociate themselves from those of its aspects about which they 
couldn't say much, given the present stage of knowledge. Formalism, 
especially in its early period, emphasized the separation of discrete 
elements of the artistic construction (priemy) and analysis of their 
relationship. The problem of meaning was hard to approach by means 
of objective analysis and was overtly bracketed out of their research 
agenda. Medvedev reproaches Formalists for being scared of meaning 
because meaning is "not here" and "not now". He notes: "Their fear of 
meaning in art led the Formalists to reduce the poetic construction to 
the peripheral, outer surface of the work. The work lost its depth, 
three-dimensionality, and fullness" (Medvedev 1978: 118). However, 
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exactly this fear — which can be also called scientific caution — 
allowed the Formalists to produce exemplary analysis of the phonetic 
and syntactic aspects of artistic works. 
3. From the very beginning Formalism was characterized by the 
tendency to quantitative and verifiable methods, by "objective-
scientific attitude toward facts" and "spirit of scientific positivism", as 
Ejhenbaum (1978: 7) put it. The property of verifiability or, if we look 
from the reverse perspective, of falsifiability, constitutes a necessary 
attribute of any serious scientific theory. The Formalist position in 
respect of this point was very clearly formulated by Ejhenbaum: 
In our scholarship we value theory only as a working hypothesis with the help 
of which facts are disclosed and take on meaning [...]. We establish concrete 
principles and adhere to them to the extent they are proved tenable by the 
material. If the material requires their further elaboration or alteration, we go 
ahead and elaborate or alter them. [...] The vitality of a science is not 
measured by its establishing truths but by its overcoming errors. (Ejhenbaum 
1978:3-4) 
4. Lastly, some of the central notions of Formalism directly rest on 
linguistics and psychology, that is, on the same disciplines which 
afterwards became the main components of cognitive science. On the 
one hand, the Formalists claimed to separate the study of the artistic 
work from the surrounding cultural context, to break with "philo­
sophical aesthetics and ideological theories of art" (Ejhenbaum 1978: 
7). However, this isolation applied mostly to the areas that were just as 
(or even more) methodologically amorphous, than literary studies 
themselves. On the other hand, the Formalists were quite willing to 
use the achievements of the methodologically more consistent 
disciplines, like the linguistics and psychology of that time. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century exactly these sciences made a 
breakthrough to the realm of structural analysis. The key names here 
are de Saussure and Freud, whose methodological influence is present 
in the humanities till now. In the writings of Formalists we can find 
numerous references to linguistic and psychological works, and they 
use many terms borrowed from these fields. A number of central 
concepts of the Formalist theory are directly derived from psycho­
logical or linguistic notions: the "estrangement" essentially characte­
rizes the alteration of the process of perception, the "dominant" refers 
to the selectively directed attention, the "set" (ustanovka) is a 
characteristic of the motivational sphere. 
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This aspect of the Formalist theory provokes the criticism on the 
part of Medvedev. He writes: 
[...] in severing literature from the ideological world, the Formalists turned it 
into some kind of stimulus for relative and subjective psychophysical states 
and perceptions. [...] It is necessary to state that the Formalists' psychologistic 
premises are very deeply lodged in the foundations of their theory. Any 
revision or denial of these premises must result in the complete destruction of 
Formalism. (Medvedev 1978: 149, 169) 
Vygotskij saw this psychologism of the Formalist theory in a less 
critical light. He ironically compared the Formalists with Moliere's 
Monsieur Jourdain who didn't know he spoke in prose until he was 
told it by his teacher: "Actually, the Formalists are compelled to be 
psychologists and to speak in sometimes confused, but absolutely 
psychological prose" (Vygotskij 1986: 74). Nevertheless, Vygotskij 
considered the connection between the Formalism and psychology as 
natural, because, as he put it, "every particular problem of artistic 
form meets on a certain stage of its development with psychological 
problems" (Vygotskij 1986: 86). 
All these methodological assumptions facilitate the placement of 
Formalist theory in the cognitive paradigm. Why should we do it? The 
point is that aesthetic theories recently put forward within the 
framework of cognitive science turned out to be consonant with the 
Formalist's views on the general principles of artistic activity. Some 
of the main notions of the Formalist theory can be reformulated into 
cognitive terms. In fact, the achievements of cognitive science and, 
more recently, of neuroscience, make it possible to explain the inner 
mechanism of principles proposed by the Formalists. 
Let us briefly summarize some of the main Formalist theses. A work 
of art is a sum of devices (or constructive elements). These devices are 
relatively autonomous and usually compete with each other. The aim 
of all devices is to influence a process of perception in one or another 
way. The character of this influence is defined as impediment or 
deformation of the perceptual process: "The technique of art is to 
make objects 'unfamiliar', to make form difficult, to increase the 
difficulty and length of perception [...]" (Shklovsky 1965: 12). In any 
work of art a leading device (or a group of devices) can be 
distinguished. This dominant governs the remaining devices and 
exerts a decisive aesthetic influence. 
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These theses are in many respects similar to aesthetic conceptions 
which rest on the recent findings in cognitive neuroscience, in 
particular, in the research on mechanisms of perception. One of the 
most important results of these studies was the conclusion that our 
perceptual system consists of a great number of areas, and each of 
these areas is concerned only with one definite feature of an object 
(such as colour, movement, form, location, etc., cf. Hubel, Wiesel 
1979). The processing of these components of perception runs in 
parallel, is asynchronous and to a great extent autonomous; that is, 
these areas function as modules, independently of each other (Zeki 
1998). 
The integral image of the world is produced as a result of a sub­
sequent convergence of different features extracted by the respective 
modules. However, this process cannot be considered as a mere 
mechanical summation. Before these features are transmitted to the 
higher associative areas they undergo a detailed preliminary pro­
cessing, where the resolution into primary elements and the extraction 
of constants are of central importance. 
The primary elements of our perception are extraordinary abstract 
and specific. For example, in the form perception module were found 
cells which respond only to horizontal or only to vertical lines. They 
are regarded as building blocks of form perception out of which all 
complex forms are constructed. There are other cells which respond 
maximally to a motion in one direction and don't respond at all to the 
opposite, or cells which are only concerned with profile vs. frontal 
views of human faces (cf. Zeki 1999: 91-92; Ramachandran 2001 : 
13). 
The effective processing of ongoing information also could not be 
possible without the ability to extract constant features of perceptual 
signals. Information from the outer world accesses the brain as an 
amorphous and steadily changing flow of stimuli. Our brain must 
selectively process them to obtain only permanent and essential 
properties of objects. Thus, we perceive form and size of an object as 
constant, regardless of distance and viewing angle. Each object is 
categorized according to colour, although the precise composition of 
the light reflected from it never remains the same. The constancy of 
our world image is achieved owning to the intricate computational 
work of the neuronal mechanism which filters, selects, and fills out 
the primary sensory data. 
These findings were recently applied to artistic phenomena. Semir 
Zeki, one of the leading specialists in the neurophysiology of visual 
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perception, argues that artistic activity follows the same principles and 
strategies that characterize the work of the brain. The artist and the 
brain both try to achieve knowledge about the world by extracting 
essential and constant features of objects and phenomena. Zeki writes: 
[...] the function of the visual brain - a search for constancies with the aim of 
obtaining knowledge about the world - is applicable with equal vigour to the 
function of art. I shall thus define the general function of art as a search for the 
constant, lasting, essential, and enduring features [...]. In this process, the 
artist must also be selective and invest his work with attributes that are 
essential, discarding much that is superfluous. [...] The function of art is 
therefore an extension of the function of the brain - the seeking of knowledge 
in an ever-changing world. (Zeki 1999: 79-80) 
According to this view, the function of art consists in an additional (in 
comparison to the routine work of the brain) transformation of our 
perceptual data which selectively emphasizes some of the most 
characteristic and constant features. This process of an additional 
transformation and rearrangement of features enables a work of art to 
be perceived as "distorting", "alienating" the familiar picture of the 
world (which is a product of a "normal", "non-artistic" activity of the 
brain). 
This view is quite near to the Formalist conception of art. Both 
conceptions consider the alteration of the process of perception as the 
driving force to produce an artistic effect. Like Zeki, the Formalists 
pointed out that in art regular perceptual process is redirected by the 
artist and "brought out of automatization". After additional processing 
the artistic image of an object is perceived as an "unfamiliar", 
"distorted" representation of its habitual appearance. 
In a number of articles, another well known cognitive neuro­
psychologist, Ramachandran, recently formulated his theory of art. 
which again recalls the Formalists. Ramachandran raises the question 
of general principles of art which are independent of its manifestations 
in different cultures and artistic styles (analogous to the universal 
grammar of natural language). As one such general rule Ra­
machandran postulates the "principle of isolation". According to this 
principle, the optimal artistic effect is achieved in each case through 
the influence of only one aspect of perceptual signal (such as form, 
colour, contour, etc.). other aspects being not so important or even 
hindering: "[...] art is most appealing if it produces heightened activity 
in a single dimension [...] rather than redundant activation of multiple 
modules" (Ramachandran. Hirstein 1999: 15). For instance, the great 
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expressive power of the artistic graphics is based on this effect, for in 
graphics all aspects of image except contour are reduced to the 
minimum. If we take into account the modular organization of per­
ception, this principle can be explained as a competition of auto­
nomous areas of the perceptual system for limited capacities of 
attention. The isolation of a single aspect allows us to focus attention 
more effectively and thus better appreciate the "priemy" of the artist. 
Like Ramachandran, Zeki also emphasizes that a great number of 
works of art are directed mainly to one isolated perceptual module. He 
argues that the modular organization of the perceptual system is 
projected onto the arts so that the arts can be regarded as modular as 
well. Artists consciously or unconsciously address a limited area of a 
perceptual system and through this achieve the maximal artistic effect 
(for example Cubist art is directed to the form module, Impressionism 
mostly to colour areas, Malevitch to the perception of lines, cf. Zeki 
1999a). 
We see that the "principle of isolation" displays clear parallels with 
the notion of the dominant which Jakobson characterized as "one of 
the most crucial, elaborated and productive concepts in Russian 
Formalist theory" (Jakobson 1978: 82). In this conception the artistic 
effect also depends on a single dominant feature which has a maximal 
influence on the perception. As Tynyanov put it, "without the 
sensation of subordination, the deformation of all the factors by the 
factor fulfilling the constructive role, there would be no fact of art" 
(Tynyanov 1924: 10). The notion of the dominant was used by the 
Formalists not only in respect to particular works of art, but in 
connection with the stylistic features of some poets as well (so called 
"stylistic dominant"). This is in line with Zeki's ideas about the 
specialization of some artists in certain perceptual modules. 
Let us summarize. It can be seen that some of the main notions of the 
Formalist theory are supported by recent cognitive and neurologic 
research. The "elimination of automatism of perception" which was 
proclaimed by the Formalists as the main principle of the arts turns out 
to be comparable with Zeki and Ramachandran's conception of the 
deformation of an object through the extraction and emphasis of its 
most essential and constant features. 
The discovery of the modular organization of the perceptual 
system throws a new light on the Formalist view on a work of art as 
on a totality of competing devices. It has been demonstrated that the 
image of the world is not a simple photographic imprint, but a filtered 
530 Valerij Gretchko 
and deformed representation of ongoing stimuli. Perception turned out 
to be a multistage and constructive process. For the artist this opens 
wide opportunities to manipulate, deform and impede the process of 
perception. Formalist theory and the cognitive conceptions of arts 
share the assumption that the aesthetic effect arises out of the 
alteration of normal, "default" course of perception. 
Cognitive neuroscience also confirms the Formalist thesis that both 
in a particular work of art and in the whole style of an artist a 
dominant device with a decisive aesthetic potential can be dis­
tinguished. Resolution of perceptual data into many independent 
features against the background of the limited resources of our 
attention (which at any moment can be directed to only one of these 
features) explains the "principle of isolation" which is analogous to 
the principle of the dominant. 
It is not only possible to reformulate the Formalist theory in 
cognitive terms — it is useful to do it. The findings from the new field 
not only prove some Formalist theses, but deepen and specify them as 
well. In spite of many interesting insights and plausible assumptions 
concerning the artistic process, the Formalist theory left open the 
question of its mechanisms and causes. In this respect the cognitive 
conceptions of arts possess more "explanatory power". For example, 
the notion of the artistic deformation that remained unspecified in 
Formalist theory is defined more closely if such deformation is con­
sidered as a result of an artist's effort to extract and accentuate the 
most characteristic features of a represented object. Artistic activity 
extends the functions of the perceptual system and can therefore be 
regarded as an adaptive process in an evolutionary sense. The 
Formalist view of the deformation of perception as a self-contained, 
"end-in-itself' process is replaced by the cognitive conclusion about 
the importance of biological functions in artistic activity. 
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Эстетическая концепция русского формализма: 
когнитивная перспектива 
В настоящее время теория формализма вновь становится актуальной 
в связи с бурным развитием когнитивной науки. Теории искусства, 
развиваемые в рамках когнитивного подхода, оказываются созв­
учными взглядам формалистов на основные законы художественной 
деятельности. В статье показывается, что (1) теория формализма со­
держит в себе ряд методологических установок, сближающих ее с 
когнитивным подходом, (2) некоторые из основных положений тео­
рии формализма допускают переформулировку в когнитивные тер­
мины, (3) подобная переформулировка является полезной в познава­
тельном плане. 
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Vene formalismi esteetiline kontseptsioon: 
kognitiivne perspektiiv 
Tänapäeval on vormi kool konna teooria muutumas taas aktuaalseks seoses 
kognitiivteaduste kiire arenguga. Kognitiivse lähenemise raames arenda­
tav kunstiteooria osutub lähedaseks formalistide vaadetele kunstitegevuse 
põhiseaduspärasuste kohta. Artiklis näidatakse, et (1) formalismi teoorias 
sisaldub rida metodoloogilisi lähtepunkte, mis lähendavad teda kognitiiv­
sele arusaamadele, (2) mõned formalismi põhiseisukohad võimaldavad 
ümberformuleerimist kognitiivsetesse terminitesse, (3) taoline ümber-
formuleerimine on kasulik tunnetuslikus (epistemoloogilises) plaanis. 
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Abstract. Diagnostics of a mental disorder completely bases on an estimation 
of patient's behaviour, verbal behaviour being the most important. The 
behaviour, in turn, is ruled by a situation expressed as a system of signs. 
Perception of a situation could be seen as a function, which depends on the 
context resulting from the previous situations, structuring personal world. So 
the world is not given — it is being formed while the person is in action. We 
argue that distinctive features of behaviour, including its abnormal variants, 
can be explained not in categories of characters and diseases but in terms of 
situations taking place in individual worlds. The situation in which a person 
perceives himself is not simply a site in a three-dimensional space at a certain 
moment, but a part of the world and an episode of his life. Like a text 
composed of words, individual world is composed of situations. Each of them 
needs certain context to cope with ambiguity. This context is induced by the 
world as a whole. And the world, in turn, is presented as a chain of situations. 
If the context cannot help to interpret a situation adequately, uncertainty can 
be eliminated by actions clarifying a situation, which is changed in a 
predictable way. Thus, purposeful activity, skills to make predictions and 
corrections of one's own actions are crucial. Weakness of any of them 
inevitably leads to the distortion of the presentation of the world, to wrong 
evaluation of situations and, as a result, to inadequate actions that finally 
reduce the activity as being ineffective. Thus, the lack of activity becomes the 
key factor in the development of disorder, being simultaneously its cause and 
effect. In periods of insufficient activity conditions for violated (and violating) 
sign processing arise. Possible variants of sign malfunction are: oligosemia 
(reduction of the number of perceivable signs), hyposemia (decrease of 
significance of signs), hypersemia (increase of significance of some signs at 
the expense of others), ambisemia (uncertainty of sign, when situation remains 
unclear), cryptosemia (recognition of signs not obvious for other observers), 
and parasemia (perverted interpretation of signs influenced by a false 
context). 
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Umwelt, as elaborated by Jakob von Uexkiill, is a model (as developed 
by Thomas Sebeok), a model of the world, or, better, the worlds, as 
there are innumerable models constructed by different inhabitants of 
our planet. Everyone has its own Umwelt adapted to its specific needs 
(Uexkiill 1928). 
Non-human signs are everywhere, investigated by different 
branches of semiotics endeavouring to understand stars and rocks, 
plants and animals (Hoffmeyer 1996; Kull 1998; 2001). However, 
humans are the only living beings who know that there are signs, i.e. 
who have the ability to engage in acts of reflection and self-reflection 
thereby creating a semiosphere of a specific character (Lotman 1984; 
1990). As Deely puts it when discussing Peirce's views, all thought is 
in signs (Deely 1982). Ethosemiotics, or teleosemiotics, was proposed 
by Ponzio and Petrilli when elaborating upon an earlier idea of the 
semiotic self (Sebeok 1979; Sebeok et al. 2001); and autosemiosis was 
defined as a universal principle of Nature to reflect itself (Seppänen 
2003) making biosemiotic space still richer. 
Is there any relation between semiotics and psychiatry? Is semio­
tics essential for an understanding of the causes of mental disorders? 
Psychosemiotics, acknowledged by many authors as a branch of the 
biosemiotic sciences, is a domain that fills a huge but very important 
gap in our knowledge of human nature and its deviations. According 
to Jakob von Uexkiill (1973), "in terms of semioses, we can conceive 
our world as a permanent dialogue between self and non-self. The 
world appears, then, as answers from non-self to questions of self and 
answers of self to questions of non-self' (Th. v. Uexkiill 1992: 459). 
The idea of 'symptom' as a sign that in pre-Newtonian days made 
medicine a semiotic discipline seems to be in need of further 
elaboration now, when a crisis of biomechanical paradigms has 
become evident. It has also become evident that Peirce's (1931-1958), 
Bakhtin's and Lotman's concepts of dialogue as a basis for any 
informational process are of the utmost importance when we attempt 
to understand semiosis as arising from the need for an interpreter 
(metainterpretation in Thure von UexkUll's terms). As Tarasti 
discusses in the existential semiotics (Tarasti 2000), the central point 
is to see signs from the inside. He also discriminates between strong 
and weak (inner) signs like those of a dream, or those created by an 
abnormal psyche. It should be stressed that weak signs can 
dynamically form a person's behaviour and be existentially vital to it. 
In order to distinguish weak from strong, a person must be involved in 
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a Bakhtinian dialogical situation — while making efforts to under­
stand the Other and his/her Umwelt (Bakhtin 1986). 
When dealing with human behaviour and especially its deviations 
in pathology, the interpretation of signs becomes extremely important. 
A psychosemiotic approach can even change paradigms in practical 
medicine. The diagnostics of mental disorders, in contrast to those of 
somatic medicine, are completely based on an estimation of a patient's 
behaviour, verbal behaviour being of greatest importance. In this 
context Bateson's mind-processes and ecology of mind (Bateson 1972: 
448-464) and Th. v. Uexkiill's (1986) semiotic approach to medicine 
are of special interest. 
Ignoring this approach is the main cause of the crisis in modern 
psychiatry, in which a nosological approach based on the triad 
'symptom-syndrom-disease' still remains dominant. The nosological 
approach does not provide mechanisms for understanding what really 
happens with a patient, serving only as a tool for recognizing and 
describing a disease. It is no wonder, therefore, that certain supposedly 
internal factors hidden within the depths of the soul or brain of a 
patient appear to be the cause of insanity. 
This situation arose from the Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm of the 
Universe and has the following implications for psychiatry: human 
beings explore the world existing apart from themselves. If a person 
acts inappropriately or makes irrelevant statements he is considered 
insane. Hence, in order to explain such behaviour, we necessarily have 
to study mentality and its 'organ' — the brain. It seems that the only 
way for scientific reasoning to proceed within the designated system 
of coordinates is again to search for a kind of an inner phlogiston 
inside combustible matter as the cause of disorder, as had been done 
centuries ago. 
For our further reasoning it is important to admit that there are no 
such mysterious inner causes, but only certain variants of behaviour 
that seem to be abnormal. Then, the question should sound like: "Why 
does someone behave in one way and not in another?" And vice versa, 
question like "What is the cause for schizophrenia?" is a wrong 
question, as it has no reasonable answer. Usually we say: "He lies 
because he is a liar", "He wins because he is the strongest", "She helps 
because she is responsive". Curiously enough, most people are usually 
satisfied with such 'explanations'. However, if someone had not won 
he would not have been called 'the strongest'. If someone had not 
been lying he would not have been called 'a liar'. And finally, if I did 
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not smoke I would not be a smoker. I am a smoker because I smoke. 
Being a smoker is not the reason for my smoking. And even at those 
times when I am not smoking I remain a smoker — especially for 
those who know that nasty habit of mine. Thus, we should avoid such 
'explanations without explanations' and stop asking, "What is the 
reason that someone is a liar" instead of: "Why does he sometimes 
lie"? 
Why do people behave differently in similar situations? What are 
the appropriate criteria for discriminating the normal, or reasonable, 
from the abnormal? Is it really possible to talk about 'similar situa­
tions' at all? What is the motivating mechanism of human behaviour 
in general and of an insane person in particular? And what is the role 
of language and of the world-view of a suffering person — primarily 
keeping in mind his semiotic nature? Unfortunately, we are able to 
think of the world existing outside of and apart from a person, but it is 
most difficult to think of a person existing outside the world and apart 
from it. Having acquired such an ability, we shall realize the impos­
sibility of the world existing apart from us. And then we shall admit 
that neither individuals nor the world can exist separately from each 
other. An individual is not a part of the world; neither is the world a 
part of him. They act as figure and background for one another. Which 
is figure and which is background depends on one's point of view. 
The psychological barrier to such reasoning is as follows: if there is 
more than one person in the world, there is also more than one world 
in the Universe, which in this case would more appropriately be called 
the Multiverse. 
Whoever or whatever an individual is, above all, he is a complex 
self-organizing and self-adjusting system. Any system like this 
engenders a certain amount of entropy that correlates with the degree 
of its complexity. Besides, all living systems aspire to maintain the 
most energy-efficient nonequilibrium and stationary condition known 
in biology as 'homeostasis'. For this purpose a system has to be active 
in order to eliminate entropy and acquire so-called negative entropy 
(or negentropy), which is an ordered structure of any nature: food, air, 
information etc. Thus, activity is a major need of living systems and 
provides for their integrity and capacity to function. The destruction of 
a system occurs when the maximum permissible level of entropy is 
attained, a condition that is equivalent to approaching the polar 
stationary state with a minimum of energy — equilibrium. The death 
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of a system causes and signifies its total passivity, whereas the 
passivity of a system causes its death. 
This brief synergetic digression is cited in order to reveal the 
widespread mistake of traditional rationality in the analysis of cause-
and-effect relationships in a 'stimulus-reaction' paradigm. Not re­
action as a whole is the consequence of a stimulus, but only a type of 
reaction among a set of possible variants. An action itself is not 
necessarily the consequence of the causal influence of a stimulus. The 
need to act in general is primary in comparison to the need to act in 
some specific way. An organism can respond to a stimulus with total 
inactivity and, vice versa, an organism's activity without any obvious 
stimulus is also possible. A person is not a machine programmed for 
reactions that occur in response to a stimulus. 
People live not in space and time where stimuli occur and where 
they have to react somehow, but in one or another situation where 
their well-being depends on a successful choice of action. Any human 
life can be represented as a sequence of personal situations. In the 
same situations different individuals would operate identically. How­
ever, in practice, situations are never the same and are never repeated. 
A threat on the life of one person can be a challenge or even light 
entertainment for another. Of importance is that similar perceptions of 
a situation dictate similar behaviour. In other words, individuals, both 
normal, and pathological, behave similarly in similar situations. So, 
the question "Why do people act differently in similar situations?" is 
irrelevant, as well as the answer: "Because they have different 
personalities". 
In contrast to animals, humans live not simply in reality, but in a 
specifically structured reality, which refers to concept of 'a world'. 
Each person is the inhabitant of his own world. These worlds are 
mutually penetrable and form a metasystem, which we designate as 
'Multiple Worlds'. Penetrability means that each person is capable of 
perceiving only his own world (part of which he evaluates as himself), 
whereas all other worlds are presented to him in their convolute and 
underside forms, looking like other people, i.e. person perceives other 
worlds only through their external forms — as other people. We have 
discussed the similarities and differences between individuals, but in 
the same way we can discuss the similarities and differences between 
such worlds. Hence, the different features of form of behaviour, 
including its abnormal variants, can be explained not as categories of 
characters and diseases but in terms of the situations taking place 
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within individual worlds. Thus, people act differently because they 
live in different worlds. 
It is time to ask: "Why are situations so ambiguous and what is the 
way to deal with the ambiguity"? We shall take advantage of an 
analogy: each word of a proposition has a complex set of meanings. 
Words receive certain value because of the fact that a proposition has 
a certain sense. If the sense is unclear, the context is not well 
determined; variations and mistakes in the interpretation of separate 
words become very probable. In turn, freedom of interpretation can 
result in a distortion of meaning. It will change the context, a change 
that will be reflected in the further interpretation of words. 
The situation in which a person perceives himself is not simply a 
site in three-dimensional space at a certain moment, but a part of the 
world and an episode in his life. Just as a text consists of words, an 
individual's world is composed of situations. And each of situation 
needs a certain context in order to cope with ambiguity. Context is 
provided by the world as a whole. And the world, in turn, is presented 
as a chain of situations. More to the point, we should add that a person 
aspires to control a situation while the situation itself controls his 
behaviour. 
Let us look at the behaviour of a person standing at a crossroads: 
the green light comes on and he crosses the road. The green traffic 
light is not the reason that he has crossed the road but only a regulator 
of his behaviour. The reason for this is that he has to go somewhere. 
The colour of the light is conventional but not accidental: green is 
associated with factors favourable to life while red — is associated 
with threatening factors. However, in order for the sign to be able to 
adjust someone's behaviour it is insufficient for it to have a meaning. 
It should also be significant: ignoring it will produce adverse con­
sequences while paying attention to it, on the contrary, should lead to 
favourable consequences. Moreover, the sign serves as a sign to the 
degree to which it serves as a sign for others: there is no reason to wait 
for a green signal if drivers don't pay attention to it. As a rule, beha­
viour should not be controlled by factors which do not also control the 
behaviour of others. 
It is impossible to remember the meanings and significance that 
billions of signs have for billions of people. Fortunately, we do not 
have to. The complete, integrated form of semiotic knowledge 
necessary for adaptive behaviour is just our belief that there is a world 
arranged in a determined, although not always clear, fashion. 
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While keeping in mind the level of active signs, let us turn now to 
the mentally ill person, and consider examples of the two most 
prevalent pathological conditions: depressive and paranoidal. 
A. The depressive patient and his reality 
In fact, he is not just a person suffering from a bad mood. He feels 
insignificant, a person who does not control the situation and he feels 
as if nothing in the world depends on his actions. His activity is 
dramatically reduced: he does not see any sense in activity and does 
not feel any satisfaction either from the results of action or from the 
process of action. The feeling of a wholeness to life and even of a 
wholeness to his own presence in the world is lost. He seems to be not 
quite alive. It is not surprising, therefore, that thoughts of death 
dominate. Nothing is positive for him: in the care of relatives he sees 
only that he has become a burden for them; in the encouraging words 
of other people he notices hidden irony; if people leave him alone, he 
considers it a sign of oblivion. Even in another person's smiles he sees 
a sign of hopelessness. He does not remember his former successes, 
conceiving himself as a loser, and his entire life is perceived as a 
circuit of continuous mistakes. Having such an experience, the patient 
becomes more disinclined toward an active life as his passivity and 
feelings of despair and hopelessness accumulate. The idea of death 
becomes a positive value. From this moment on, the risk of suicide 
sharply grows. 
Thus, the initial manifestation of depression (the periods of 
decreased activity arising cyclically) gradually changes the context of 
the patient's existence and, as a result, in subsequent situations nega­
tive values become more topical, confirming the dominant idea that 
everything is not only negative but even worse than it seemed before. 
The situation becomes still worse as the significance of life is 
diminished, the importance of all essentially decreases and, hence, the 
number of perceiving signs carrying a positive sense reduce. And 
finally, signs with negative content prominently arise from the general 
background, gradually filling all the semiotic space of the patient. The 
world becomes unipolar, nothing in it promises anything good; there 
is almost nothing to do in it; and it is not a place to live in. It all moves 
in a vicious circle: depression develops, the sufferings of the patient 
reach a culminating point, death, which had earlier symbolized 
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absolute evil, becomes a blessing — the most desired event. The only 
reason for not committing suicide in this case is total apoplexy of the 
will. 
B. The paranoid patient and his reality 
Initially a paranoic is a person living in a world that is unsafe. The 
world is an arena for him, and his life is a struggle. He is a person who 
understands meanings, rather than feels senses: he is attuned to the 
analytical interpretation of signs rather than to the direct sensual 
perception of a situation as a whole. Thus, if he is intelligent enough, 
he might never fall ill. The level of intelligence defined semiotically is 
the amount of perceivable signs and the awareness of their meanings: 
intelligence is equivalent to the ability to operate optimally, taking all 
circumstances into account. Recent researches show that the intelli­
gence of paranoid patients is roughly 10% lower than the average 
level in a population. Besides, the semiotic space for such individuals 
is wider, and the borders of their semantic fields are vague and fuzzy. 
They appear in adverse situations more often than others; 
threatening feelings arise every time they face an indefinite situa­
tion — with signs that are not distinctly denotative. Although the 
ambiguity of a situation is overcome by context, there are cases when 
a context cannot help to interpret a situation adequately. In such cases 
uncertainty can be eliminated by taking action to clear up a situation 
which is changed in a predictable way. Otherwise, an alternative 
hypothesis is put forward, which also must be confirmed by practical 
experience. This is a way to overcome ambiguity and to form new 
necessary contexts. 
Thus, purposeful activity, skills to make predictions, and correc­
tions of one's own actions are crucial. Weakness in any of these areas 
inevitably leads to the distortion of representations of the world, to the 
wrong appreciation of a situation and, as a result, to inadequate 
actions. Without its clarifying contextual clues, the world becomes 
more and more unreliable, and situations become more unpredictable. 
Eventually, a feeling of confusion and fear of impending threats 
reaches a point when further life becomes impossible: the world can 
be hostile, bad, or any variant thereof, but it should be conceivable. 
However, a means for clarifying actions has already been foreclosed, 
because a person's activity only increases the adversity in a situation. 
Psychiatry in free fall: in pursuit of a semiotic foothold 541 
Together with a reduction in activity, a simplification of behaviour 
and a loss of control of the situation, the representation of a hostile 
world occupied by persecutors supervising the life of a patient 
crystallizes. This is the price which is paid for the world to regain its 
distinctiveness. However, a new context gives knowledge of the 
hostile intentions of other people, which is fed by a feeling of being 
threatened and under the control of others. Any word, any act in the 
person's surroundings is now a sign of potential danger. Minimal 
activity, withdrawal from the world and other people, and keeping a 
safe distance from them is the most expedient strategy now. Inter­
action with the world decreases, and consequently representations of it 
lose validity. Alienation and apathy gradually grow: the world beco­
mes impoverished, losing its colour, signs and significance. The 
patient's activity lessens — from this time on total passivity guaran­
ties safety in the world where there is no longer anything to do. 
In summary, we should mention again that the most significant 
primary manifestation in psychiatry is abnormal behaviour. This 
behaviour, in turn, is completely ruled by a situation expressed as a 
system of signs. A person's perception of a situation can be seen as a 
function that depends upon the context that results from previous 
situations that structure a person's world. 
The world is not given; it is formed while a person is acting. Ade­
quate personal world formation is possible only through successful 
behaviour based on the ability to predict and to make corrections if 
necessary. Thus, activity deficit becomes the motivating mechanism, 
the key factor in the development of a disorder, being simultaneously 
its cause and effect. In this respect, a final semiotic equivalent of 
disease, as it has been shown above, proves to be the simplification of 
person's world and behaviour, which is represented as a reduction in 
the number of perceivable signs (or oligosemia) and a decrease in the 
significance of signs in his life situations, their fragments and in the 
world as a whole (or hyposemia). 
We consider that, along with a lack of activity, the second leading 
factor determining abnormal behaviour is the malfunction of signs 
(compare with Rudnev's understanding of psychopathology as hyper-
and hyposemiotization of reality — Rudnev 2002). This malfunction 
is related to such a fundamental feature of the sign as its ambiguity, 
which a healthy subject copes with during his activity. In periods of 
insufficient activity, conditions for violated sign processing arise. 
Several variants of such a violation are possible in addition to the 
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oligo- and hyposemia mentioned above. Some of them we have tried 
to demonstrate in our clinical examples. We suggest the new terms for 
that: 
- ambisemia — for the uncertainty of a sign when the situation 
remains unclear; 
- cryptosemia — for the recognition of signs not obvious to other 
observers; 
- parasemia — for the perverted interpretation of signs influenced 
by a false context; and 
- hypersemia — for the increase in significance of some signs at the 
expense of others. 
All of these conditions may be present in various proportions in any 
variation of abnormal behaviour. The particular structure of sign 
malfunction depends on such conditions as the initial features of the 
'person-world' system, the origin of activity deficit and the duration 
of the disorder. 
Conclusion 
We must reject thinking of psychoses as disorders of the psyche. 
However difficult it is, the less we use the terms psyche, conscious­
ness, or mind the better. Although there really are individuals who are 
called mentally ill, mental diseases themselves are no more than the 
offspring of our theoretical speculations. We perceive and evaluate 
what we from our inside think to be the outer world, while its 
specificity is caused by language and more broadly by individual 
semiotic maps. This means that we are never looking out upon the 
world, but rather drawing and extracting 'the external' world semioti-
cally. That is why the approach to mental deviations should be much 
more complex, taking into account the egocentric nature of an 
individual semiosphere with its own co-ordinates through all axes. 
This inevitably leads us to a necessity — and a possibility — to 
develop an alternative approach to the psychiatric domain in accor­
dance with the synthetic thinking currently under discussion in 
philosophy of science. 
Following Vijver's (1999) paper on psychic closure, we argue that 
human beings are hierarchically organized and embedded in language 
and socio-cultural space — which is also hierarchical and subject to its 
own constraints in addition to biological development or pathological 
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conditions; and further — it is most important to understand what 
makes up systems and how this understanding helps to realize sign 
functions within them. To understand the Other, who in the case 
discussed is a person exhibiting abnormal behaviour, we should 
reconstruct as thoroughly as possible his semiosphere, the Umwelt, 
and see how it functions for him, what signal-values are there (Hoff-
meyer 1996), to understand what his signs mean to him. There is no 
way to recognize the semiosphere except in dialogue and by delicate 
language analysis, as we are language-determined systems, and this is 
species-specific.1 
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Психиатрия в свободном падении: 
в поисках семиотической опоры 
Диагностика психического заболевания полностью опирается на 
оценку поведения больного, включая его речевое поведение. Поведе­
ние, в свою очередь, контролируется ситуацией, понимаемой как 
система знаков. Восприятие ситуации можно расценивать как функ­
цию. зависимую от контекста, формируемого предшествующими 
ситуациями, структурирующими индивидуальный мир субъекта. 
Таким образом, мир не задан — он формируется в процессе актив­
ности человека. Мы полагаем, что различия в поведении, включая 
его аномальные формы, может быть объяснено не в терминах, 
описывающих характеры или болезни, а в рамках ситуаций, разы­
грывающихся в индивидуальных мирах. Ситуация, в которой 
субъект воспринимает себя, является не просто местом в трехмерном 
пространстве в определенный момент времени, но частью его мира и 
эпизодом его жизни. Подобно тексту, состоящему из слов, инди­
видуальный мир составлен из ситуаций, каждая из которых требует 
определенного контекста для преодоления ее неоднозначности. Этот 
контекст 
порождается миром как целым по отношению к каждой 
входящей в него ситуации, высту пающей как часть целого. В случае, 
если контекст не способен прояснить ситуацию, её неопределен­
ность преодолевается путем активности, направленной на прогно­
зируемое изменение ситуации. Поэтому главными механизмами, 
определяющими адекватность представлений о мире субъекта, 
являются его целенаправленная активность, умение прогнозировать 
результаты своих действий и вносить в них необходимые коррекции. 
Слабость каждого из них неотвратимо ведет к формированию 
искаженной картины мира, ошибочной интерпретации ситуаций и, 
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как следствие, — к неадекватным действиям, в конечном итоге 
приводящим к редуцированию активности как неэффективной. 
Дефицит активности, таким образом, становится ключевым факто­
ром, ответственным за развитие болезни, являясь одновременно ее 
причиной и следствием. В периоды недостаточной активности 
субъекта возникают условия для патологического (и патогенного) 
функционирования знаков. Выделены следующие возможные 
варианты такого функционирования знаков: олигосемия (уменьше­
ние количества воспринимаемых знаков); гипосемия (снижение 
значимости знака); гиперсемия (усиление значимости одних знаков в 
ущерб другим); амбисемия (неоднозначность знака, оставляющая 
ситуацию неясной); криптосемия (восприятие знаков, неочевидных 
для других наблюдателей) и парасемия (извращенное толкование 
знаков под влиянием ложного контекста). 
Psühhiaatria vabas langemises: semiootilise toe otsinguil 
Psüühikahäirete diagnostika tugineb täielikult haige käitumise hinda­
misele (kaasaarvatud tema kõneline käitumine). Käitumist omakorda 
kontrollib situatsioon, mida võib määratleda märgisüsteemina. Olukorra 
vastuvõttu võib hinnata kui kontekstist, mis on tingitud eelnevatest 
subjekti isiklikku maailma vormivatest situatsioonidest, sõltuvat funkt­
siooni. Seega maailm ei ole ette antud — see vormitakse inimtegevuse 
käigus. Me eeldame, et erinevusi käitumises, ka selle anomaalseid vorme, 
võib seletada mitte iseloomu või haigusi seletavate mõistete abil, vaid 
individuaalsetes maailmades lahtimängitavate situatsioonide raames. 
Situatsioon, milles subjekt ennast teadvustab, ei ole mitte lihtsalt koht 
kolmemõõtmelises ruumis kindlal ajahetkel, vaid tema maailma osa ja 
tema elu episood. Nagu tekst, mis koosneb sõnadest, nii koosneb indivi­
duaalne maailm situatsioonidest, milledest igaüks nõuab kindlat konteksti 
oma mitmetähenduslikkuse ületamiseks. See kontekst tekitatakse maailma 
kui terviku poolt iga selles sisalduva situatsiooni (mis on terviku osaks) 
suhtes. Juhul, kui kontekst ei ole võimeline situatsiooni selgitama, üle­
tatakse selle määramatus situatsiooni muutusele (prognoositavale) suuna­
tud aktiivsuse abil. Seetõttu on peamisteks mehhanismideks, mis määra­
vad ära subjekti maailmanägemise adekvaatsuse, tema suunatud aktiivsus, 
oskus prognoosida oma tegevuse tulemusi ja viia neisse sisse vajalikke 
parandusi. Viga ühes neist mehhanismidest viib vältimatult moonutatud 
maailmapildi tekkimisele, olukordade eksliku tõlgendamise ja, kui taga-
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järe — mitteadekvaatsete tegevusteni, mis lõppkokkuvõttes toovad 
endaga kaasa aktiivsuse (kui mitteefektiivse) redutseerimise. Aktiivsuse 
defitsiit muutub seega võtmeteguriks, mis on vastutav haiguse arengu 
eest, olles ühtaegu nii selle põhjuseks kui ka tagajärjeks. Subjekti vähese 
aktiivsuse perioodidel tekivad tingimused märkide patoloogilise (ja 
patogeense) funktsioneerimise jaoks. Tuuakse välja järgmised võimalikud 
variandid: oligoseemia (vastuvõetavate märkide hulga kahanemine); 
hüposeemia (märgi olulisuse vähenemine); hüperseemia (ühtede märkide 
osatähtsuse suurenemine teiste arvelt); krüptoseemia (teiste vaatlejate 
jaoks arusaamatute märkide vastuvõtt) ja paraseemia (märkide väär 
tõlgendus vale konteksti mõjul). 
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Abstract. In biosemiotics, life and living phenomena are described by means 
of originally anthropomorphic semiotic concepts. This can be justified if we 
can show that living systems as self-maintaining far from equilibrium systems 
create and update some kind of representation about the conditions of their 
self-maintenance. The point of view is the one of semiotic realism where signs 
and representations are considered as real and objective natural phenomena 
without any reference to the specifically human interpreter. It is argued that 
the most basic concept of representation must be forward looking and that 
both C. Peirce's and J. v. Uexküll's concepts of sign assume an unnecessarily 
complex semiotic agent. The simplest representative systems do not have 
phenomenal objects or Umwelten at all. Instead, the minimal concept of 
representation and the source of normativity that is needed in its interpretation 
can be based on M. Bickhard's interactivism. The initial normativity or 
natural self-interest is based on the 'utility-concept' of function: anything that 
contributes to the maintenance of a far from equilibrium system is functional 
to that system — every self-maintaining far from equilibrium system has a 
minimal natural self-interest to serve that function, it is its existential 
precondition. Minimal interactive representation emerges when such systems 
become able to switch appropriately between two or more means of 
maintaining themselves. At the level of such representations, a potentiality to 
detect an error may develop although no objects of representation for the 
system are provided. Phenomenal objects emerge in systems that are more 
complex. If a system creates a set of ongoingly updated 'situation images' and 
can detect temporal invariances in the updating process, these invariances 
constitute objects for the system itself. Within them, a representative system 
gets an Umwelt and becomes capable of experiencing triadic signs. The 
relation between representation and its object is either iconic or indexical at 
this level. Correspondingly as in Peirce's semeiotic, symbolic signs appear as 
more developed — for the symbolic signs, a more complex system is needed. 
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1. Why biosemiotics? 
Modern biosemiotics, as a discipline or a united field of discourse, can 
be said to born about the decade ago, at the turn of the 1990s. At that 
time, isolated biosemiotically oriented researchers (and small discus­
sion groups) found a connection with each other, and the name 'bio­
semiotics' was taken into common use.1 As an approach to the pheno­
menon of life, modern biosemiotics has been characterized following 
ways: 
The sign rather than the molecule is the basic unit for studying life. (Hoff-
meyer 1995: 369.) 
Biosemiotics can be defined as the science of signs in living systems. A 
principal and distinctive characteristic of semiotic biology lays in the 
understanding that in living, entities do not interact like mechanical bodies, 
but rather as messages, the pieces of text. (Kull 1999a: 386.) 
According to biosemiotics all processes going on in animate nature at 
whatever level, from the single cell to the ecosystem, should be analysed and 
conceptualised in terms of their character of being sign-processes. This does 
not imply any denial of the anchoring of such processes in well-established 
physical and chemical lawfulness. Only, it is claimed that life-processes are 
part of and are organised in obedience to a semiotic dynamic. Biosemiotics, 
then, is concerned with the sign-aspects of the processes of life itself (not with 
the sign-character of the theoretical structure of life-sciences). (Hoffmeyer 
1998: 82.) 
Biosemiotics — [,..| biology that interprets living systems as sign systems. 
(Emmeche. Kull, Stjernfelt 2002: 26). 
Question: Why should we approach life by mixing our internally 
meaningful semiotic concepts to the externally describable natural 
phenomenon of life? What makes the phenomenon of life so 
peculiar that we should develop bio-semiotics? 
Answer: Firstly, living systems are not just complex collections of 
atoms and molecules, but they are far from equilibrium systems. 
They are relatively constant forms — like flames and vortices — 
in the continuous flow of matter. If this continuous change ceases. 
Although modern biosemiotics has had a number of antecedents since the 
times of Peirce, it was not until the 1990s, when Thomas Sebeok, Jesper Hoff­
meyer. Claus Emmeche, Thure von Uexküll, and Kalevi Kull (among others) 
begun to organize seminars, publications, etc. where the biosemiotics was the 
leading theme. (About the history of biosemiotics, see Kull 1999a, b, and Hoff­
meyer 2002.) 
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the system will start to fall apart and loose its identity as a living 
system. 
Secondly, despite the ethereal vulnerability of far from equilib­
rium systems, especially living systems have a tendency to stay 
alive — although they are mortal, they are also potentially im­
mortal.1 We can easily imagine the self-extinction of human race, 
but the .^//-extinction of all life seems much more improbable — 
at least, it is most probably far beyond human powers. 
Question: What gives the potential immortality to living systems? 
Answer: The potential immortality of living systems is due to their 
readiness to change their behaviour and structure appropriately — 
i.e. directionally —in the pressure of the environmental changes. 
The minimal criterion for this appropriateness is ultimately the 
mere survival of the system. 
Question: How is this possible? What makes this readiness to 
appropriate self-reconstruction possible? 
Answer: Firstly, the readiness to self-reconstruction requires that 
living systems are more or less flexible, and secondly, the directio­
nality or appropriateness of this self-reconstruction requires some 
kind of anticipation of possible future changes in relation with the 
flexibility of a system. The system has to make some kind of vica­
riate comparison between anticipated external change and anti­
cipated internal changability and have means to indicate the appro­
priate action that this vicariate comparison suggests. 
Question: What is the general mechanism or functional structure of 
that anticipation? 
Hypothesis: Living systems have to be able to create and update 
some kind of representation about the external and internal 
conditions of their self-maintenance. These embodied 'representa­
tions' are used as an internal model of the world according to 
If one looks at the proof, bacteria are still with us and thus constitute a living 
evidence of the potential immortality of living systems. Moreover, what we and 
all the current forms of life ultimately are but swarms of (the swarms of) 
developed and co-operative bacteria (cf. Hoffmeyer 1997c). Although (most) 
organisms are certainly mortal, it is not the death of an organism but the extinction 
of its lineage that means the total failure of its self-maintenance. Thus, it is a 
lineage rather than an organism that fits better the concept of living system (that 
can be 'potentially immortal'). And if organisms were still considered as living 
systems, they can be said to have 'life after death' in the form of their 
descendants. The identity of a system has to be based on continuity rather than on 
invariable essential characters or structures. 
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which the behaviour of a system — especially the use of the 
constructive power of a system (including the self-constructive 
power) — is appropriately guided. 
If this hypothesis is redeemable, living systems are not 
describable as merely physical systems, but besides this, they have 
to be considered — in a certain strict and abstract sense — as real 
mental systems? The core idea of biosemiotics follows: "Signs and 
life are coextensive" (e.g., Stjernfelt 2002: 337). 
2. What biosemiotics could mean? 
If the idea of living systems being mental is based merely on analogy, 
this will not lead us to anything definitive, because the analogy with 
the common sense conceptions of mind is at its best only partial, 
distant, or loose. The more definitive sense to 'the core idea of bio­
semiotics' is needed. 
As demonstrated in the line of thought above, they are especially 
the signs or representations that are usually counted as mental and that 
therefore attach a mental character to life. Thus to make specifically 
b/osemiotics means a study and search of signs, mind, and other 
semiotic concepts as they appear in living natural phenomena. More­
over, they have to be taken as (and not mere as if) natural phenomena. 
Thus, we (should) find ourselves at some kind of semiotic naturalism 
which, in turn, should lead us to the question what the correct semiotic 
concepts are and how they should be (re)defined. As I have proposed 
elsewhere (Vehkavaara 2002: 295-297), the core project in the 
semiotic naturalism should be a certain kind of naturalization of 
This is the basic hypothesis — not only of biosemiotics — but of evolutionary 
epistemology too (Campbell 1974; Lorenz 1973). In evolutionary epistemology, 
evolutionary adaptation through natural selection is considered as evolutionary 
learning, i.e. as knowledge gathering. The basic point is to naturalize and 
generalize the 'intuitive' concept of knowledge — 'true well-justified belief is a 
special case of valid and reliable representation. However, the criteria for validity 
and reliability are hard to distinguish when the subject matter is 'phylogenetic 
knowledge etc. (in Vehkavaara 1998, I did not yet fully recognize this). 
Therefore, the concept of knowledge in evolutionary epistemology is rather the 
concept of valid representation. It can be noticed that they are exactly the 
concepts of representation (or sign) and its validity both of which constitute the 
object of study of Peircean semeiotic, and consequently, of its extension (or 
application) to biosemiotics. 
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semiotic concepts. They should be based solely on the objects of 
external experience. 4  The main reason for this project is the hope that 
within it, the risk of falling into anthropomorphic error, or more 
generally into 'zoomorphic' error, would decrease. It is too easy to 
make the erroneous generalization of cognitive structures peculiar 
only to human or animal cognition over all kinds of living systems. 
Another essential feature in this semiotic naturalism is the demand for 
semiotic realism — that signs are real and have real effects as signs 
and that this principle applies to every semiotic concept, i.e., 
(1) that at least some effects of signs are not reducible to physical (but 
are genuinely semiotic), and 
(2) that the semiotic concepts are definable independently of our 
internal conceptions and intuitions about them, i.e. that semiotic 
concepts could be defined entirely at the 'object-level', from the 
point of view of 'object-system', (or 'object-agent' if the 'object-
system' can be considered somehow agential, see Fig. 1 ). 
In search for the proper concept of representation (or sign) for bio­
semiotics, we should first choose the proper motivation and 'proto­
type' for the concept in order to recognize what kind of conception is 
needed. There are at least three different motivations (accordingly, 
there are three basic 'prototypes') for the conception of representation: 
(1) representation for explanation 'how things are' (or for interpre­
tation 'what is the essence of a phenomenon'); 
(2) representation for communication, or for explanation how the 
(mutual) communication of meanings (usually between individual 
human minds) is possible and mediated; 
(3) representation for the guidance of appropriate behaviour, (i.e. for 
the anticipative behaviour), for the model of 'how things should 
be', i.e. for the model of the real reconstruction of the world; the 
'real reconstruction' here includes both 'self-construction' and 
'other-construction'. 
1 An experience of a person is external experience if it refers to the object that 
is analogously sensible by others. An experience is internal, if it refers to (or is 
dependent on) some subjective object (or event) that is sensible by others only 
mediately through this internal experience. Naturalized concepts refer only to the 
objects of our external experience (Vehkavaara 2002: 295-297). 
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meta-agent 
('observer/researcher") 
the object-agent 
and its representation 
represented objectX 
X (in the Umwelt of j 
the object-agent) У 
Figure 1. The phenomenology of the other one (Vehkavaara 2002: 300). 
The explanative representation is familiar and widely used in science, 
art. and religion. It is self-evidently one of the basic concepts in 
philosophy of science. The communicative representation is a special 
case of the first one but the significant one, because it has been a 
central background conception in philosophy and human sciences 
after the 'linguistic turn' of the 20th century. It has dominated the 
basic orientation of both structural and cultural semiotics (Saussure. 
Lotman, etc.), as well as the ones of critical hermeneutics (e.g. 
Habermas) and the post-Wittgensteinian analytic philosophy of 
language and logical semantics. These two models or prototypes are 
not adequate starting points here. Firstly, most of the living systems 
do not explain anything (for themselves). Explaining is specifically 
human action, and even for humans, explanations are often made in 
the name of some (scientific, religious, medical, etc.) institution that 
has specialized to give such explanations. Secondly, although many 
living systems do (or are able to) communicate with each other (at 
least occasionally), all living systems (and especially the simplest and 
the most primitive ones) do not need to do that. Moreover, many 
living systems have to survive also when they are all alone, without 
any actual contact (even causal) with other systems. They have to deal 
with the challenges rising from their non-living environment without 
any aid or interaction with other systems. The 'private' use and for­
mation of representations for the guidance of their behaviour and 
reproduction are necessary. 
5 As an idea and a term, 'the phenomenology of the other one' (or 'the 
epistemology of the other one') is originated by Donald T. Campbell (1969). 
However, the more appropriately it should be called the logic or semiotic of the 
other one (cf. Vehkavaara, in preparation). 
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Therefore, the third conception of representation, representation 
for the real reconstruction of the world is the starting point we need. It 
can be called the constructive or anticipative representation because 
of its orientation to future — it implicitly contains some kind of 
anticipation of the future reconstructions that it tends to produce. If we 
think about any externally determinable object-system (or -agent), the 
only hallmark of its act of anticipation is its apparently 'intelligent' or 
'foresighted' control of behaviour. The constructive representation is 
familiar especially in politics and technology, but also in certain 
(mechanical) sense in genetics.6 
The conception of constructive representation can be taken as the 
most general or primitive form of representation, because (A) the 
motivation behind the search of correct explanations is often the hope 
that this knowledge can somehow be useful. (B) In many cases, these 
anticipative representations can be and are used for communication 
too, i.e. as communicative representations. (C) If the basic hypothesis 
of biosemiotics holds that living systems are not essentially mecha­
nical systems (but semiotic ones), the constructive representation is 
certainly the form of representation whose availability is necessary. 
Living systems have to reproduce themselves (if they are going to stay 
living), and for this self-reconstruction, some kind of internal 'guide­
book' is needed. If genes, enzymes, hormones, etc. are considered as 
signs, most of them are principally signs in a sense of constructive 
representation, they function for the reconstruction of the system and 
its environment. 
3. Peircean objective logic and 
its insufficiency for biosemiotics 
The modern biosemiotics has dominantly been based on two different 
traditions, on Charles Peirce's semeiotic and on Jakob von Uexküll's 
(1928; 1982) theoretical biology. In 'Copenhagen interpretation' of 
biosemiotics initiated by Jesper Hoffmeyer, some ideas drawn from 
these two traditions have been tried to consolidate and utilize in the 
6 When a piece of DNA-string is said to be the gene of some trait, it is thought 
to represent (or code) that trait in the sense of anticipative representation — the 
occurrence of the gene is necessary for the construction of that trait in the 
organism. 
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light of current biological and biochemical knowledge. Although both 
Peirce's semeiotic and Uexküll's Umweltforschung and Bedeutungs­
lehre share a common antecedent, Immanuel Kant's transcendental 
philosophy, and both of them relativize and naturalize Kant's 
transcendental idealism in some respects, they nevertheless did not go 
very far in their 'naturalism'. Still, certain features make especially 
Peirce's semeiotic more than a promising starting point for the natura­
lization of its semiotic concepts. 
Firstly, Peirce's concept of sign is general enough to support all the 
above described three different motives for the concept of repre­
sentation. Secondly, Peirce's concept of mind suits more than ideally 
with the consequence of the basic hypothesis of biosemiotics: living 
systems are mental systems (and vice versa). If we think what makes 
the concept of representation or sign essentially mental, we find that it 
is ultimately some kind of normativity internal in it. Any interpreta­
tion, translation, or other transformation of signs can be judged suc­
cessful or unsuccessful according to some normative criterion like the 
grade of fruition of the anticipated result of the process. According to 
Peirce. it is this normativity, purposiveness, or more generally, final 
causation in a sense of a general tendency that may or may not fulfill, 
which is the definitive character of mind or mental systems in the 
most general sense: 
Mind has its universal mode of action, namely, by final causation. The 
microscopist looks to see whether the motions of a little creature show any 
purpose. If so, there is mind there. Passing from the little to the large, natural 
selection is the theory of how forms come to be adaptive, that is, to be 
governed by a quasi purpose. [...] But the being governed by a purpose or 
other final cause is the very essence of the psychical phenomenon, in general. 
(Peirce, CP 1.269 [1902]) 
Thus, mind can be found in any natural system whose action appears 
(quasi)purposive, and therefore, it can be studied as it appears in 
nature. No consciousness or free will is the necessary (or even com­
mon) companion of mind although both of them are real possibilities, 
their reality in certain phenomena is not denied. The scope of bio­
semiotics could then be determined as applied Peircean objective 
logic, as a theory of mind objectively operative in nature (cf. Vehka­
vaara 2002: 302-303). A summary of Peircean scheme of objective 
logic is represented on Fig. 2. 
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Figure 2. Peircean scheme of habituation. 
Peirce defines a sign or representation as a non-reducibly triadic unity 
of representamen, object, and interprétant. The act of the recognition 
of a representamen as a sign of its object creates the interprétant (see 
Peirce, W3: 82-83 [1873]). There are two perspectives to the object: 
(1) the immediate object is the object as it is presented in the sign, and 
(2) the real or dynamic object can be considered as the hidden totality 
of past causes of the sign as an event to be the sign it happens to be. 
The dynamic object is always more or less absent or hidden in the 
sign, but it has to be in certain ways 'previously acquainted' for the 
system (cf. Peirce, CP 8.178-179 [1909]). The result of the inter­
pretation is another sign, the interprétant that is representing the same 
object as the original one. This interpretant-sign is further interpreted 
so that the whole chain of interprétants proceeds. The process of 
interpretation is not just a simple succession of signs, but it is a 
(quasi)-purposive or goal-directed process — a representamen is 
recognized to represent its object by a normative habit of inter­
pretation. This 'norm' in the habit gives the criterion for the success-
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fulness of the interpretive process — the interpretation may fail during 
its actualization. 
The immediate result of the interpretation is called the emotional 
or immediate interprétant that appears as some kind of 'feeling', 
'irritation', or 'excitement' in the system where the interpreting habit 
is embodied. The process of interpretation does not necessarily arise 
above this state of 'feeling', in which case the feeling just fades away 
and the system returns to its earlier state without any significant 
effects. If the process proceeds beyond that temporary state, it produ­
ces some real action, i.e. some directed internal restructuration or 
external action of the system. These are called energetic or dynamic 
interprétants of the sign and they act as signs themselves. The chain 
of interprétants is potentially endless (as in seemingly endless discus­
sion about the existence of God), but it may as well achieve a kind of 
end. the final interprétant (or final logical interprétant). It is no more 
a sign in itself, but the form that the resultant action takes — it is a 
form of a habit that either strengthens, modifies, or entirely replaces 
the habit according to which the interpretation was originally exe­
cuted. The dynamic object is therefore the effective cause of the sign 
at least in this way by becoming the effective cause of the habit of 
interpretation in habit formation. The process of interpretation, 
semiosis. is a process of self-control, a process of self-controlled 
habit-formation.1 
This description of semiosis is based mainly on "Prolegomena to an Apology 
or Pragmaticism" (Peirce CP 4.530-572, 1906) and chapter 28 in EP 2 (MS 318, 
1907). In the latter one, semiosis is described as a thought process that starts from 
perception and ends up to totally internalized and embodied belief (i.e. habit of 
action) about the dynamic object of the perceived sign. "[W]e have to distinguish 
the Immediate Object, which is the Object as the Sign itself represents it. and 
whose Being is thus dependent upon the Representation of it in the Sign, from the 
Dynamical Object, which is the Reality which by some means contrives to 
determine the Sign to its Representation. In regard to the Interprétant we have 
equally to distinguish, in the first place, the Immediate Interprétant, which is the 
interprétant as it is revealed in the right understanding of the Sign itself, and is 
ordinarily called the meaning of the sign; while in the second place, we have to 
take note of the Dynamical Interprétant which is the actual effect which the Sign, 
as a Sign, really determines. Finally there is what I provisionally term the Final 
Interprétant, which refers to the manner in which the Sign tends to represent itself 
to be related to its Object" (Peirce, CP 4.536 [1906]). 
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This scheme of habituation is plausibly applicable to most human 
and animal horizontal semiosis. 8  as Peirce himself certainly thought. 
But its general biosemiotic applicability, e.g. to phytosemiosis (i.e. to 
semiosis in plants, cf. Krampen 1981; Kull 2000), to intracellular 
semiosis, to prokaryotic semiosis (Hoffmeyer 1997; 2002) and espe­
cially to vertical semiosis (i.e. to phylo- and ontogenesis, cf. Hoff­
meyer, Emmeche 1991 ; Hoffmeyer 1996b) is more dubious. This con­
cerns the application of Peirce's tri ad i с concept of sign and especially 
the concept of object. The concept of semiosis should, perhaps, be 
defined in terms that are more general. Then the sign-action would be 
only a special type of semiosis, as Peirce himself seems to suggest. 9  I 
nevertheless doubt that it is not justifiable to extend the concepts of 
sign or representation, its objects and interprétants, etc. so that they 
could be used to describe any such semiosis. 0 
s In 'Copenhagen interpretation' of biosemiotics, the term horizontal semiosis 
refers to systemic "communication throughout the ecological space" in 
contradistinction with vertical semiosis referring to "genetic communication down 
through the generations" (Hoffmeyer 1997b: 933). 
9 
"But by 'semiosis' I mean, on the contrary, an action, or influence, which is, 
or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its 
interprétant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions 
between pairs." (Peirce CP 5.484 [1907]. Cf. also Peirce's self-criticism in CP 
1.565 [c. 1899].) However, there are some Peirce-scholars like Peder Voetmann 
Christiansen (2002), John Deely (1990: 83-92), and Ed win a Taborsky who define 
both semiosis and sign in metaphysical terms. E.g. Taborsky (2002: 363) defines 
semiosis in terms of codification, energy, and informed mass. 
111 Peirce himself does not seem to be quite consistent. This kind of extension of 
the concept of tri ad i с sign would, at least, violate Peirce's "ethics of terminology" 
(Peirce EP 2:263-266 [1903]), but not merely the ethics of terminology speaks in 
favor of this interpretation. A comparison of Peirce's maxim of pragmaticism (e.g. 
Peirce CP 5.9) with his examples of sign-action that concern almost exceptionally 
about human agents, should lead to the same probable conclusion. Moreover, the 
most famous of the rare examples of non-human representations, the turning of a 
sunflower towards the sun (Peirce CP 2.274 [1903]), is used to demonstrate 
whether there are any genuine representamens that are not signs. If the concept of 
triadic sign is extended too far, there is a danger of a kind of 'overformalization' 
(as seems to be in Taborsky 2002) that the habits of inanimate nature are no more 
considered as strictly normative, but they are diluted to merely formative habits. 
This degenerated semiotic ceases to be a 'positive science' but it flows under the 
field of 'negative sciences' (as Peirce himself forewarns in CP 4.241). It becomes 
mere 'mathematics' in the sense that Peirce gives to it: "the Conditional or 
Hypothetical Science of Pure Mathematics, whose only aim is to discover not 
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The general thesis in this paper is that, from the point of view of 
the interpreting system ('object-system'), the environment does not 
have to be divided into objects at all. At the metalevel, from the point 
of view of human observer (meta-agent), the environment of an 
object-system is divided into objects, but object-systems do not neces­
sarily have access to this or any such division — they do not neces­
sarily have any Umwelt.11 Interaction with the undivided environment 
(or more properly, within the whole local world that consists of both 
the object-system and its environment) is sufficient. This does not 
mean that the concepts of object, the whole Peircean triadic sign, and 
Umwelt were not real or applicable but that they are not properly 
applicable in all cases where meaning and final causes are present. 
They are not primitive semiotic concepts but emerge within relatively 
complex semiotic systems. The objects of representation step into the 
stage side by side with the emergence of real zoösemiotic (or perhaps 
also robosemiotic) Umwelt. This is well in line with the original use 
of the concept of Umwelt — for Jakob von Uexküll it was a zoo­
logical concept and he explicitly rejected the idea that it could be 
applicable to plants: 
The plant has no nervous system, receptors, or effectors; therefore, no 
meaning-carriers, functional circle, perceptual, or effector cues exist for the 
plant. [...] The houses of plants lack mobility. Because they possess neither 
receptor nor effector organs, plants are not able to construct and be in 
command of an Umwelt. (Uexküll 1982; 33) 
As Kalevi Kull (2000: 330-331 ) has noticed. Uexküll wrote almost 
nothing about plants in his Theoretische Biologie (Uexküll 1928) and 
other early writings. This does not nevertheless mean that there would 
not be meanings or even signs for plants,1- but whether there are any 
objects for plants is questionable. 
how things actually are, but how they might be supposed to be, if not in our 
universe, then in some other" (Peirce CP 5.40 [1903]). 
11 The concept of Umwelt, introduced by Jakob von Uexküll (1928), can be 
defined as a species-specific "subjective world of an organism" (Emmeche et al. 
2002: 30). The Umwelt of a species ot object-system is the environment (or more 
generally the world) as it is appearable for the object-systems according to their 
species-specific (sensory) capacities. The concept of environment is treated here 
as a meta-level concept, the environment of an object-system is externally 
determined (or defined) by the meta-agent, the observer or researcher. 
12 Instead of Umwelt, Uexküll introduced the concept of Wohnhülle (dwelling-
integument) for plants (Uexküll 1982: 34; discussed in Kull 2000: 330-332). 
Natural self-interest, interactive representation 559 
Implicit adaptationism in Peircean objective logic 
The object of sign/representation was, however, a necessary com­
pound of sign for Peirce. It had a certain explanatory task — it was 
needed to explain the potential success of interpretation: the habit of 
interpretation is able to track the right object for the interpreted 
representation, because this object has already affected the formation 
of that habit in earlier semiosic processes. Especially in the context of 
scientific investigation, which was Peirce's central prototype for 
objective logic (cf. Vehkavaara 2002: 301), the concept of object is 
needed to provide both an initial contact with the real world and the 
criterion for the successfulness of the interpretation. The investigation 
is looking for the truth about the real object of the representation. 
The problem is that as a general explanation of habit formation, 
this is in the certain respect parallel to the adaptationistic mode of 
thinking in sociobiology and functionalistic anthropology. The initial 
criticism of 'Panglossian adaptationism' (Gould, Lewontin 1979) 
attacks on two common assumptions: (1) natural selection is assumed 
to forge optimal — not just sufficient — adaptations, and (2) every 
identifiable common trait is implicitly assumed (or perhaps better, 
defined) to be a real adaptation, i.e. that nature has really selected it 
because of its advantageousness. The general form of the latter of 
these assumptions — with its practical consequence that only adaptive 
historical explanations are drawn — seems to be present also in the 
Peircean scheme of habituation. It is, namely, an explanation and 
description about how cognition, knowledge, or 'synthetic judge­
ments'1' are possible and how the knowledge acquisition or learning 
can be cumulative or otherwise positively progressive. And the 
explanation was that our habits of interpretation tend to interpret signs 
we are receiving correctly, since our habits of interpretation are 
already predetermined to do that because of the earlier influence of the 
objects of these signs. This is an adaptationistic a priori story if it is 
taken as the universal model of habit formation. 
Both sociobiological (etc.) and semeiotic adaptationism seem to be 
based on the strong implicit (although simultaneously often explicitly 
rejected) intuition that there can be no event without a cause. This 
13 While Kant started his Kritik der reinen Vernunft by asking 'how are synthetic 
judgements a priori possible', Peirce argued that "before asking that question he 
ought to have asked the more general one, 'How are any synthetical judgments at 
all possible?'" (Peirce CP 2.690 [1877]). 
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claim may sound odd, because Peirce is so well known for his anti-
necessitarianism in cosmology (cf. "The Doctrine of Necessity 
Examined", Peirce EP 1: 298-31 1 [1892]). Still, although one of 
Peirce's basic metaphysical conceptions was that absolute or objective 
chance is real and effective force in every event, it was not meant to 
explain the regularities of phenomena but their inevitable irregular 
characters. 1 4  The habits (of interpretation), if any, are regular pheno­
mena and the possibility that some formation of a successful habit of 
interpretation could be completely accidental or unmotivated might 
seem to ruin the basic doctrine of the internal normativity of sign-
action. Namely, without an object of sign, any internal criterion for 
successfulness of an interpretation cannot be drawn — if there were 
any normativity in the interpretation, it would be completely external 
to the sign interpreted. Otherwise, there would be no directionality in 
habituation and interpretation. 
Thus, for Peirce, appealing to chance probably did not appear as an 
intellectually satisfying explanation for the regularity of the suc­
cessful habit formation.15 Similarly, Panglossian adaptationists feel it 
intolerable to leave the existence (or even usefulness) of some traits to 
remain unexplained, because the situation reminds them too much 
about (or leaves open space to) such intellectually unsatisfying super­
natural explanations as 'God made it so'. 
Nowadays it is quite commonly accepted that besides natural 
selection, there are also other natural forces in the evolution. Many life 
forms have useful or functional traits that are not selected because of 
their usefulness or functionality, but that are exapted. They have been 
adapted for some other function (which may not be functional 
anymore) or not adapted at all, e.g. when they are just consequences 
of some material constraints or genetic drift (Gould, Lewontin 1979; 
Gould. Vrba 1982). This thought is analogously applicable to general 
semiotics, and especially to biosemiotics, in which evolutionary 
adaptations have to be considered as useful habits of biosemiotic inter­
pretations. All apparently useful traits or habits of behaviour do not 
14 Continuously effecting chance was also needed to make the emergent 
development or creative evolution, i.e. the arousal of essentially new forms in 
nature possible. 
15 Peirce rejects the explanations that appeal to miracles etc: "[A]n explanation 
should tell how a thing is done, and to assert a perpetual miracle seems to be an 
abandonment of all hope of doing that, without sufficient justification" (Peirce CP 
2.690 [1877]). 
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necessarily have adaptive origin, but their historical origins do not 
explain — or have anything to do with — their usefulness. Thus, if the 
object of sign is tried to determine in such cases, either it has not been 
attended in the formation of the interpreting habit or it has nothing to 
do with the successfulness ('goodness') of the interpretation. This 
does not mean that history would not matter. It does matter in many 
cases but not in all cases. But even in the cases in which the history is 
significant, it is often not known what were the particular historical 
forces in the development of an apparently useful trait or habit. In 
such cases the mere usefulness of a trait or habit does not give enough 
evidence to conclude that it is also designed (whether by self-organi-
zation or by natural selection) to be useful. It would be mere story­
telling, which both Peirce, biosemioticians, and sociobiologists 
(among many others) have all tended to commit in some respects (cf. 
Gould 1978; Gould, Lewontin 1979). 
Despite the problems due to its implicit adaptationist logic, 
Peirce's concept of representation is still a promising starting point. It 
is not merely an explanatory concept, but independently of its expla­
natory use, an anticipatory concept too. A sign or representation is not 
just looking at its past causes — it has no meaning or signification, i.e. 
it is not a sign at all, if it could not hafuture effects, if it is not able 
to direct future actions. What is needed is such a criterion (or norm) 
for the validity, value, appropriateness, or successfulness of the 
interpretation that is definable without any reference to the concept of 
the object of representation. After all. they are essentially the goals, 
norms, or purposes of action that make actions semiotic (or, in the 
generalized sense, 'mental'), and distinguish them from phenomena 
that are nothing more than physical. If there were no kind of goal, 
norm, or purpose in interpretation, there would be no criterion for the 
value of interpretation and there would be no real sense in calling this 
transformation process an interpretation or a sign process — nothing 
would distinguish it from a sheer physical process. 
Now we are coming into the crucial point concerning semiotic 
naturalism. If any kind of normativity or teleology is somehow de­
fined in natural terms, it offers, in a sense, some kind of positive 
solution to the one of the most central philosophical questions of 
modern era, how 'ought' can be defined in terms of 'is'. However, we 
must first make it clear what kind of normativity we are looking for. 
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1. A naturalist cannot rely on or refer to anything supernatural, and 
even if naturalism would be taken only as a methodology, there 
cannot be any place for God or other supernatural forces in natural 
science. Naturalism endeavours to explain away the need for any 
supernatural or vitalistic principle in science (cf. Stjernfelt 2002: 
342). 
2. We are looking for a system relative concept. What does it mean if 
something is said to be beneficial for the system? Most of all, any 
normativity, criterion for progress or purpose is not supposed to be 
found for global evolution. 
3. We need a real concept of a system relative normativity or 'natural 
self-interest'. The success or unsuccessfulness of a system must 
have real effects in the world — success must, on the one hand, be 
externally observable phenomenon, and on the other hand, be 
effective independently of our human descriptions, definitions, and 
observations. It must give objective criteria for the value of the 
interpretations of a system for itself (i.e. independently of our 
human purposes, needs, interests, and ideas). 
4. The concept is not necessarily representational for a system. 
Norms for action are only some kind of general guiding principles 
that need not be in any sense conscious any more than individual 
'existing things' or 'Platonic ideas'. Goals, (purposes) or interests 
of a system are not necessarily in themselves represented at all in 
the system.1" 
There are numbers of notions (or words) that biosemioticians (and 
others) have used to refer to this distinguishing character of the 
semiotic realm. Among these are finality or final cause (e.g., Peirce. 
Hoffmeyer). purposefulness (e.g., Peirce; Hoffmeyer, Emmeche 1991; 
however, notice Hoffmeyer 2002: 102f), goal- or end-directness (e.g., 
Bickhard 1998), intentionality (Hoffmeyer 1996a), value (e.g.. Sharov 
1998), need (e.g.. Kull 2000: 340), and appropriateness (e.g., Vehka­
vaara 1998). The list is certainly incomplete. In the standard neo-
Darwinism, the concepts of fitness (as 'reproductive success') and 
function have played the same role as the normative or teleological 
concepts of the list above. 
16 This is in accordance with Peirce's 'extreme scholastic realism' that there are 
real generals (although not all generals are real, cf. Peirce CP 5.430. 1905) that are 
(like natural laws) not existing 'things' in the 'world of ideas' or anywhere else. 
Peirce's conceptual realism is Aristotelian rather than Platonic. 
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Before the concepts of representation, its object, interpretation and 
Umwelt can be thoroughly considered, it is necessary to define the 
concept of 'real' system related normativity or natural self-interest. 
How the 'benefit for object-system' is definable at object-level and 
what is its origin or emergence in natural systems. I am proposing that 
the Peircean concept of triadic sign and Uexküll's concept of Umwelt 
are both definable in terms of Mark Bickhard's interactivism — that 
interactivism would offer more general (but not too general) and 
definite conceptual scheme to biosemiotics than either of these. 
4. Function and natural self-interest 
In Bickhard's interactivism, the naturalistic treatment of normativity, 
how 'ought' can be defined in terms of 'is', is based on the concept of 
function or (self)functionality. Marc Bekoff and Colin Allen (1995: 
254) have classified three main accounts to the concept of function as 
follows. 
1. The etiological or historical account. "A trait T has function F for 
the organism О if F was an effect of ancestral versions of T that 
contributed, via natural selection, to transmission of T from O's 
ancestors to 0" (Bekoff. Allen 1995: 254). The function of a trait 
or organ is defined according to its appropriate evolutionary origin. 
This is a backward-looking account. The concept of the etiological 
function is used when a historical explanation for the origin or 
'becoming' of the existence of a trait in a given population is 
quested. The etiological concept of function can be successfully 
used in the explanations of how the systems have developed as 
they now are (e.g. Williams 1966; Gould, Vrba 1982). 
2. The function as capacity' account. "A trait T has function F for 
organism О if F is an effect of T that contributes to some capacity 
of O". This conception is neutral to all normative judgements 
about the function — no distinction between function and 
dysfunction can be made. "According to this account, it is just as 
much a function of blood to carry pathogens as it is a function to 
carry oxygen" (Bekoff, Allen 1995: 254). 
3. The forward looking 'current utility' account. "A trait T has 
function F for organism О if F is an effect of T that contributes to 
O's fitness. This definition is forward looking (dispositional) in the 
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sense that function is defined with respect to future reproductive 
success" (Bekoff, Allen 1995: 254). 
The 'capacity-account' is transparently unsuitable here, because we 
are looking for a normative concept. The etiological concept is heavily 
criticized by Bickhard being causally epiphenomenal: in the etiolo­
gical model, the mere current state (or process) of a system is not 
sufficient to specify function, but the right kind of history is essen­
tial — still, only current state can be causally efficacious (Bickhard 
1998a: 266). In interactivism, the concept of function is thus defined 
as a forward looking concept, which is, in a sense, a natural choice, 
because we are not trying to explain how this or that functional trait 
has emerged, but what is its future value to the system.17 However, we 
need more general definition than the 'organismal' one above — 
organism does not necessarily fit well enough to what is counted as a 
living system here (cf. footnote 2). 
The concept of function can be based on the property of the 
potential immortality of living systems — anything that contributes to 
the maintenance of a system is functional to that system. Because 
living systems maintain themselves far from equilibrium, the property 
of self-maintenance is an existential precondition of these kinds of 
systems. If any self-maintenant far from equilibrium system, the 
maintenance of which is based on its own activity, can no more serve 
this function, it starts to fall apart and will soon become extinct (i.e. it 
falls into some equilibrium state). In this way, we become able to say 
that serving a function of self-maintenance is a natural self-interest of 
any self-maintenant far from equilibrium system. It is not about the 
plain survival of a system, but about the survival of a system by means 
of its own activity, by its internal continuous flow. The self-interest for 
self-maintenance is not necessarily the only 'value' for the system 
(like Darwinian 'survival value') though still, perhaps, minimal 
natural self-interest. Additionally, it may set up new goals, 'values', or 
purposes as the system develops in its continuous self-organization. 
Moreover, living systems are not merely self-organized but also 
'other-organized' by other living systems so that they may additio­
nally function for alien goals, interests, etc. As these alien interests 
This does not mean that the backward looking concepts of function were 
needless. Some of them are probably necessary to explain the course of past 
evolution. Both backward and forward looking concepts are useful, but they 
should be kept separated — they are suitable for explaining different issues. 
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mix with self-interests, it may be impossible to make sharp difference 
between them. The self-interest for self-maintenance provides only 
initial normativity. 
Notice firstly, systems that are not in far from equilibrium but in 
some (stable) 'energy well' — state do not need to maintain them­
selves — the 'successfulness' of their action is not their existential 
precondition. Therefore, there is no natural criterion of success for 
themselves (at the object-level) — a 'meta-agent' is needed for the 
definition of success. Similarly, such far from equilibrium systems 
that are not even indirectly se//-maintenant but completely 'other-
maintenant' do not have any natural self-interest either — the 
consequences of their action do not affect their maintenance. Se­
condly, every particular self-maintenant far from equilibrium system 
has its own natural self-interest(s), because "function, in this view, is 
always relative to a particular system — something might be functio­
nal for one system and simultaneously dysfunctional for another" 
(Bickhard 1998a: 266). Thirdly, there is no natural self-interest for the 
whole universe. Even if the universe might be considered as a far from 
equilibrium system, it is nevertheless questionable whether the 
universe needs to maintain itself. How could the universe be 
unsuccessful in its self-maintenance? If there is no possibility for 
failure, there is no natural criterion for success either. Thus, the local 
emergence of system relative normativity does not contain any 
assumption about the purpose, progress, or even direction in global or 
cosmic evolution. 
Primacy of normativity and 
function over habituation and signs 
The concepts of natural self-interest and function are not applicable 
only to living systems but to all non-living self-maintaining far from 
equilibrium systems. If this sounds counterintuitive or inappropriate, it 
will not need to do so. Although such non-living physical systems as a 
candle flame or a tornado are serving their self-interest and. as a 
consequence, are 'staying alive' (without being living), they are never­
theless not trying to serve it. Their self-interest is not forcing or 'sug­
gesting' them to do anything. They are not seeking how they can sur­
vive but they just happen to have such a structure that fulfils their sole 
self-interest and existential precondition some period. Their self-
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maintenance does not yet give birth to any real growth or increase in 
complexity. 
The situation is different if a system has alternative ways of self-
maintenance available and it can switch one alternative to another if 
the first one did not succeed. Bickhard calls systems of this kind 
recursively self-maintenant: 
The conditions under which the serving of a function succeeds constitute the 
dynamic presuppositions of those functional processes. [...] Some systems, 
however, have the ability to switch among two or more means of being self 
maintaining, two or more functional processes, such that if the dynamic 
presuppositions of one fail, the dynamic presuppositions of the other may 
hold. (Bickhard 2001: 462) 
Within the recursively self-maintenant systems — and living systems 
are certainly such — representation and internal error recognition (and 
consequently, 'pre-rational' choice) can emerge and the evolutionary 
growth becomes possible. 
Before going deeper into recursively self-maintenant systems, I 
would like to propose that one basic 'chicken and egg? problem of 
biosemiotics (or semiotic naturalism) can now be resolved (cf. Em­
meche 2000; 2002). If we look at the rise and development of bio­
semiotics in the 1990s, the point of view and solutions that especially 
its 'Copenhagen interpretation' have suggested to the problematic of 
the origin and emergence of life have been the main strength and 
legitimation of the biosemiotic approach (cf. Hoffmeyer 1996b; 2002; 
Hoffmeyer. Emmeche 1991 ). The potential impact of biosemiotics on 
the understanding about living phenomena is to demonstrate how the 
historical (evolutionary and developmental) and the structural ways of 
description can be inextricably conjoined, and if they are not seam­
lessly conjoined (as in mainstream biology), how their 'methodo­
logical' separation distorts the interpretation. 
The standard biosemiotic solution that the thesis about the coexten-
sivity of signs and life underlines, is that in the cosmic history, all the 
basic semiotic concepts have emerged simultaneously within the 
emergence of first living systems. But now. if we agree that there has 
been an era when life has not yet emerged, and that at that time, some 
self-maintaining far from equilibrium systems — like Kauffman's 
(1995) autocatalytic closures — have nevertheless been existed, we 
have to conclude that these systems, even if neither living nor 
representative ones, have already had real natural self-interests of their 
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own. Natural self-interests and functions have emerged before life and 
signs (or representations) in the cosmic history. The norm of inter­
pretation that makes the interpretation possible has become first 
(before any interpretation) and the actual interpretative systems have 
developed afterwards. Normativity, self-functionality, and self-interest 
are more primitive and general concepts than the ones of sign, 
representation, and interpretation are — they can be described and 
defined without any reference to the concepts of life and sign, they are 
properties of physical systems of a certain kind. The extension of 
living or genuinely semiotic systems is a subclass of the extension of 
systems with self-interest.18 However, there is still point to call the 
problem a 'chicken and egg problem', because although natural self-
interests can be said to have been emerged before life and semiosis, 
they have played no role in cosmic evolution until the emergence of 
recursively self-maintenant systems, i.e. of life and signs. They were 
'insignificant', had no power over the course of evolution without the 
agent, without the living system that tends to fulfil its self-interest. 
Real final causes co-emerge with life and signs. 
IX Although Peirce's classification of sciences (cf. Peirce CP 1.180-202) does 
not offer any cosmological order of concepts, it gives some support to the thesis 
about the primacy of norms or goals over signs. In this classification, Normative 
science (as the second order of Philosophia Prima) is divided into three 
'families': esthetics, ethics (practics), and logic (semeiotic) (cf. Peirce, CP 1.281). 
Logic as the science of self-controlled thought is subordinate to ethics (and a 
subclass of it). Ethics, in turn, as the science of self-controlled action needs aid 
from esthetics in determining its ideals or goals, i.e. establishing its norms (Peirce, 
CP 1.191). Thus, in Peirce's system, the esthetic concepts like norm, goal, or 
purpose are more abstract than logical concepts like sign, representation, and 
interpretation. Norms can be studied without the concept of sign (at object-level), 
but signs and semiosis cannot be studied without the reference of some esthetic 
concepts (norms, goals, ideals, etc.) — or in terms of Peirce's 'method of 
precission' (cf. Peirce CP 1.549 [1867]), norms (etc.) can be prescinded from 
signs, but signs can not be prescinded from norms. I have elsewhere (Vehkavaara, 
in preparation) concluded that according to Peirce's classification of sciences, 
only minor part of biosemiotics can be properly characterized as applied semeiotic 
(i.e. logic) but rather applied ethics and esthetics (in Peircean theoretical sense). 
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5. There are a million ways 
to maintain oneself in the long run 
If a far from equilibrium system is recursively self-maintenant and 
thus may have alternative procedures for self-maintenance, then the 
future development of the system is dependent on which alternative, 
on which 'way of life', it chooses. Sometimes these 'choices' are 
irreversible as when recreating the basic material structure of the 
system and constraining thus all the future development. However, 
even if these irreversible 'choices' can not be cancelled, the construc­
tion of additional functional structures can compensate their inappro­
priate effects. In contrast, if the system fails in its maintenance, it is 
insignificant which way that happens, its causal effects, as well as 
semiotic ones (if it has any), end anyway. So, there is a kind of anti­
symmetry between failure and success, the meaning of total failure is 
absolute for the system, but one of success depends on the way of self-
maintenance. If the concept of representation can successfully be 
based on this concept of minimal natural normativity, the similar anti­
symmetry holds between the invalidity and validity of representation, 
between its inappropriateness and appropriateness, and between its 
falsity and truth. There is the absolute negative limit, extinction, but 
no necessary positive limit, because future growth and development is 
dependent on the successfully chosen way of self-maintenance. 
The success in self-maintenance can be achieved by two basic 
strategies: by the manipulation of the system itself or of its environ­
ment. In variable external conditions, a system can maintain itself 
either 'directly', by self-reconstruction, i.e. by altering itself (as in 
adaptation to environmental pressures), or 'indirectly', by the active 
reconstruction of the local environment so that the altered environ­
ment would function for the maintenance of the system. These basic 
ways of self-maintenance do not exclude each other but are often 
carried through simultaneously and the distinction between them is 
not a sharp one. especially in cases where the self-maintaining activity 
operates in the borderline of the system and its environment. 
For instance, (most) Poikilothermie animals have only behavioural 
thermoregulation available. Their only way to maintain their optimal 
internal temperature (for self-maintenance) is to change the tempe­
rature of their environment. There are several possible ways for this 
'environmental reconstruction'. An animal can exchange its environ­
ment for another one of a different locality, as in seasonal migration. It 
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can also make 'real reconstructions' in its present local environment 
by building nests, digging tunnels, etc. Homeothermic animals have, 
in addition to behavioural thermoregulation, also means for metabolic 
thermoregulation that does not affect much on the environment but 
that function self-constructively. When metabolic heath production (as 
well as winter sleep or hibernation with decreased metabolism and 
internal temperature) is switched on, the organism is changing its own 
mode of action in order to fit better with changed environmental 
conditions. 
Self-reconstruction — choosing the 'way of life' and 
constructing new purposes 
Recursively self-maintenant systems are more complex than a simple 
candle flame or tornado. They contain subsystems the operation of 
which the whole system is maintained. When these subsystems take 
care the maintenance of the whole system, each of them functions in 
itself for some subgoal (like the maintenance of the optimal internal 
temperature of the whole system). If these subsystems are far from 
equilibrium systems, they have to be maintained either by the whole 
system (i.e. by other subsystems) or by the subsystem itself. In the 
latter case, a subsystem has its own self-interest of self-maintenance in 
addition to its functioning for the interests of the whole system. As the 
system develops and evolves, some goals of the subsystems may 
become independent of the goals of the whole system. They may even 
evolve in the pathological direction where the existential conditions of 
a subsystem and of the whole system are in conflict. Phenomena like 
cancer, mental illnesses, suicide, and many seemingly 'pathological' 
cultural tendencies (whatever they were) might be considered as 
examples of this kind of development and 'conflict of interests'. The 
self-reconstruction means thus either the creation or assimilation and 
integration of new subsystems within the whole system or the 
development of old subsystems to strive for new subgoals or 'needs' 
that some internal or environmental changes 'forces' the system to 
take into account. If newly created or assimilated subsystems are 
integrated, the whole system has to take account of their existential 
preconditions, i.e. the system has to begin to strive for the self-
interests of new subsystems. Thus, the self-reconstruction of a system 
means the adoption of new subgoals or purposes for the system, either 
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by the system itself or by its environment. It is a kind of choosing the 
way of life — the choosing of the direction of (or some limits to) the 
evolution of the lineage. 
Reconstruction of environment — 
ecological implications 
(A) Passive reconstructions. Some of the effects, and even the most 
permanent ones, that living systems set off in their environment do not 
have much, if at all, to do with self-maintenance. They are not active 
reconstructions of environment but more like passive ones. The most 
obvious examples are coral limestone, coal-beds, and the other 
geological formations of fossil origin. These passive reconstructions 
of environment are 'side-effects' of a kind — if they happen to be 
functional, their functionality is purely accidental. They can not be 
considered as genuinely semiotic effects, but like the proportion of 
oxygen in the atmosphere, they may still be the most significant for 
current living systems. 
( B )  A c t i v e  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s .  Reconstructions that are clearly de­
signed (by the system) to be functional to the maintenance of a system 
can be considered as the genuinely semiotic effects of self-mainte-
nance. By such active reconstructions of their environment, organisms 
(or living systems in general), in a sense, externalize their interests or 
purposes into their environmental structure.19 If this external structure 
is firm enough, these 'externalized purposes' may remain effectual 
even if they were no more functional to the system. The structures 
with externalized purposes may continue to strive for these purposes 
even after the extinction of the system. 
The active reconstruction of environment can be divided into two 
branches: to the active reconstruction of non-living elements in the 
environment, and of the other (living) systems in the environment. 
(Bl) Active reconstruction of non-living elements in the environ­
ment. The most 'natural' examples of active reconstruction of non­
living elements are nest building (when it uses inorganic materials), 
the construction of coral reefs, etc. One of the most striking examples 
is nevertheless the machine construction of humans, and especially 
19 The idea of externalized purposes is comparable with the concept of extended 
phenotype introduced by Richard Dawkins (1978) 
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the creation of external non-living goal-directed or self-regulating 
devices and machines. When a (wo)man designs and builds machines, 
(s)he externalizes her/his purposes into the non-living material system 
that (s)he is currently organizing. This gives the sense in which 
thermostats can be said to be semiotic systems (although not genuine 
semiotic agents), as is proposed in the next chapter. A thermostat or 
any self-regulating system can be said to form representations that 
guide its functioning. It is a kind of representative system, but not a 
genuinely semiotic one, because the goals of its functioning are not of 
its own but set up by humans. It is functioning for human purposes. 
Mechanical man-made devices like thermostats do not have to 
maintain themselves, because usually they are not far from equilib­
rium systems. They have no self-interests — their existence as sys­
tems is not (necessarily) dependent on their action. The norm for their 
'interpretations' (that distinguishes well-functioning from mal­
functioning) does not contribute their maintenance. 
(B2) Active reconstruction of other living systems in the environ­
ment — ecological implications: A system can manipulate other 
systems (that are in its environment) to maintain itself, to fulfill its 
self-interests, needs, or purposes that are in itself foreign to these other 
systems. However, this manipulation is not the necessary direct 
construction of other systems — other systems do not necessarily have 
to be in one's Umwelt as 'Other' (or at all). No direct contact between 
systems is needed. It is sufficient that only some of the effects (i.e. 
reconstructions) of other systems belong to one's Umwelt, (or if it has 
no Umwelt, to common environment) so that no genuine commu­
nication between systems exists. There is just a competition between 
the mutually exclusive reconstructions of the common environment. 
The one who 'loses' have to adapt oneself to the environmental 
reconstruction of the other system, i.e. to find new ways to maintain 
oneself. If this kind of indirect construction of other systems is reci­
procal, it may bring along new symbiotic relations and a co-evolution 
of systems.2 It is at least logically possible that the emergence of 
symbiotic relations (or more generally, of heterogeneous metasystem 
211 When one system forces the other one to adapt its reconstructions in their 
common environment, this other may develop oneself into such a form that it can 
reconstruct some other characters in their environment to which the first system 
has to adapt oneself. In such a way, they may start to maintain each other without 
any direct contact between them. 
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transition21) does not require direct contact between symbionts 
(although it may develop later). 
However, in many biological examples about symbiotic relations, 
there is a direct contact between symbionts in such a way that at least 
for one system, the others are in one's Umwelt as independent se­
miotic systems. Then, we can talk about the genuine semiotic 
construction of other systems. This does not necessarily imply that 
there would be a genuine communication between systems, because 
the relation of semiotic construction does not need to be reciprocal. 
Besides symbiotic relations, all parasite-host -relations (including 
human breeding of livestock etc.) are also examples of semiotic con­
struction of other systems. For genuine (reciprocal) communication 
between systems, such a community of systems, where each one has 
others in one's Umwelt (as systems of 'similar kind'), is required. 
6. Minimal interactive representation — 
a representation without the object 
One of the basic claims in Bickhard's interactivism approach is that 
within recursively self-maintenant far from equilibrium systems, the 
minimal concept of representation emerges. Although Bickhard 
(1998b) presents a ten-level hierarchy of different concepts of repre­
sentation, there is no need to consider all its levels here. For the basic 
semiotic concepts, three levels suffice. The level of minimal (inter­
active) representation "constitutes a minimal emergence of onto-
logical representationality" (Bickhard 1998b: 189). The level of 
phenomenal objects is needed for Peircean concepts of the object of 
sign, the iconic and indexical types of signs as well as UexkülVs 
concept of Umwelt. Finally, at the level of symbolic signs, symbolic 
signs emerge. Further levels, where e.g. genuine intersubjective com­
munication (language) and self-awareness might emerge, are not 
considered here. 
Although the emergence of system-relative normativity or natural 
self-interest is essential both in biosemiotics and interactivism, the 
origin and ontological status of the norm, goal, purpose, or interest, 
according to which representations are judged, is not relevant merely 
for the theory and concept of interactive representation. It is sufficient 
21 About metasystem transition and its types, see Sharov 1999. 
Natural self-interest, interactive representation 573 
that the concept of natural normativity (or self-interest) can be defined 
without any reference to the concept of representation and that the 
world can be said to contain such real natural interests that are 
influential independently of our knowledge and concepts. For any 
representative system, some kind of goal, norm, or purpose is 
necessary, but this does not have to be its own. Thus, we can consider 
representative systems with non-natural purposes and goals that are 
set up e.g. by humans and that are serving — or are planned to 
serve — human interests. 
For instance, if the goal of a man-made mechanical thermostat is to 
keep up steady temperature, the fulfilment of this goal has generally 
no survival value for the thermostat itself (except perhaps indirectly), 
although it may be beneficial for the man. They can continue their 
existence without doing anything, i.e. their good functioning is not 
their existential precondition (although the assumed or anticipated 
good functioning by humans may be the necessary cause for their 
becoming into existence). Ultimately, this means a kind of 'over-
generalization' of the concept of representation beyond genuine 
semiotic systems and processes. But does that matter much? It just 
means that mere appearance of sign-like acting 'representations' is not 
sufficient to determine the semiotic realm. Additionally, real natural 
self-interests are demanded. 
This kind of 'overgeneralization' of the concept of representation 
has several benefits. First, it gives a clear sense in which respects 
robots and other self-regulating devices are human-like (or life-like) 
and in which respects they are not. Robots can be considered, 
modelled, and developed as representative systems. Second, mecha­
nical man-made representative systems can be considered as exten­
sions of their constructor (or user), i.e. as newly constructed sub­
systems of human agent. This is quite natural point of view especially 
when devices produced by medical technology are considered — e.g. 
when a malfunctioning organ is replaced by such an artificial device 
that secures the (main) function of the organ. 
Whether within a natural or non-natural goal, whether a far-from-
equilibrium or equilibrium system, a minimal ontological represen­
tative system (S) has to include a subsystem, a differentiator (D), 
engaging in interaction with its environment (£). 
[T]he internal course of that interaction will depend both on the organization 
of the subsystem and on the interactive properties of the environment being 
interacted with. [...] [T]he internal state that the subsystem [D] ends up in 
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when its current interaction ceases will depend on the environment that it has 
interacted with. Some environments [E\\ will yield the same final state [Z 7,], 
while other environments [E 2\ will (or would) yield a quite different final state 
[F 2]. The possible final states of such a subsystem, then, serve as classifica­
tions of the possible environments: each final state classifies all of the 
environments together that would yield that particular final state if interacted 
with. Each possible final state [/*",] will serve as a differentiation of its class of 
environments [£,]. (Bickhard 1998: 186) 
However, this is not yet enough to define the possible final state of a 
differentiating subsystem to be a representation of the corresponding 
class of environments. What are needed more are indications to some 
goal-directed activity (A,) of the whole system (i.e. to some effector-
subsystem) that may provide feedback to the environment. This 
corresponds to representation at level 4 in Bickhard's hierarchy of 
representations (Bickhard 1998: 189-191). 
This basic model can be applied to any goal-directed control 
system, even to such a simple system as a mechanical thermostat that 
is connected in a radiator (see Fig. 3). The interaction of the diffe­
rentiating subsystem (temperature measuring device) of a thermostat 
with its environment indicates different activities (switch on or off 
heating) depending on the quality of the environment (the tempera­
ture). A thermostat makes the environmental representation and uses it 
when it is functioning to fulfil its goal (to keep up minimum tempera­
ture etc.). 
The basic model of minimal interactive representation suits well 
also for the 'hidden prototype' of horizontal biosemiosis (cf. Em-
meche 2000), the Chemotaxis of Escherichia coli. (See the more 
detailed description of E. coli, e.g., in Hoffmeyer 1997a.) Coli bacteria 
move in the direction which offers more nutrient molecules rather than 
less. They do this by measuring the saturation of their transmembrane 
chemoreceptor-sites while they move and by transmitting the 
weighted result of this measurement to the flagellar motors that are co-
ordinately moving the cell. The system of transmembrane chemo-
receptors that is sensitive to nutrient-molecules (wherever its internal 
limits will be defined) is a natural candidate for the differentiator for 
E. coli. Relative saturation and non-saturation of these receptors (or in 
the 'internal ends' of the receptors, the corresponding binding of 
ligands) form the two possible final states of this differentiator. When 
an external nutrient concentration is increasing relative to the motion 
of a bacterium, receptors will keep on saturated, otherwise the degree 
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of saturation of the receptors will diminish. Each of the final states 
indicates counter clockwise or clockwise flagellar movements respec­
tively and these will make a bacterium either to move linearly or to 
tumble around itself. 
S = Representative system, 
D = Differentiator (differentiating 
subsystem), 
Ei = Possible local environment 1 of 
D (alternative to E2), 
E: = Possible local environment 2 of 
D (alternative to E,), 
Fi = Final state 1 of D 
(alternative to F2), 
F2 = Final state 2 of D 
(alternative to Fi), 
A] = Activity 1 of S 
(alternative to A2), 
A2 = Activity 2 of S 
(alternative to AO, 
—> = Indication, <-> = Interaction. 
The case of S = Escherichia coli: The case of S = thermostat 
D = System of transmembrane (connected in radiator): 
chemoreceptors D = Thermometer or temperature sensor 
e, = Increasing concentration of nutrient E, = Environmental temperature below 
molecules the goal-temperature 
e2 = Decreasing concentration of nutrient e2 = Environmental temperature above 
molecules the goal-temperature 
f, = Relative saturation of receptors in D a, - fi = Switch on heating 
f2 = Relative non-saturation of receptors a2 = f2 = Switch off heating 
in D 
A, = Counter clockwise flagellar move­
ment (leads to linear movement of S) 
A2 = Clockwise flagellar movement 
(makes S tumble around itself) 
Figure 3. Basic model of minimal interactive representation. 
Although both thermostats and coli bacteria are representative 
systems, thermostats (like the most of the man-made self-regulating 
machines) are not alive in any sense unlike E. coli. The difference 
between these is not based on the nature of the representation they are 
using but on the nature of the goals they are pursuing. Unlike 
thermostats, coli bacteria are real far from equilibrium systems and 
have to maintain themselves continuously thus having the natural self-
interests of their own. The open question arises: is it sufficient to 
576 Tommi Vehkavaara 
characterize living systems — or (bio)semiotic agents — as minimal 
representative systems with at least one 'own' natural self-interest? Or 
are these merely necessary conditions? 
Some characteristics of the model 
1. Formality of the model. The interactivism offers only a formal 
model for the most primitive real representation. The counterparts in 
real systems have to be identified separately in each case. For 
instance, a differentiator need not be spatially differentiable 'organ' in 
the whole system, but it can be integrated in a distributed manner into 
the system. 
2. Constructivism. The representations, the possible final states of 
the differentiator, are not continuously existent things. In this most 
primitive type of real representation, representations are not like 
already written letters or stable DNA-segments that are just waiting to 
be read and interpreted. Instead, their construction is repeated in every 
interaction/interpretation again by the differentiator (or by the 
interaction between the differentiator and its environment). They are 
permanent only as possibilities, not as existing states. 
3. Internality of representations. Consequently, minimal represen­
tations are internal states of the system — they are not stable external 
things or objects that are just waiting to be perceived. Still, these final 
state representations are not purely internal or 'solipsistic' con­
structions of the system, but they are constructed in interaction with 
the environment so that they are produced in contact with the 
environment. 
4. No objects of representations. Therefore, for the system there are 
no objects any more than the qualities of objects in its environment. 
All that a simple thermostat 'perceives' is the type of the environment 
it is interacting with. They are we, humans (who use thermostats) who 
can say that a thermostat measures the temperature and compares the 
measured value with its goal- or limit-temperature. Concepts as 
temperature and object are human concepts — they belong to human 
Umwelt and thermostats have no access to them. Thermostats have no 
Umwelt at all. 
If E. coli bacteria were as simple systems as thermostats are. the 
situation might be the same for them as for thermostats, i.e. there 
would be no represented objects for them — bacteria 'recognize' only 
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the type of the environment, not the nutrient molecules, and respond 
with the appropriate strategy. However, depending on the details of 
the bacterial representation processing, they may turn out to be 
complex enough so that bacteria can be said to perceive the objects 
i.e. that nutrients (molecules or the gradients of their concentrations) 
appear as objects to them — and to give an appropriate interpretation 
of the interactively constructed internal representation of these objects. 
5. Objective error and internal error-detection. It is important to 
notice that goals or interests do not have to be represented in the 
system. A mechanical thermostat has no self-interest, there is no goal 
for the thermostat itself (although there is for the man), and in the case 
of a bacterium whose ultimate self-interest is just self-maintenance, 
the interest is not represented either, life or death is the criterion for 
the success. Thus, it is not circular to define the concepts of function, 
self-interest, and goal first, and the concept of representation after­
wards. 
In the recursively self-maintenant far from equilibrium systems, 
minimal interactive representations guide the goal-directed activity, 
and that guidance can be appropriate or erroneous — to be in error 
does not undress the representationality of the representation. More­
over, the system might even have means to find out that its represen­
tation is in error at this same level of minimal interactive represen­
tation. There is not only the possibility of error per se, but the possi­
bility that the system might discover that it is wrong. "Specifically, if 
the system fails to reach its goal, then something was in error in the 
indications of further interactions for that goal, and, since that failure 
to reach its goal is itself an internal condition of the system, infor­
mation of such failure is functionally available to the system for 
further processing" (Bickhard 1998b: 190). 
Consider, as an example, the case of the so called alarmones, the 
bacterial signal molecules that signal stress (like glucose starvation), 
discussed e.g. by Gordon Tomkins (1975) and Jesper Hoffmeyer 
(2002: 111-112). When, say, saccharin molecules block the chemo-
receptors of a bacterium, the bacterial system erroneously interprets 
the situation as if the glucose concentration is still increasing. The 
bacterium keeps on swimming linearly although it does not catch its 
primary nutrient, glucose, enough by doing so. If the bacterium had no 
other means to ensure its energy production, it would starve to death. 
However, in glucose starvation, when there is no glucose in the cell, 
the same enzyme (glucose kinase) that starts the process of glucose 
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degradation starts its minor side reaction (because of the privation of 
the substrate of its main reaction), to degrade ATP to cyclic AMP 
(cAMP). 2 2  Because cAMP and ATP tend to bind to the same regions 
of cellular proteins, the increasing concentration of cAMP leads up to 
increasing displacement of ATP from its normal binding sites. 
Therefore, since ATP is the major energy-carrier molecule of the cell, 
this process blocks effectively the energy consumption of the cell. 
This blocking effect on energy consumption is, in the situation like 
this, self-functional to the bacterial system. It gives more time to the 
system to detect the apparent error in the interpretive process that 
guides the Chemotaxis (i.e. movements) of the system. The earlier 
dysfunctional indication (straightforward moving) of chemoreceptor-
subsystem is blocked off by switch in energy-consumption-subsystem. 
The energy-consumption-subsystem 'detects' and even compensates 
'detected' errors in chemoreceptor-flagellar-subsystem. Production of 
cAMP-molecules (from ATP) is a way of controlling the behaviour 
that is already controlled by other subsystems. 
The description above is a somewhat speculative story about the 
evolutionary origin of the production of с AMP. The increasing 
concentration of cAMP is here a mere side-product of an error-
detection process, but such a side-product that appears to correlate 
with errors in Chemotaxis. Nowadays, bacterial systems use the in­
creasing concentration of с AMP as an 'alarm-sign' of their internal 
state of glucose-starvation so that cAMP is used as a release-sign for 
specific transcription processes of the production of a series of 
enzymes needed for the degradation of non-glucose sugars. If the story 
about the origin of cAMP-production is correct, it is plausible to 
assume that the bacterial systems have learned — in the course of 
evolution — to 'cognize' the positive correlation between с AMP and 
starv ation. 2  and even developed additional methods of getting out of 
: :  The main reaction catalyzed by glucose kinase is 
ATP + glucose —> ADP + glucose-P 
and the minor side reaction is 
ATP —> P-P + с AMP 
where ATP = adenosine-tri-phosphate, ADP = adenosine-di-phosphate, AMP = 
adenosine-mono-phosphate, and P-P = pyrophosphate (Hoffmeyer 2002: 111). 
2 3  The high concentration of cAMP has become a sign of its correlate 
(starvation) for the bacterial system, which fits well in Hoffmeyer's 'rule of 
thumb' of biosemiotics: "Wherever there has developed a habit there will also 
exist an organism for whom this habit has become a sign" (Hoffmeyer 1997b). 
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that undesirable state. I.e. when glucose starvation is detected, the 
production of the means for an alternative energy production system is 
launched and after that, the original interpretation-error in Chemotaxis 
may no more appear dysfunctional, i.e. erroneous, for the system. 2 4  It 
is noticeable that even if this evolutionary story were incorrect, it 
shows that minimal interactive representation is all that is needed for 
these kinds of switches in behaviour. Error of reaching a goal can be 
detected and compensated by other differentiators at the level of 
minimal interactive representation. 
7. Emergence of the objects (of representation) and 
Umwelt 
If we consider the basic concepts of Peirce's semeiotic, some of them 
have equivalents in the above described minimal interactive represen­
tative system. Most notably, the normal behaviour of a differentiator-
effector subsystem (D + the set of potential A,'s in Fig. 3) constitutes a 
systemic habit, each final state (F,) of a differentiator (D) constitutes 
the representamen of a sign, and indicated action (A,) of the system 
constitutes the (dynamic) interprétant of a sign. Because there is no 
object of a sign (for the system), signs can not be characterized either 
iconic, indexical, or symbolic.25 However, the concept of phenomenal 
object is still a real one, and the structure of systems that experience 
phenomenal objects — and that can thus have Umwelt and triadic 
signs — can be defined on the basis of minimal interactive 
representation. 
A representative system can contain several interlinked differen­
tiators and several different goals. Indications based on one final state 
of one differentiator can be multiple — which one will be chosen can 
24 After these developments, these supposed original means of producing cAMP 
(as a side-product) has become dysfunctional for the system. The lowering of 
activity is no more needed, if these non-glucose sugars that block the chemo-
receptors really prove to be eatable. 
These constitute the possible relations that a triadic sign has with its real (or 
dynamic) object. Because in this minimal model there are the equivalents of the 
representamen and the (dynamic) interprétant, at least some equivalents of the 
other Peircean sign-types (based on the possible relations between a sign and its 
representamen and between a sign and its interprétant) might, perhaps, be 
detectable. 
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be dependent on other differentiators and the success in reaching other 
goals. In such a complex representative system, the internal pro­
cessing time of a system may become too long for fast enough 
checkings of the environmental conditions. For such a system, it may 
be profitable to create and maintain a set of standard or 'default-
settings' of activity indications and to keep them updated ongoingly. 
These 'defaults' are then available if needed, without time-taking 
computation or processing of final states and indications to further 
actions at that time (the level 6 in Bickhard 1998: 194). An organi­
zation of the indications of interactive potentialities based on these 
defaults forms a kind of situation image that is used as a base for 
interaction while the continuous updating of its default-settings 
(apperception) is alienated to an independent process. 
The updating process of the situation image leaves great parts of it 
untouched, so that there are certain temporal invariances in the 
situation image. If the system is able to discover such types of 
organizations of interactive potentialities in its situation image that 
tends to remain constant, unchanged or invariant as patterns with 
respect to the most potential updates of the situation image, then these 
invariances constitute something like objects for the system itself. 
Physical objects are then epistemologically. i.e. as they are accessible 
to the system, the "invariances of patterns of potential interactions 
under certain classes of physical interactions" (the level 7 in Bickhard 
1998: 197). 
Within this level of complexity, appears the emergence of certain 
biosemiotically central concepts. I suggest that both Peirce's and 
VexkülTs biosemiotic concepts presuppose this level. 
1. Memory and perception. Discovering temporal invariances in the 
situation image constitutes a system memory and makes active 
remembering possible. Past 'experiences' can be reconstructed and the 
actual updates of the situation image ("actual experiences') can thus be 
identified with the past ones — objects and their invariant relations 
can be identified and recognized over and over again. Within memory 
and possibility to recognition, genuine perception emerges or becomes 
at least possible — perception which presupposes at least some kind 
of recognition and therefore also memory."6 
2Л Two forms of memory (and perception) emerge: one of environmental continuities 
and the other of internal system flows of activity (Bickhard 1998b: 197). Although 
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The conception about perception is in coherence with Peirce's 
conception (see his Harvard lectures, 1903 on Pragmatism, CP 5.14— 
212). Individual things or objects (including external signs), like 
individual persons, are not perceived directly as individuals. They are 
directly perceived, but if the different reacting perceptual singulars are 
to be identified as one individual object or other invariance, some kind 
of general character have to be associated with them. Thus, our 
common sense individual objects etc. are not 'singular existent things' 
but semi-instinctively derived general notions, relations of identity 
between singular perceptual reactions (cf. Peirce, EP 2: 222 [1903]). 
At the level of minimal representation, there are just classes of 
environments — at the level of objects, invariant features of different 
classes of environments are constructed and differentiated from each 
other. 
2. Umwelt and triadic sign. As phenomenal objects and percepts 
emerge the first time at this level of complexity, and especially 
because they are not external to the system but constituted as its 
internal states (although not without contact with its exterior) — they 
can be said to constitute the Umwelt for the system. Similarly, the 
simplest types of Peircean triadic sign or representation becomes 
applicable at this level. In my criticism of application of Peircean 
concept of sign in biosemiotics, the concept of the object of sign was 
troublesome. Now we have objects constructed by the system itself (in 
interaction with its environment, however) and internal to the 
system — immediate objects of signs can emerge. 
3. Iconic and indexical signs. Within the ability to 'experience 
objects', i.e. to discover invariances in the situation image, the system 
becomes able to discover also invariant relationships between these 
invariances, as causal, similarity, part whole, and nearness (i.e. spatial) 
relations between objects. Especially, a system can remember the 
objects it has perceived in the past and find them in some respects 
both of these forms of perception are internal states of the system, the difference 
between them constitutes the difference between external and internal experience (cf. 
Vehkavaara 2002: 295-296). The difference lies in the interacting environments: the 
perception about environmental continuities constitutes the external experience in 
which the interacting environment is at least partly exterior to the system boundaries. 
Consequently, the interacting environment in the perception of the activity history of 
the system is internal to the system and so it constitutes internal experience. 
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similar to a new perception. Likenesses can be recognized which 
makes it possible that this new perception is cognized as the iconic 
sign of the objects perceived in past. Similarly, because also causal 
and other real relations (like nearness) between objects become 
recognizable, a system becomes able to handle indexical signs21  
Although I have suggested earlier (in this paper and in Vehkavaara 
2002: 306-307) that no higher level than the one of minimal inter­
active representation is necessary for bacterial Chemotaxis, it remains 
still somewhat open question. The more detailed biochemical descrip­
tions are needed to resolve the question, whether the bacteria as real 
systems function at some higher level of complexity and after all 
construct internal objects. Or, perhaps we can say that bacteria have 
some kinds of situation images without ability to discover its 
invariances (like objects). Moreover, if this possibility is confirmed, 
we can raise a question: did the most primitive real living systems 
emerge already at that level or did some lower one suffice? 
Emergence of symbolic sign 
Although the concepts of Umwelt and iconic and indexical signs have 
now found their place and proper interpretation in the theory of 
interactive representation, no symbols, no language, no genuine social 
communication, and no se If-awareness can yet be introduced. More 
complex levels of representation are needed for each of these. A 
corresponding situation occurs in Peirce's semeiotic, e.g. when 
symbolic signs are considered, they are defined as more developed 
than iconic and indexical ones, moreover, symbolic signs may have 
icons or indexes as its constituents (Peirce CP 2.261, 293 [1903]). I 
will consider only symbolic signs2* here in order to make complete the 
most widely used trichotomy in Peirce's semeiotic: division of signs 
into iconic, indexical, and symbolic. 
2 Iconic signs are representations that are based on the recognition of a similarity 
between the representamen and the object of representation. Correspondingly, 
indexical signs are based on the knowledge or recognition of causal or other real 
relation (like nearness) between the representamen and the object of sign. 
2!> Symbolic signs are representations in which the relation of the representamen 
with its object is based merely on the habit that the representamen is used to 
represent its object, i.e. merely on the fact that the representamen is habitually 
interpreted as that particular sign. 
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A system may have separate situation images for activities of a 
different kind that it uses in order to reach it goals. Each situation 
image has a direct 'on-line' effect into some activity. However, the 
environmental information that is gathered for one activity, may not 
be available for another activity," 9  it may, for instance, be in an 
inappropriate form. The system can, however, create a 'second order 
situation image' that does not refer to environment directly but by the 
mediation of directly functional situation images. (This constitutes the 
level 8 in Bickhard 1998b.) The representations of this abstract 
situation image are alienated from 'direct' connect to their environ­
mental referent, and this makes 'theoretical', vicariate, or 'off-line' 
processing of representations possible. 
If we consider symbolic signs, the only property that makes a 
symbolic sign represent its object is that it is just used to represent 
it — that there happens to be such a habit. Now, the invariances in the 
relation of 'second order situation image' and directly functional 
situation images can be just such postulated habits (although they need 
not be). Thus, the symbolic representation and symbolic signs emerge. 
Still, these 'symbols' are purely internal to the system, they may be 
kind of 'private' symbols for the system — whether the genuine inter-
subjective communication of symbols (language) can be based on this 
or some higher level is not settled.30 For this, at least a community of 
systems is needed, the systems of which may need to have more 
complex or specialized internal structure. '1 
2y For instance, according to Konrad Lorenz (1941), water shrew has separate 
spatial maps for hunger, thirst, escape from each predator, etc. The spatial 
information that is saved in 'hunger-map' may not be available when it is thirsty 
and seeking water etc. 
311 On the other hand, even at the lower levels, there are certainly reciprocal 
interaction and interdependence between systems. This is communication of a 
sort, but here the term 'communication' is used in a narrower sense referring to 
interaction where some content is intended to transfer to other systems. In genuine 
communication between systems, a message is sent that is supposed (by the 
sender) to be received and interpreted in some certain sense (by the receiver). 
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Естественный интерес, интерактивная репрезентация 
и формирование объектов и умвельта: определение 
главных семиотических понятий в рамках биосемиотики 
Жизнь и жизненные проявления в биосемиотике описываются с по­
мощью семиотических понятий, которые по происхождению своему 
антропоморфны. Это могло бы быть оправдано, если бы мы могли до­
казать, что живые системы как самосохраняющиеся далекие от равно­
весия 
системы создают и обновляют своего рода репрезентацию, 
информацию об условиях своей сохранности. Это — точка зрения 
семиотического реализма, в котором знаки и репрезентации рассмат­
риваются как реальные и объективные явления природы, не нуждаю­
щиеся в интерпретаторе-человеке. В статье утверждается, что 
основное определение репрезентации должно быть более дально­
видным и что понятие знака как у Пирса, так и у Юкскюлла пред­
полагает наличие слишком усложненного семиотического посред­
ника. Простейшие репрезентирующие системы вообще не имеют 
явных объектов и умвельта. В качестве альтернативы выдвигается 
предложение основывать элементарное понятие репрезентации и 
источника нормативности, необходимого для ее интерпретации, на 
интерактивности М. Бикхарда. Первичная нормативность или 
естественный интерес опирается на концепцию "полезности" функ­
ции: все, что входит в комлекс сохранности нестабильной системы, 
является функциональным для этой системы, — каждое проявление 
самосохранения нестабильной системы обладает чертами минималь­
ного естественного интереса, это ее экзистенциалное непременное 
условие. Минимальная интерактивная репрезентация проявляется, 
если подобные системы могут соответствующим образом переклю­
чаться с одного на другой или большее количество модусов самосох­
ранения. На уровне такой репрезентации мы можем выявить ошибки, 
даже если система не имеет объектов репрезентации. Явно выра­
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женные объекты проявляются в более сложных системах. Если 
система создает ряд постепенно обновляющихся "образов ситуации" и 
способна определить временные промежутки в этом процессе 
обновления, то в таком случае эти инварианты создают объекты для 
самой системы. Репрезентируемая таким образом система образует 
умвельт и делает возможным применение триадических знаков. 
Отношение между репрезентацией и ее объектом на этом уровне 
может быть либо иконическим либо индексиальным. Как в семейо-
тике Пирса, так и здесь символические знаки появляются как более 
развитые: знаки-символы нуждаются в более сложных системах. 
Loomulik huvi, interaktiivne esitus, objektide ja omailma 
kujunemine: peamiste semiootiliste mõistete piiritlemine 
biosemiootika jaoks 
Elu ja elunähtusi on biosemiootikas kirjeldatud päritolult antropomorfsete 
semiootiliste mõistete abil. See oleks õigustatud, kui õnnestub tõendada, et 
elussiisteemid kui ennastsäilitavad tasakaalukauged süsteemid loovad ja 
täiendavad mingeid esitusi oma piisimistingimuste kohta. See on semioo­
tilise realismi vaatekoht, mille kohaselt märgid ja esitused on reaalsed ja 
objektiivsed loodusilmingud, ilma tarviduseta inimtõlgendaja järele. Vajalik 
on esituse mõiste fundamentaalne määratlus; nii Peirce'i kui Uexkülli 
märgi mõisted eeldavad liialdatult keerulist semiootilist toimijat. Lihtsaimad 
esitavad süsteemid ei evi objekte ega omailmu. Minimaalne esitus ja 
normatiivsuse allikas (mis on vajalik esituse tõlgendamiseks) võivad põhi­
neda M. Bickhard'i interaktiv ismil. Esmane normatiivsus ehk loomulik huvi 
põhineb funktsiooni 'kasutus-mõistel': see, mis aitab kaasa tasakaalukauge 
süsteemi püsimisele, on selle süsteemi jaoks funktsionaalne; iga ennast-
säilitava tasakaalukauge süsteemi minimaalne loomulik huvi on täita seda 
funktsiooni, see on ta eksistentsiaalseks eelduseks. Minimaalne inter­
aktiivne esitus ilmub, kui sellised süsteemid saavad sobivalt umber lülituda 
kahe või enama enesesäilitamise viisi vahel. Niisuguste esituste tasandil 
võib areneda võime ära tunda vigu, kuigi süsteemil pole esitusobjekte. 
Nähtumuslikud objektid ilmuvad keerukamates süsteemides. Kui süsteem 
loob rea järjest täiendatavaid 'olukorra kujundeid' ja suudab määrata ajalisi 
invariante selles täiendusprotsessis, siis moodustavad need invariandid 
objekte süsteemi enda jaoks. Esitaval süsteemil kujuneb seejuures omailm 
ja võime kogeda triaadseid märke. Suhe esituse ja ta objekti vahel on sel 
tasemel kas ikooniline või indeksiline. Nii nagu ka Peirce'i semeiootikas, 
ilmuvad sümbol-märgid kui enamarenenud, kuna sümbolmärgid vajavad 
keerukamaid süsteeme. 
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Abstract. Fundamental turns in biological understanding can be interpreted as 
replacements of deep models that organise the biological knowledge. Three 
deep models distinguished here are a holistic ladder model that sees all levels 
of nature being complete (from Aristotle to the 18th century), a modernist tree 
model that emphasises progress and evolution (from Enlightenment to the 
recent times), and a web model that evaluates diversity (since the 20th 
century). The turn from the tree model to the web model in biology includes 
(1) a transfer from modern to postmodern approaches, (2) a shift of semiotic 
threshold to the border of life, and (3) building the semiotic models of living 
systems, i.e., the rise of biosemiotics. 
The main issue of the 20th century has been the end of modernity. 
However, it has not yet been understood very well that this will also 
mean the end of the modern model of natural science. The modern 
age, as starting in the 17th century and being characterized particularly 
via the formation of experimental science together with the philo­
sophy of Descartes and Bacon, would be replaced by anything that 
also replaces the experimental science, a strive for technological 
progress or innovation, and cartesianism. As John Deely (2001 ; 2004) 
has stated, this can be semiotics. Several analyses have shown that 
much of what has been called post-modern is more like late modern, 
or ultra-modern (Deely 2003: 22), which means that we still see the 
extension of modern era. This particularly seems to be true for the 
modernist science, the current situation of which demonstrates large 
fluctuations and extremist approaches. It is not an entire end of 
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science, however, it is an end of the science as we know its image 
from the modernity. 
A study of meaning and semiosis cannot be provided via physics, 
even via physics of the 20th century. Because, in order to detect 
meaning, the measuring device has to be alive. And the question is 
whether a research that uses organisms instead of ruler could be called 
physics any more. It is more like biology, of course, but biology of a 
special kind — biosemiotics. As C. Emmeche has put it — it is an 
experiential biology, instead of experimental one.1 
In this paper, I am not going to analyse the end of science as a 
modernist creation. However, since the period of modern science 
ending has its reflection in every field of knowledge, we cannot avoid 
the theme either. Still, this paper confines itself with biological know­
ledge only, attempting to understand the meaning of the semiotic turn 
in biology, or the meaning of the development of biosemiotics as an 
approach declaring a principal change in the fundamentals of biolo­
gical theory — i.e., in biological understanding. 
The age of modernity has been an age of revolutions, one after 
other (cf. Cohen 2001). In biology, the turn from preformism to 
epigenetics in 1830s, and the Modern Synthesis of 1930s, have been 
distinguished as the turns of major importance for biological under­
standing in last centuries (e.g., Mayr 1982). However, the turn that 
would consider biology not as a Naturwissenschaft, but rather a 
Bedeutungswissenschaft, would appear no less profound than any 
other in the history of biology since at least Carl Linnaeus. 
Considering the turn in biology, or a remarkable shift in biological 
understanding, we find several quite different approaches to this, to 
the turn itself. At least three different aspects of the semiotic tum in 
biology should be distinguished. Namely, the semiotic turn in biology 
can be interpreted, 
(1) as entering into a next phase or period in the historical develop­
ment of biological understanding, e.g., from the modern to a type 
of postmodern; 
(2) as a shift in the placement of the semiotic threshold — from the 
boundary of human culture, to the boundary of biological life; 
accordingly, life appears to be semiosis, biology being a part of 
semiotics; 
1 Cf. Pesic 1999. 
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(3) as a change of the theoretical basis for biology — the replace­
ment of physical models by the ones of semiotic when inter­
preting the phenomena of life. 
We are going to characterise the aspects of the turn briefly via a charac­
teristic change in the deep models used in biological thinking, 
particularly the replacement of the archetypic model of tree by a model 
of web. 
1. Ladder, tree, web 
When interpreting the influences of biological ideas to other spheres 
of science (including humanities) in any period, or even to the bio­
logical discourse itself, the paradigmatic identification of the period 
and of the discourse would be necessary. For instance, the influence of 
biology to linguistics has been of several different kinds. On one hand, 
there exist the works of August Schleicher, who has applied the 
Darwinian model of diversification to language evolution (Dahlke 
2001). And on the other hand, there exist works of Roman Jakobson 
of his Prague period, when using the ideas from the works of Karl 
Emst von В aer and Lev Berg for the formation of his views on 
linguistic structuralism (Seriot 2001). 
E. Mayr has noted that, despite some historians of science dis­
tinguish different periods, each with a single dominant paradigm (like 
T. Kuhn), or episteme (M. Foucault), or research tradition, "this 
interpretation does not fit the situation in biology" (Mayr 1982: 113). 
Indeed, there cannot exist any final and best periodization of the 
history of ideas, or the history of thought. Instead, there are several 
different, overlapping periodizations. The scientific debates can be 
characterized as relations between the different basic models or 
metaphors. This is because any model is situated in a context of other 
contemporary models, and the dialogue between these would create 
meaning and identity to any proposed one. 
Among the metaphors, there exist some that characterise the very 
stable and basic models — archetypic models — used in the 
interpretation of knowledge in certain area. These are the ones we are 
going to describe and analyse here. 
The basic metaphors form rows and opposites. This means, there 
are some that replace one another during the paradigm changes (like 
ladder/tree/web, or preformism/epigenetics). These are row meta-
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phors. And then, there are ones that appear as pairs, and as such seem 
to represent the eternal opposites (like holism/reductionism, or 
tychasm/anancasm) (cf. Berg 1969; Lyubischev 2000; Kull 2000a; 
2000b). 
Arthur Lovejoy (1964) has described in detail an early biological 
knowledge as organised on the basis of a deep model of ladder, scala 
naturae, and its replacement by a profound alternative during the 
Enlightenment. Accordingly, in the history of biology, three basic 
metaphors or models have been used that represent correspondingly 
three major types of paradigms: 
(a) scala naturae, or ladder, or chain; this is a non-temporal model, a 
whole, in which the creatures differ in their level and complexity, 
however being complete (in plenitude) and non-evolutionary; 
(b) tree, ever branching and growing arbor vitae\ this model 
appeared in biology in concordance with the Enlightenment view 
that nature may be incomplete, and accordingly, there is an 
evolution towards perfection, a progress;" this is the core of the 
Darwinian or Haeckelian view, where growth and divergence are 
the basic processes and competition being the progressive force; 
in classification, it corresponds to hierarchical systems; 
(c) web, or network, tela; this seems to appear together with an 
ecological view that sees every creature to have a (symbiotic) 
role in the element cycles of ecosystem, or in an ideas of the 
biosphere and semiosphere that emphasise the interconnected-
ness, however it is rooted also in a Romanticist views to nature or 
early semiotic ideas; here, time is rather periodical, recognition 
and interpretation turn to be the important features of nodes, and 
the model of classification is non-hierarchic. 
The change of the ladder-model by the tree-model in the 18th century 
included very much more than just a temporalizing the ladder. The 
basic idea, indeed, could be the (supposedly, Voltairean) idea that 
nature can be improved. 3  If so, then it infers the situations of choice, 
i.e., the branching points of the path. The branching structure as such, 
the replacement a linear staircase by a hierarchic branchy form, as, 
e.g., used for classification purposes, may not itself still assume any 
As Cassirer (1955: 5) has mentioned, "perhaps no other century is so 
completely permeated by the idea of intellectual progress as that of the Enlighten­
ment". 
According to Heelan (1994), a characteristic of modernity that the individual 
subject can authoritatively impose an order of things traces back to Luther. 
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temporal dynamics. However, an application of the form of the tree to 
any set of facts, etc., implies an asymmetric representation, together 
with identification of a "stem" and divergences that provides good 
conditions for a temporal interpretation. Still, the first extensive re­
presentation of the system of organisms via the form of a branching 
model — the one of C. Linné — did not imply a temporal interpre­
tation yet. However, it appeared soon, e.g., as the one by J. B. La­
marck. 
The frequent usage of tree-like schemes as representations of the 
system of organisms does not go back much more than the first 
decades of the 19th century, according to M. Ruse (1996) who has 
made an attempt to trace the early usage of tree diagrams.4 There has 
also been found, for instance, a tree-diagram of types of ontogenies, 
drawn by K. E. v. В aer in 1827. Since E. Haeckel, the tree diagrams 
have been extensively used for representation of phylogenies. 
The tree-model includes growth and sequential branching as built-
in features. The exponential growth is just an implication from the tree 
structure. Also, tree model leads naturally to a problem of the insuf­
ficiency of space for all subsequent generations of branches, and thus 
to a concept of competition and survival. Accordingly, the Darwinian 
concept of evolution via struggle for existence and natural selection is 
an evident and natural implication from the tree-model (cf. Gould 
2002: 146, 1334, 1342). Darwin's role was just to supply this model 
by examples that could illustrate its evolutionary interpretation. 
The tree-model enforces an investigator to ask about the origins of 
the features under study, in order to identify the placement of the 
"stem". It also leaves one with thinking about the ever-going progress, 
and of endless fight for available resources. 
The tree-model has spread, of course, to many areas. It has been 
applied almost in any science together with an evolutionary approach. 
Interesting parallels of its usage can be found, e.g., in linguistics (e.g.. 
Sutrop 2000). 
Most of the biology textbooks in the 20th century are so comple­
tely built on the basis of the tree-model that it might be very difficult 
to see any alternative to it. However, the model of web provides this. 
4 The icon of arbor vitae is, of course, much older, e.g., as used in Christianity; 
however, it seems that earlier usage mainly refers to its features like bending, 
crossing, persistence, instead of hierarchy and growth. 
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The web-model has been introduced mainly through two ap­
proaches. One is the idea of trophic network between the organisms in 
an ecosystem. The other is a representation of communication pro­
cesses in a population, in a social community. Thus, these are the 
ecological and semiotic approaches that mainly begin to replace the 
tree-model by a web-model, a process that should be remarkable since 
1960s. 
The contemporary biology is using the web-metaphor widely. This 
includes cell biology ('metabolic web'), ecology ('trophic web', 'web 
of life', Capra 1996), evolutionary biology (e.g., 'the tangled web of 
life', Katz 1998). However, Darwin, for instance, did not use the term 
'network' at all, and 'web' appears in the Origins of Species only 
twice. 
The first appearance is in the chapter where Darwin speaks about 
the 'complex relations of all animals and plants throughout nature' 
(Darwin 1872: 59): "I am tempted to give one more instance showing 
how plants and animals, remote in the scale of nature, are bound 
together by a web of complex relations. I shall thereafter have occa­
sion to show that the exotic Lobelia fulgens is never visited in my 
garden by insects, and consequently, from its peculiar structure, never 
sets a seed." And Darwin continues with examples about local plants, 
for which the pollinators exist and are often obligatory. 
The second appearance of the word 'web' is in the chapter on 
classification: "We shall never, probably, disentangle the inextricable 
web of the affinities between the members of any one class [...]" 
(Darwin 1872: 333). 
It is interesting to mention that these are the only cases of the 
usage of the word 'web' in Darwin texts, in which this word appears 
in the functional or relational sense. All the other usage refers to the 
structural meaning, as for instance describing the spider's web. 
As different from tree, web (as if) has no origin. Because web 
represents polyphyly, instead of a monophyly of tree. The nodes of 
web represent the points of meeting, not only divergence, thus 
recognition, co-existence and symbiosis, instead of competition. Web 
is a model for a communication network, not so much for a domi­
nance of inheritance. 
Thomas A. Sebeok, a biosemiotician, has emphasised the impor­
tance of web-metaphor: "Web conjures up the organic world of a 
spider, as well as, in their ineluctable correlations, its inorganic 
complement, the scaffolding of dry thread that the spider spins. Web 
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suggests the reciprocal lives of both invertebrate and vertebrate 
creatures; it depicts the interplay between hub, spokes, and periphery; 
it kindles the dialectic of suspense and abatement; and many summon 
up still further cascades of contrasts or oppositions" (Sebeok 2000: 
76). Thure von Uexkiill (Uexkiill et al. 1993: 9) has characterised an 
organism's body as a web of semioses. 
When comparing the logics that are based either on dyadic or on 
triadic relations, J. Hoffmeyer (1996: 17-18) points out a simple 
feature — only triadic relations allow to build networks. He has used 
this as an argument for Peirce's approach that thus can be used in 
biology. 
If the web-model can be identified as the one that is related to a 
semiotic approach, then the analysis provided by John Deely (2001 ) 
would be applicable also for biology. According to Deely, the 
Postmodern Age replaces the Modern via the semiotic understanding 
of sign, which has been given in the works of C. S. Peirce, and also, 
by Jakob von Uexkiill. 
The discussions on these three basic models and metaphors (scala, 
arbor, tela) have been superimposed in the history of biology by two 
alternative interpretations of the concept of natural system — either it 
to be as a real, actual, or as a potential, ideal. Accordingly, the re­
search programs differ in a study of origins — one that requires a 
reconstruction of genealogy, and the other that is searching for a 
deduction from general laws. 
There have been several other widespread deep models used in 
biology (e.g., map), however, of clearly lesser importance (Barsanti 
1989; Gruber 1972). 
As different from the ladder/tree/web periodization, which marks 
as focals the 1760s and 1960s, there can be seen a periodization on the 
basis of the models that treat dynamics — history/development/ 
evolution — with the turning points (or turning periods) of 1830s and 
1930s. This marks the age of dominance of the developmental view in 
biology from the establishment of embryology around 1830, until the 
Modern Synthesis in 1930s. As E. Mayr has said, the idea of Dar­
winian evolution did not win before 1930s. In a larger perspective, 
there have been alternating periods of preformism and epigenetics in 
the history of biology. The В aer's work of 1827-1837 has been 
claimed to overcome a long period of preformism. His epigenetic 
emphasis has been replaced by a modern form of preformism — 
genetic determinism, since 1930s. 
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2. Life as semiosis 
In 1986, in a conference on semiotics of cellular communication and 
immunological systems, in Italy. Umberto Eco was among the 
contributors. Attempting to ask about the features of sign processes in 
the cellular reactions that can distinguish between the alien and self, 
he still remained his hesitation. He finished his talk with these 
sentences (Eco 1988: 15): "As you probably understand, such a 
question concerns the dramatic problem of the boundaries between 
Spirit and Matter, Culture and Nature. Let me stop. I feel afraid." 
U. Eco (1979) has formulated in his A Theory of Semiotics the 
concept of semiotic threshold. This is a boundary between the world 
of signs and the world of non-signs. At one side of this threshold there 
is the universe of meanings, at the other side — "stereochemistry": 
either the spatial correspondences between molecules, or the balances 
and imbalances of physical forces, but not anything "standing for 
something else". 
Where is this semiotic threshold situated, and whether it exists at 
all? These questions have caused more than one debate. 
According to Eco's quite clear statement in A Theory of Semiotics, 
"translation", as the term has been used by geneticists when they 
describe the relationship between nucleic acids and proteins, is only a 
concept transfer, a metaphor, without any concern to the nature of this 
process itself. In other words, the semiotic threshold, according to 
Eco, is situated on the boundary of culture. 
Thomas Sebeok, a founder of zoosemiotics, has not agreed to Eco 
in this. Sebeok stated that there are sign processes in all living pro­
cesses. and therefore, the semiotic threshold is placed at the boundary 
of life. 
Signs are always connected to codes. Codes are the correspon­
dences that cannot be inferred from the general physical laws. For 
instance, the fact that namely green light is permissive and not red 
neither yellow, does not follow anyhow from the universal laws about 
photons. The rules of lights are local, they became fixed in the history, 
they are bound to a culture. 
Following Sebeok's approach, we notice that there are no universal 
laws in biology or in any other field that describe the phenomena of 
life and living. As different from the physical laws, biological rules do 
not hold universally, they include exceptions. This is because the 
biological rules represent codes, or because they are themselves codes. 
Ladder, tree, web 597 
Thus, from the point of view of semiotic threshold, it is important 
to see the principal difference between the DNA-RNA and RNA-
protein correspondences. The first is a code, the second is no. 
Guanosine fits cytidine due to stereochemical reasons; it is possible to 
predict it via calculations, there is no code. The relationship between a 
nucleotide triplet and an aminoacid in a protein, instead, is not due to 
stereochemistry, but due to sequences, the sequences that create the 
genetic code through the fixed order in the chains of transport-RNAs 
and aminotransferases. The gene sequences cannot be deduced from 
the universal laws of physics. 
According to this approach, semiosis, the sign process, appears 
together with life. Which also means that there are many more 
codes— in addition to the genetic code — already in each cell 
(several of them have been illustrated by M. Barbieri 2003). Thus, the 
genetic code is not a metaphor — this is a true code. And there are no 
codes before the appearance of life. 
When Eco discusses the concept of genetic code (Eco 1988: 7), he 
does not notice the difference described above — the one between 
transcription and translation in a cell. When he returns to this topic in 
his Kant and Platypus, asking how "lymphocytes have the capacity to 
distinguish infected from normal macrophages" (Eco 2000: 108), then 
he is going to allow speaking about a 'primary iconism' in the cellular 
level, however, again, he does not distinguish it from the 'primary 
iconism', e.g., of a trace of stone on sand. 
Thus, one should distinguish between recognition as a biological, 
and interaction as a physical phenomenon. Recognition, as different 
from interaction, is based on a memory, i.e., it refers to something else 
via the relationship of the remembered. In this sense, we may say that 
enzymes are the simplest systems where recognition occurs. Enzymes 
may fit to their substrate not only due to their structure, but also due to 
the habit, due to the former interactions that have shaped it. 
The life process is an endless self-interpretation. Namely in this 
code-dependent process, it is the same as endless semiosis. 
The shift of the semiotic threshold from the Culture-Nature border 
to the one of Life-Non-life, took some time, and some research. At 
first, it was the zoosemiotic argument that Sebeok used, and only 
much later, probably influenced also by Uexkiill, he arrived to the 
statement of coextensiveness of life and semiosis. 
A difference between a dead and a living may appear no less great 
as the difference between being a (languageing) human or being an 
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(other) animal. This would mean that we could speak about a semiotic 
threshold in both cases. And there may even be a third threshold — a 
semiotic threshold between the vegetative and the animal sign 
systems. 
What exactly distinguishes between the different sign systems? 
This would be a topic for semiotic modelling. 
3. Semiotic modelling 
In late 1960s and early 1970s, during a peak of the 'general theory of 
systems' as initiated, e.g., by L. v. Bertalanffy, a search for a theo­
retical basis of biology led several biologists to an idea to apply the 
principles of semiotics in biology. Among them, it is important to 
mention at least four: C. H. Waddington (1972), who claimed that a 
paradigm of general biology should be taken from general linguistics; 
T. A. Sebeok (1969; 1972), who developed semiotic models for 
analysis of animal communication; F. S. Rothshild (1962), who 
formulated first principles of biosemiotics; R. Jakobson, who 
interpreted the genetic phenomena in linguistic terms. 
Since then, biosemiotics has slowly grown. It has found its 
forerunners, like Jakob von Uexkiill (1928; 1982). It has established 
its first institutions, and became a university discipline, in 1990s (Kull 
1999; 2001). There has been published a series of books (Sebeok. 
Umiker-Sebeok 1992; Hoffmeyer 1996; Deacon 1997; Emmeche et 
al., 2002; Markos 2002; Barbieri 2003; Weber 2003; etc.) and several 
special issues of journals devoted to biosemiotics — e.g., Semiotica 
vol. 120(3/4), 1998; 127(1/4), 1999; 134(1/4), 2001; Sign Systems 
Studies 30(1), 2002; Zeitschrift für Semiotik 18(1), 1996; Cybernetics 
and Human Knowing 10(1), 2003; European Journal for Semiotic 
Studies 9(2), 1997; etc. Annual meetings (Gatherings in Biosemiotics) 
as established by Copenhagen and Tartu biosemiotic groups, have 
turned into a regular event. 
Despite of these rapid developments during the last decade or two, 
the semiotic theory of life is still in a period of formation. There are 
not many well-elaborated semiotic models to be applied in biological 
situations. However, there are some. 
As U. Eco (1988: 14--15) has nicely put — "the properties of the 
model must be better known than the properties of the object" — 
otherwise there will not be much use of a model. In physics, the 
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models have almost always been more sophisticated than the obser­
vations. In a large part of biology it has never been so. 
That the models of semiotics may look too simple for biology may 
seem so only in a superficial approach. The indirect information a 
semiotic model includes, itself being formulated briefly, can be huge. 
Recently, a state-of-the-art of biosemiotic theory has been briefly 
reviewed by Emmeche et al. (2002). Thus, let me here list only some 
points that can be taken as tasks for the further work. Because, the 
development of semiotic models as applicable in biology is very much 
a task for the coming decades. 
(1) Biological things — organisms, species — are systems that 
hold together due to communicative reasons. They are not natural 
kinds, likewise the linguistic things (e.g., a sentence, or a phoneme) 
are not natural kinds. They exist as communicative structures, as 
natural categories. The process that leads to their formation is gene­
rally analogous to the one of perceptual categorization. 
(2) Biological species that appear due to biparental reproduction, 
are related to the width of the organisms' recognition window. The 
recognition concept of species is the one close to this biosemiotic 
model of species (Paterson 1993; Lambert, Spencer 1995). 
(3) The discretization (a formation of discrete units) is a general 
feature of any communication system. Most probably, the formation 
of distinct tissues and tissue types in a multicellular organism is an 
example of the same general phenomenon. However, a general typo­
logy of biological units that are created by communication processes 
is yet to be done. 
(4) The meaningful communication requires at least two codes and 
the asymmetry of partners. Diversification and stability as the general 
consequences of communication can serve as a basis for a biodiversity 
theory. 
(5) Biological needs are the codes that relate innate instabilities to 
the behavioural forms or categories. Thus, biosemiotics provides an 
approach for a theoretical study of biological needs. 
(6) A semiotic classification of the types of biological communi­
cation should be further specified. It should, particularly, include a 
theory of vegetative and animal (i.e., non-linguistic, or non-
propositional) sign systems — the sign systems that are functioning 
without, e.g., sentences, or narratives. Thus, despite there exist many 
good surveys about biological communication, the theory of the field 
is still in its youth. 
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(7) Changes in the cellular interpretation of a genome may appear 
as a factor of evolution, on the basis of a mechanism close to the 
Baldwinian (Hoffmeyer. Kull 2003). 
As Myrdene Anderson (2003: 298) has stated: "Biosemiotics 
transcends ordinary science through its attention to communication, a 
nondeterministic open process of self-realization '. 
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Лестница, дерево, сеть: 
вехи понимания в биологии 
Главные биологические воззрения можно различить на основе глу­
бинных моделей, которые одновременно организуют многие аспекты 
интерпретации и достаточно явно различаются в разные периоды. В 
статье рассматриваются три основные модели или метафоры: 
"холистская" модель природы как лестницы, характерная для эпохи, 
предшествующей XVIII веку, биологическая модель дерева начиная 
с конца XVIII века и постмодернистская модель сети. Тем самым 
замена научной модели Нового времени семиотической оказывается 
связанной 
со сменой модели дерева на модель сети и с созданием 
биосемиотики. 
Redel, puu, võrk: 
arusaamise ajastud bioloogias 
Peamisi bioloogilisi vaateviise saab eristada süvamudelite alusel, mis 
organiseerivad ühtaegu paljusid interpretatsiooniaspekte ning mis 
võrdlemisi selgesti erinevad eri ajastuil. Artiklis vaadeldakse kolme põhi­
list mudelit või metafoori — uusaja-eelset holistlikku looduse kui redeli 
mudelit, uusaegse bioloogia puu-mudelit, ning postmodernset võrgu-
mudelit. Seega uusaegse teadusmudeli asendumine semiootilisega osutub 
seotuks puu-mudeli asendamisega võrgu-mudeli poolt ning biosemiootika 
kujunemisega. 
37 
Sign Systems Studies 31.2, 2003 
An epigenetic machine 
Review: Marcello Barbieri, 
The Organic Codes: An Introduction to Semantic Biology. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
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Attempts to grasp the essence of the living can be grounded in different areas 
of human knowledge. If we set aside theological or mythical explanations, we 
are left with two basic approaches. Biology as a natural science prefers 
assuming pre-existent and well defined entities, subjects of immutable laws 
and therefore discernible, describable and computable. In contrast, "huma­
nities" (semiotics, hermeneutics, philosophy and the like) stress the historical 
and contextual aspect of the "lifeworld", i.e. namely those properties that 
cannot be covered by constructs of physics. Both approaches are mutually 
incompatible and the trench dividing them seems to be insurmountable. 
Perhaps the best difference between them can be perceived in their approach 
toward concepts like information. Whereas in natural sciences it represents a 
computable and measurable entity, in humanities it is an entity that, in spite of 
its immaterial and unquantifiable nature, exerts its influence upon the world. 
It is therefore both surprising and encouraging when a scientist takes a 
term used by the humanities and makes a serious effort to incorporate it into 
the standard toolbox of experimental biology. The term is meaning, and the 
author is Marcello Barbieri (Barbieri 2003). The principal claim of his book is 
that contemporary biology fails to understand life properly, because it is 
focused only on two principal aspects out of three: energy and information. 
The third aspect — meaning — remains totally neglected. It is meaning 
through which memory, frozen patterns (e.g. the genetic code), and 
conventions come to existence in living beings, in contrast to blind causal 
relations reigning in the realm of the inorganic. Ordinary chemical reactions, 
for example, will proceed repeatedly and predictably according to their 
energy charge and external conditions (e.g., temperature). No such causality 
1 Author's address: Anton Markos, Department of Philosophy and History of 
Science, Faculty of Sciences. Charles University Prague. Vinicnâ 7, 12844 Praha 
2, Czechia; e-mail: markos@natur.cuni.cz. 
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is obvious in case of processes like protein synthesis. Without doubt, energy 
to drive the process must be available, but digital "information" in the form of 
mRNA is also required. The synthesis of a polypeptide would not, however, 
proceed without a third factor, connecting the realm of the nucleic acids with 
that of proteins: the system of tRNAs (and code-bearing enzymes — 
aminoacyl-tRNA-synthetases). Thanks to this interface, determining how a 
specific non-random polypeptide chain is synthesized, proteosynthesis gains 
its meaning. If we dare to incorporate meaning into biology, states the author, 
we shall witness reformulation of both great biological narratives: evolution 
and ontogeny. "Evolution by natural selection" would turn into "Evolution by 
natural selection and natural conventions". Similarly "Ontogeny as an 
execution of a program" will be reformulated as "Ontogeny as epigenetic 
reconstruction from (genetic) projections". What follows is partly a review of 
Barbieri's book, partly discussion and comments on the main issues of his 
work. We investigate both the firmness of the proposed footbridge across the 
gap and possible ways of further reinforcing its construction. 
Information, meaning, code: a language analogy 
"Meaning is an object, which is related to another object via a code", says 
Barbieri (p. 5), and to illustrate the statement, he takes a language analogy: 
Mental objects (meanings) are related to objects of the world by the language 
code, i.e., words. We can easily measure the amount of information2 in a 
world, say "ape" — which equals the number of bits necessary to pick the 
letters from a given alphabet and align them in a given order. Information, 
however, has nothing to do with the meaning of that world in different 
languages (e.g. "ape" in English and Italian). In contrast, the world for male 
family progenitor has diverged substantially in Indo-European languages: 
words pater, father, père, etc. obviously contain different amounts of 
information, in spite of their identical meaning, (p. 94) 
This analogy, however, brings more questions than explanations: (1) Does it 
suggest that languages were devoid of information before the invention of 
alphabetic (i.e. digital) script? (2) Is information simply a matter of spelling? 
Can we change the "information content" of words simply by changing 
orthography? It so, what is such "information" good for? (3) Are words 
mere labels tor things out there in the world, having no meaning by 
themselves? Sure, the string APE as such has no meaning, but a string of 3 
letters is not a word. Only after we state that this string represents a word (not 
a thing!) in, say, English, a plethora of possible dictionary meanings will pop 
out immediately, and the context will decide which one we take. Words do 
In the technical, Shannonian sense. 
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have meanings; strings of letters may or may not. Such strings, however can 
evoke an interpretative effort, which may create meaning, but we believe that 
meaning is not there. Strings like padre, père, father, Vater will gain their 
meaning only in an environment where there is somebody (a sentient being) 
speaking the respective language(s) and, moreover, able to read. All such 
questions and parables can be brought back to a biological context. 
The whole analogy, however, can be turned upside down. One can argue 
that language is not only a code; language, not the alphabet, makes words; 
and language defines, makes, creates, not simply connects objects, mental or 
"real". As stated by J. Lotman (e.g., 2001), should the addressee and the 
receiver share identical information or text, it is necessary that they share 
authentic coding and decoding devices. What is possible theoretically (and in 
technology), will never be attained in "live" communication systems. Culture, 
language, texts, consciousness (and living beings, we add, to complement 
Lotman's list) work in two directions: they create a unified semiotic situation 
to allow exchange of messages and, at the same time a dis-unified situation 
creating new texts, new information. Communication or reading thus means 
breaking of symmetries: the original entanglement of many possible 
meanings will "collapse" into a single interpretation; the interpretation 
attained will, in its turn, become new superposition of new statements, etc. 
The body of a culture, a language (and a living being, we add) represent thus 
structures which can act as their own inputs. In this way the structure is able 
of self-transformation. 
In coding, similar superpositions are forbidden: codes cannot acquire new 
information. Only thanks to this property it is possible to quantify coded 
information. An example of an unequivocal code is a transcription between 
two sets of signs, i.e. the English alphabet and the Morse "alphabet" ("c" is 
transformed, by convention, as "—").3 Note that only whole tables of codes 
exist, in which all conventions are contained at the same time. For codes, 
history is forbidden, says Lotman — codes cannot evolve, they can be only 
changed as a whole by a single synchronous decision act. We are not 
interested in how the code came into existence. Since it does not change in 
the time interval of our interest, rules of transcription can be programmed into 
machines (or to ribosome's in the cell). No subject is necessary to do the job; 
the code is independent of the context.4 J. Monod (1970) acknowledged the 
existence of codes by the term gratuity, which meant that some functions will 
Equivocal or degenerate codes do also exist. For example, in Czech "c" is also 
transcribed as " but backward translation allows both "c" and "6" Si Г' 
situation in the genetic code. i m i  a r  
Even if sometimes it can be dependent on its position in the strin» Th 
genetic codon AUG codes for the amino acid methionine. In bacteria howev C 
AUG at the beginning of the string will code for N-formyl methionine ^ 
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be mediated "for nothing", simply thanks to existing conventions, rules, not 
deducible from natural "laws". 
Thirty years after Monod, Barbieri tries to broaden gratuity also to natural 
languages by stating that written and spoken languages are also nothing but a 
code connecting objects of the world with mental objects. Of course we can 
find areas, in language, where unequivocality is a goal and codes prevail, like 
in military. Outside such special areas, however, grammar is overwhelmed by 
semantical, semiotical, or hermeneutical levels: contexts, experience, situa­
tion enter the game, which is accessible to a sentient subject, not a machine. 
Similar levels can be distinguished also in proteosynthesis, where the genetic 
code represents one important level of control out of many, not all of them 
hardwired (see Markos 2002). 
Barbieri, however, suggests hardwired codes not as a derived situation but 
as the very basis of meaning. This is a very courageous reduction: Even the 
most elementary usage of the word meaning5 excludes its usage in a sense of 
"context-independent decoding rule". More sophisticated usage — as, e.g., 
intention, purpose, spirit of the told (or written), interpretation, signifi­
cation — points clearly towards a conclusion that meaning cannot be subject 
of any coding table or context-independent rule. Only when we accept this, 
can we speak — in a natural language — of semantics. 
Barbieri in contrary intends to introduce meaning in a technical sense, 
similarly as Shannon did for information. He explicitly states: 
The term codes, or conventions, normally indicates the rules which are 
adopted by a human community, but it has also a wider meaning. A code can 
be defined as a set of rules that establish a correspondence between two 
independent worlds. The Morse code, for example, connects certain 
combinations of signs with letters of the alphabet. The highway code is a 
liaison between illustrated signals and driving behaviors. A language makes 
words stand for real objects of the physical world, (p. 89, emphasis by us) 
This sentence brings us to a very strange world, where "real objects" stick 
"out there" and we simply attach our linguistic labels (i.e. codes) to them. No 
semantics and no semiotic process are allowed in this world, where meaning 
is indistinguishable from code! This may hold only in some variety of perfect 
languages, be it artificial languages, computer language, or mathematical 
calculus (see, e.g., Eco 1997). 
The quotation above, moreover, continues as follows: "The extraordinary 
thing about codes is that a new physical quantity appears in them, since they 
require not only energy and information but also meaning" (p. 94). In what 
sense codes are "physical quantities"?6 We argue that meaning is a 
As in "What should this all mean?" 
An et fort to make virtual entities real and thus "justify" their usage in science 
is apparent from sentences like "codes [...] must have had a specific mechanism" 
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relationship, which must be negotiated in every particular situation. There 
may be a finite table of codes, but never of meanings (see, e.g, Heelan 1998: 
279, 288). Meaning is understanding, not a table of codes. 
The logic of embryonic development 
In the 1940s, C. H. Waddington (1975) introduced the concept of epigenetics 
to give a name to causal interactions between genes and their products that 
lead to the accomplishment of the phenotype. Today, epigenetics serves 
practically as a synonym for ontogeny; its meaning is occasionally broadened 
also to heritable changes in gene function, to innate operations taking place in 
the brain, practically to any biological patterning which does not involve 
changing DNA sequences (examples of such usage see, e.g., Lodish et al. 
1995: 1286; Russo et al. 1996: 1; Wilson 1998: 193, respectively). What all 
such perspectives have in common is that they see development as a process 
being canalized along some preexisting trajectory (program); the trajectory 
may branch, i.e. contain alternative subroutines called forth by the environ­
ment. The living being remains fully passive, without any say in the ongoing 
ontogeny; no meaning is necessary to understand the process. 
Barbieri is, rightly, not happy with this neat preformist world where 
novelty can arise only by random mutation. Instead he presents a view of 
epigenetics as a convergent process7 of reconstructing structures from 
projections (i.e. from incomplete information, p. 3).h Information contained in 
the zygote or spore is somehow insufficient, unsatisfactory, and new infor­
mation must be generated to build an adult organism.9 "The reconstruction of 
structures from incomplete information is therefore a model that could make 
us understand how it is possible for a system to obtain a convergent increase 
of complexity" (p. 70). Notice: information must be created, a great leap 
forward from the traditional views hold by informatics. Author provides an 
original model (MCM, see below) how such a process might take place. 
(p. 2); "mechanism of natural conventions" (p. 2); "organic codes are not 
metaphorical but real" (p. 3); "organic code requires molecules" (p. 3), etc. Also 
the physical terminology is not new — see Driesch's definition of entelechy as a 
"physical quantity" (Driesch 1905). 
7 Terminological note: ontogeny is understood as convergent, whereas 
evolution as divergent, increase of complexity. 
8 
"As anyone can see, this is a mathematical version of the problem that we face 
in embryonic development. The fertilized egg contains far less information than 
the adult organism (whatever criterion is used to measure information in 
biological systems), and embryonic development can be described therefore as a 
process that is reconstructing a structure from incomplete information" (p. 68). 
9 It is a priori presupposed that the adult form is the very goal of ontogeny. 
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The cell 
To understand further reasoning, we make a short detour to the cellular level. 
The cell is depicted (pp. 34-35) as, (a) something which builds itself like a 
crystal (obviously a view inspired by self-assembly of viral particles or 
ribosomes); apparently the absence of beginning poses no problem; (b) a 
"machine capable of self-replication" as in von Neumann automata; (c) an 
autopoietic system. 
Obviously, Barbieri considers these three descriptions as practically 
synonymous. Indeed, he apparently treats the whole ontogenesis of an ape or 
a bee as a mere assembly of a body from organs, organs from tissues, tissues 
from cells etc. (pp. 95-96). We believe that this extrapolation, well in the line 
with the famous "an elephant is just E. coli writ large", deserves a word of 
caution, instead of being treated as a simple and indisputable fact. If not, we 
will remained marooned in contradictions like "a mechanical model of 
• „ 10 
epigenesis . 
Ontogeny as program execution 
As already mentioned, Barbieri is criticizing the naive self-satisfaction 
exerted by some molecular biologists that "we know by now" that 
development is simply an execution of a program inscribed in genes." 
Barbieri takes Maynard Smith as an authority to corroborate this opinion, and 
continues: "embryonic development is a process that increases the complexity 
of a living system, but we do not know how to build niachines that increase 
their own complexity, and we cannot therefore understand the logic of 
development" (p. 67-68). It can be argued whether the logic of such a process 
can be understood only through modeling it as a machine, i.e. by 
deterministic rules. The question of "how does a system manage to increase 
its own complexity in a convergent way?" was more or less satisfactorily 
answered by mathematical models for systems, which are able to increase 
their complexity, like whirl-pools, tornadoes, or even biosphere (see, e.g., 
Kauffman 2000; Prigogine 1980). It is simply not true that "there cannot be a 
convergent increase of complexity without memory" (p. 86), or better, the 
"We need to understand how does a system manage to become more complex, 
otherwise the word "epigenesis" becomes a mere label that is conveniently used 
only to cover up our ignorance, just as "vis vitalis" in the past. We need, in other 
words, a mechanical model of epigenesis in order to understand it. Luckily today 
we do have such a model [the one presented], and we can at least try to apply it to 
the cell" (p. 212). 
See, for example, Davidson (2001: 7): "It was possible to deduce that genomic 
regulatory architecture constitutes the structural, genetic basis for the 
morphological features of animals 30 years ago; now we know it for a certainty". 
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memory may sometimes reside in the very structure of the "body" of the 
system. J  
Back to the logic of embryonic development. "The real key to embryonic 
development is the logic of systems which are capable of increasing their 
complexity in a convergent way, and in order to understand this we need if 
not a machine, at least a model that is functioning according to that logic" (p 
68). The model offered by Barbieri is rooted in his rich experience in image 
analysis and reconstruction of the shape of three-dimensional objects from 
two-dimensional projections. Such a task can be solved relatively easily if 
there are enough data (projections) available, so that they "contain (in a 
compressed form) all the information that was present in the original 
structure" (p. 69). 1 2  However, surprisingly good results can be obtained even 
with substantially less data, if we employ special iterative algorithms such as 
the Memory Reconstruction Method (MRM), developed by the author. The 
model exploits memory matrices as very suitable to describe the logic of 
embryonic development. 
Increase of complexity 
If we have a model for the reconstruction of structures from incomplete 
information, it will help us understand how it is possible for a system to 
obtain a convergent increase of complexity. However, what does it mean if 
we say that the egg contains less information than an adult does, what is 
meant by the convergent increase of complexity? Barbieri admits that "there 
is no satisfactory definition of complexity. However we do not need to 
provide a precise definition of complexity in order to build a model", because 
"we can start from a different formulation of the problem, and say that 
embryonic development is a reconstruction from incomplete information" (p. 
196). The difference between complexity and information is fuzzy, but we 
leave these details aside for the moment. For a closer approach to the 
convergent increase of complexity, let us discuss two examples.. 
The first comes from R. Dawkins' famous definition: "a complex thing is 
something whose constituent parts are arranged in a way that is unlikely to 
have arisen by chance alone" (Dawkins 1987). If we jumble parts of an 
airliner at random, the likelihood that a working Boeing 747 will come out 
spontaneously is vanishingly small. Only one or very few contraptions out of 
zillions would actually fly. The arrangement of the parts that flies is 
meaningful and the other arrangements are meaningless regardless the fact, 
whether the right arrangement of the parts was specified in advance or not. 
Certainly, the documentation does not contain the "complete" information 
for the construction of an aircraft. No project will bother with providing 
1 2  Again we face the question what is meant by "all the information". 
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information concerning, e.g., how to screw bolts or use a hammer, not 
speaking about iron-ore mining instructions, theory of wheel, and Newtonian 
mechanics... No project is accomplished in 3 dimensions and in 1:1 ratio, to 
contain the complete information. It has to be detailed enough to be 
understandable for the comprehensive reader or even for a robot equipped 
with necessary instructions. Let us now imagine 747 documentation with 
some pages and drawings missing. It may even appear that only as little as 
10% of the files is really crucial for the construction of a functional plane. 
Plans for kitchens, seats, bathrooms, seatbelts etc. could be supplied by 
anyone who understands what kitchens, seats, bathrooms, seatbelts etc. are 
good for, i.e. what they mean. Somebody who understands aeronautical 
engineering may even do it without all those detailed mechanical drawings; 
he even might be able to assemble the parts in a better way than what was 
intended in the (now lost) documentation. Any (re)construction requires a big 
deal of experience and/or constructive imagination. 
Barbieri's book will serve as our second example. Certainly, the book 
does not contain all the information on semantic biology, organic codes, 
ribotype, phenotype etc.; all these items are much more complicated than the 
book itself. Is it a deadlock forbidding our understanding of the book? We 
hope not, we have even methods, how to reconstruct that missing 
information, how to complete the picture, even how to understand better the 
intentions of the author. We have to read the book carefully again and again, 
to interpret it and to remember what was read and interpreted, and confront it 
with our own experience and knowledge. 
The message of both our examples is as follows: any reconstruction from 
a projection requires a comprehensive reader who understands what is to be 
reconstructed. Otherwise that blank could be filled only by pre-defined rigid 
structures given in advance, but these are surely not the concern of semantic 
biology. 
Increase of information 
An increase of information in the Shannonian sense within a system is 
inconceivable. Information can increase only if (1) a wired comprehensive 
model exists for the reconstruction of structures (i.e. the model contains 
additional information), or (2) an understanding, informed reader can build a 
whole structure trom incomplete source (see above the 747 example). In its 
core, the MRM is a mathematical compression/reconstruction model, which 
accepts that "there cannot be a convergent increase of complexity without 
memory" (p. 90). The problem of the MRM model is not in the model itself, 
as it is used for reconstruction of 3-dimensional structures from a limited set 
of 2-dimensional projections, but in its use as a biological metaphor. 
Therefore, it may be even an advantage that it is vague as concerns the nature 
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of the organic memory , which plays a crucial role in the reconstruction 
process and "generating information." 
The task ot compression/reconstruction consists of two components, an 
encoding algorithm that takes a message and generates a "compressed" repre­
sentation, and a decoding algorithm that reconstructs the original message or 
some approximation trom the compressed representation. These two 
components are intricately tied together since they both have to understand 
the shared compressed representation. The methods can be divided into two 
types: Lossless algorithms (typically used for texts) reconstruct the original 
message from the compressed message exactly, whereas lossy algorithms 
(used for images and sounds) recover with somewhat lower resolution. 
Methods can also be classified as either static or dynamic. In a static mode, 
the mapping from messages to codewords has been fixed before the 
transmission begins, so that a given message is represented by the same 
codeword every time it appears in the message ensemble (Huffman coding). 
In a dynamic mapping, the set of codewords changes over time. An algorithm 
may also be a hybrid of both static and dynamic regimes. The MRM, in this 
respect, can be characterized as a static lossy reconstruction model. 
Reconstruction 
Barbieri takes morphogenesis as a reconstruction (of an adult) from an n-
dimensional "projection" (DNA sequence) or from a bunch of projections 
(images) represented by the zygote. The first problem of this approach lies in 
the far from obvious translation (rather than coding) of a bodily structure into 
a digital string of the genetic text. In the model, it is us who decide ( I ) what 
properties of the object should be "scanned" and (2) what the accuracy of 
digitalization (size of "pixels") should be. Who or what is the decision­
maker in zygote — body transformations? 
The process of reconstruction, in the model, resides in an interplay 
between the state present at the beginning, and a "memory matrix", which is 
empty at the beginning. (Note that there is a beginning when all parameters of 
a living being are reset to "time zero".) The model works as follows: 
The initial memory matrix is a tabula rasa, a white page that is gradually 
filled during the reconstruction process, while the reconstructed picture starts 
with a uniform image and becomes progressively differentiated in the course 
of time. A reconstruction with a MRM method, in other words, is a set of two 
distinct reconstructions that are performed in parallel. The point is that this 
double reconstruction is necessary for reasons which are absolutely general, 
(p. 90) 
13 ]у[0{е th a t  j t  cannot be refined ad infinitum because of the uncertainty 
principle. 
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The whole model is reminiscent of bootstrapping of a computer upon startup. 
We can view the relatively small and simple system files as "projections" 
from which the complex and in some aspects almost lifelike "image" of the 
running operation system is produced by action of a "codemaker" (hardware 
and BIOS) and a "memory matrix" (RAM). Completeness or incompletness 
of system files is just a matter of complexity of the hardware and BIOS and/or 
RAM size. 
We have thus two independent worlds: that of an image or projection and 
that of organic memory. They intensively communicate in both ways, which 
leads to filling the memory and, at the same time, elaborating the picture. As 
the nature of both worlds is different, the flow of communication between 
them can be accomplished only thanks to the existence of suitable 
conventions called organic codes. Embryonic development is possible, states 
Barbieri, only if organic codes and organic memories are in charge. If 
"resetting" to time zero really takes place in a zygote, then epigenesis might 
indeed work according to the model. 
The principal question, however, is why do we need to introduce meaning 
into such a system? The whole model is indeed a variation of the computer 
metaphor, with a concealed presence of a creator of the computer in the 
background — only in his/her head there is something like meaning. 
The third space 
Even if the book is not really about meaning as the author suggests, but rather 
about decoding, it still touches the enigma how two worlds — that of 
"immaterial" digital symbols, epitomized as genotype and that of "material" 
bodies, shapes, and patterns (phenotypes) — can become related. According 
to Barbieri, the interface is codes. However, here comes to the focus the 
question of their origin and of the codemaker (and of course also the decoding 
entity). 
A paradigmatic (if by no means single) example of coding in living 
system is presented by a set of tRNAs. representing the ribotype, mediating 
between the genotype and phenotype. although many elaborated coding 
systems exist at different levels of organization. The effects that external [we 
add: also internal] signals have on cells, in conclusion, do not depend on the 
energy and the information that they carry, but only on the meanings that 
cells give them with rules that can be called signal transduction codes" (p. 
106). Yes, most of "reactions"14 going on in the cell are important not 
metabolically, but semantically. But if it is the cell that gives a meaning to the 
signals, does it mean that these signals — in contrast to the genetic code — 
We put quotation marks because many cellular signaling processes represent 
rather molecular recognition than standard chemical reactions on covalent bonds. 
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- r i, äks aassas plays such a relevant role m language" (p 107) mat 
We fully agree, but as we have staled above, language is no, only a codine 
system. Everything is prepared here for semantic biology, at a price- bioloev 
will not remain in the realm of (fully?) experimental science. Barbieri is not 
willing to take this last step. He will protest against "frozen accidents" he 
will even suggest that the barrier between nature and culture should be 
brought down. He does not say it explicitly, but we can interpret his words as 
follows: if we have a "countless number" of "codes" in living beings, then 
living beings can be taken as an analogy of culture. One of us (Markoš 2002) 
has developed a similar analogy, arguing that a species can be understood as 
an analogy of culture, with its internal language and convention how to 
interpret its own living according to internal or external cues. What we are 
uneasy with, is the antinomy code-language. Codes cannot be used to tell a 
story. With codes, living beings remain safely in the realm of science, with 
language they cross the barrier towards "humanities". We can, of course, try 
to bring natural language to science's side of the barrier. Such a move would, 
however, change substantially science as we know it. 
Semantic biology 
Can we constitute a semantic biologyl Barbieri gives a positive answer, but 
the more we read, the more we suspect that what is being discussed is not 
semantic but syntactic biology, in other words, a kind of grammar and 
(complete sets of) rules of a biological "language" (in the sense of computer 
language). But how can we know at what moment the code became 
"complete"? Why it must not be modified? Is not the only reason for such a 
claim that it is necessary to stick to timeless "laws" in order to stay in the 
realm of science? We remind again the Morse code, created indeed as a 
complete set. However, the fullness of a statement's meaning lies not in its 
internal grammatical or logical structure but in its ability to illuminate the 
totality of fore-understandings which are the grounds of its intelligibility. In 
this context, we should refer to another contemporary book, which also 
attempts to constitute a general biology: Investigations by S. Kauffman 
(2000). But Kauffman acknowledges internal activity in his autonomous 
agents, conventions in his models are truly generated and changing in 
evolution — they are product and subject of history, not of a list of given 
immutable rules! 
We agree with the general conclusion that "every cell must have (1) 
organic structures, (2) organic memories, and (3) organic codes" (p. 212; 
albeit organic seems to be a mere epitheton ornans). However, we maintain 
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that these pre-requisits, although necessary, are not sufficient, and that in 
order to grasp life, we have to introduce yet another component, very close to 
what we call habits in our culture.L 
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